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This thesis explores and challenges the dominant understanding in the literature that there is a 
clear binary and hierarchical distinction between the absolute forum internum and qualified forum 
externum in the architecture of the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion in Article 
9 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and the jurisprudence of the European 
Court of Human Rights (ECtHR).  
 This thesis argues — based on a detailed analysis of ECHR Article 9, related international 
instruments and travaux préparatoires, and all Article 9 jurisprudence in English and French 
from the 1960s to the present day — that the traditional understanding of Article 9 in the 
literature is not founded textually or jurisprudentially. It contends that the forum internum and 
forum externum aspects of Article 9 are interrelated and should be understood on a conceptual 
continuum ranging from the forum internum to the forum externum because the forum internum is 
always relevant, to some degree, in Article 9 complaints.  
Whilst the degree of forum internum relevance is the principal factor that the ECtHR uses 
to ascertain the strength of an applicant’s complaint, it is not the determining factor in Article 9 
cases; the ECtHR balances factors indicating a violation (primarily, but not only, forum internum 
relevance) with countervailing factors indicating no violation, in order to reach its decision. As 
such, in terms of grouping Article 9 cases, this thesis suggests that it is easier to understand the 
jurisprudence if one thinks of it in terms of a series of concentric circles, rather than as a binary 
framework. In the loose concentric circles model, forum internum relevance is strongest and 
countervailing factors are weakest in the innermost circle, forum internum relevance is weakest 
and countervailing factors are strongest in the outermost circle, and forum internum relevance and 
countervailing factors are at their most contested in the middle circle.   
 This thesis contends that this radical reconceptualisation of the place of the forum 
internum and forum externum in Article 9 and the jurisprudence has implications for both 
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INTRODUCTION   
The purpose of this thesis is to explore and challenge the dominant understanding of the right to 
freedom of thought, conscience and religion as found in Article 9 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights (ECHR)1 and the protection of this right by the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECtHR).2  
ECHR Article 9 comprises two sections. Article 9.1 provides:  
‘Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to change his 
religion or belief and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his 
religion or belief in worship, teaching, practice and observance.’3 
Article 9.2 sets out the limitation clause:  
‘Freedom to manifest one’s religion or beliefs shall be subject only to such limitations as are prescribed by law 
and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of public safety, for the protection of public order, 
health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.’4 
 
A. The Background and the Problem  
Since the turn of the century, there has been a significant increase in the number of Article 9 
complaints before the ECtHR.5 The right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion was 
once considered to be of limited importance but there is now a substantial and influential body of 
case law relating to Article 9, thus reflecting the ‘rapidly increasing judicialization of religion.’6 
The ECtHR’s jurisprudence on Article 9 covers a wide range of topics, including limitations on 
the display of religious symbols or clothing in public spaces, dissolution of religious 
communities, refusals to act contrary to one’s conscience and forced disclosure of religion or 
belief. Whilst violations of Article 9 were rarely found in the early jurisprudence,7 in an ever-
 
1 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (European Convention on Human 
Rights, as amended) (4 November 1950) ETS No.005. 
2‘ECtHR’ will be used to refer to the former, part-time European Commission on Human Rights and the 
European Court of Human Rights (up to October 1998), and the current permanent, full-time European Court of 
Human Rights (from 1 November 1998 onwards). ‘ECtHR’ will also be used to refer to the Court in all its 
judicial formations (single judge, Committee, Chamber and Grand Chamber). For a detailed discussion of the 
organisation, practice and procedure of the ECtHR, see D Harris and others, Harris O’Boyle & Warbrick: Law 
of the European Convention on Human Rights (4th edn, OUP 2018) 107-132. 
3 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (European Convention on Human 
Rights, as amended) (4 November 1950) ETS No.005. 
4 Ibid. 
5 This is representative of the increased workload of the ECtHR in general. 
6 Effie Fokas, ‘Directions in Religious Pluralism in Europe: Mobilizations in the Shadow of the European Court 
of Human Rights Religious Freedom Jurisprudence’ (2015) 4:1 Oxford Journal of Law and Religion 54, 61, 64.  
7 The first violation of Article 9 was found in 1993 in Kokkinakis v Greece (1993) Series A no 260-A. For 
discussion of the legacy of this case see, Jeroen Temperman, T Jeremy Gunn and Malcolm D Evans, The 





growing number of cases the ECtHR is finding that State interference constitutes a violation of 
this right.8 In addition, the importance of Article 9 jurisprudence is increasingly being recognised 
outside of the ECtHR; in recent years numerous high-profile cases concerning religion in the 
public sphere have drawn considerable political and media attention across Member States in 
Europe and beyond.  
This growth in Article 9 jurisprudence ties in with the global resurgence of religion.9 
Contrary to the ‘secularisation thesis’10 religion has not declined as societies have advanced; 
internationally, and in Europe, the religious landscape has become increasingly diverse.11 And, 
paradoxically, as the number of those adhering to religions has increased so too has the number of 
those claiming no religious adherence. Since the turn of the century the protection of the right to 
freedom of thought, conscience and religion has become a particularly contested issue in 
Europe.12 The increasing uneasiness concerning Islam acted as a ‘catalyst’ for debates13 but 
debates have now expanded to cover much wider questions about the relationship between 
religion, law and society. 
More and more, the exercise of the right to freedom of religion or belief is coming into 
conflict with States which claim that it is necessary to restrict the exercise of this right in order to 
pursue legitimate aims under Article 9.2, particularly the protection of public order and the rights 
and freedoms of others. Notably, there has been a significant shift in the types of applicant 
bringing Article 9 complaints to the ECtHR during the twenty-first century. Article 9 
jurisprudence no longer largely concerns individual applicants who seek to justify behaviour 
which challenges the status quo, or to access special treatment or exemptions by appealing to 
 
8 Carolyn Evans, ‘Individual and Group Religious Freedom in the European Court of Human Rights: Cracks in 
the Intellectual Architecture’ (2010) 26:1 Journal of Law and Religion 321, 321. 
9 See e.g., Carolyn Evans, ‘Introduction’ in Peter Cane, Carolyn Evans and Zoe Robinson (eds) Law and 
Religion in Theoretical and Historical Context (CUP 2008), 1. 
10 This idea, that religion would decline as societies advanced, is an important theme in sociology of religion. 
For a detailed discussion of the secularisation thesis in relation to law and religion, see Russell Sandberg, 
Religion, Law and Society (CUP 2014) 53-83.  
11 See, e.g. Camil Ungureanu, ‘Europe and Religion: An Ambivalent Nexus’ in Loreno Zucca and Camil 
Ungureanu (eds) Law, State and Religion in New Europe: Debates and Dilemmas (CUP 2012), 332. 
12 See e.g., Karl-Heinz Ladeur and Ino Augsberg, ‘The Myth of the Neutral State and the Individualization of 
Religion: The Relationship between State and Religion in the Face of Fundamentalism’ (2007) 8 German Law 
Journal 143; Heiner Bielefeldt, ‘Misperceptions of Freedom of Religion or Belief’ (2013) 35 Human Rights 
Quarterly 33, 67; Effie Fokas, ‘Directions in Religious Pluralism in Europe: Mobilizations in the Shadow of the 
European Court of Human Rights Religious Freedom Jurisprudence’ (2015) 4:1 Oxford Journal of Law and 
Religion 54, 54.; Kristin Henrard, ‘How the European Court of Human Rights’ Concern Regarding European 
Consensus Tempers Effective Protection of Freedom of Religion’ (2012) 4:3 Oxford Journal of Law and 
Religion 398, 398.  
13 Effie Fokas, ‘Directions in Religious Pluralism in Europe: Mobilizations in the Shadow of the European Court 




their religion or belief.14 Rather, in an ever growing number of cases individuals,15 and religious 
communities,16 are fighting for their right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion against 
State authorities which, they claim, are actively trying to control them or deprive them of this 
right. The ECtHR’s role — as a supranational judicial body overseeing the protection of the right 
to freedom of thought, conscience and religion in Member States — seems therefore to be 
increasingly central in the face of ever more complex and pressing issues.17 
In tandem with the significant increase in cases relating to Article 9 before the ECtHR 
there has been a substantial growth in academic literature relating to this right. Most discussions 
of Article 9 begin with a description of the structure of this article and there is an overriding 
consensus in the literature that Article 9 can be divided into two realms: the internal realm (forum 
internum) and the external realm (forum externum). This distinction is understood to be central to 
the protection of Article 9 rights in practice because, it is held, rights in the forum internum must 
always be protected absolutely whereas rights in the forum externum can be subjected to 
limitations in certain circumstances in accordance with Article 9.2. According to commentators, 
this binary and hierarchical distinction between the forum internum and the forum externum is the 
‘abiding and fundamental’ distinction18 which must be observed at all times to ensure effective 
implementation of Article 9.  
 But herein lies a serious problem. Increasingly commentators are arguing that the 
ECtHR’s understanding and application of the forum internum and forum externum distinction is 
undermining rather than enhancing the protection of Article 9. In terms of cases concerning the 
right to manifest (which dominate the literature) commentators claim that the ECtHR treats the 
forum externum as a second order concern and allows States to restrict this right whenever they 
desire to do so. However, when commentators have examined the forum internum they have also 
claimed that the ECtHR fails to adequately protect this absolute realm by ignoring the relevance 
 
14 See, e.g., Cederberg-Lappalainen v Sweden App no 11356/85 (Commission Decision, 4 March 1987); V v 
Netherlands (1984) 39 DR 267; W v The United Kingdom App no 18187/91 (Commission Decision, 10 
February 1993); Logan v The United Kingdom (1996) 86-A DR 74.  
15 See e.g., Larissis and Others v Greece ECHR 1998-I 362; Leyla Şahin v Turkey ECHR 2005-XI 173; Ivanova 
v Bulgaria App no 52435/99 (ECtHR, 12 April 2007); Folgerø And Others v Norway ECHR 2007-III 51; Sinan 
Işik v Turkey ECHR 2010-I 341; Grzelak v Poland App no 7710/02 (ECtHR, 15 June 2010); Bayatyan v 
Armenia ECHR 2011-IV 1; SAS v France ECHR 2014-III 341 (extracts); Mockutė v Lithuania App no 66490/09 
(ECtHR, 27 February 2018).  
16 See e.g., Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia and Others v Moldova ECHR 2001-XII 81; Stankov and the United 
Macedonian Organisation Ilinden v Bulgaria ECHR 2001-IX 273; Moscow Branch of the Salvation Army v 
Russia App no 72881/01 (ECtHR, 5 April 2007); Jehovah’s Witness of Moscow and Others v Russia App no 
302/02 (ECtHR, 10 June 2010); Biblical Centre of the Chuvash Republic v Russia App no 33203/08 (ECtHR, 12 
June 2014); İzzettin Doğan and Others v Turkey App no 62649/10 (ECtHR, 26 April 2016).  
17 The importance of the ECtHR is noted by Renucci, see Jean-François Renucci, ‘Article 9 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights’ Human Rights Files No 20 (Council of Europe 2005) 
<https://www.echr.coe.int/LibraryDocs/DG2/HRFILES/DG2-EN-HRFILES-20(2005).pdf> accessed July 2015, 
59.  




of the forum internum in Article 9 complaints or inappropriately subjecting it to limitations under 
Article 9.2. Overall, it is claimed, Article 9 jurisprudence is ‘incoherent’ and ‘inconsistent’.19  
Added to this, in recent years, commentators have increasingly advanced conceptual 
critiques of the forum internum and forum externum distinction, calling into question the very 
notion of a binary and hierarchical distinction between belief and action in Article 9 because, they 
argue, it does not reflect the understanding of religion or belief for individuals in reality, in which 
having a belief is understood to be intimately connected with manifesting it. 
Such criticisms are deeply concerning given the ECtHR’s important role in protecting the 
right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion in the face of serious challenges made by 
States. The right to freedom of religion or belief is a fundamental human right. If the 
understanding of Article 9 and the protection of this right by the ECtHR in practice is really as 
problematic as the literature suggests, this is not simply an academic concern; there are tangible 
human rights implications and as such, this is a question which needs to be addressed.    
 However, there is a substantial gap in the literature. To date, there has not been a 
comprehensive analysis of the understanding of the forum internum and the forum externum in 
Article 9, in the related travaux préparatoires or in Article 9 jurisprudence. Two of the seminal 
monographs on freedom of religion or belief which emphasise the centrality of the binary and 
hierarchical forum internum and forum externum distinction, and criticised the ECtHR’s 
understanding and application of the distinction,20 are both limited in their analyses (because the 
forum internum and forum externum distinction is not the focus of these texts) and are 
considerably dated in light of the exponential growth in Article 9 jurisprudence over the past 
twenty years. And, the more up to date publications which engage with the forum internum and 
forum externum distinction concentrate almost exclusively on cases concerning the right to 
manifest religion or belief.21 This thesis seeks to redress this.  
 
19 See e.g. Carolyn Evans, Freedom of Religion under the European Convention on Human Rights (OUP 2001) 
1 and throughout; Paul Taylor, Freedom of Religion (CUP 2005) 117; Merlin Kiviorg, ‘Religious Autonomy in 
the ECHR’ (2009) 4 Derecho y Religion 131, 131; Alison Mawhinney, ‘Coercion, Oaths and Conscience’ in 
Frank Cramner and others (eds) The Confluence of Law and Religion: interdisciplinary Reflections on the Work 
of Norman Doe (CUP 2016) 205. 
20 Carolyn Evans, Freedom of Religion (OUP 2001); Paul Taylor, Freedom of Religion (CUP 2005). 
21 See e.g., Peter Petkoff, ‘Religious Symbols Between the Forum Internum and the Forum Externum’ in Silvio 
Ferrari and Rinaldo Cristofori (eds) Law and Religion in the 21st Century: Relations Between States and 
Religious Communities (Ashgate 2010) 297; Pamela Slotte, ‘What is a Man if he has Words but has no Deeds? 
Some Remarks on the European Convention on Human Rights’ (2011) 11 Ars Disputandi 259; Peter Petkoff, 
‘Forum Internum and Forum Externum in Canon Law and Public International Law with Particular Reference to 
the Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights’ (2012) 7 Religion and Human Rights 183; Celia G 
Kenny, ‘Public Space, Private Face: Veiling as a Challenge for Legal Reasoning’ in Russell Sandberg, Religion 
and Legal Pluralism (Routledge 2015); Meadhbh McIvor, ‘Carnal Exhibitions: Material Religion and the 




B. Research Questions and Methodology 
The purpose of this thesis is to address the gap in the literature by updating and extending the 
analysis and, in light of the findings, reviewing the understanding of Article 9 and the protection 
of this right by the ECtHR. More specifically, it considers whether the claims made in the 
literature that i) there is a binary and hierarchical distinction between the forum internum and 
forum externum and that ii) the understanding and application of the distinction by the ECtHR is 
undermining the protection of Article 9 rights, stands up to scrutiny or whether there is a better 
way of understanding the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion and Article 9 
jurisprudence.22 To do this, this thesis addresses the following research questions:   
 
1. How is the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion in ECHR Article 9 and 
the protection of this right by the ECtHR presented in the literature? 
2. How is the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion presented in the text of 
ECHR Article 9, the related international instruments and the relevant travaux 
préparatoires?  
3. How is the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion presented and protected 
in practice by the ECtHR? Does the jurisprudence reflect the presentation in the literature 
or the presentation in the text of ECHR Article 9 and relevant travaux préparatoires?  
4. What does this reveal about the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion in 
ECHR Article 9?  
 
This thesis, like much of the literature relating to the right to freedom of thought, conscience and 
religion, is doctrinal in nature. However, unlike other studies, this thesis comprehensively 
examines all Article 9 jurisprudence, available both in English and in French, from the 1960s to 
present day.23 And, in addition, it undertakes a thorough analysis of the text of ECHR Article 9, 
the related international instruments — including the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
(UDHR), the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the Declaration 
on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief 
 
22 The idea for this thesis emerged out of the author’s LLM dissertation which discussed the forum internum and 
forum externum in the context of the right not to manifest, see ‘The Other Side of the Coin? A Critical 
Examination of the Right Not to Manifest Religion or Belief in Article 9 of the European Convention on Human 
Rights’ (Aberystwyth University 2014) 
<https://cadair.aber.ac.uk/dspace/bitstream/handle/2160/30063/Roberts_Caroline.pdf?sequence=2&isAllowed=
y> accessed July 2019.  
23 Previous commentaries on Article 9 have largely restricted the analysis to case law available in English which 
means that a significant proportion of relevant case law available only in French has been neglected. This thesis 
seeks to redress this by examining case law in English and in French. When citing cases available only in 




(1981 Declaration) — and the relevant travaux préparatoires. In terms of secondary material, this 
thesis examines a wide range of academic commentary and practitioner material relating to the 
right to freedom of religion or belief.  
Taken together, this material forms the basis for updating, extending and reviewing the 
understanding of Article 9 and its protection by the ECtHR in this thesis. 
 
C. Contributions to Knowledge 
This thesis makes the following significant original contributions to knowledge. Firstly, it 
challenges the orthodoxy that there is a binary and hierarchical distinction between the absolute 
forum internum and qualified forum externum in ECHR Article 9 which must be observed at all 
times to ensure adequate protection of the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion, 
by demonstrating that textually and jurisprudentially there is a lack of support for this 
interpretation. Building upon a recent, deeply valuable, interpretation of ICCPR Article 18 in the 
literature,24 this thesis argues that the evidence in relation to ECHR Article 9 reveals that the 
forum internum and forum externum are deeply interrelated and as such should be understood on 
a conceptual continuum ranging from the forum internum to the forum externum. The forum 
internum is never irrelevant in Article 9 claims; it is just that the extent of its relevance depends 
on the ECtHR’s consideration of the facts.  
Flowing from this, this thesis argues that the degree of forum internum relevance is the 
principal factor that the ECtHR uses to ascertain the strength of an applicant’s claim. It contends 
that the ECtHR takes into account forum internum relevance when considering the facts in Article 
9 complaints, from the outset of the assessment. Rather than asking, ‘is this a complaint engaging 
the forum internum or forum externum?’, the primary question for the ECtHR seems to be, ‘how 
relevant is the forum internum in this case on the basis of the facts?’.  
However, forum internum relevance is not the only factor that the ECtHR takes into 
consideration when determining Article 9 cases; the ECtHR balances factors indicating a 
violation of Article 9 (primarily, but not only, forum internum relevance) with countervailing 
factors indicating no violation of Article 9, in order to reach its decision. As such, Article 9 
protection can be helpfully understood on a spectrum, ranging from a very high to a very low 
degree of protection. Where the ECtHR considers that forum internum relevance is strongest and 
countervailing factors are weakest, it offers a very high degree of protection. Where it considers 
that forum internum relevance is weakest and countervailing factors are strongest, it offers a very 
 
24 See Heiner Bielefeldt, Nazila Ghanea and Michael Wiener, Freedom of Religion or Belief (OUP 2016), 76, 




low degree of protection. Where the strength of forum internum relevance and countervailing 
factors are contested, the ECtHR offers protection ranging from a very high to a very low degree 
depending on the way in which it balances the factors.   
In light of this, this thesis argues that a useful way of grouping the cases — according to 
the ECtHR’s characterisation — is a loose concentric circles model comprising three circles. The 
innermost circle represents forum internum relevance at its strongest and countervailing factors at 
their weakest, the outermost circle represents forum internum relevance at its weakest and 
countervailing factors at their strongest and the middle circle represents forum internum relevance 
and countervailing factors at their most contested. In the middle circle, forum internum relevance 
and countervailing factors may both be strong or both be weak. Whilst this thesis argues that the 
ECtHR balances in all Article 9 cases, cases which fall into the middle circle are ‘harder’ 
(relatively speaking) than cases which fall into the innermost or outermost circles because the 
balancing exercise is more difficult in such cases.  
Given the ECtHR’s nuanced approach to the protection of Article 9, this thesis argues that 
the loose concentric circles model, which groups cases according to the ECtHR’s 
characterisation, is more conducive to a coherent interpretation of Article 9 jurisprudence than a 
binary framework.  
D. Thesis Structure  
This thesis comprises eight chapters which form three parts. Part I examines the presentation of 
the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion and the protection to be offered under 
this right in i) the literature, ii) the text of ECHR Article 9, the related international instruments 
and the relevant travaux préparatoires and, iii) in ECtHR jurisprudence. Part II examines the 
protection of the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion in practice by analysing a 
wide range of Article 9 cases. Part II is organised according to the loose concentric circles model; 
it analyses cases where one would expect forum internum relevance to be at its strongest and 
countervailing factors at their weakest, cases where one would expect forum internum relevance 
to be at its weakest and countervailing factors at their strongest and, cases where one would 
expect forum internum relevance and countervailing factors to be at their most contested. Part III 
brings together the findings from the comprehensive analysis of the primary materials in Parts I 
and II, to advance the alternative approach to the understanding of ECHR Article 9 and 





















CHAPTER 1. THE FORUM INTERNUM AND FORUM EXTERNUM: 
THE LITERATURE 
Introduction  
This chapter conducts a detailed examination of the notion of the forum internum and forum 
externum distinction in the literature relating to freedom of thought, conscience and religion. In 
order to set the wider background, it begins by exploring the literature concerning related 
international instruments (UDHR Article 18 and ICCPR Article 18) before critically analysing 
literature relating specifically to ECHR Article 9. This chapter demonstrates that there is a clear 
consensus in the literature that a binary and hierarchical distinction between the forum internum 
and forum externum is central to the understanding and protection of the right to freedom of 
thought, conscience and religion. In terms of ECHR Article 9, specifically, it is understood to be 
a fundamental feature of the architecture of this provision and a central doctrine of the ECtHR.  
 Despite this emphasis on the centrality of the forum internum and forum externum 
distinction to the understanding and protection of Article 9, however, the ECtHR’s application of 
the distinction is being increasingly criticised and, importantly, the very existence of such a 
distinction in ECHR Article 9 is coming under attack in the literature for undermining rather than 
enhancing the protection of Article 9 rights. The second section of this chapter explores the 
serious criticisms of the forum internum and forum externum distinction in the literature and 
discusses some of the limited suggestions made by commentators aimed at improving the 
understanding and protection of Article 9 rights within the forum internum and forum externum 
framework.   
In the third section, this chapter takes a step back to explore how this traditional approach 
to understanding Article 9 and the protection of this article by the ECtHR has come to dominate. 
Through a close, chronological analysis of the references to, and discussions of, the forum 
internum and forum externum in the literature relating to Article 9 this chapter will demonstrate 
that the centrality of the forum internum and forum externum distinction is a notion which has 
developed over time. Rather than revealing, as one would expect, that the forum internum and 
forum externum distinction is a notion rooted in evidence, this analysis shows that commentators 
have perpetuated the distinction largely through intertextual reliance rather than close 
engagement with the text of ECHR Article 9, the relevant travaux préparatoires or the vast body 
of Article 9 case law. On the whole, commentators have tended to view statements made about 
the forum internum and forum externum distinction in two seminal texts (published in 20011 and 
 




20052 and based on limited evidence) as a the ‘final word’, adding to this a largely conceptual 
critique of the notion in recent years.   
This discussion of the serious limitations and gaps in the literature relating to Article 9, 
propels the thesis forwards by contending that it is now time to carefully engage with the primary 
materials in order to review claims made about the centrality of the forum internum and forum 
externum distinction to the understanding and protection of Article 9 by commentators, and the 
‘problems’ they claim have emerged as a result of this distinction. Overall, this chapter provides 
the basis for the analysis of ECHR Article 9, relevant travaux préparatoires and Article 9 
jurisprudence in this thesis.    
 
A. The Origins and Meaning of ‘Forum Internum’ and ‘Forum Externum’  
Whilst the terms ‘forum internum’ and ‘forum externum’ look like Latin legal terms they do not 
have legal definitions; they are not defined in legal dictionaries, nor do they appear in dictionaries 
of Latin legal terms. Before examining the meaning of forum internum and forum externum in the 
literature relating to the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion it is, therefore, 
useful to briefly examine the ordinary meaning and origins of these terms.   
In modern usage, ‘forum’ is usually used to describe ‘a meeting or medium where ideas 
and views on a particular issue can be exchanged.’3 Originally, however, the Latin noun ‘forum’ 
(pl. ‘fora’) referred to a ‘public square or marketplace used for judicial and other business’ in 
Roman cities4 and in Late Middle English, referred specifically to ‘what is out of doors’, typically 
an enclosure surrounding a house.5 The Latin adjective ‘internum’ describes that which is 
‘inward’ or ‘internal’, whereas the term ‘externum’ describes that which is ‘outward’ or 
‘external’.6 Latin dictionaries explain that the adjective internum (from ‘inter’ meaning between 
or among) means inward or internal, and also domestic or civil 7 and the adjective externum (from 
‘exter’ meaning ‘outward’ or ‘outside’) means external and also foreign, alien and strange.8  
Research is shedding light on the meaning and origins of these terms when used together 
as ‘forum internum’ and ‘forum externum’, however, there is some disagreement in different 
 
2 Paul Taylor, Freedom of Religion: UN and European Human Rights Law and Practice (CUP 2005). 
3 Oxford English Dictionary (7th edn, OUP 2015). 
4 Ibid.  
5 Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary (9th edn, OUP 2015). The term forum itself derives from the Proto-
Indo-European ‘dhworom’, meaning enclosure, courtyard or something enclosed by a door, see Fernando López-
Menchero, Proto-Indo-European Etymological Dictionary (Indo-European Language Association 2012) 55; 
Andrew L Sihler, New Comparative Grammar of Greek and Latin (OUP 1994) para 184. 
6 Oxford English Dictionary (7th edn, OUP 2015).  
7 ‘internum’ in Charlton T Lewis and Charles Short, A New Latin Dictionary (Harper and Brothers Publishers 
1981). 




disciplines. In the field of political theory and philosophy, Furmurescu, for instance, argues that 
the distinction between the forum internum and forum externum originated in, and was central to, 
the Medieval understanding of the self.9 The forum internum represented the individual’s internal 
reality, the ‘forum of conscience, authenticity and freedom, subject to no one and punishable by 
no one except God’ which could not be controlled or regulated, not even by the Church,10 
whereas the forum externum represented the individual’s external appearance, ‘the forum in 
which the individual identified himself and was identified…’ in community.11 Others argue that 
the forum internum and forum externum distinction emerged in Cartesian epistemology to refer to 
the mind (or conviction) and to outward, publicly observable behaviour, respectively.12 
In the field of law and history, specialists in canon law, such as Gerosa,13 Makinen and 
Pihlajamaki,14 and Petkoff,15 argue that the terms originated in canon law and represented 
different ways in which the Medieval Church exercised jurisdiction; in the ecclesiastical court 
(the forum externum) and the court of penance (the forum internum) or forum of conscience 
(forum conscientiae).16 Petkoff suggests that the terms first appeared at the Council of Trent,17 
however, Müller argues that the idea of a distinction between the internal and external forum in 
canon law in the late Middle Ages is a ‘modern myth’.18 She contends that the ‘articulation of a 
neat distinction between private and public church proceedings’ — between a forum externum 
 
9 Alin Fumurescu, Compromise: A Political and Philosophical History (CUP 2013) 10, 12, 119, 166.  
10 Ibid, 10. See Alin Fumurescu, ‘The Role of Political and Self Representation in Compromise’ in Christian F 
Rostbøll and Theresa Scavenius (eds) Compromise and Disagreement in Contemporary Political Theory 
(Routledge 2017).  
11 Alin Fumurescu, Compromise: A Political and Philosophical History (CUP 2013) 10. Furmurescu traces this 
antithesis to Aquinas, arguing that ‘dialectic’ formed the basis of individualism in the West, ibid.,10. See also FR 
Ankersmit, Aesthetic Politics: Political Philosophy Beyond Fact and Value (Stanford University Press 1997) 247, 
249. 
12 FR Ankersmith, History and Tropology: The Rise and Fall of Metaphor (University of California Press 1994) 
69, 70, 104. See also TM Lennon, The Plain Truth: Descartes, Huet, and Skepticism (Brill 2008) 38; Peter G 
Danchin, ‘Of Prophets and Proselytes: Freedom of Religion and the Conflict of Rights in International Law’ 
(2008) 49:2 Harvard International Law Journal 249, 263.  
13 Libero Gerosa, Canon Law (LIT Verlag Munster 2002)157ff. 
14 Virpi Makinen and Heikki Pihlajamaki, ‘The Individualization of Crime in Medieval Canon Law’ (2004) 65 
(4) Journal of the History of Ideas 525, 531. 
15 Peter Petkoff, ‘Forum Internum and Forum Externum in Canon Law and Public International Law with 
Particular Reference to the Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights’ (2012) 7 Religion and 
Human Rights 183, 184, 202.   
16 Joseph Goering, ‘The Internal Forum and the Literature of Penance and Confession’ (2004) 56 Traditio 175, 
175-176; Alexander Murray A, ‘Confession before 1215’ (1993) 3 Transactions of the Royal Historical Society 
51, 51. Makinen and Pihlajamaki explain that ‘non-criminal sins were a matter of inner forum (forum internum), 
the sacrament of confession’ whereas crimes against canon law were a matter for the ecclesiastical court (forum 
externum), see Virpi Makinen and Heikki Pihlajamaki, ‘The Individualization of Crime in Medieval Canon 
Law’ (2004) 65 (4) Journal of the History of Ideas 525, 531.  
17 Peter Petkoff, ‘Forum Internum and Forum Externum in Canon Law and Public International Law with 
Particular Reference to the Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights’ (2012) 7 Religion and Human 
Rights 183, 187. 
18 Wolfgang P Müller, ‘The Internal Forum of the Later Middle Ages: A Modern Myth?’ (2015) 33:4 Law and 




and forum internum — did not fully develop until early modernity.19 Whatever the precise 
origins, Canon 196 of the 1917 Code of Canon Law20 and Canon 130 of the 1983 Code of Canon 
Law,21 which relate to the power of jurisdiction in the Church, make a distinction between the 
forum internum and the forum externum. 
Whilst this brief overview reveals that the precise meaning and origin of the terms forum 
internum and forum externum is debatable22 what is clear, however, is that these terms have a 
spatial meaning; the forum internum is consistently presented as an internal realm (whether the 
individual’s internal reality or the realm of the mind, or conscience) whereas the forum externum 
is the external realm (whether the individual’s external appearance, the realm of public, 
observable behaviour or the realm in which individuals are punished for crimes). And, what is 
more, in each of the disciplines in which the terms forum internum and forum externum are 
discussed, they are generally used in conjunction, as a pair, suggesting a relationship between 
them.   
To understand the meaning of these terms in the specific context of the human right to 
freedom of thought, conscience and religion it is essential to begin with a detailed examination of 
the way in which the terms have been used in the literature; it is to this that this chapter will now 
turn.  
 
B. The Traditional Approach to the Right to Freedom of Thought, Conscience 
and Religion in the Literature 
In discussions of the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion in international human 
rights instruments, the literature typically refers to a distinction between the forum internum (the 
‘internal realm’ of the mind) and the forum externum (the ‘external realm’ of action).23 It is 
 
19 Ibid. Sullivan also argues that the forum internum and forum externum dichotomy is an ‘early modern 
bifurcation’, see Winnifred Sullivan and others, Politics of Religious Freedom (University of Chicago Press 
2015) 6. 
20 Edward Peters, 1917 Pio-Benedictine Code of Canon Law: In English Translation with Extensive Scholarly 
Apparatus (Ignatius 2001), Canon 196. 
21 Canon Law Society of America, Code of Canon Law, Latin-English Edition, New English Translation (Canon 
Law Society of America 1999), Canon 130. See also Matúš Nemec and Vojtech Vladár, ‘The Essentials of 
Canon Law’ (Trnavská univerzita v Trnave, Právnická fakulta 2013) 
<http://iuridica.truni.sk/sites/default/files/dokumenty/zahranicne-
vztahy/en/publications/pdf/01Canon%20Law.pdf> accessed February 2015, paras 32-33. See also Arthur 
Canon, ‘Canon Law and Moral Theology’ (1962) 22 Jurist 319, 319-320. 
22 For Little, Sachedina and Kelsay it was the result of a ‘complicated interweaving of classical Greco-Roman 
and Christian notions’ from Aquinas to Luther, Roger Williams and John Locke, see David Little, Abdulaziz 
Sachedina and John Kelsay, ‘Human Rights and the World’s Religions: Christianity, Islam and Religious 
Liberty’ in Irene Bloom, J Paul Martin and Wayne L Proudfoot (eds) Religious Diversity and Human Rights 
(Columbia University Press 1996) 218-25. 
23 Bahia Tahzib-Lie, ‘The European Definition of Religion or Belief’ (1998) 9 Helsinki Monitor 17, 17; Willi 




difficult to overemphasise the centrality of the forum internum and forum externum distinction; it 
has become the agreed conceptual framework, or the ‘traditional terminology’24 underpinning 
discussions of this right in the UDHR, ICCPR and ECHR so much so it is now, as Petkoff points 
out, ‘almost inconceivable to consider freedom of religion or belief without coming across at least 
one reference to the forum internum and forum externum.’25  
It is, then, odd (to say the least) that so central a distinction is not clearly made in the texts 
of the legal instruments; neither the term forum internum nor the term forum externum appears in 
UDHR Article 18, ICCPR Article 18 or ECHR Article 9. Yet, commentators argue that the notion 
of an internal and external realm is evident in the structure of these articles.26 It is explained that 
each of these provisions distinguish between the right to freedom of thought, conscience and 
religion (in the forum internum) and the right to manifest religion or belief (in the forum 
externum).27 This distinction between the forum internum and the forum externum which is 
understood to be ‘spelled out’28 in these provisions, is believed to be a ‘foundational’29 or 
 
Rights’ [2000] Brigham Young University Law Review 829, 831; Javier Martínez-Torrón, ‘The European Court 
of Human Rights and Religion’ in Richard O’Dair and Andrew Lewis (eds) Law and Religion: Current Legal 
Issues 2001 Volume 4 (OUP 2001) 198; Carolyn Evans, Freedom of Religion (OUP 2001) 73; Leonard 
Hammer, ‘Selective Conscientious Objection and International Human Rights’ (2002) 36 Israel Law Review 
145, 149; Paul Taylor, Freedom of Religion (CUP 2005) 19; Jan Rothkamm, ‘Religious Freedom in Time of 
Conflict: An Overview of International Legislation and a Discussion of Recent Cases’ (2007) 46 Military Law 
and Law of War Review 261, 261; Merilin Kiviorg, ‘Religious Autonomy in the ECHR’ (2009) 4 Derecho y 
Religion 131, 133; Javier Martínez-Torrón, ‘The (Un)protection of Individual Religious Identity in the 
Strasbourg Case Law’ (2012) 1:2 Oxford Journal of Law and Religion 363; Javier Martínez-Torrón, ‘Religious 
Pluralism: The Case of the European Court of Human Rights’ in Ferron Requejo and Camil Ungureanu (eds) 
Democracy, Law and Religious Pluralism in Europe (Routledge 2014) 125; Julie Maher, ‘Eweida and Others: A 
New Era for Article 9? (2014) 63:1 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 213, 215; D Harris and others, 
Harris O’Boyle & Warbrick: Law of the European Convention on Human Rights (3rd edn, OUP 2014) 594. 
24 Heiner Bielefeldt, Nazila Ghanea and Michael Wiener, Freedom of Religion or Belief: An International Law 
Commentary (OUP 2016) 76. 
25 Peter Petkoff, ‘Forum Internum and Forum Externum in Canon Law and Public International Law with 
Particular Reference to the Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights’ (2012) 7 Religion and Human 
Rights 183, 184. 
26 Paul Taylor, Freedom of Religion (CUP 2005) 19; Todd Parker, ‘The Freedom to Manifest Religious Beliefs: 
An Analysis of the Necessity Clauses of the ICCPR and the ECHR’ (2006) 17:1 Duke Journal of Comparative 
and International Law  91, 93-94; Pamela Slotte, ‘Waving the ‘Freedom of Religion or Belief’ Card or Playing it 
Safe: Religious Instruction in the Cases of Norway and Finland’ (2008) 3 Religion and Human Rights 33, 38; 
Pamela Slotte, ‘What is a Man if he has Words but has no Deeds? Some Remarks on the European Convention 
on Human Rights’ (2011) 11 Ars Disputandi 259, 268; Malcolm D Evans, ‘Advancing Freedom of Religion or 
Belief: Agendas for Change’ (2012) 1:1 Oxford Journal of Law and Religion 5, 5. 
27 W Cole Durham Jr and JT Beatty, ‘Book Review: Evans MD, Religious Liberty and International Law in 
Europe’ (2001) 16 (2) Journal of Law and Religion 623, 630; Natan Lerner, ‘The Nature and Minimum Standards 
of Freedom of Religion or Belief’ in W Cole Durham Jr and others (eds) Facilitating Freedom of Religion or 
Belief: A Deskbook (Martinus Nijhoff 2004), 67-8 (relying upon R Lillich, Human Rights Instruments (William 
S Hein & Company 1983) para 490.2); Malcolm D Evans, ‘Advancing Freedom of Religion or Belief: Agendas 
for Change’ (2012) 1:1 Oxford Journal of Law and Religion 5, 9. 
28 Theo van Boven, ‘The United Nations Commission of Human Rights and Freedom of Religion or Belief’ in 
W Cole Durham Jr and others (eds) Facilitating Freedom of Religion or Belief: A Deskbook (Martinus Nijhoff 
2004) 176.  
29 Peter G Danchin and Louis Blond, ‘Unlawful Religion? Modern Secular Power and the Legal Reasoning in 




‘classical’30 distinction; it is described as the ‘fundamental organising concept’31 and the ‘most 
well-entrenched feature’ of the right to freedom of religion or belief.32 As such, commentators 
continually assert that there is a ‘double side’ 33 to freedom of thought conscience and religion, 
consistently stressing the distinction between the internal and external ‘realm’,34 ‘sphere’,35 
‘elements’,36 ‘components’,37 ‘domains’38 or ‘provinces’.39  
This distinction between ‘inner and outer freedoms’,40 is understood to be ‘of 
foundational importance to international legal thinking about freedom of religion or belief’41 
because the ‘two dimensions’42 have ‘different degrees of legal protection.’43 It is very common 
to see the statement that the forum internum is an absolute realm which must not be interfered 
with by the State in any way under any circumstances, whereas the forum externum is a qualified 
realm which can be limited by the State in certain circumstances. In Taylor’s words — which are 
representative of the literature on the whole — this distinction between the unrestricted forum 
internum and restricted forum externum is the ‘abiding and fundamental’, ‘inescapable and 
 
and Clare Ovey, Jacobs, White and Ovey: The European Convention on Human Rights (6th edn, OUP 2014) 
412. 
30 Grégor Puppinck, Conscientious Objection and Human Rights: A Systematic Analysis (Brill Research 
Perspectives 2017) 10.  
31 Alison Mahwinney, ‘Coercion, Oaths and Conscience’ in Frank Cramner and others (eds) The Confluence of 
Law and Religion: interdisciplinary Reflections on the Work of Norman Doe (CUP 2016) 205.  
32 Peter G Danchin and Louis Blond, ‘Unlawful Religion? Modern Secular Power and the Legal Reasoning in 
the JFS case’ (2014) 29 Maryland Journal of International Law 419, 467  
Bernadette Rainey, Elizabeth Wicks and Clare Ovey, Jacobs, White and Ovey: The European Convention on 
Human Rights (6th edn, OUP 2014) 412. 
33 Javier Martínez-Torrón, ‘The European Court of Human Rights and Religion’ in Richard O’Dair and Andrew 
Lewis (eds) Law and Religion: Current Legal Issues 2001 Volume 4 (OUP 2001) 198, footnote 39.  
34 Manfred Nowak and Tanja Vospernik, ‘Permissible Restrictions on Freedom of Religion or Belief’ in W Cole 
Durham Jr and others (eds) Facilitating Freedom of Religion or Belief: A Deskbook (Martinus Nijhoff 2004) 
147.  
35 Malcolm D Evans, Religious Liberty and International Law in Europe (CUP 1997) 203; A Glogowska-
Balcerzak and MJ Wasiński, ‘Druids, Scientologists and Wiccans – Religions, Beliefs and Their Manifestation 
in Strasbourg Jurisprudence’ (2015) 1 Studia Humanitas <http://st-hum.ru/content/glogowska-balcerzak-
wasinski-mj-druids-scientologists-and-wiccans-religions-beliefs-and> accessed March 2016.  
36 Willi Fuhrmann, ‘Perspectives on Religious Freedom from the Vantage Point of the European Court of 
Human Rights’ [2000] Brigham Young University Law Review 829, 831; Peter Cumper and Tom Lewis, 
‘Taking Religion Seriously’? Human Rights and Hijab in Europe – Some Problems of Adjudication’ (2008) 24 
Journal of Law and Religion 599, 604; D Harris and others, Harris O’Boyle & Warbrick: Law of the European 
Convention on Human Rights (3rd edn, OUP 2014) 594. 
37 Kendal Davis, ‘The Veil That Covered France’s Eye: The Right to Freedom of Religion and Equal Treatment 
in Immigration and Naturalization Proceedings’ (2010) 10 Nevada Law Journal 732, 746. 
38 Bahia Tahzib-Lie, ‘The European Definition of Religion or Belief’ (1998) 9 Helsinki Monitor 17, 17. 
39 Leonard Hammer, ‘Selective Conscientious Objection and International Human Rights’ (2002) 36 Israel Law 
Review 145, 149. 
40 Bahia Tahzib-Lie, ‘The European Definition of Religion or Belief’ (1998) 9 Helsinki Monitor 17, 17. 
41 Pamela Slotte, ‘What is a Man if he has Words but has no Deeds? Some Remarks on the European 
Convention on Human Rights’ (2011) 11 Ars Disputandi 259, 268. 
42 Peter Petkoff, ‘Legal Protection of Sacred Places as a Medieval Gloss- Towards Working ‘Soft Law’ 
Guidelines under Public International Law’ (2011) 167 Law and Justice 27, 36 




immutable distinction in the architecture of all core freedom of religion articles’, which must ‘be 
observed at all times’.44  
 
i. The Forum Internum and Forum Externum: Literature Relating to UN 
Instruments  
In the literature relating to UDHR Article 18 and ICCPR Article 18, the forum internum — the 
‘internal and private realm’45 or the ‘inner dimension’46 — is juxtaposed with ‘outward 
manifestations of one’s religion or belief’47 in the forum externum.  UN Special Rapporteurs on 
Freedom of Religion or Belief have consistently used the terms forum internum and forum 
externum to refer to the ‘internal dimension of a person’s religious or belief related conviction’48 
and the ‘external manifestations of religious or philosophical conviction’ respectively.49  
In the literature relating to ICCPR Article 18, in particular, it is constantly emphasised 
that the distinction between the forum internum and the forum externum is of ‘legal 
significance’50 because these realms are afforded different levels of protection. The forum 
internum is described as an ‘absolute’51 realm which benefits from ‘unconditional protection’52 or 
‘status’.53 According to commentators, ‘no interference is justified under any circumstances’ with 
 
44 Paul Taylor, Freedom of Religion (CUP 2005) 19, 292. 
45 Ibid.,19. 
46 Heiner Bielefeldt, Nazila Ghanea and Michael Wiener, Freedom of Religion or Belief (OUP 2016) 64, 76, 
footnote 3. Van Boven, for instance, defines forum internum as the ‘realm of the mind’, the realm which ensures 
the ‘spiritual integrity and conscience of the human person’, see Theo van Boven, ‘The United Nations 
Commission of Human Rights and Freedom of Religion or Belief’ in W Cole Durham Jr and others (eds) 
Facilitating Freedom of Religion or Belief: A Deskbook (Martinus Nijhoff 2004) 176. 
47 All Party Parliamentary Group on International Religious Freedom (eds Malcolm D Evans and others) 
‘Article 18: An Orphaned Right’ (unknown) <https://appgfreedomofreligionorbelief.org/media/Article-18-An-
Orphaned-Right.pdf> accessed August 2015. See also Manfred Nowak, UN Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights: CCPR Commentary (2nd edn, NP Engels 2005) 411. Cf. Manfred Nowak, UN Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights: CCPR Commentary (NP Engels 1993). 
48 OHCHR, Statement by the Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion or Belief, Heiner Bielefeldt, during the 
67th session of the General Assembly in New York, Item 70 (b), (25 October 2012); See also UNGA, Human 
Rights Council, Freedom of Religion or Belief: Report of the Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion or 
Belief, Ahmed Shaheed (5 March 2019) UN Doc A/HRC/40/58, para 31. See also The Annual Report cited in 
Olivier De Schutter International Human Rights Law: Cases, Materials, Commentary (2nd edn, CUP 2014) 398. 
49 Heiner Bielefeldt, ‘Freedom of Religion or Belief – A Human Right under Pressure’ (2012) 1:1 Oxford 
Journal of Law and Religion 15, 7, 8.  
50 Manfred Nowak, UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: CCPR Commentary (2nd edn NP Engels 2005) 
412, Daniel Moeckli and others (eds), International Human Rights Law (1st edn, OUP 2010) 223.  
51 David Little, ‘Does the Human Rights to Freedom of Conscience, Religion and Belief has Special Status?’ 
[2001] Brigham Young University Law Review 603,605; All Party Parliamentary Group on International 
Religious Freedom, (eds Malcolm D Evans and others) ‘Article 18: An Orphaned Right’ (unknown) 
<https://appgfreedomofreligionorbelief.org/media/Article-18-An-Orphaned-Right.pdf> accessed August 2015; 
Heiner Bielefeldt, ‘Freedom of Religion or Belief – A Human Right under Pressure’ (2012) 1:1 Oxford Journal 
of Law and Religion 15, 8. 
52  UNGA, Human Rights Council, Thirty-First Session, Report of the Special Rapporteur on Freedom of 
Religion (23 December 2015) UN Doc A/HRC 31/18, para 77. 





this ‘internal, private realm of the individual’54 not even for reasons of national security or in an 
emergency55 and it can be ‘subject neither to coercion nor to limitations.’56 It is emphasised that 
no limitations ‘whatsoever’ are permitted in respect of the right to have or adopt a religion or 
belief of one’s choice.57 This is believed to be one of the ‘few unconditional norms within 
international human rights law.’58 That these are ‘inalienable’ freedoms59 is considered 
‘apodictic’.60 
The forum internum, it is explained, has ‘long been held…to be absolutely beyond state 
regulation’;61 for Gunn, the claim that the forum internum merits absolute protection has 
‘virtually become a platitude’,62 and for Taylor, it is ‘trite law’ that the forum internum is ‘subject 
to unqualified protection in all the key international instruments’.63 According to Danchin, the 
‘inviolability’ of the forum internum is ‘unchallenged and unchallengeable’, it is the ‘basic claim’ 
relating to freedom of thought, conscience and religion.’64 
In contrast, the forum externum which embraces ‘public manifestation of religious 
belief’,65 is described as a qualified realm. Manifestations of religion or belief ‘may be limited’ in 
accordance with ICCPR Article 18.3.66  
 
 
54 David Little, ‘Religion, Human Rights and Public Reason: Protecting the Freedom of Religion or Belief’ in 
John Witte and M Christian Green (eds) Religion and Human Rights: An Introduction (OUP 2011) 128. 
55 Peter Petkoff, ‘Forum Internum and Forum Externum in Canon Law and Public International Law with 
Particular Reference to the Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights’ (2012) 7 Religion and 
Human Rights 183. See also Heiner Bielefeldt, ‘Freedom of Religion or Belief – A Human Right under 
Pressure’ (2012) 1:1 Oxford Journal of Law and Religion 5, 8.  
56 Heiner Bielefeldt, Nazila Ghanea and Michael Wiener, Freedom of Religion or Belief (OUP 2016) 560. See 
also Sylvie Langlaude, The Right of the Child to Religious Freedom in International Law (Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers 2007) 70.  
57 Heiner Bielefeldt, Nazila Ghanea and Michael Wiener, Freedom of Religion or Belief (OUP 2016) 68. 
58 Ibid. 
59 Thomas M Krapf, ‘Lost Opportunities and Missed Targets’ in Peter Petkoff and Julian Rivers (eds) Changing 
Nature of Religious Rights in International Law (OUP 2015) 127. 
60 See Heiner Bielefeldt, Nazila Ghanea and Michael Wiener, Freedom of Religion or Belief (OUP 2016), 64, 
68, 80.  
61 W Cole Durham Jr and Carolyn Evans, ‘Freedom of Religion and Religion-State Relations’ in Tushnet M, 
Fleiner T, and Saunders C (eds) Routledge Handbook to Constitutional Law (Routledge 2013) 248; Heiner 
Bielefeldt, Nazila Ghanea and Michael Wiener, Freedom of Religion or Belief (OUP 2016) 64. 
62 T Jeremy Gunn, ‘Book Review: Taylor P, Freedom of Religion: UN and European Human Rights Law and 
Practice’ (2008) 23 Journal of Law and Religion 101, 102. 
63 Paul Taylor, Freedom of Religion (CUP 2005) 115. 
64 Peter G Danchin, ‘Of Prophets and Proselytes: Freedom of Religion and the Conflict of Rights in 
International Law’ (2008) 49:2 Harvard International Law Journal 249, 262. 
65 Peter van Dijk and GJH van Hoof, Theory and Practice of the European Convention on Human Rights (3rd 
edn, Intersentia 1998) 54; Todd Parker, ‘The Freedom to Manifest Religious Beliefs: An Analysis of the 
Necessity Clauses of the ICCPR and the ECHR’ (2006) 17:1 Duke Journal of Comparative and International 
Law  91, 93-4.  




ii. The Forum Internum and Forum Externum: Literature Relating to the ECHR  
There are striking similarities between the literature relating to the right to freedom of thought, 
conscience and religion in UN instruments and the literature relating to ECHR Article 9. Article 9 
is perceived to include ‘two elements’,67 or ‘spheres’,68 namely the forum internum and forum 
externum, and the distinction between these two realms is considered to be ‘foundational’.69 The 
forum internum is variously described as the ‘internal dimension of religiosity’,70 ‘the inner 
sphere of belief’,71, the ‘sphere of inner conviction’,72  ‘an individual’s inner faith and 
conscience’,73 the ‘locus of religious belief and conscience’74 and as a ‘psychic’ freedom.75 It is 
explained that ‘the forum internum, by strict definition, refers to that which is internal to the 
individual, it is a sphere of activity which is private or ‘personal’;76 it relates ‘to matters of 
internal conscience’,77 the ‘inner world’78 and is ‘largely exercised inside an individual’s heart 
and mind.’79   
 
67 D Harris and others, Harris O’Boyle & Warbrick: Law of the European Convention on Human Rights (3rd 
edn, OUP 2014) 594.  
68 A Glogowska-Balcerzak and MJ Wasiński, ‘Druids, Scientologists and Wiccans – Religions, Beliefs and 
Their Manifestation in Strasbourg Jurisprudence’ (2015) 1 Studia Humanitas <http://st-
hum.ru/content/glogowska-balcerzak-wasinski-mj-druids-scientologists-and-wiccans-religions-beliefs-and> 
accessed March 2016.   
69 Peter G Danchin and Louis Blond, ‘Unlawful Religion? Modern Secular Power and the Legal Reasoning in 
the JFS case’ (2014) 29 Maryland Journal of International Law 419, 467; Bernadette Rainey, Elizabeth Wicks 
and Clare Ovey, Jacobs, White and Ovey: The European Convention on Human Rights (6th edn, OUP 2014) 
412. 
70 Esra Demir Gürsel, ‘The Distinction Between the Freedom of Religion and the Right to Manifest Religion: A 
Legal Medium to Regulate Subjectivities’ (2013) 22 Social & Legal Studies 377, 379. See also Julie 
Ringelheim, ‘Rights, Religion and the Public Sphere: The European Court of Human Rights in Search of a 
Theory?’ in Loreno Zucca and Camil Ungureanu (eds) Law, State and Religion in New Europe: Debates and 
Dilemmas (CUP 2012) 285. 
71 Jan Rothkamm, ‘Religious Freedom in Time of Conflict: An Overview of International Legislation and a 
Discussion of Recent Cases’ (2007) 46 Military Law and Law of War Review 261, 261 
72 Malcolm D Evans, Manual on the Wearing of Religious Symbols in Public Areas (Council of 
Europe/Martinus Nijhoff 2009) 8. 
73 Kendal Davis, ‘The Veil That Covered France’s Eye: The Right to Freedom of Religion and Equal Treatment 
in Immigration and Naturalization Proceedings’ (2010) Nevada Law Journal 10 
74 Saba Mahmood and Peter G Danchin, ‘The Politics of Religious Freedom: Contested Genealogies’ (2014) 
113:1 The South Atlantic Quarterly 1, 3. 
75 Aileen McColgan, ‘Religion and (In)equality in the European Framework’ in Loreno Zucca and Camil 
Ungureanu (eds) Law, State and Religion in New Europe: Debates and Dilemmas (CUP 2012) 219. 
76 Jim Murdoch, Freedom of Thought, Conscience and Religion: A Guide to the Implementation of Article 9 of 
the European Convention on Human Rights (Council of Europe 2007) 12. 
77 Carolyn Evans, Freedom of Religion (OUP 2001) 101. 
78 Peter van Dijk and others, Theory and Practice of the European Convention on Human Rights (4th edn, 
Intersentia 2006) 754. 
79Donna Gomien, Short Guide to the European Convention on Human Rights (Council of Europe 1991) 69. See 
also D Harris and others, Harris O’Boyle & Warbrick: Law of the European Convention on Human Rights (3rd 
edn, OUP 2014) 594, footnote 30; Françoise Tulkens, ‘Freedom of Religion under the European Court of 




 In contrast the forum externum, the ‘sphere of external manifestation’, 80 is described as 
the ‘external, often collective dimension of freedom of thought, conscience and religion’81 or the 
‘outward expression’82 of religion or belief. It is the ‘external dimension of religiosity’,83 the 
physical manifestation,84 the area in which the forum internum can be ‘exteriorized’85 or the area 
where an individual’s personal beliefs ‘emerge into the open’.86 In Puppinick’s words, ‘the forum 
internum pertains to the being of the person, and the forum externum to the person’s doings.’87 
 Throughout the literature relating to Article 9, it is again repeatedly emphasised that this 
‘double character’ or ‘double side’88 of the provision is legally significant because of the different 
degrees of protection to be offered to rights within the forum internum and rights within the 
forum externum.89  There is a clear consensus that forum internum rights are absolute (they 
cannot be subject to any limitations), whereas forum externum rights are qualified (and can be 
limited in accordance with Article 9.2).90 This, it is claimed, is a ‘clear implication’ from the text 
of Article 991 and evident if one follows the ‘letter of Article 9’.92  
To unpack this, the forum internum is understood to represent the ‘internal and private 
realm against which no State interference is justified in any circumstances’;93 it is a realm which 
 
80 Carolyn Evans, Freedom of Religion (OUP 2001) 72; Malcolm D Evans, Manual on the Wearing of Religious 
Symbols in Public Areas (Council of Europe/Martinus Nijhoff 2009) 9. 
81 John Witte Jr and M Christian Green, Religion and Human Rights (OUP 2011) 259 
82 Peter G Danchin, ‘Religious Freedom in the Panopticon of Enlightenment Rationality’ in Winnifred Sullivan 
and others (eds) Politics of Religious Freedom (University of Chicago Press 2015) 176. 
83Esra Demir Gürsel, ‘The Distinction Between the Freedom of Religion and the Right to Manifest Religion: A 
Legal Medium to Regulate Subjectivities’ (2013) 22 Social & Legal Studies 377, 378-9. 
84 Peter G Danchin and Lisa Forman, ‘The Evolving Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights and 
the Protection of Religious Minorities’ in Peter G Danchin and Elizabeth A Cole (eds) Protecting the Human 
Rights of Religious Minorities in Eastern Europe (Columbia University Press 2002) 198. 
85 Julie Ringelheim, ‘Rights, Religion and the Public Sphere: The European Court of Human Rights in Search of 
a Theory?’ in Loreno Zucca and Camil Ungureanu (eds) Law, State and Religion in New Europe: Debates and 
Dilemmas (CUP 2012) 293. 
86 Tom Lewis, ‘What Not to Wear: Religious Rights, the European Court and the Margin of Appreciation’ 
(2007) 56 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 395, 400. 
87 Grégor Puppinck, Conscientious Objection and Human Rights: A Systematic Analysis (Brill Research 
Perspectives 2017) 11. 
88 Javier Martínez-Torrón and Rafael Navarro-Valls, ‘The Protection of Religious Freedom in the System of the 
European Convention on Human Rights’ (1998) 3 Helsinki Monitor 25 31, footnote 22. 
89 Nicolas Bratza, ‘The “Precious Asset”: Freedom of Religion under the European Convention on Human 
Rights’ (2012) 14:2 Ecclesiastical Law Journal 256, 259. 
90 Peter W Edge, ‘The European Court of Human Rights and Religious Rights’ (1998) 47 International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly 681, 681.  
91 Jim Murdoch, Freedom of Thought, Conscience and Religion: A Guide to the Implementation of Article 9 of 
the European Convention on Human Rights (Council of Europe 2007) 18. 
92 Javier Martínez-Torrón, ‘Religious Pluralism: The Case of the European Court of Human Rights’ in Ferron 
Requejo and Camil Ungureanu (eds) Democracy, Law and Religious Pluralism in Europe (Routledge 2014) 
126-7. 
93 Paul Taylor, Freedom of Religion (CUP 2005) 19, 115. See also Peter Petkoff, ‘Forum Internum and Forum 
Externum in Canon Law and Public International Law with Particular Reference to the Jurisprudence of the 




‘does not belong to the sphere of state power.’94  Indeed, it is described as a ‘domain outside of a 
state’s control’95 and a ‘hands off’ area for States.96 The rights to hold and to change a religion or 
belief are understood to be the most intensely protected aspects of religious liberty, falling within 
the ‘inner core’,97 and are ‘absolute’98 and ‘unfettered’.99 Indeed, commentators consistently 
emphasise that the forum internum is ‘subject to no limitations’,100 it is ‘unrestricted’101 and 
guaranteed without qualification.’102 It is understood to be a ‘largely sacrosanct’,103 or 
‘untouchable’104 realm, a ‘private, autonomous sphere of religion or belief.’105  
In contrast, the forum externum (usually used interchangeably with manifestation) is 
understood to be a ‘qualified’ realm, in which rights can be interfered with, or ‘overridden’106 if 
in accordance with Article 9.2.107 It is explained that once a person has left the ‘refuge’ of the 
 
94 Pamela Slotte, ‘What is a Man if he has Words but has no Deeds? Some Remarks on the European 
Convention on Human Rights’ (2011) 11 Ars Disputandi 259, 268.  
95 Peter Petkoff, ‘Forum Internum and Forum Externum in Canon Law and Public International Law with 
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96 Pamela Slotte, ‘The Religious and the Secular in European Human Rights Discourse’ in Jan Klabbers (ed) 
Finnish Yearbook of International Law: Volume 21 (Bloomsbury 2010) 249. See also Françoise Tulkens, 
‘Freedom of Religion under the European Court of Human Rights: A Precious Asset’ [2014] Brigham Young 
University Law Review 509, 513. 
97 Renata Uitz, ‘Rethinking Deschomets v France: reinforcing the protection of religious liberty through 
personal autonomy in custody disputes’ in Eva Brems E (ed), Diversity and European Human Rights: Rewriting 
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Symbols: European Bans of the Wearing of Religious Symbols in Education (Routledge 2011) 16-17; Ben-Oni 
Ardelean, ‘Liberty: The Forum Internum of Faith and Belief’ (2013) 9:5 European Journal of Science and 
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99 Bernadette Rainey, Elizabeth Wicks and Clare Ovey, Jacobs, White and Ovey: The European Convention on 
Human Rights (6th edn, OUP 2014) 412. 
100 Carolyn Evans, Freedom of Religion (OUP 2001) 96. 
101 Paul Taylor, Freedom of Religion (CUP 2005) 19. 
102 Peter van Dijk and others, Theory and Practice of the European Convention on Human Rights (4th edn, 
Intersentia 2006) 752. 
103 Jim Murdoch, Freedom of Thought, Conscience and Religion: A Guide to the Implementation of Article 9 of 
the European Convention on Human Rights (Council of Europe 2007) 84. 
104 Tom Lewis, ‘What Not to Wear: Religious Rights, the European Court and the Margin of Appreciation’ 
(2007) 56 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 395, 400; Peter Cumper and Tom Lewis, ‘Taking 
Religion Seriously’? Human Rights and Hijab in Europe – Some Problems of Adjudication’ (2008) 24 Journal 
of Law and Religion 599, 605. 
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106 Jean L Cohen and Celia Laborde (eds) Religion, Secularism and Constitutional Democracy (Columbia 
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forum internum, and beliefs ‘emerge into the open,’108 ‘there might be circumstances in which his 
belief through manifestation could be challenged.’109 Unlike forum internum rights, the forum 
externum right to manifest is ‘not absolute’ because manifestations of religion or belief may have 
‘societal consequences which necessitate state interference,’ for instance, they can ‘potentially 
interfere with the rights of others or pose a danger to society’.110 
In the literature, it is common to see the terms forum internum and forum externum used 
interchangeably or synonymously with absolute and qualified protection.111 When commentators 
speak of a right as a forum internum right, they usually mean that it is an absolute right, and when 
they speak of a right as a forum externum right they usually mean that it is a right which can be 
limited.  
 
In addition to being central to the architecture of Article 9, it is widely understood that 
this distinction between the forum internum and the forum externum is a ‘doctrine’112 of the 
ECtHR. Martínez-Torrón, for instance, explains that the Strasbourg institutions have ‘for many 
years…distinguished between two different and complementary aspects of the right recognised 
by Article 9,’ the ‘internal aspect (forum internum)’ and the ‘external aspect (forum 
externum).’113 And, according to Peroni, the ECtHR understands religion ‘in terms of a binary 
opposition between belief and practice,’114 referred to as the forum internum and forum externum 
in ‘Strasbourg jargon.’115 Elsewhere, it is claimed that the ECtHR has ‘drawn a line’,116 or more 
 
108 Tom Lewis, ‘What Not to Wear: Religious Rights, the European Court and the Margin of Appreciation’ 
(2007) 56 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 395, 400. 
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Requejo and Camil Ungureanu (eds) Democracy, Law and Religious Pluralism in Europe (Routledge 2014) 
126-7. See also Javier Martínez-Torrón, ‘Religious Liberty in European Jurisprudence’ in Mark Hill (ed) 
Religious Liberty and Human Rights (University of Wales Press 2002) 117. 
114 Peroni describes a ‘binary opposition between belief and practice’, see Lourdes Peroni, ‘Deconstructing 
‘Legal’ Religion in Strasbourg’ (2014) 3:2 Oxford Journal of Law and Religion 235, 236.  
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emphatically, a ‘substantial dividing line’117 between these two spheres. It is a distinction which 
is understood to be ‘well-acknowledged’ by the ECtHR;118 commentators claim it is one which 
has been ‘stressed’119 by the ECtHR120 and is ‘imperative in the judgments of the Court.’121 
Crucially, it is widely believe that this distinction between the forum internum and forum 
externum is the ‘correct’ understanding of Article 9 and that the application of the distinction is 
crucial for the protection of Article 9 rights in practice.  
However, despite the heavy emphasis on the centrality of the forum internum and forum 
externum distinction commentators are increasingly arguing that the ECtHR’s understanding and 
application of the distinction is problematic; rather than enhancing the protection of Article 9 
rights the forum internum and forum externum distinction, it is claimed, is increasingly 
undermining it. It is to the criticisms of the forum internum and forum externum distinction that 
this chapter will now turn.  
 
C. Criticisms of the Forum Internum and Forum Externum Distinction in the 
Literature 
Commentators have, for some time, criticised the ECtHR’s understanding and application of the 
forum internum and forum externum distinction claiming that the failure to clearly delineate the 
scope of the forum internum and the ways in which this realm can be interfered with, has led to 
poor protection of this absolute realm. More recently, however, the forum internum and forum 
externum distinction itself has come under criticism. Commentators have argued that the binary 
and hierarchical distinction between the forum internum and the forum externum in Article 9 is 
not the most suitable way of approaching religion or belief and has led to poor protection of the 
right to manifest religion or belief.  
 
Dijk and Fried van Hoof (eds) Theory and Practice of the European Convention on Human Rights (1st edn, 
Intersentia 1984) 298. 
117 Françoise Tulkens, ‘Freedom of Religion under the European Court of Human Rights: A Precious Asset’ 
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This section focuses on criticisms of the ECtHR’s understanding and protection of Article 9 
and explores some suggestions made by commentators to improve the understanding of Article 9 
and the protection of this right.  
 
i. Poor Forum Internum Protection  
The argument that the ECtHR offers poor protection to the forum internum will be examined in 
detail later in this thesis but, for now, it is worth noting that for many commentators it is 
problematic that the ECtHR has not clearly distinguished between rights which they believe fall 
into the absolute forum internum and rights which fall into the qualified forum externum. This 
‘failure’ on the part of the ECtHR to clearly set out the scope of the forum internum is, it is held, 
largely the cause of poor protection of rights in the forum internum.  
 
a. Failure to Define the Scope of the Forum Internum  
Both C Evans and Taylor argued that despite the ECtHR’s emphasis on the forum internum as the 
primary realm, the ECtHR has often failed to identify when forum internum rights are engaged. 
For C Evans, writing in 2001, the forum internum played ‘almost no practical role in Article 9 
cases’ and its scope was so narrow it was difficult to envisage how a State could interfere with it 
‘short of brainwashing.’122 And, according to Taylor, the ‘unimpugnable and fundamental nature 
of the forum internum’ was ‘undermined by European institutions through the persistent 
avoidance of principles that permit forum internum rights to be asserted by applicants.’123 
Both C Evans and Taylor argued that a key problem in the jurisprudence was the 
treatment of complaints engaging the forum internum (which, they argued, should be protected 
absolutely) as complaints engaging the forum externum (which, they argued, can be limited under 
Article 9.2).124 This, they contended, seriously undermined the protection under Article 9 and the 
focus on the forum externum at the detriment of the forum internum, reflected the ECtHR’s more 
widespread assumption that in Article 9 complaints the ‘issue of interference with the forum 
internum is not in question’.125  
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b. Failure to Recognise the Relevance of the Forum Internum   
A further criticism of the jurisprudence in the literature is that it fails to appreciate the way in 
which the forum internum and the forum externum are related, and thus to recognise the relevance 
of the forum internum in Article 9 complaints. Whilst there is such a distinction in theory, it is 
claimed, its application in practice is problematic because a ‘neat distinction between the internal 
and external realm’ is difficult to maintain.126 C Evans, for instance, explained that according to 
the wording of Article 9 a ‘distinction must be drawn between the general right to freedom of 
religion or belief and the right to manifest that religion or belief,’127 and spoke of centrality of the 
forum internum and forum externum ‘distinction’, ‘division’ or ‘dichotomy’ in Article 9, but 
argued that the divide was not as self-evident in reality; in particular, she criticised Article 9 
jurisprudence on the grounds that ‘the distinction between belief and action is not as clear and 
simple as the cases suggest.’128  
For C Evans the ECtHR failed to recognise, and reflect in its case law, the complex 
relationship between belief and action.129 ‘It is not clear,’ she contended, ‘that the first limb of 
Article 9 [i.e. the forum internum] simply becomes irrelevant once some manifestation is in 
question’;130 in some cases, limitations on manifestation may be so severe that they not only 
interfere with the forum externum but also the forum internum (a point which has been reiterated 
by later commentators131). In particular, she argued that there were some serious issues with the 
ECtHR’s approach to complaints about being forced to act contrary to one’s conscience, 
contending that in these cases both the forum internum and the forum externum may be 
engaged,132 and criticised the ECtHR for its narrow focus on the question of whether 
manifestation had been legitimately limited by the State.  
These arguments were later developed by Taylor who drew attention to the perceived 
problematic nature of the binary forum internum and forum externum distinction in the protection 
of Article 9 rights. Like C Evans, Taylor also argued that refusals to act contrary to one’s religion 
or belief have been awkwardly ‘shoehorned’ into the category of manifestation by the ECtHR so 
that these complaints can be limited under Article 9.2. This, he contended, reflected the ECtHR’s 
‘marked tendency to focus on the manifestation of belief to the exclusion of other aspects of 
 
126 Carolyn Evans, Freedom of Religion (OUP 2001) 77. 
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129 Ibid., 201.  
130 Ibid., 76.  
131 See Rex Adhar and Ian Leigh, Religious Freedom in the Liberal State (2nd edn, OUP 2013) 125. 
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Article 9(1)’.133 When faced with a ‘binary choice between recognising the forum internum and 
characterising the applicant’s position in some way, no matter how inappropriately, as a form of 
manifestation’, the ECtHR, Taylor contends, has done the latter.134 
 
ii. Poor Forum Externum Protection  
In the literature, Article 9 is understood to focus on the ‘individual right to develop and adhere to 
a religious identity’135 rather than to outwardly manifest religion or belief. In other words, a 
distinction has been drawn between the ‘private’ forum internum and the ‘public’ forum 
externum, and whilst the forum internum is protected absolutely, it is held, the forum internum 
can be subject to limitations under Article 9.2.136   
 
a. A Problematic Conceptual Distinction  
It is argued that this conceptual distinction between the forum internum and the forum externum 
and the emphasis on the forum internum, suggests that States can limit manifestation of religion 
or belief ‘without being seen to “undermine” or “undo” the right to freedom of religion itself.’137 
In other words, it is claimed that the distinction implies that regardless of restrictions in the forum 
externum, the forum internum remains untouched.  
However, the idea that a ‘line’ can be drawn between the forum internum and forum 
externum is, it is increasingly argued in the literature, a problematic notion. There is a growing 
feeling amongst commentators that it is ‘often hard to distinguish’ between the forum internum 
and the forum externum,138 contending that in practice, the distinction is ‘elusive’139 or blurry.140 
In strictly applying the forum internum and forum externum distinction in Article 9 complaints 
the ECtHR is failing, it is claimed, to adequately protect Article 9 rights, particularly the right to 
manifest religion or belief. 
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An increasing number of commentators, particularly those taking an interdisciplinary 
approach,141 argue that the forum internum and forum externum distinction is no longer a 
satisfactory paradigm for approaching the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion 
because it separates the holding of a religion or belief from its manifestation in artificial way, 
arbitrarily privileging the former over the latter. Even Martínez-Torrón, who explains that ‘the 
case law of Strasbourg emphasises that it is necessary to distinguish between the internal and 
external aspects of religious liberty,’ has argued that the binary and hierarchical understanding of 
religion, which he believes is advanced by the ECtHR, ‘is not the most desirable.’ 142 
In 2001, C Evans observed that the Court chose the ‘cerebral, internal and theological 
over the active, symbolic and moral dimensions of freedom of religion or belief’143 but was 
undecided whether this was a conscious choice on the part of the ECtHR or simply an 
‘assumption about the nature of religion’,144 pointing out that the ECtHR did not justify its 
approach or demonstrate ‘any awareness that this is anything but self-evident.’145 A number of 
more recent commentators have been much more critical of the understanding of religion or 
belief they believe to be conveyed through the forum internum and forum externum distinction. 
Peroni, for instance, contends that the notion of ‘legal’ religion at the ECtHR, particularly the 
imagining of ‘religion in terms of a binary opposition between belief and practice’ — or between 
the forum internum and the forum externum — has led to the ‘automatic privileging’ of the forum 
internum over the forum externum.146 This she claimed is evident from the ECtHR’s emphasis on 
the forum internum as the primary realm147 and is ‘re-affirmed in the Court’s well-known 
principle that the protection of the forum internum is ‘absolute and unqualified’, whereas the 
forum externum can be subject to limitations.148 A similar argument is made by Ferrari who 
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of this thesis.  




contends the forum internum and forum externum distinction ‘erects an artificial boundary’149 
between different ways of conceiving and experiencing religion;’150 he criticises the ECtHR for 
failing to justify why one is privileged over the other and for failing to recognise that belief and 
practice are ‘mutually dependent’ and ‘cannot be neatly separated from each other.’151 Kenny 
describes the forum internum and forum externum distinction as a ‘fallacy of dualism’ explaining 
that the complexity of the relationship between the forum internum and the forum externum 
‘makes it highly difficult to sustain the idea that a useful distinction can be made between the 
forum internum and forum externum’.152 
 On the whole, therefore, it is increasingly being claimed that it is a ‘dubious proposition 
that religion can be neatly packaged’ into belief and action;153 more and more commentators are 
arguing that it is not possible for belief and action to be ‘surgically kept apart’ 154 in ‘logic tight 
compartments’.155 Indeed, Petty suggests the forum internum and forum externum distinction is 
an example of law as a literature of caricature.156  
It is contended in the literature that the ECtHR’s treatment of the forum internum and 
forum externum as ‘separate entities’, and its privileging of the former over the latter, has had a 
negative impact on the protection of the right to manifest religion or belief, notably that it has led 
to the emergence of a problematic spatial distinction between the public and private spheres, and 
to a problematic bias against certain forms of religion. These claims will be looked at in the 
following sections.  
b. A Problematic Spatial Distinction   
The conceptual distinction between the forum internum and forum externum in Article 9 has, 
commentators argue, facilitated,157 or been definitive for, the emergence of a spatial distinction 
 
149 Aaron R Petty, ‘Religion, Conscience and Belief in the European Court of Human Rights’ (2013) 48:4 The 
George Washington International Law Review 807, 833. 
150 Silvio Ferrari, ‘Law and Religion in a Secular World: A European Perspective’ (2012) 14:3 Ecclesiastical 
Law Journal 355, 367. 
151 Aaron R Petty, ‘Religion, Conscience and Belief in the European Court of Human Rights’ (2013) 48:4 The 
George Washington International Law Review 807, 833. 
152 Celia G Kenny, ‘Public Space, Private Face: Veiling as a Challenge for Legal Reasoning’ in Russell 
Sandberg, Religion and Legal Pluralism (Routledge 2015) 221, 223, 224.  
153 JES Fawcett, The Application of the European Convention on Human Rights (2nd edn, OUP 1987) 238-39; 
Gabriel Moens, ‘The Action-Belief Dichotomy and Freedom of Religion’ (1989) 12 Sydney Law Review 195; 
Donna J Sullivan, ‘Advancing the Freedom of Religion or Belief Through the UN Declaration on the 
Elimination of Religious Intolerance and Discrimination’ (1988) 82:3 American Journal of International Law 
487, 500-510. 
154 Iona Cismas, Religious Actors in International Law (OUP 2014), 29.  
155 Gabriel Moens, ‘The Action-Belief Dichotomy and Freedom of Religion’ (1989) 12 Sydney Law Review 
195, 208. 
156 Aaron R Petty, ‘Religion, Conscience and Belief in the European Court of Human Rights’ (2013) 48:4 The 
George Washington International Law Review 807, 834. 
157 Peter Cumper and Tom Lewis, ‘Taking Religion Seriously’? Human Rights and Hijab in Europe – Some 




between the public and private spheres, and lent ‘weight to the privatisation of religion.’158 The 
forum internum and forum externum distinction, with the emphasis on the private realm, is seen to 
have contributed to the ‘hiving off’ of religion to the private sphere,159 so that religion remains 
‘behind closed doors rather than in public.’160 It is believed that through the distinction the 
emphasis is on manifestation in private (i.e. in one’s home or a religious building) rather than 
manifestation in public (i.e. in the street, in places of education or work)161 and, as such, the 
former enjoys greater protection than the latter. When individuals cross the ‘spatial divide’,162 
from the private to the public sphere, it is believed that the State often intervenes to limit 
manifestation. 
There is considerable literature on religion in the private and public spheres.163 Much of the 
debate concerning religion in the public and private spheres tends to concentrate on broad 
questions of religion-state relations and associated issues of secularism and state neutrality. 
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Whilst related, such discussions are often not directly relevant to the exploration of the 
understanding of forum internum and forum externum in Article 9 in this thesis and, as such, the 
analysis must be limited here.164 The key point in the privatisation debate is that commentators 
often argue that the notion of a spatial divide between the private and the public sphere is not one 
which is readily apparent to believers, particularly for those for whom the display of religious 
clothing or symbols in public is central to their faith.165  
The idea that religion or belief can be compartmentalised in such a way, or ‘left at the door’, 
when entering the public sphere,166 is seen as deeply problematic. Adhar and Leigh, for instance, 
contend that believers ‘may experience the world differently’, i.e. without boundaries between 
private and public spheres.167 They argue that such a distinction means individuals receive ‘the 
contradictory message that society thinks it is important that they can believe what they choose, 
but it is not sufficiently important to be able to act on those beliefs,’168 especially not in public.  
 
c. A Problematic Bias  
Related to this, it is claimed that the forum internum and forum externum distinction, leads to a 
bias at the ECtHR towards orthodoxy and against orthopraxy, i.e. towards doctrine and against 
practice.169 It is argued that ‘for the most part, religious faith [at the ECtHR] is understood as 
being analogous to various kinds of intellectual convictions’;170 it essentially about ‘intellectual 
assent’ and that actions based on religion or belief are somehow ‘separate’.171 Slotte explains that 
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the forum internum and forum externum distinction presents us ‘with an understanding of a 
religious person whose faith is an inner state of mind clearly distinguishable from manifestations 
of faith, such as rites and rituals, symbols, clothing, teaching or observance of certain food 
choices.’172 This distinction is, for Trigg, an ‘obnoxious’ distinction because it does not reflect 
lived experience and contradicts the self-understanding of believers.173  
Recently, it is being increasingly claimed that the structure of Article 9 disadvantages 
certain religions, particularly those which have an emphasis on manifestation. Indeed, in the 
literature the forum internum and forum externum distinction has been described as a ‘biased and 
historically contingent’ distinction which depends on ‘a priori assumptions.’174 The ECtHR has 
been criticised for working with a ‘pietistic’,175 largely Protestant Christian view of religion176 
and, as a result, for privileging Post-Reformation Protestant Christianity177 ‘which places more 
emphasis on the internal holding of faith than the outward display of it’.178 It is contended that the 
ECtHR ‘valorizes disembodied, autonomous, and private forms of religiosity, while side-lining 
embodied, habitual and public forms.’179 The practical result of this structural bias is, it is 
claimed, that the ECtHR is more ready to protect ‘voluntarist, private and individualist’ forms of 
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belief180 rather than forms which are communitarian or organisational in orientation’181 (and thus, 
it is less likely to protect the manifestation of religion or belief in the public sphere).182  
As such, minority beliefs, especially those which place particular emphasis on external 
manifestation, ritual rather than intellectual assent183 and on material objects,184 are, it is claimed, 
‘relegated to second place.’185 The ECtHR is seen as being ‘unsympathetic to non-Christians,’186 
indeed commentators have argued that it is more difficult for ‘fringe’ or New Religious 
Movements (NRMs) to get protection.187 And, Danchin, for instance, has argued that ‘by 
subsuming or tacitly incorporating Christian or post-Christian norms into the meaning and scope 
of Article 9’ the ECtHR ‘has placed in jeopardy and marginalised the religious freedom claims of 
Muslim (and other religious) communities.’188 This has been reiterated more recently by Berry189 
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and by Gunn190 in their analyses of the ECtHR’s approach in French and Turkish headscarf cases 
in particular.  
 
iii. Incoherent and Inconsistent Jurisprudence  
Both C Evans and Taylor have argued that the protection of Article 9 is incoherent and 
inconsistent.191 Indeed, it is the thesis of C Evans’ monograph.192 Later commentators have 
continued in this vein.193 In terms of the forum internum, for instance, commentators have 
criticised the ECtHR for its ‘confused’ approach of offering absolute protection to forum 
internum rights in some cases, but in other similar cases, inappropriately treating forum internum 
rights as forum externum rights and considering the legitimacy of interference under Article 
9.2.194 And the Grand Chamber has been criticised for ‘ignoring’ forum internum complaints 
(even when a violation of Article 9 has been found by the Chamber) by focusing on complaints 
under different ECHR articles in its judgment.195  
In terms of the forum externum, particularly the right to manifest religion or belief, 
commentators have argued that the ECtHR’s approach is haphazard and unpredictable because in 
some cases it offers very strong protection against interference but in other, similar cases, even 
cases of the same ‘type’ (for instance ‘religious clothing cases’) it has not found interference with 
or a violation of Article 9.196 In respect of religious symbols, for instance, Ronchi claims that 
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Intellectual Architecture’ (2010) 26:1 Journal of Law and Religion 321, 339. 
194 See e.g., Alison Mahwinney, ‘Coercion, Oaths and Conscience’ in Frank Cramner and others (eds) The 
Confluence of Law and Religion: interdisciplinary Reflections on the Work of Norman Doe (CUP 2016).  
195 See e.g., Jeroen Temperman, ‘Lautsi II: A Lesson in Burying Fundamental Children’s Rights’ (2011) 6 
Religion and Human Rights 279.  
196 Some attempts have been made at reconciling cases, see for instance, Teresa Sanader, ‘Religious Symbols 
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there is an ‘incoherent approach of double standards’197 at the ECtHR and Petkoff argues that the 
jurisprudence is ‘not terribly consistent.’198 
In working with the notion that there is a strict, binary and hierarchical distinction 
between the forum internum and the forum externum commentators have struggled to reconcile 
these ostensibly contradictory outcomes. Some suggestions made by commentators to improve 
the protection of Article 9 will be examined in the next section. 
 
iv. Suggestions made by Commentators  
The criticisms brought against the forum internum and forum externum distinction by 
commentators are deeply troubling because these criticisms relate to very real issues in terms of 
the practical protection of the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion by the ECtHR, 
not just to academic concern for consistency and coherence in the jurisprudence. Numerous 
suggestions have, however, been made by commentators to address the problems they have 
identified in order to improve the understanding and protection of Article 9. 
a.  Clarify and Rigorously Apply the Distinction  
Commentators who highlight problems with the application of the forum internum and forum 
externum distinction often call for the ECtHR to more precisely delineate the scope of the forum 
internum and forum externum199 because, they argue, this would encourage better and more 
consistent Article 9 protection. C Evans, for instance, called for the ECtHR to develop a more 
sophisticated definition of the meaning and scope of the forum internum, to offer clarification 
regarding the ways in which the forum internum could be interfered with,200 and to take ‘the 
claims of applicants more seriously’ especially when complaints relate to the forum internum.201  
More recently, Mawhinney argued that the ECtHR needs to apply the distinction between the 
forum internum and forum externum more conscientiously and have ‘greater respect for the 
structure of the right’.202 In an effort to address this ‘problem’ in the jurisprudence, commentators 
have drawn up their own ‘lists’ of rights which fall into the forum internum and the forum 
 
197 Paolo Ronchi, ‘Crucifixes, Margin of Appreciation and Consensus: The Grand Chamber Ruling in Lautsi v 
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198 Peter Petkoff, ‘Religious Symbols Between the Forum Internum and the Forum Externum’ in Silvio Ferrari 
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Communities (Ashgate 2010) 297, 300. 
199 Carolyn Evans, Freedom of Religion (OUP 2001) 205. 
200 Ibid. 
201 Ibid. 
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externum, but such lists remain largely idiosyncratic, created on the basis of what commentators 
think ought to fall into the forum internum or forum externum.203 
 
b. Seek Forum Internum Protection Under Other ECHR Articles  
Other commentators have been less optimistic about improving protection under Article 9 
and have suggested looking elsewhere for forum internum protection. Taylor, writing in 
2005, argued that it was ‘notoriously difficult’ for applicants to claim that forum internum rights 
had been violated under Article 9, contending that this was evidenced by ‘no claim ever 
succeeding Article 9 before the ECtHR.204 To address the problem of the ECtHR continually 
‘shoehorning’ complaints concerning direct forum internum interference into the category of 
manifestation (or in other words, treating forum internum complaints as forum externum 
complaints) Taylor suggested that it was ‘necessary to consider a parallel means of protection 
when forum internum rights are at issue.’205 Relying on the ECtHR’s approach in Thlimmenos v 
Greece,206 which he considered to be a  ‘significant landmark’,207 Taylor argued that protection of 
forum internum rights could be improved by using the right to freedom from discrimination under 
Article 14 in conjunction with Article 9. This, he suggested, provied ‘a useful basis on which to 
defend against interference with forum internum, without having to artificially establish an 
eligible form of manifestation’ (in order to gain protection under Article 9).208  
 
c. Emphasise the Forum Internum and Forum Externum Relationship    
Commentators who have advanced a more conceptual critique — concerning the very existence 
of a forum internum and forum externum distinction (and the implications of this) in Article 9 — 
have been less forthcoming with practical recommendations to address the problems in the 
jurisprudence. Generally speaking, when suggestions for improvements have been offered, these 
are limited to calls to move away from understanding the forum internum and forum externum 
distinction as binary and hierarchical one, to a more relational understanding of the forum 
internum and forum externum in Article 9. Cismas, for instance, argues that the forum internum 
and the forum externum should be understood as ‘inherently interlinked’.209 And Petkoff, argues 
 
203 Taylor argues for an enlarged forum internum and identifies a number of rights in what he calls the ‘residual 
scope’ of the forum internum, see Paul Taylor, Freedom of Religion (CUP 2005) 115.  
204 Ibid., 201. 
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206 In this case the ECtHR found a violation of Article 14 in respect of an accountant who was barred from the 
profession due to a previous conviction for refusing to perform military service. The ECtHR observed in the obiter 
dicta that his refusal to perform military service could be construed as a manifestation of religion or belief under 
Article 9, see Thlimmenos v Greece ECHR 2000-IV 263.  
207 Paul Taylor, Freedom of Religion (CUP 2005) 201. 
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that rather than two distinct realms, the forum internum and forum externum in Article 9 should 
be understood, as they were, and continue to be understood in canon law, as two interrelated 
elements, in a ‘dialogical relationship’.210 However, these commentators have stopped short of 
showing how this would or could work in practice at the ECtHR.   
 
v. Reflecting on the Suggestions 
The main problem with the suggestions that have been made in the literature so far is that 
commentators tend to only address the issues which they themselves have highlighted.  To date, 
no commentator has offered a way forward which addresses a significant number of the serious 
issues raised in respect of the understanding of the right to freedom of thought, conscience and 
religion and the protection of this right by the ECtHR. Furthermore, the criticisms and 
recommendations made by commentators all tend to be rooted in the idea that the forum internum 
and forum externum distinction is central to Article 9; they argue either that i) it is not as central 
as it should be or ii) it should not be as central as it is. They seem to be constrained by the 
perceived centrality of the notion of a clear binary and hierarchical distinction between the forum 
internum and forum externum and have held back from asking more radical questions about the 
forum internum and forum externum in the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion.    
 
D. Evaluating the Literature: Limitations and Gaps  
This thesis seeks to step back from the traditional understanding of the centrality of this 
distinction to interrogate the conceptual framework and ask radical questions about the forum 
internum and forum externum dichotomy in Article 9. In doing so, the following section asks 
firstly, how the notion of a distinction between the forum internum and the forum externum 
evolved in the literature, secondly, why it is now so embedded in it, and lastly, examines the 
evidentiary basis for claims made about the centrality and problematic nature of this distinction. 
This section, therefore, begins the task of unpicking the assumptions by critiquing the literature. 
 
 
210 Peter Petkoff, ‘Forum Internum and Forum Externum in Canon Law and Public International Law with 
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i. The Evolution of the Traditional Approach to the Right to Freedom of Thought, 
Conscience and Religion   
Given the way in which the forum internum and forum externum distinction has been presented as 
longstanding distinction, it may come as a surprise that the notion of a distinction between the 
internal and external realms, particularly as expressed through the language of the forum 
internum and the forum externum has not been always been a central feature of the literature 
relating to the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion. Rather, this is a notion that 
has gained traction over time, only becoming central to discussions of Article 9 after the turn of 
the century.  
 
a. Literature Relating to UN Instruments 
There were few references to the forum internum or forum externum (or the notion of a 
distinction) in the literature relating generally to UN instruments published before the turn of the 
century, and this remains largely the trend today211 (with a few exceptions).212 In literature 
relating specifically to freedom of religion or belief provisions in UN instruments, there were also 
few references to the forum internum and forum externum distinction in early texts, but since the 
2000s there has been a significant increase in the number of references to the terms, and the 
notion of a distinction, in literature relating specifically to Article 18 of the UDHR and the 
ICCPR.213 Much of this literature, however, post-dates the emergence of the notion of a 
distinction in the material relating to the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion in 
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International Human Rights Lexicon (OUP 2005); Walter Kälin and Jörg Künzli, The Law of International 
Human Rights Protection (OUP 2010); Olivier De Schutter, International Human Rights Law: Cases, Materials, 
Commentary (1st edn, CUP 2010); Sarah Joseph and Adam McBeth (eds) Research Handbook on International 
Human Rights Law (Edward Elgar 2010); Conor Gearty (ed), The Cambridge Companion to Human Rights Law 
(CUP 2012); Phillip Alston and Ryan Goodman, International Human Rights (OUP 2012); Michael Haas, 
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Cases, Materials and Commentary (2nd edn, OUP 2005); Sarah Joseph, Jenny Schultz and Melissa Castan, The 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: Cases, Materials and Commentary (2nd edn, OUP 2005); 
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Rights (7th edn, OUP 2015); United Nations, Universal Declaration of Human Rights (CreateSpace 2016). 
212 The exceptions include: Daniel Moeckli and others (eds), International Human Rights Law (1st edn, OUP 
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ECHR Article 9 and tends to project it backwards into these instruments.214 A similar pattern is 
also seen in material relating generally to the ECHR.  
 
b. Literature Relating Generally to the ECHR  
In literature relating generally to the ECHR published before the turn of the century, there were 
very few references to the terms forum internum and forum externum or to the notion of a strict 
distinction between the internal and external realms in the right to freedom of religion or belief.215 
Commentators tended speak more loosely of the guarantees under Article 9 instead;216 for 
instance by simply noting that Article 9 recognises the right to freedom of thought and 
conscience, the right to change, and the right to manifest religion or belief.217 However, there has 
been a steadily growing number of references to the forum internum and forum externum, and the 
notion of a distinction, in discussions of Article 9 in general literature relating to ECHR in recent 
years.218 Again, however, much of this material post-dates the emergence of the distinction in 
literature relating specifically to Article 9, and commentators have tended to project this 
distinction backwards into Article 9 in general commentaries on the ECHR as a result.  
 
214 When there are references to jurisprudence ECtHR cases rather than Human Rights Committee (HRC) 
decisions are cited, see e.g, Daniel Moeckli and others (eds) International Human Rights Law (2nd edn, OUP 
2014) 223.  
215 There are no references in the following texts: Peter van Dijk and Fried van Hoof (eds) Theory and Practice 
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Ensuring Effective International Legal Protection (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1996); D Gomien, D Harris and 
L Zwaak, Law and Practice of the European Convention on Human Rights and the European Social Charter 
(Council of Europe 1996); Karen Reid, A Practitioner’s Guide to the European Convention on Human Rights 
(Sweet and Maxwell 1998); Peter van Dijk and GJH van Hoof, Theory and Practice of the European 
Convention on Human Rights (3rd edn, Intersentia 1998). 
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Reid, A Practitioner’s Guide to the European Convention on Human Rights (Sweet and Maxwell 1998) 344. 
216 There are no references in the following texts: Mark W Janis, Richard S Kay and Anthony W Bradley, 
European Human Rights Law: Text and Materials (3rd edn, OUP 2008); D Harris and others, Law of the 
European Convention on Human Rights (2nd edn, OUP 2009); Alistair Mowbray, Cases, Materials and 
Commentary on the European Convention on Human Rights (OUP 2012); Eva Brems and Janneke Gerards 
(eds) Shaping Rights in the ECHR (CUP 2015). 
217 See e.g. William A Schabas, The European Convention on Human Rights: A Commentary (OUP 2015) 420. 
218There is a small section entitled, ‘Protection of the forum internum’ in Peter van Dijk and others, Theory and 
Practice of the European Convention on Human Rights (4th edn, Intersentia 2006) 752. Reference is made to 
‘two aspects’ in Clare Ovey and Robin CA White, Jacobs & White: The European Convention on Human 
Rights (4th edn, OUP 2006) 412; Bernadette Rainey, Elizabeth Wicks and Clare Ovey, Jacobs, White and Ovey: 
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c.  Literature Relating Specifically to ECHR Article 9  
Generally speaking, the terms forum internum and forum externum were absent219 or used 
infrequently in specialist texts relating to Article 9 before the turn of the century.220 This early 
literature tended to speak more loosely about the guarantees under Article 9, rather than juxtapose 
the forum internum and forum externum.  M Evans, for instance, in Religious Liberty and 
International Law did not draw a clear distinction between the forum internum and forum 
externum, or between believing and manifesting.221 In his discussion of Article 9, the forum 
internum appears once, in a citation of C v The United Kingdom, in which M Evans explains that 
the statement that ‘Article 9 primarily protects the sphere of personal beliefs and religious creeds, 
i.e. the area which is sometimes called the forum internum’ had become a ‘standard recital’ in the 
jurisprudence.222  Notably, the term forum externum is not used at all in relation to Article 9; M 
Evans speaks rather of the right to manifest or of manifestation. 
The real catalyst for the use of the forum internum and forum externum to describe two 
distinctive elements of the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion in Article 9 was C 
Evans’ Freedom of Religion under the European Convention on Human Rights.223 Whilst she was 
not the first to use these terms together in the literature on freedom of religion,224 she was the first 
to use it in relation to Article 9, to do so frequently and invest it with such significance. In her 
monograph, she refers to the forum internum over fifty times, and although she only used the term 
forum externum twice,225 she frequently juxtaposed the forum internum with the manifestation of 
religion or belief.  
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The impact of the way in which C Evans presented the forum internum and the forum 
externum, and popularised the terms, is difficult to overemphasise; her work seems to have 
heavily influenced not only commentary on Article 9 but also that relating to UDHR Article 18 
and ICCPR Article 18 too. Indeed, recognising this turning point in the literature, seems to 
account for the striking similarities in terms of the presentation of UDHR Article 18, ICCPR 
Article 18 and ECHR Article 9 in the literature after 2001.   
Following this publication, the number of references to the forum internum and externum 
to describe the distinction between holding and manifesting religion or belief grew exponentially 
in discussions relating to the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion in Article 9.  In 
Taylor’s Freedom of Religion: UN and European Human Rights Law and Practice, in which 
there is an extended treatment of Article 9, there are numerous references to the distinction; in 
fact, there are over seventy references to the forum internum and two references to the forum 
externum (the latter, both times in juxtaposition with the forum internum) as he too prefers to 
speak of manifestation instead.226 And, the notion of a distinction between the forum internum 
and forum externum has also become a prevalent feature in practitioner material specifically on 
the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion in Article 9;227 notably, the forum 
internum and forum externum aspects of Article 9 are now often addressed in separate chapters228 
or sections.229 
This chronological analysis is informative because it shows that the use of the language of 
the forum internum and forum externum (and the notion of a distinction) has increased 
significantly over a relatively short period of time in relation to Article 9. It is, therefore, hardly a 
‘classic’ approach and as such, it seems odd to locate its origins in the drafting and architecture of 
provisions relating to freedom of thought, conscience and religion.  
This analysis is also useful in revealing that the distinctiveness of the realms has been 
increasingly stressed over time. In juxtaposing, or contrasting, the forum internum and the forum 
externum commentators have brought into sharper focus a difference between these two realms. It 
is striking to note how, as the number of references to the forum internum and forum externum 
have increased, the language associated with these terms has changed significantly to emphasise 
their separateness and distinctiveness.   
 
226 Paul Taylor, Freedom of Religion (CUP 2005) 19, 344. 
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Writing in 1997, M Evans commented that although ‘separate’ the forum internum and 
the external realm of manifestation are ‘intimately connected’.230 Over time, however, any sense 
that these realms are connected has almost disappeared in the literature relating to this right. 
Commentators are now increasingly describing a ‘clear and sharp distinction’,231 ‘a 
dichotomy’,232 or a ‘binary opposition’233 between the forum internum and forum externum in the 
architecture of Article 9 and it is a claimed that there a ‘wall of separation’ between the forum 
internum and the forum externum in Article 9 jurisprudence.234 It is held that the ‘difference’ 
between the forum internum and the forum externum is ‘well-acknowledged’ at Strasbourg235 and 
that the ECtHR has drawn a line between these two spheres236 or more emphatically, ‘a 
substantial dividing line between freedom of religion (internal conviction, inner sphere) and 
freedom to manifest one’s religion in the public sphere (the expression of that conviction).’ 237 
This context is significant because it is against this background that commentators, in recent 
years, have argued that the ECtHR should recognise the relationship between the forum internum 
and forum externum.238  
The emphasis on the distinctiveness of these realms goes hand in hand with the increased 
use of the terms forum internum and forum externum as synonyms for absolute and qualified 
protection, respectively, in the literature. This elision of ideas seems to be an important part of the 
 
230 Malcolm D Evans, Religious Liberty (CUP 1997) 203. M Evans attempted to distinguish between ‘active’ 
and ‘passive’ rights but noted that even such a distinction was ‘blunted’ because some rights had active and 
passive dimensions, see ibid. See also Malcolm D Evans, ‘The Freedom of Religion or Belief and the Freedom 
of Expression’ (2009) 4:2 Religion and Human Rights 197, 203. 
231 Heiner Bielefeldt, Nazila Ghanea and Michael Wiener, Freedom of Religion or Belief (OUP 2016) 566.  
232 Aaron R Petty, ‘Religion, Conscience and Belief in the European Court of Human Rights’ (2013) 48:4 The 
George Washington International Law Review 807, 832 
233 Lourdes Peroni, ‘Deconstructing ‘Legal’ Religion in Strasbourg’ (2014) 3:2 Oxford Journal of Law and 
Religion 23, 236.  
234 Peter Petkoff, ‘Forum Internum and Forum Externum in Canon Law and Public International Law with 
Particular Reference to the Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights’ (2012) 7 Religion and 
Human Rights 183, 203 213. 
235 Peter G Danchin and Lisa Forman, ‘The Evolving Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights and 
the Protection of Religious Minorities’ in Peter G Danchin and Elizabeth A Cole (eds) Protecting the Human 
Rights of Religious Minorities in Eastern Europe (Columbia University Press 2002) 198.  
236 Peter van Dijk and Fried van Hoof (eds) Theory and Practice of the European Convention on Human Rights 
(1st edn, Intersentia 1984) 298; Peter G Danchin and Lisa Forman, ‘The Evolving Jurisprudence of the European 
Court of Human Rights and the Protection of Religious Minorities’ in Peter G Danchin and Elizabeth A Cole 
(eds) Protecting the Human Rights of Religious Minorities in Eastern Europe (Columbia University Press 2002) 
198. 
237 Françoise Tulkens, ‘Freedom of Religion under the European Court of Human Rights: A Precious Asset’ 
[2014] Brigham Young University Law Review 509, 511. 
238 Cf. Peter Petkoff, ‘Forum Internum and Forum Externum in Canon Law and Public International Law with 





development of these terms; the forum internum and forum externum are to be sharply 
distinguished because they represent different levels of legal protection.239  
 
ii. Intertextual Reliance  
It must be pointed out that this thesis recognises that it is not in itself problematic for a concept to 
gain currency over time. However, what is problematic about the forum internum and forum 
externum distinction is the way this notion has become so deeply embedded in the literature on 
Article 9, and the way the distinctiveness of the realms has been emphasised, over time. What is 
immediately striking from a close analysis of the statements made regarding the forum internum 
and forum externum distinction in the literature relating to Article 9 is the lack of evidence 
provided for claims made and extent of intertextual reliance. It is typical for commentators to 
simply assert that there is a fundamental distinction between the forum internum and the forum 
externum in the structure of this article without providing any evidence to support such claims. 
When evidence is provided, commentators usually cite one or two earlier commentators who 
have referred to these realms or made claims about a distinction,240 rather than engage text of the 
articles, the relevant travaux préparatoires or the case law for themselves.  
The distinction has been and continues to be largely reinforced through intertextual 
reliance on the seminal texts by C Evans and Taylor. Statements made by C Evans and Taylor, 
relating to the centrality of the forum internum and forum externum distinction and the 
problematic nature of the distinction, have largely been accepted as accurate by later 
commentators; it has been taken as the ‘final word’ on the topic.  
On the whole, the analysis of the case law and the conclusions drawn by these early 
commentators were not challenged at the time, or more importantly, have not been 
comprehensively reviewed in light of the significant developments in Article 9 case law over the 
past decade. This is concerning because C Evans and Taylor did not engage closely with the 
structure of ECHR Article 9 or the related travaux préparatoires relating to this article to support 
their claims about the centrality of the forum internum and forum externum distinction. And, the 
ECtHR case law referred to in these seminal texts in respect of the forum internum and forum 
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externum distinction is very limited, both in terms of the number of cases cited and the analysis of 
the distinction within the cases.241 
In the rare instances in which later commentators refer to ECtHR case law to support 
claims made about the forum internum and forum externum distinction in Article 9 a reference to 
the case of C v The United Kingdom242 is usually the extent of the evidence provided.243 This is 
typically a passing reference in a footnote; commentators do not examine how the forum internum 
was used in that case or demonstrate how it supports the claim that there is a clear distinction 
between the internal and external realm in Article 9, or that it is central to the ECtHR’s 
jurisprudence on Article 9.  Reliance on a single case is deeply problematic, of course, because it 
provides almost no support for generalisations.244 
Moreover, criticisms of the forum internum and forum externum distinction by recent 
commentators tend to unquestioningly build on the claims in the earlier literature relating to the 
application of the distinction,245 adding to this material a largely conceptual critique of the forum 
internum and forum externum distinction which tends to float free of the case law.246 The 
implication from the literature is that the forum internum and forum externum distinction is such a 
clear and established legal principle that it needs little explication. It seems to be a notion that has 
been referred to so often that it has become a dogma which no one thinks to question.247 Indeed, 
M Evans has recently noted, with some scepticism, that ‘few elements of the Article 9 framework 
seem to be more settled than the distinction between the…forum internum…and the forum 
externum’.248  
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245 See e.g., Alison Mahwinney, ‘Coercion, Oaths and Conscience’ in Frank Cramner and others (eds) The 
Confluence of Law and Religion: interdisciplinary Reflections on the Work of Norman Doe (CUP 2016).  
246 The same pattern is seen in specialist literature relating to the UN instruments. And commentators usually 
reference ECtHR jurisprudence rather than HRC decisions, see for instance, Daniel Moeckli and others (eds), 
International Human Rights Law (2nd edn, OUP 2014) 223.  
247 Hong and Provost comment that for lawyers the ‘erection of such intellectual scaffoldings presents a largely 
irresistible urge…’ see Caylee Hong and René Provost, ‘Let us Compare Mythologies’ in Rene Provost (ed) 
Mapping the Boundaries of Legal Religion: Religion and Multiculturalism from Israel to Canada (OUP 2014) 1-
21, 2. 
248 Malcolm D Evans, ‘The Freedom of Religion or Belief in the ECHR since Kokkinakis or “Quoting 
Kokkinakis” in Jeroen Temperman J, T Jeremy Gunn and Malcolm D Evans, The European Court of Human 




But question it one must. Just because something has been repeated so frequently does 
not necessarily mean that it is true. There is a certain sense of ‘cognitive ease’249 surrounding 
claims about the existence and centrality of the forum internum and forum externum distinction in 
the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion in the literature. It has been uncritically 
reinforced and mechanically deployed so often that it now feels familiar, true and effortless.250 
However, as this section has demonstrated the way in which the notion of a distinction between 
the forum internum and the forum externum has become the orthodox approach to Article 9, or 
the intellectual scaffolding upon which discussions are based, is concerning. It has largely been 
entrenched through superficial references and repeated, unsupported assertions, rather than 
through engagement with the primary materials.  
The paucity of evidence provided to support claims made about the centrality of the 
forum internum and forum externum and the extent of intertextual reliance raises serious 
questions about the accuracy of claims made about the centrality and problematic nature of the 
distinction, both at the time they were made and their applicability in light of developments in 
case law over the past twenty years. Does the lack of serious engagement with the text of Article 
9, the relevant travaux préparatoires and Article 9 jurisprudence mean that commentators have 
projected their own understanding of the forum internum and forum externum distinction onto 
Article 9 and the jurisprudence, and as a consequence, their own expectations of how the 
distinction works or should work in practice?  
It is evident from the analysis above that claims made in the literature that the forum 
internum and forum externum distinction is central to the understanding of Article 9, and that it is 
detrimentally affecting the protection of Article 9 rights, should be perpetuated no longer. It is 
clear that a review of the understanding of Article 9 and Article 9 jurisprudence in light of a close 
and detailed analysis of the primary materials — including the text of ECHR Article 9, related 
international instruments, relevant travaux préparatoires and all Article 9 case law  — is 
necessary and, indeed, well overdue.251  
 
Conclusion  
This chapter demonstrates that there is an established consensus in the literature that there is a 
clear, binary and hierarchical distinction between the absolute forum internum and the qualified 
forum externum in the architecture of freedom of religion or belief articles and that this is a 
 
249 Kahneman explains that ‘a sentence…that has been repeated, or has been primed, will be fluently processed 
with cognitive ease’, see Daniel Kahneman, Thinking, Fast and Slow (Penguin 2012) 59. 
250 These are prerequisites for cognitive ease according to Kahneman, see ibid.,70. 
251 We are inclined to believe statements that have been repeated frequently but it is often useful to think them 




doctrine of the ECtHR. It has become the conceptual starting point for discussions of Article 9; 
indeed, it is now, as has been emphasised above, an almost guaranteed feature of any discussion 
of the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion in Article 9. Commentators have 
consistently emphasised the importance of the forum internum and forum externum distinction to 
the understanding and protection of this right, particularly the key difference between the 
absolute forum internum and the qualified forum externum in terms of protection at the ECtHR.  
Yet, despite the emphasis on the centrality of the forum internum and forum externum 
distinction, commentators have increasingly criticised the distinction for leading to poor 
protection of both the forum internum and forum externum. Commentators have criticised the 
ECtHR for i) failing to apply the distinction ‘correctly’, ii) for failing to acknowledge the 
interrelationship between belief and manifestation and, iii) for working with a conception of 
religion or belief which reflects a Protestant Christian understanding of religion and 
disadvantages orthopraxic religions. The suggestions made by commentators to address these 
‘problems’ — such as clarifying the scope of the forum internum and forum externum, more 
rigorously applying the distinction or viewing the forum internum and forum externum as 
interrelated realms — are unsatisfactory because they are piecemeal and based on the idea that a 
clear distinction between the forum internum and forum externum is central to Article 9. 
In stepping back from the traditional approach to Article 9 and the jurisprudence, this 
chapter asks some radical questions about how and why this distinction became central to 
literature relating to Article 9. The detailed chronological analysis of references to, and 
discussions of the forum internum and forum externum distinction in the literature on freedom of 
thought, conscience and religion reveals that this distinction only became a central feature of the 
literature after the turn of the century.  Since then there has been an exponential growth in the use 
of the terms, but this is largely the result intertextual reliance (on two, now somewhat outdated, 
seminal texts) rather than close engagement with the structure of Article 9, the relevant travaux 
préparatoires or Article 9 jurisprudence.  
This chapter points out that the way in which the notion of this distinction has become 
ossified, and the elision of ideas in respect to the forum internum and forum externum, is deeply 
concerning; it seriously calls into question the accuracy of statements made in the literature 
regarding the centrality of the forum internum and forum externum distinction. Given the gaps in 
and limitations of the existing literature with respect to the forum internum and forum externum 
distinction, this chapter argues that it is now time for a comprehensive review of centrality of the 
forum internum and forum externum distinction to the understanding and protection of Article 9. 
It is to this comprehensive review of the text of ECHR Article 9, the related travaux 
préparatoires and Article 9 case law that this thesis will now turn.  
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CHAPTER 2. THE FORUM INTERNUM AND FORUM EXTERNUM: 
THE TEXT OF ECHR ARTICLE 9 
Introduction  
This chapter explores whether the forum internum and forum externum distinction is central to the 
architecture of the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion (the next chapter will 
focus on the question whether it is a central ‘doctrine’ of the ECtHR).  This chapter comprises 
three sections. The first section examines the text of ECHR Article 9 in detail. The second 
analyses the travaux préparatoires1 relating to ECHR Article 9 and to the right to freedom of 
thought, conscience and religion in two contemporary instruments drafted just before the ECHR, 
upon which the ECHR drafters relied, namely, UDHR Article 18 and Article 16 of the draft 
International Covenant on Human Rights. The third section explores two significant changes 
made to the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion in two later international 
(ICCPR Article 18 and Article 1 of the 1981 Declaration) namely, the removal of the right to 
change religion or belief and the addition of the prohibition on coercion.2  
Through an original analysis of this material, this chapter argues that a binary and 
hierarchical distinction between the forum internum and forum externum is not evident from the 
structure of ECHR Article 9, nor was it the intention of the drafters of these instruments to create 
such a distinction in the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion. Rather the structure 
of ECHR Article 9, related international provisions, and the travaux préparatoires suggest that 
the drafters understood the importance of both the forum internum and forum externum aspects of 
the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion, and importantly, recognised the 
interrelatedness rather than the distinctiveness of these realms. This interrelationship, it is 
contended, is clearly illustrated in the debates relating to the right to change religion or belief and 
the prohibition on coercion in international instruments finalised after the ECHR.  
 
 
1 It is recognised that the travaux préparatoires - the drafting documents - relating to ECHR Article 9 are succinct 
and therefore must be used cautiously but these documents remain useful in identifying what was meant by the 
drafters at the time.  
2 It is useful to consider these other international instruments because of the shared history with the ECHR. 
However, the way in which ICCPR Article 18 has been protected by the HRC will not be examined in this thesis 
because the focus in on the understanding of ECHR Article 9 and the protection of Article 9 at the ECtHR. For 
discussion of the HRC’s approach see, Malcolm D Evans, ‘The United Nations and the Freedom of Religion: 
The Work of the Human Rights Committee’ in Rex Adhar R (ed) Law and Religion (Ashgate Publishing Ltd 
2000) 35-61; Martin Scheinin, ‘The Human Rights Committee and Freedom of Religion or Belief’ in W Cole 
Durham Jr and others (eds) Facilitating Freedom of Religion or Belief: A Deskbook (Martinus Nijhoff 2004); 
Stephanie Berry, ‘A ‘Good Faith’ Interpretation of the Right to Manifest Religion? The Diverging Approaches 




A. ECHR Article 9 
 
i. The Structure of ECHR Article 9 
As the previous chapter has demonstrated, commentators recognise that the terms forum internum 
and forum externum are not used in the text of Article 9, however, they repeatedly state that the 
distinction between the forum internum and forum externum is a clear implication from the 
structure of Article 9.3 Nevertheless, on close inspection, a distinction between the forum 
internum and forum externum is not clear from the structure of this right itself. Indeed, this very 
point is revealed by the fact that there is no consensus among commentators as to precisely how 
to divide Article 9 into the forum internum and forum externum.  
 
a. A Binary Distinction?  
Article 9.1 provides that ‘everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; 
this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief and freedom, either alone or in 
community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in worship, 
teaching, practice and observance.’4 The commonest approach is to divide Article 9.1 at the semi-
colon, i.e. to separate ‘the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion’ from the right to 
change a manifest religion or belief. It is claimed that the rights listed before the semi-colon (in 
the first ‘limb’) fall into the forum internum and those listed after the semi-colon (in the second 
‘limb’) fall into the forum externum. However, the significant problem with this approach is that, 
in order for it to work, it is necessary to ignore the awkward placement of the right to change in 
Article 9. In the literature, the right to change religion or belief is invariably presented as a forum 
internum right, but in Article 9 the right to change is placed after the semi-colon, thus implying 
that it is not simply a forum internum right. If the drafters inserted the semi-colon in order to 
distinguish between forum internum and forum externum rights (as commentators claim) the 
failure to include the right to change religion or belief in the list of rights before the semi-colon 
suggests that the structure of Article 9.1 was poorly thought through.  
 
3 For Murdoch the clear implication from the text is that freedom of thought, conscience and religion may not be 
subject to state interference, see Jim Murdoch, Freedom of Thought, Conscience and Religion: A Guide to the 
Implementation of Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights (2nd edn, Council of Europe 2012) 
18. See also Yannis Kistakis, ‘The Protection of the forum internum under Article 9 of the ECHR’ in D 
Spielmann, M Tsirli and P Voyatzis (eds) La Convention europénne des droits de l’homme, un instrument 
vivant, Mélanges en l’honneur de Christol L Rozakis (Bruykant 2011) 287.  
4 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (European Convention on Human 




 It is also implied in the literature that the two paragraphs in Article 9 (paragraphs 9.1 and 
9.2) represent the distinction between the forum internum and the forum externum.5 However, this 
again involves ignoring another aspect of the right in the article, this time the right to manifest. It 
is not accurate to say that paragraph one rights are forum internum rights and paragraph two 
rights are forum externum rights because the right to manifest religion or belief — which is 
invariably understood as a forum externum right in the literature — appears in both paragraph one 
and paragraph two.  A paragraph-based division does not work because paragraph one includes 
both forum internum and forum externum rights whereas paragraph two relates only to forum 
externum rights.   
 Some commentators suggest that the forum internum and forum externum distinction 
maps onto a private and public distinction in Article 9.6 However, this is another deeply 
problematic approach which involves glossing over the actual terms in Article 9. Whilst the 
literature frequently describes the forum internum as the ‘private sphere’ this is misleading 
because it is narrower, conceptually, than this.7 There is a significant difference between the 
‘private sphere’ and the privacy of the mind. Particularly, it is confusing to use ‘private sphere’ 
interchangeably with forum internum because Article 9 explicitly states that manifestation of 
religion or belief (understood to be in the forum externum) is protected both in public and in 
private.8  
The problems with each of the different methods commentators use to divide up Article 9 
into the forum internum and forum externum not only undermines the claim that a binary 
distinction between the forum internum and forum externum is evident in the structure of this 
article but also suggests that such attempts to identify a point of division between these two 
realms in the structure of Article 9 are misguided. The opening of Article 9 — that ‘everyone has 
the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion’— seems to function as a chapeau. The 
following sentence — ‘this right includes the right to change and manifest religion or belief,’ — 
seems to provide examples of rights included within the broader right to freedom of thought, 
conscience and religion. This will be borne out by the travaux préparatoires which will be 
considered later in this chapter.  
 
5 Scharffs notes that they are divided into paragraph one and two, or first tier and second tier rights, see Brett G 
Scharffs, ‘Symposium Introduction. The Freedom of Religion and Belief Jurisprudence of the European Court 
of Human Rights: Legal, Moral and Political Perspectives’ (2010) 26 Journal of Law and Religion 249, 255. 
6 E.g. Manfred Nowak, UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: CCPR Commentary (2nd edn, NP Engels 
2005) 410. See the discussion of the public/private distinction in Chapter One of the thesis.  
7 Nowak uses ‘forum internum’ and ‘forum externum’ and ‘private’ and ‘public’ synonymously, see e.g. 
Manfred Nowak, UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: CCPR Commentary (NP Engels 1993) 314.  
8 Danchin explains the forum internum does not include ‘external spheres, even if non-state and therefore 
technically ‘private’ such as places of worship, school or the family where religious belief may be 
communicated or acted upon’, see Peter G Danchin, ‘Of Prophets and Proselytes: Freedom of Religion and the 




Contrary to claims made by commentators, therefore, the structure of Article 9 does not 
reveal a clear distinction between the forum internum and the forum externum; rather the structure 
suggests that both the forum internum and the forum externum are protected under the broad right 
to freedom of thought, conscience and religion and are related aspects of this right.   
 
ii. The Limitation Clause 
Just as commentators have identified a binary distinction between the forum internum and forum 
externum in Article 9 they have also identified a hierarchical distinction between the two realms 
in the article. Commentators claim that the structure of Article 9 as a whole, specifically the 
inclusion of a limitation clause in Article 9.2, creates a hierarchy in terms of the different levels 
of protection to be offered to Article 9 rights. It is constantly repeated that whilst manifestation 
can be limited by the State (in accordance with Article 9.2), forum internum rights must be 
protected absolutely.9  However, again, a close reading of the text of ECHR Article 9 suggests 
that claims about a clear hierarchy in Article 9 are unfounded.  
 
a. A Hierarchical Distinction? 
Firstly, all that can be gleaned from the text of Article 9 itself, in terms of the legal status of rights 
therein, is that manifestation of religion or belief can be subject to limitations in certain 
circumstances as set out in Article 9.2. Article 9 makes no comment on the level of protection to 
be offered to the other rights listed. Commentators have assumed that this means that the right to 
freedom of thought, conscience and religion and the right to change religion or belief are absolute 
rights. However, it does not automatically follow that, because these rights are not explicitly 
qualified, they must be absolute rights; they are not expressly absolute, so all that can be 
concluded from the text of Article 9 is that there are no express limitations on the right to 
freedom of thought, conscience and religion or the right to change religion or belief.10 Moreover, 
given the wider context of the ECHR, it is problematic to claim that Article 9 protects absolute 
rights because Article 9 is not (like other provisions which are understood to protect absolute 
 
9 See, for example, T Jeremy Gunn, ‘Book Review: Taylor P, Freedom of Religion: UN and European Human 
Rights Law and Practice’ (2008) 23 Journal of Law and Religion 101, 102; Heiner Bielefeldt, ‘Freedom of 
Religion or Belief – A Human Right under Pressure’ (2012) 1:1 Oxford Journal of Law and Religion 15, 8; W 
Cole Durham Jr and Carolyn Evans, ‘Freedom of Religion and Religion-State Relations’ in Tushnet M, Fleiner 
T, and Saunders C (eds) Routledge Handbook to Constitutional Law (Routledge 2013) 248; Thomas M Krapf, 
‘Lost Opportunities and Missed Targets’ in Peter Petkoff and Julian Rivers (eds) Changing Nature of Religious 
Rights in International Law (OUP 2015) 127; Heiner Bielefeldt, Nazila Ghanea and Michael Wiener, Freedom 
of Religion or Belief: An International Law Commentary (OUP 2016) 64. 
10 For a similar point in relation to Article 3 see generally Steven Greer, ‘Is the Prohibition against Torture, 
Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment Really ‘Absolute’ in International Human Rights Law?’ (2015) 
15:1 Human Rights Law Review 101; Steven Greer, The European Convention on Human Rights: 




rights, such as Article 3) exempted from derogations in time of public emergency under Article 
15.11 
 Secondly, Article 9.2 does not simply state that manifestation can be limited by the State. 
Article 9.2 says that manifestation of religion or belief can only be limited by the State in certain 
circumstances. This is a subtle but important difference. Rather than a second order concern, what 
this suggests is that manifestation has a high degree of protection in the ECHR. And, in 
comparison with other limitation clauses in the ECHR, such as Article 8.2 or 11.2, Article 9.2 is 
one of the least permissible. 
Again, therefore, the text of Article 9 does not reveal a clear hierarchical distinction 
between the level of protection to be offered to forum internum and forum externum rights; rather 
the wording of the article suggests that the two are understood to be important aspects of the right 
to freedom of thought, conscience and religion as a whole. 
 
B. Other Contemporary International Instruments and Travaux Préparatoires 
(pre-November 1950) 
It has been argued above that the text of Article 9 does not reveal a binary and hierarchical 
distinction between the forum internum and the forum externum. But what about the travaux 
préparatoires relating to Article 9? Do they reveal that the drafters of Article 9 envisaged a 
binary and hierarchical distinction between the forum internum and forum externum in Article 9 
even if such a distinction is not evident from the text of Article 9 itself? The ECHR was drafted 
during 1949-1950, was signed on 4 November 1950 and entered into force on 3 September 
1953.12 The key point to make about the ECHR, as revealed from the travaux préparatoires 
relating to Article 9, is the heavy intellectual dependence on provisions relating to freedom of 
religion or belief in international instruments drafted around the same time.  
Firstly, the drafters relied heavily on UDHR Article 18;13 this instrument was drafted in 
1947, finalised in 1948 and adopted by the UN General Assembly on 10 December 1948. 
Secondly, the drafters relied on the provision relating to freedom of thought, conscience and 
religion (numbered Article 16) in the June 1949 version of the draft International Covenant on 
Human Rights. This Covenant, unlike the UDHR, was intended to be legally binding. Initially, 
 
11 For discussion see Malcolm D Evans, Religious Liberty and International Law in Europe (OUP 1997); 
Carolyn Evans, Freedom of Religion under the European Convention on Human Rights (OUP 2001). 165. For a 
discussion of Article 15, see D Harris and others, Harris O’Boyle & Warbrick: Law of the European Convention 
on Human Rights (4th edn, OUP 2018) 805- 834. 
12 For a useful summary of the drafting history, see William A Schabas, The European Convention on Human 
Rights: A Commentary (OUP 2015) 414-419.  
13 COE, Collected Edition of the “Travaux Préparatoires” of the European Convention on Human Rights 




the Committee on Human Rights planned to produce all the elements of the ‘international bill of 
human rights’ (a declaration, a covenant and means of implementation) at the same time, but the 
Covenant was delayed. As it developed, this draft International Covenant on Human Rights was 
split into two treaties, namely the ICCPR and International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (ICESCR). In this process, Article 16 of the draft International Covenant on 
Human Rights formed the basis for ICCPR Article 18. The ICCPR was drafted up until 1954, 
signed on 19 December 1966 and came into force on 3 January 1976.  
The first draft of what is now ECHR Article 9, simply stated that freedom of thought, 
conscience and religion should be protected in accordance with Article 18 of the UDHR.14 
Following recommendations that attention should be paid to the progress which had been made 
by UN drafters with respect to the draft International Covenant on Human Rights by mid-1949,15 
the ECHR drafters compared the draft International Covenant on Human Rights with the 
Consultative Assembly’s draft of the ECHR.16 At the time, Article 16 (the provision relating to 
freedom of religion or belief) in the draft International Covenant on Human Rights, formed two 
paragraphs.17 The first paragraph of the International Covenant on Human Rights was taken 
verbatim from UDHR Article 18 and the second paragraph set out permissible limitations on the 
right to manifest religion or belief.18 This two-paragraph version became the basis for ECHR 
Article 9.  
What is striking about the ECHR travaux préparatoires is that it reveals that in 
considering Article 16 of the draft International Covenant on Human Rights, the members of the 
Committee of Experts focused only upon proposals for alterations to the second paragraph. The 
travaux préparatoires record an extended debate on the precise wording of limitations until 
agreement was finally reached in 7 August 1950.19 In contrast, the travaux préparatoires do not 
refer to any discussion whatsoever on paragraph one. The Committee simply accepted the 
decision to incorporate UDHR Article 18 verbatim into ECHR Article 9. This remained 
unchanged in the final draft of ECHR Article 9 submitted by the Committee of Ministers to the 
Consultative Assembly in 25 August 1950.   
 
14 Ibid. See also, ibid., Volume IV, Appendix to the Report of the Committee of Experts on Human Rights: Draft 
Convention of Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 16 March 1950, 52.  
15 Ibid., Volume II, Second Session of the Committee of Ministers Held in Paris from 3 – 5 November 1949, Letter 
Addressed by Mr Gustave Rasmussen, Chairman of the Committee of Ministers to Mr Paul Henri Spaak, President 
of the Consultative Assembly of the 5 November 1949, 296, para 6.  
16 Ibid., Volume III, Working Papers Prepared by the Secretariat General for the Committee of Experts, 
Preparatory report by the Secretariat-General concerning a preliminary draft convention to provide a collective 
guarantee of human rights (undated), 26 -38. 
17 UNECOSOC, Report of the Fifth Session of the Commission on Human Rights to the Economic and Social 
Council (23 June 1949) UN Doc E/CN.4/350, 33. 
18 Ibid.  
19 For a useful summary of the development, see COE, European Commission of Human Rights, Preparatory 




Given this clear intellectual dependence on UDHR Article 18 it is, therefore, necessary to 
analyse the travaux préparatoires relating to UDHR Article 18 in order to establish whether the 
drafters of that instrument conceived of a binary and hierarchical distinction between the forum 
internum and forum externum in the protection of freedom of thought, conscience and religion.  
 
i. ECHR Article 9.1 and UDHR Article 18  
The previous chapter demonstrated that the forum internum and forum externum distinction, 
described as a ‘classic’, ‘fundamental’ and ‘abiding’ distinction, is presented as if it has always 
been an essential part of provisions protecting the right to freedom of religion at the international 
level. Bielefeldt, Ghanea and Wiener claim, for instance, that the distinction between the absolute 
forum internum and the qualified forum externum was ‘embedded’ in Article 14 of the Draft 
Outline of the International Bill of Human Rights in June 1947.20 There is also an assumption in 
some of the literature that the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion was a 
straightforward article to draft. Indeed, some early commentators writing specifically on the 
UDHR travaux préparatoires explained that Article 18 was ‘an easy case.’21  
Recent scholarship, however, particularly the illuminating research undertaken by Lindkvist, 
has highlighted many complexities and nuances involved in the drafting of UDHR Article 18.22 
This section will analyse the travaux préparatoires relating to UDHR Article 18 in detail23 to 
demonstrate that, contrary to popular opinion in the literature, there is not a clear binary and/or 
hierarchical distinction between the forum internum and forum externum in that article, or by 
implication, in ECHR Article 9.1.  
 
 
20 See Heiner Bielefeldt, Nazila Ghanea and Michael Wiener, Freedom of Religion or Belief (OUP 2016) 93.  
21 Martin Scheinin, ‘Article 18’ Guðmundur S Alfreðsson and Asbjørn Eide (eds) The Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights: A Common Standard of Achievement’ (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1999) 379. For exceptions to 
this general trend see John P Humphrey, Human Rights and the United Nations: A Great Adventure 
(Transnational Publishers 1984), 67-68. See also the discussions of Article 18 in Mary Ann Glendon, A World 
Made New: Eleanor Roosevelt and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Random House Trade 
Paperbacks 2002) 69-70, 107, 154 165-9, 183-4, 222. 
22 Linde Lindkvist, Religious Freedom and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (CUP 2017). See also 
his earlier PhD thesis, Lindkvist L, ‘Shrines and Souls: The Reinvention of Religious Liberty and the Genesis of 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights’ (2014) <https://lup.lub.lu.se/search/publication/8be4900a-a82a-
4d0e-97a8-305fe45b3872> accessed December 2016. 
23 A collection of documents can be found in William A Schabas, The Universal Declaration of Human Rights: 
the Travaux Préparatoires (CUP 2013). However, for the purposes of consistency and clarity - with respect to 
travaux préparatoires relating to each of the UN instruments discussed in this thesis - reference will be made to 




a. A Hierarchical Distinction?  
UDHR Article 18 opens with the statement that ‘everyone has the right to freedom of thought, 
conscience and religion.’24 As such, it foregrounds the internal aspect of religious liberty 
(notably, freedom of thought and conscience) rather than the protection of external manifestation 
of religion or belief and religious institutions. The foregrounding of the internal aspect of 
religious liberty is often interpreted as an emphasis on the forum internum at the expense of the 
forum externum. However, the travaux préparatoires do not support such a reading. Whilst they 
reveal that there was, undeniably, an emphasis on the individual, internal aspects of freedom of 
thought, conscience and religion in the drafting of Article 18,25 the evidence does not suggest that 
this reflected a hierarchal understanding of the rights within Article 18 or that manifestation in 
community was considered a second order concern. 
The background provided by Lindkvist is illuminating here. Lindkvist has demonstrated 
that Article 18 of the UDHR represented a new way of approaching religious liberty at the 
international level.26 Before the UDHR, religious liberty protection at the international level had 
focused on protecting minority communities27 (and the external manifestation of religion). With 
this already well established in international law, the UDHR emphasised the importance of also 
including individual rights — particularly the protection of the individual against the state —28 
and the emphasis on the individual, internal aspects of freedom of thought, conscience and 
religion in Article 18 should be understood as a reflection of that.29   
The emphasis on the internal does not suggest that the right to manifest was considered a 
second order concern for the drafters. The right to manifest religion or belief, in public or private, 
alone or in community with others, was also considered to be a fundamental part of the right to 
freedom of thought, conscience and religion, as a whole. This was reflected in the Belgian 
representative’s comment that ‘it would be unnecessary to proclaim that freedom [of religion or 
belief] if it were never to be given outward expression; if it were intended, so to speak, only for 
the use of the inner man.’30  
 
24 UNGA Resolution 217 A(III) Universal Declaration of Human Rights (10 December 1948) UN Doc 
A/RES/3/217/A. 
25 Cassin and Malik emphasized the ‘person’ rather than ‘individual’, see Mary Ann Glendon, A World Made 
New: Eleanor Roosevelt and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Random House Trade Paperbacks 
2002), 42.  
26 Linde Lindkvist, Religious Freedom and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (CUP 2017) 7. See 
earlier comments by Malcolm D Evans, Religious Liberty (CUP 1997) 183ff.  
27 See Julian Rivers, The Law of Organized Religions: Between Establishment and Secularism (OUP 2010) 34. 
28 Berry explains that the purpose of human rights instruments is to protect individuals from the power of the 
State and the tyranny of the majority, Stephanie Berry, ‘A ‘Good Faith’ Interpretation of the Right to Manifest 
Religion? The Diverging Approaches of the European Court of Human Rights and the UN Human Rights 
Committee’ (2017) 37:4 Legal Studies 672, 692. 
29 Linde Lindkvist, Religious Freedom and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (CUP 2017) 32ff. 




By appreciating the broader context of international law against which the UDHR was 
drafted the reason for the emphasis on the individual, internal elements of religion or belief in the 
drafting of Article 18 becomes clear. Protection of individual, internal rights was novel in the 
context at the time, whereas the protection of external, communal manifestations of religion or 
belief was already well established. The emphasis on the individual, internal aspects in the 
travaux préparatoires and the foregrounding of these rights in the text of UDHR Article 18 does 
not therefore reflect an arbitrary hierarchy between the forum internum and the forum externum 
but rather, reveals a concern to ensure that both forum internum and forum externum aspects of 
the right to religious liberty were included in the UDHR.   
 
b. A Binary Distinction?   
A close examination of travaux préparatoires relating to UDHR Article 18 does not support the 
claim that there is a binary distinction between the forum internum and the forum externum in 
UDHR Article 18 either. In highlighting the novelty of the approach to religious liberty protection 
in the UDHR, Lindkvist explains that it stood out from other international instruments protecting 
religious liberty at the time because it distinguished between the ‘inner and external freedoms’ 
and recognised the right to change religion or belief.31 Caution, however, must be taken with the 
precise wording of this claim. Whilst it is indeed accurate to say that, in the context, the UDHR 
was novel in that it protected both the internal and external freedoms, and a right to change 
religion or belief, it seems an overstatement to claim that it distinguished between the internal and 
external realms. To distinguish means to set apart of treat differently. The evidence from the 
travaux préparatoires shows whilst it may be argued that individual drafters, at certain points, 
distinguished between the inner and external freedoms by setting them apart and treating them 
differently, the same cannot be said of the drafters a whole, or the final text of UDHR Article 18. 
An original reading of the travaux préparatoires, focusing on the presentation of the forum 
internum and forum externum, reveals that it was not apparent from the outset that there was a 
distinction to be drawn between these realms in the protection of freedom of religion or belief at 
the international level, and, it is not apparent from the final text of UDHR Article 18.  
 
31 Linde Lindkvist, ‘Shrines and Souls: The Reinvention of Religious Liberty and the Genesis of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights’ (2014) <https://lup.lub.lu.se/search/publication/8be4900a-a82a-4d0e-97a8-
305fe45b3872> accessed December 2016, 31. This was later changed to ‘rests on an implicit distinction 
between the freedom of thought, conscience and religion on the one hand and the freedom of external 
manifestation on the other’ (my emphasis) in his monograph, see Linde Lindkvist, Religious Freedom and the 




In the initial draft of UDHR Article 18 (the ‘Humphrey Draft’),32 the article simply set 
out ‘freedom of conscience and belief and of private and public worship.’33 Lindkvist highlights 
the important role of Cassin, Malik and Nolde in shaping Article 18 into its final form. In 
particular, Lindkvist claims that it was Cassin34 who ‘designed a religious liberty article that drew 
a sharp line between the inner and external freedoms’35 and ‘marked the freedom of thought and 
conscience as “absolute and sacred” thus underlining its special status, not only within this 
specific article, but also within the UDHR in general.’36  
Indeed, the travaux préparatoires do reveal that in 1947, Cassin submitted a proposal for 
the article which constituted two paragraphs: the first read that ‘individual freedom of conscience, 
belief and thought is an absolute and sacred right’ and the second, that ‘the practice of private or 
public worship and the manifestations of opposite convictions can be subject only to such 
limitations that are necessary to protect public order, morals and the rights and freedoms of 
others.’37 The two-paragraph structure of this proposal separated freedom of conscience, belief 
and thought, on the one hand, and the practice of worship on the other. Importantly, there was 
also an addition regarding the legal status of the rights within the article; the right to freedom of 
thought, conscience and religion was identified as an ‘absolute and sacred’ right whereas 
manifestations of religion could be subject to certain limitations.38   
 Furthermore, Cassin’s proposal was indeed influential in the development of Article 18 as 
it formed the basis for the Drafting Committee’s discussions. Influenced by the UK’s more 
detailed version of the article,39 the main changes made by the Drafting Committee were to 
include the right to hold or change religion or belief (at the insistence of Malik) and remove the 
reference to limitations.40 The version of the article which was submitted to the Commission on 
Human Rights read:  
 
32 Referred to as such in Mary Ann Glendon, A World Made New: Eleanor Roosevelt and the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (Random House Trade Paperbacks 2002) Appendix i.  
33 UNECOSOC, Commission on Human Rights, Drafting Committee, International Bill of Rights Documented 
Outline (11 June 1947) UN Doc E/CN.4/AC.1/3/Add.1, 100.  
34 Cassin was influenced by Charles Malik, who was in turn influenced by the Catholic Theologian, Maritian and 
existentialist philosophy generally, see Linde Lindkvist, Religious Freedom and the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights (CUP 2017) 21-60.  
35 Ibid., 27. 
36 Linde Lindkvist, ‘Shrines and Souls: The Reinvention of Religious Liberty and the Genesis of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights’ (2014) <https://lup.lub.lu.se/search/publication/8be4900a-a82a-4d0e-97a8-
305fe45b3872> accessed December 2016, 35. 
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June 1947) UN Doc E.CN.4/AC.1/W.2/Rev.2, 4.  
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40 UNECOSOC, Commission on Human Rights, Second Session, Report of the Working Group on the Declaration 





1. ‘individual freedom of thought and conscience, to hold and change beliefs, is an absolute and sacred right.’ 
2. ‘Every person has the right, either alone or in community with other persons of like mind and in public or 
private, to manifest his beliefs in worship, observance, teaching and practice.’41 
However, the final text of UDHR Article 18 differed significantly from this draft. It was the 
proposal submitted by Malik during the meeting on 4 June 1948 — in which he responded to and 
incorporated the substantial changes which had been proposed during the meeting by members of 
the Commission on Human Rights — which became the final text of UDHR Article 18. Malik’s 
proposal read: 
‘Everyone has the right to freedom of thought conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to 
change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in community with others, in public or private, to 
manifest his religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship and observance.’42 
 It is important to compare these versions of the article because there are some significant 
differences between Malik’s version in June 1948 and the version in December 1947 (which was 
based on Cassin’s earlier proposal). Notably, Malik’s later version explicitly referred to 
‘religion’, reintroduced ‘thought’ and removed the reference to the right to hold a religion or 
belief (as this was understood to be implicit in the right to freedom of thought, conscience and 
religion itself). In terms of understanding the importance of the forum internum and forum 
externum distinction to the drafters, there were two further significant changes in Malik’s later 
version. Firstly, the descriptive terms ‘absolute and sacred’ were removed43 and secondly, the 
article was framed as a single paragraph. 
It is especially interesting in this respect that Lindkvist suggests that these late changes to 
the text proposed by Malik were regarded as insignificant by ‘the main supporters of segregating 
the inner and external freedoms in Article 18’.44 Compared with the December 1947 draft — in 
which the right to hold and change a religion of belief were described as ‘absolute and sacred’ 
rights,45 and were separated from the right to manifest religion or belief in a two paragraph 
structure – these are significant changes. So, if they were as Lindkvist claims, considered 
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43 Brazil had suggested replacing ‘absolute and sacred’ with ‘unrestricted’, see UNECOSOC, Commission on 
Human Rights Third Session, Collation of the Comments of Governments on the Draft International Declaration 
on Human Rights, Draft International Covenant on Human Rights and the Question of Implementation (1 May 
1948) UN Doc E/CN.4/85, 31-32 
44 Linde Lindkvist, Religious Freedom and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (CUP 2017) 29, 141  
45 It was also referred to as ‘absolute and sacred’ by Malik, UNECOSOC, Commission on Human Rights, 
Drafting Committee First Session, Summary Record of the Eighth Meeting (17 June 1947) UN Doc 




insignificant, why was this so? Does this mean that those drafters identified by Lindkvist as ‘main 
supporters of segregating the inward and external freedoms’ were not really supporters of 
segregating inward and external freedoms at all? Was Cassin’s sharp line not a sharp line at all? 
If this is the case then it calls for a different reading of Article 18, i.e. one which does not suggest 
that the drafters intended to draw a distinction (let alone a binary and hierarchical distinction) 
between the forum internum and forum externum in Article 18. Given the importance of these 
implications, it is crucial to ascertain whether the forum internum and forum externum distinction 
really is, as so often claimed, central to the understanding of the right to freedom of thought, 
conscience and religion in UDHR Article 18.   
A close examination of the travaux préparatoires reveals that Cassin did initially object 
to the one-paragraph structure, however, soon after, he voted in favour of it. The records show 
that following Cassin’s initial objection to the one-paragraph formulation Malik responded by 
separating the article into two paragraphs so that it read: ‘everyone has the right to freedom of 
religion, conscience and thought, including freedom to change his religion or belief’ and 
‘everyone has the right to freedom…to manifest his religion or belief….’.46 However — and this 
is interesting — Malik said that if this met with objection in later discussion it would revert back 
to a one paragraph structure. The fact that the Drafting Sub-Committee (which included both 
Cassin and Malik, along with representatives from the UK and Uruguay) recommended Malik’s 
single paragraph structure47 a short while later indicates firstly that there was objection to the two-
paragraph structure, and secondly, and more importantly, that Cassin changed his mind about its 
significance.  It was the single paragraph version, approved by the Commission on Human 
Rights48 and submitted to the General Assembly49 which became the final text of UDHR Article 
18.50    
The unanimous adoption of a single paragraph structure provides strong evidence to 
refute the claim that UDHR Article 18 distinguishes between the forum internum and forum 
externum. In particular, the use and placement of the semi-colon is revealing. Semantically, semi-
colons separate two closely related independent clauses. In Article 18 the semi-colon separates 
the statement that ‘everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion’ from 
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the statement that the right includes the right to change a religion or belief and the right to 
manifest religion or belief. Rather than marking a point of division between the forum internum 
and the forum externum, the semi-colon blurs any such distinction. The placement of the semi-
colon after the statement ‘everyone has the right…’ suggests that this sentence functions as a 
chapeau — as an introductory text setting out the principles and objectives of the article — 
whereas the sentence which follow the semi-colon gives examples of rights within this broader 
right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion, namely the right to change and manifest 
religion or belief.  
Given this, an alternative way of making sense of the unanimous decision to adopt this 
single paragraph structure is to understand the aim of the drafters in a different way.  Rather than 
claiming that they aimed to segregate forum internum and forum externum rights in the article it 
makes more sense, in light of the travaux préparatoires and the final text of Article 18, to argue 
that the primary concern of the drafters was to ensure that both forum internum and forum 
externum aspects were encompassed. Rather than separating rights based on whether they fell 
within the forum internum or forum externum the drafters set out the broad right to freedom of 
thought, conscience and religion in the chapeau which included both forum internum and forum 
externum aspects.     
This is a subtle but important difference and it has significant implications for the 
understanding of the relationship between the forum internum and forum externum today. There 
is a danger when examining the travaux préparatoires that pre-conceived notions regarding the 
importance of the forum internum and forum externum distinction in the literature today may 
influence the reading of these earlier materials. Indeed, Lindkvist concedes that the current 
centrality of the forum internum and forum externum distinction in the literature makes it difficult 
to imagine that it was debated at the time of drafting the UDHR.51 Despite this recognition, 
however, it seems that Lindkvist has been influenced by increasing emphasis on the division 
between the forum internum and forum externum in the literature on freedom of thought, 
conscience and religion, as noted in the previous chapter of this thesis. In his own work, 
Lindkvist moved from using the language of a ‘distinction’ between the forum internum and 
forum externum in his doctoral thesis52 to describing ‘a sharp line’ between the forum internum 
and forum externum in his monograph.53 This is a notable semantic change because the rest of the 
argument has remained identical.  
 
51 Linde Lindkvist, ‘Shrines and Souls: The Reinvention of Religious Liberty and the Genesis of the Universal 
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It is also important to bear in mind the fact that, whilst the drafters did have a notion of 
internal and external rights, they did not articulate it through the language of the forum internum 
and forum externum which, as the previous chapter of this thesis explains, has become a 
convenient way of emphasising a distinction between the two realms. It is also anachronistic to 
suggest that the individual drafters drew a neat, binary distinction between the internal and 
external realms, however conceptualised. For instance, Lindkvist explains that Cassin drew a 
‘sharp line’ between the forum internum and the forum externum in his two-paragraph proposal 
and claims he was a main supporter of segregating in internal and external freedoms.54 However, 
a close reading of statements made by Cassin elsewhere in the travaux préparatoires relating to 
Article 18 suggests that even he did not view the internal and external realms as segregated. In 
fact, his statements show the opposite; they show that Cassin conceived of the forum internum 
and the forum externum as deeply interrelated elements of religious liberty. 
In this respect, Cassin’s comments relating to the scope of right to freedom of thought are 
particularly revealing. For Cassin, the right to freedom of thought did not simply protect the inner 
freedom to hold a thought; he explained that the right to freedom of thought also protected 
individuals against situations in which they were forced to ‘profess a belief which was not 
held.’55 Such an outward obligation, Cassin commented, was an example of a way in which 
freedom of thought could be attacked indirectly. It was this concern for indirect attack from 
outward obligations which led Cassin to argue for formal protection of the right to freedom of 
thought in Article 18.  These comments are interesting because they show that Cassin had 
nuanced understanding of the relationship between the forum internum and forum externum. 
Rather than viewing them as hermetically sealed realms he understood them to be deeply 
connected so much so that he thought that in certain circumstances obligations in the external 
realm could impact upon the internal realm.   
 
 This section has demonstrated, from a close reading of the travaux préparatoires relating 
to UDHR Article 18, that the claim that there is a hierarchical distinction between the forum 
internum and forum externum in this provision is unsupported. Once the context is taken into 
account, the foregrounding of the individual, internal aspects of freedom of thought, conscience 
and religion is understandable and should not automatically be interpreted as a privileging of the 
forum internum over the forum externum aspects of freedom of thought, conscience and religion. 
Secondly, through an original reading of the material, it has also demonstrated that there is not a 
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binary distinction between the forum internum and the forum externum in UDHR Article 18 
either. It has argued that the drafters did not conceive of the forum internum and forum externum 
as aspects to be kept separate in the article, but rather as important and deeply related elements of 
the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion as a whole. As such, contrary to recent 
claims, UDHR Article 18 does not seem to represent a Protestant Christian understanding of 
religion in which the internal holding of a religion or belief is prioritised at the expense of 
external manifestation. 
  
ii. ECHR Article 9.2 and Article 16 of the draft International Covenant on 
Human Rights  
Given that the draft International Covenant on Human Rights became obsolete (as it was later 
divided into the ICCPR and ICESCR) the very early versions of the provision relating to the right 
to freedom of thought, conscience and religion, as part of the draft International Covenant on 
Human Rights, are not well-known today. However, the June 1949 version of Article 16 in the 
draft International Covenant on Human Rights56 is important to the understanding of Article 9 
because, as explained above, the ECHR travaux préparatoires reveal that the drafters of ECHR 
Article 9 relied upon Article 16 of the draft International Covenant on Human Rights and 
modelled Article 9 upon it; in this sense, it is a proto ECHR Article 9. 
As noted above, in June 1949, Article 16 of the draft International Covenant on Human 
Rights formed two paragraphs: the first paragraph was taken verbatim from UDHR Article 18 
and the second paragraph set out limitations on the right to manifest religion or belief. 57 
Specifically, the second paragraph provided that: 
‘Freedom to manifest one's religion or beliefs shall be subject only to such limitations as are pursuant 
to law and are reasonable and necessary to protect public safety, order, health, or morals or the fundamental 
rights and freedoms of others.’58 
Given that this two-part structure of Article 16 of the draft International Covenant on 
Human Rights formed the basis for the two-part structure of ECHR Article 9, it is — in order to 
ascertain whether this represents a binary and hierarchical distinction between the forum internum 
and forum externum in ECHR Article 9 — necessary to ascertain whether such a binary and 
hierarchical distinction between the forum internum and the forum externum was envisaged by 
the drafters of Article 16 of the draft International Covenant on Human Rights.  
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a.  A Hierarchical Distinction? 
It is not evident from the travaux préparatoires relating to Article 16 of the draft International 
Covenant on Human Rights that the drafters intended to create a hierarchy between forum 
internum and forum externum in the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion, namely, 
by distinguishing between rights which could be subject to limitations and rights which could not 
be limited by the State.  
The previous chapter emphasised that the key point about the forum internum and forum 
externum distinction for commentators is that it reflects different levels of protection; 
commentators hold that forum internum rights are absolute rights which cannot be interfered with 
by the State in any circumstances, whereas forum externum rights may be limited in certain 
circumstances. Indeed, the concepts are often used interchangeably. Like the forum internum and 
forum externum distinction itself, this is so deeply embedded in the literature it is difficult to 
imagine that the protection of the various aspects of the right to freedom of thought, conscience 
and religion was anything but self-evident to the drafters. However, just as it is important not to 
read into the travaux préparatoires a clear binary distinction between forum internum and forum 
externum rights in UDHR Article 18, it is also important not to read into the travaux 
préparatoires of the draft International Covenant on Human Rights a clear hierarchical 
distinction in terms of the levels of protection to be offered to the rights within that article.  
In early versions of Article 16 — which included UDHR Article 18 verbatim in paragraph 
one — all rights within the article were subject to restrictions set out in the limitation clause. In 
the version discussed by the Commission on Human Rights in May and June 1948 the limitation 
clause in paragraph three applied to all rights enumerated in the article, including the right to hold 
and change religion or belief, the right to manifest, the right not to be forced to act contrary to 
one’s religion and the right to give or receive religious teaching.59 
This is particularly striking because of the overlap in terms of the drafters working on the 
UDHR and the draft International Covenant on Human Rights. In the travaux préparatoires 
relating to UDHR Article 18, Cassin described freedom of thought and freedom of conscience as 
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‘unconditional’ freedoms60 and as ‘sacred and inviolable’ rights61 which give the human person 
‘worth and dignity’.62 Given this, and the fact that other drafters also described the right to 
thought, belief and conscience as ‘unrestricted’ and ‘fundamental’ at various points in the 
drafting of UDHR Article 18 it is surprising that these rights were not immediately singled out 
and given a special status in Article 16.   
 Notably, it was only in response to the May 1949 draft that Malik suggested that the 
restrictive clause should only be applied to the rights in paragraphs two and three (which 
protected the right to manifest, the right not to be forced to act contrary to one’s religion, and the 
right to give or receive religious teaching) and not to the rights to thought, belief and conscience, 
the right to profess any religion or belief and the right to change beliefs, listed in paragraph one.63 
At this stage, Malik emphasised that it was particularly vital to recognise that ‘the principle of 
conscience expressed in paragraph 1 was intangible and could not be restricted.’64 Malik did not 
however comment on the legal status of the right to change religion or belief.65 
 This drafting history undermines the claim that the right to manifest was a second order 
concern in the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion, from the outset. 
Manifestation was not singled out as a less important right and subjected to restrictions as a result 
of its place in a hierarchy of rights. Initially the limitation clause applied to all rights within the 
right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion without discrimination. It was only at a later 
stage that the rights to profess a religion or belief or change a religion or belief were excluded 
from the scope of the limitation clause which applied to the right to manifest, the right not to be 
forced to act contrary to one’s religion and the right to give or receive religious teaching. And, it 
was only after the drafters removed the explicit reference to the right not to be forced to act 
contrary to one’s religion and the right to give or receive religious teaching that the limitation 
clause applied only to the right to manifest religion or belief. The reason why the limitation clause 
in ECHR Article 9.2 relates only to the right to manifest religion or belief, therefore, is because 
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the drafters relied directly upon the 1949 version of Article 16 in the draft International Covenant 
on Human Rights, in which the limitation clause related only to the manifestation of religion or 
belief.  
This background shows that the introduction of a limitation clause into the right to 
freedom of thought, conscience and religion was not a reflection of an automatic, arbitrary 
hierarchy drawn between different types of rights (i.e. between forum internum and forum 
externum rights) or evidence of prioritising one over the other in this article. The drafters 
recognised that there were some extreme circumstances in which states may need to limit certain 
forms of expression of religion or belief, which are dangerous such as those which include ‘brutal 
and bloody ritual, self-mutilation, collective suicides and so forth.’66 Thus, it was agreed a 
religious liberty article in a legally binding treaty should include a limitation clause. It was only 
as the article developed, and rights were removed, that the limitation clause related only to 
manifestation of religion or belief.  
Moreover, even then, the limitation clause was not intended to be a carte blanche for 
states to limit manifestation. Manifestation of religion or belief could only be limited in certain, 
carefully identified, circumstances. The limitation clause is to be strictly interpreted – this has 
been emphasised since by the Human Rights Committee (HRC) in General Comment 22.67 So, 
whilst the scope of the right to manifest was understood to be broad, the scope of the limitation 
clause was understood to be narrow.  
 
b. A Binary Distinction?  
The travaux préparatoires relating to the limitation clause in the provision relating to freedom of 
thought, conscience and religion in the draft International Covenant on Human Rights does not 
only provide strong evidence that the limitation clause relating to the manifestation of religion or 
belief in ECHR Article 9.2 does not represent a hierarchical distinction between forum internum 
and forum externum rights (specifically between holding and manifesting a religion or belief) it 
also provides evidence that the drafters did not conceive of a binary distinction between these 
realms either.  
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 A comment made by the Chinese Representative (Cha) in response to Malik’s proposal to 
restrict the application of the limitation clause is key here. Malik suggested that the limitations in 
paragraph four of Article 16 of the draft International Covenant on Human Rights should only 
apply to the rights listed in paragraphs two and three, namely the right to manifest, the right not to 
be forced to act contrary to one’s religion and the right to give or receive religious teaching.68 
According to the Chinese representative, however, this proposal ‘hardly seemed realistic’ because 
‘it was very difficult in practice to differentiate between religion or belief and its external 
manifestations.’69  
Unfortunately, the travaux préparatoires do not reveal whether this point was discussed 
further, nonetheless, the fact that it was raised at all clearly demonstrates that the drafters did not 
consider the holding of a religion or belief and the external manifestation of religion or belief to 
be separate aspects; they were understood to be interrelated elements of the freedom of thought, 
conscience and religion. Indeed, M Evans has noted that most of the drafters of UDHR Article 18 
‘accepted that the inner realm of private belief and the outward act of manifestation formed a 
continuum; they differed over the point within the continuum at which the interference with the 
enjoyment of the right was justified,’70 i.e. they did not agree on precisely which rights should be 
subject to limitations. The idea that the forum internum and the forum externum are interrelated is 
not, therefore, a novel idea in the literature today; it is important to appreciate that it was there 
from the very beginning. 
Furthermore, the very fact that a right not to be forced to act contrary to one’s religion or 
belief was initially explicitly included in Article 16 of the draft International Covenant on Human 
Rights suggests that the drafters had an understanding that the right to freedom of thought, 
conscience and religion was broader than simply the right to hold, change and manifest religion 
or belief. The inclusion of the right not to be forced to act contrary to one’s conscience is 
particularly relevant here. This right was not included in the 1949 version of Article 16 upon 
which ECHR Article 9 was based, but interestingly, the discussion relating to this right in Article 
16 of the draft International Covenant on Human Rights was later included in the appendix to the 
summary of the travaux préparatoires on ECHR Article 9.71  
It is particularly interesting to note from the appendix that the drafters of Article 16 of the 
draft International Covenant on Human Rights did not have any objection to including a right not 
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to be forced to act contrary to one’s religion or belief, in principle, i.e. they agreed that it was 
within the scope of the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion. It was removed 
simply due to concerns about the practical difficulties of protecting such a right at the 
international level.72 A different approach was taken to the proposal to include a provision 
establishing that ‘persons who conscientiously object to war as being contrary to their religion 
shall be exempt from military service.’73 This was withdrawn on the basis that it was outside the 
scope of the article and covered in Article 8.74  
The right not to be forced to act contrary to one’s religion or belief is interesting because 
it seems to be a liminal right straddling both the forum internum and the forum externum; on the 
one hand it is concerned with the holding of a religion or belief in the internal realm, whereas on 
the other, it is concerned with action (or refusal to act) in the external realm. The fact that the 
drafters had no objection in principle to including this right suggests that there was an 
understanding among the drafters that the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion 
could protect rights which clearly span both the forum internum and forum externum. This is 
further evidenced in the debates concerning the right to change religion or belief to which this 
chapter will now turn.  
 
C. Later International Instruments and Travaux Préparatoires (post-
November 1950) 
This section argues that there are two key pieces of evidence from the drafts of the right to 
freedom of thought, conscience and religion in ICCPR Article 18 and Article 1 of the 1981 
Declaration which further refute the claim that there is a binary and hierarchical distinction 
between forum internum and forum externum rights in UDHR Article 18 and ECHR Article 9. 
The key changes in these later instruments relate to the removal of the right to change religion or 
belief and the introduction of a clause prohibiting coercion which would impair the freedom to 
have or adopt a religion or belief.  
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i. The Right to Change Religion or Belief 
The clearest evidence to support the argument that there is not a binary distinction between the 
forum internum and forum externum in the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion 
can be found in a detailed analysis of the right to change religion or belief in the pre-November 
1950 travaux préparatoires relating to Article 18 of UDHR and Article 16 of the draft 
International Covenant on Human Rights (which formed the basis for Article 18 of the ICCPR) 
and the post-November 1950 travaux préparatoires relating to ICCPR Article 1875 and the 1981 
Declaration.   
Lindkvist has pointed out that the right to change religion or belief was one of the most 
controversial aspects of the UDHR and was by no means ‘a self-evident feature of what religious 
liberty meant when the declaration came to life.’76 The right to change religion or belief was 
included in UDHR Article 18 and Article 16 of the draft International Covenant on Human 
Rights. However, as Article 16 of the draft International Covenant on Human Rights later 
developed into ICCPR Article 18, the drafters replaced the right to change with the ‘freedom to 
have or adopt a religion or belief of one’s choice’.77 In the later, non-binding 1981 Declaration 
even the reference to adopting a religion or belief was removed so that Article 1 does not endorse 
change at all.78   
This section argues that the discussions relating to the right to change religion or belief, 
firstly in the UDHR and the draft International Covenant on Human Rights, and later in the 
ICCPR and 1981 Declaration, support the claim in this chapter that the forum internum and forum 
externum aspects of the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion were understood to 
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be deeply interrelated elements by the drafters of these instruments. An analysis of the 
development of the right to change religion or belief shows that this right was not only 
controversial politically, it was also problematic conceptually in terms of the forum internum and 
the forum externum. The focus of concern for the drafters with respect to the right to change was 
not so much the internal change of mind, but rather the external impact of this change of mind; in 
other words, discussions centred on the move from the forum internum to the forum externum, 
from a change in belief to a change in action. This was clearly understood by the drafters if not 
clearly articulated in terms of the language of internal and external, forum internum and forum 
externum, at the time.  
As the previous chapter demonstrated, commentators invariably categorise the right to 
change religion or belief as a forum internum right. However, in the travaux préparatoires 
relating to UDHR Article 18 and Article 16 of the draft International Covenant on Human Rights, 
the right to change religion was not understood as an entirely internal right but as a right which 
had both forum internum and forum externum aspects. From arguments made by supporters of the 
inclusion of the right to change in UDHR Article 18, the overlap envisaged between the forum 
internum and forum externum within the right to change is evident. According to Malik, for 
instance, it was not enough to protect the freedom to be (a static right) it was also imperative to 
protect the freedom to become, i.e. to change one’s religion or belief from the ‘good to the better 
and better as the truth progressively reveals itself’.79 This freedom to become was not interpreted 
simply as an internal freedom. It was not just about freedom to change one’s mind internally; in 
advocating for the explicit inclusion of the right to change drafters also sought to protect the 
consequences of this change which would be evident through a change of behaviour in the 
external realm. 
The liminal position of the right to change religion or belief in terms of spanning both the 
forum internum and the forum externum is especially evident in the arguments made by those 
who objected to the inclusion of this right in UDHR Article 18. Objections did not centre simply 
upon the right to an internal change of mind per se but on the external implications of this.  
As Lindkvist rightly points out, whilst the literature on the drafting of the UDHR 
typically presents the controversy surrounding the right to change religion or belief in terms of a 
‘clash between secular and predominately Western tradition of individual human rights on the 
one hand, and traditional Islamic doctrines of apostasy on the other’ the travaux préparatoires 
 
79 Habib C Malik (ed) The Challenge of Human Rights: Charles Malik in the Universal Declaration (Charles 




provide little support for such an interpretation.80 Objections were not simply theological. The 
evidence, as Lindkvist indicates, shows that the Saudi Arabian (and the Swedish) amendments 
were rooted in ‘worries about what kinds of social practices the article could be used to 
legitimise,’ such as blackmailing individuals into adopting a religion.81 Saudia Arabia, for 
instance, saw the provision as a threat to Islam; there were concerns that such a provision would 
encourage missionary activity from missionary religions and that Muslims who do not undertake 
missionary activity or proselytise, would be placed at a disadvantage.82  
In terms of the forum internum and forum externum distinction, and the place of the right 
to change religion or belief within this framework, this is an important difference. The fact that 
the Saudi Arabian and Swedish representatives were concerned not simply with the forum 
internum element of the right to change but predominantly the forum externum element of this 
right (specifically, the social practices that the right to change could legitimise) shows that it was 
not understood as a wholly internal right – it was a right which spanned both the forum internum 
and the forum externum.  In addition, in 1949 the Egyptian representative (Loufti) objected to the 
inclusion of a specific right to change religion, not because of its internal aspect but because it 
may lead to abuse in the forum externum, specifically, he argued that the right may be invoked for 
‘unworthy motives’ for example to obtain a divorce.83   
Ultimately the right to change religion or belief remained in UDHR Article 18. And, 
despite objections about forum externum implications from some drafters, early versions of 
Article 16 in the draft International Covenant on Human Rights included the right because there 
was a recognition that a failure to explicitly include a right to change in the would be ‘tantamount 
to a denial of that right’84 because there were ‘religious bodies which discouraged conversions, 
and laws which recognised State religions and discriminated against non-believers of such 
religions.’ 85  
Later, however, there was a definite move away from protecting the right to change 
religion or belief, and an emphasis on the more static right to maintain a religion or belief instead 
in the Covenant.  In 1952, the draft International Covenant on Human Rights was, as noted 
above, split into two separate treaties, one on civil and political rights and one on economic, 
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social and cultural rights (the ICCPR and ICESCR respectively). Article 16 formed the basis for 
the article relating to freedom of thought, conscience and religion in the draft Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights, later known as the ICCPR. In drafting the ICCPR, the emphasis moved from 
the right to change, to the right to maintain one’s religion or belief. It was noted that the right to 
change included a right to maintain one’s religion or belief, but it was argued that it was ‘not 
enough to leave this interpretation to implication’.86 The right to maintain and the right to change 
were considered to be of equal importance and therefore both deserved explicit recognition in the 
article.87 The Egyptian amendment to insert the words, to ‘maintain’ into the article, so that it 
read, ‘freedom to maintain and to change’ was unanimously accepted.88  
By 1960, the right to change had become the fulcrum point in this article and numerous 
amendments were proposed which sought to remove the right to change from the article 
completely, preferring instead to protect an entirely static right, to have a religion or belief. For 
instance, Saudi Arabia proposed deleting the words ‘to maintain or change his religion or belief’ 
in the first paragraph of the article, and also suggested that paragraph two should be replaced by 
the statement that ‘no one shall be subject to coercion which would deprive him of his right to 
freedom of religion or belief.’89 And, Brazil and the Philippines proposed replacing ‘to maintain 
or change his religion or belief’ with the words ‘to have a religion or belief of his choice.’90 The 
compromise by the UK to insert ‘to adopt’ after ‘to have’ a religion or belief was accepted91 and 
the final version of ICCPR Article 18 explains in paragraph one that the right to freedom of 
thought, conscience and religion includes ‘freedom to have or adopt a religion or belief of his 
choice’ and in paragraph two, that ‘coercion which would impair his freedom to have or adopt a 
religion or belief’ is prohibited.92 However, whilst the insertion of ‘to adopt’ went some way 
towards expanding the static right to simply have a religion or belief, it is a stretch to claim that 
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this inclusion of ‘adopt’ specifically protects the right to change. The right to adopt implies that 
one can adopt a religion, but once adopted, cannot abandon it.93  
A similar pattern with respect to the right to change can be seen in the travaux 
préparatoires relating to the 1981 Declaration. In the initial Working Group drafts the right to 
change was included in Article 1.94 This was later replaced with ‘freedom to have or adopt a 
religion or belief of his choice’95 and eventually even this was removed96 following continued 
opposition from representatives of Islamic countries.97 In removing both the right to change and 
the right to adopt religion or belief, so the final text of Article 1 of the 1981 Declaration simply 
provided for ‘freedom to have a religion or whatever belief of his choice’, the right to change 
religion or belief was not explicitly endorsed at all.98  
The right to change religion or belief was problematic precisely because it was 
understood to span both the forum internum and the forum externum. The implications of 
including such a right in a legally binding treaty became so controversial by the time of the 
ICCPR it was exchanged for the less controversial right ‘to adopt’ a religion or belief, and both 
the right to change and the right to adopt were entirely written out of Article 1 of the 1981 
Declaration. This is conveniently ignored by commentators as the right is routinely said to be an 
implied right. Taylor, for instance, argues that there is ‘little doubt’ that ICCPR Article 18 
includes the right to change. In respect of the 1981 Declaration, he argues that Article 8, which 
states that nothing in the 1981 Declaration shall be ‘construed as restricting or derogating from 
any right defined in the UDHR or the International Covenants on Human Rights’, means that the 
right to change is included in this instrument too.99 
The precise nature of the right to change is also largely ignored by commentators. The 
right to change is invariably described as a forum internum right in the literature relating to 
ECHR Article 9, but this section has demonstrated that the travaux préparatoires relating to 
UDHR Article 18 and Article 16 of the draft International Covenant on Human Rights, and the 
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travaux préparatoires relating to Article 18 of the ICCPR, show that it was not conceived in this 
way by the drafters of these instruments. Rather, the evidence demonstrates that the drafters 
understood that the right to change religion or belief spans both the forum internum and the forum 
externum. 100 Objections were not just based on opposition to an internal change of mind on a 
theological basis (i.e. because certain religions prohibited apostasy) but rather on the external 
consequences of a change of mind; it was the move from thinking to doing within this right that 
was its most controversial feature. Contrary to the claims of commentators, it is not clear from the 
structure of ECHR Article 9 that the right to change religion or belief is a forum internum right. 
The right to change occupies an ambivalent place both in UDHR Article 18 and ECHR Article 9.  
Once it is recognised that the forum internum and forum externum aspects of the right to 
change religion or belief were appreciated by the drafters of freedom of religion or belief 
provisions, it is extremely difficult to claim that there is an either/or, binary distinction between 
the forum internum and the forum externum in ECHR Article 9. Any attempt to categorise rights 
into forum internum or forum externum is undermined by the fact that the right to change spans 
both the forum internum and the forum externum. One is forced to concede, therefore, that UDHR 
Article 18 and by implication ECHR Article 9, protects rights in the forum internum, rights in the 
forum externum and rights which span both the forum internum and forum externum. There is 
therefore no binary distinction; any boundaries which may be perceived between these two 
realms are in fact blurred.  
 
ii. The Prohibition on Coercion 
The claim that there is a clear hierarchical distinction between absolute forum internum and 
qualified forum externum rights in UDHR Article 18 and ECHR Article 9 is also undermined by a 
significant change to the structure of the provision in what became Article 18 of the ICCPR in 
1952, namely, the introduction of the provision that prohibited coercion which would impair the 
freedom to maintain or change a religion or belief.  
Whilst the terms ‘absolute’, ‘sacred’ and ‘unconditional’ had been used to describe the 
rights to hold and change a religion or belief in the drafting of the UDHR up to 1949, these terms 
were ultimately removed from the final text of UDHR Article 18. This meant that the precise 
level of protection to be offered to rights included in UDHR Article 18 was not clear from the 
text itself. Given the fact that the ICCPR was intended to be a legally binding treaty, the drafters 
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of ICCPR Article 18 decided to insert a paragraph into the text to expressly prohibit any coercion 
which would impair the rights to maintain or change a religion or belief.  
In 1952 the drafters of the ICCPR explained that in order to ‘ensure the conditions in 
which the freedom to maintain or change one’s religion could be enjoyed’, the article should 
include, in paragraph two, a provision which expressly prohibited coercion which would impair 
the freedom to maintain or change a religion or belief.101 This paragraph was retained in the final 
version of ICCPR Article 18 and also appears in Article 1 of the 1981 Declaration. Whilst it is 
recognised that this does not alter the meaning of ECHR Article 9, it does affect the perception of 
it given that provisions relating to freedom of religion or belief in the UDHR, ICCPR, ECHR and 
the 1981 Declaration are often addressed together.  
For the purposes of this thesis, the prohibition on coercion in ICCPR Article 18.2 is 
illustrative because it shows a further blurring of any distinction between the forum internum and 
the forum externum. Firstly, the prohibition on coercion is not restricted to forum internum rights 
because it relates both to the forum internum right to hold a religion or belief and the right to 
change, which spans both the forum internum and forum externum.  
Secondly, and crucially in terms of the forum internum and forum externum distinction, 
the elaboration in paragraph two emphasises the interrelationship between the holding and 
changing of a religion or belief and manifestation.  In choosing to prohibit coercion which would 
impair the freedom to maintain or change a religion or belief, any coercion which has this effect 
is prohibited. Indeed, the scope of this provision was made explicit in the travaux préparatoires 
relating to ICCPR Article 18. They explain that the words ‘coercion which would impair’ were 
preferred over ‘coercion which would deprive’ because it was broader in scope and also covered 
‘indirect pressures’102 such as ‘improper inducements’.103 The scope of this provision has also 
been elaborated on in General Comment 22 which explains that ICCPR Article 18.2 prohibits 
coercion which would impair the right to have or adopt a religion or belief, including the use (or 
threats) of physical force or punishment to ‘compel’ individuals to adopt a religious belief, recant 
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or convert, and also, policies or measures which have the ‘same intention or effect’, for instance, 
bars to education, to medical treatment or employment on the basis of religion or belief.104 
In terms of the forum internum and forum externum distinction, it is important that 
ICCPR Article 18.2 relates both to direct and indirect forms of coercion. This suggests that 
interference with other Article 18 rights, such as the right to manifest religion or belief, which 
would impair the rights to hold or change a religion or belief, is also covered.  This seems 
sensible because limitations on an individual’s right to manifest religion or belief may be so 
severe that their right to hold a religion or belief may also be seriously affected.105 For instance, if 
an individual is prevented from adhering to a religious diet, this may significantly impair that 
individual’s right to hold their religion.  
Article 18.2 even seems broad enough to encompass coercion to act in a particular way 
(especially coercion to act contrary to one’s religion or belief), if such coercion would impair the 
right to maintain or change a religion or belief.106 For instance, it seems that compulsion to 
participate in military service may also be covered by this provision if the individual’s religion or 
belief is impaired as a result, or if the purpose of the coercion is to force the individual to 
abandon or change their religion or belief.  
This wider scope of Article 18.2 is significant because it further blurs any boundary 
between the internal and external aspects of the right to freedom of thought, conscience and 
religion. This important point is missed by most commentators who simply label forum internum 
rights as absolute rights and forum externum rights as qualified rights and draw a clear line 
between the two. In doing so, they fail to appreciate the interrelated nature of the forum internum 
and the forum externum in this provision, in particular, they fail to recognise that just as direct 
coercion with respect to the right to hold and change religion or belief is prohibited, the scope of 
this provision is such that interference with other rights which would impair the right to hold or 
change religion or belief is also encompassed.  
It must be conceded that an exception to this trend in the literature is the recently 
published Freedom of Religion or Belief: An International Law Commentary, by Bielefeldt, 
Ghanea and Wiener. In their discussion of the prohibition of coercion in ICCPR Article 18, they 
argue that in practice the forum internum and forum externum in ICCPR Article 18 ‘do not exist 
as two clearly separated domains’ but rather are ‘typically interwoven’.107 They contend that it is 
‘plausible to assume that in reality the dimensions covered in article 18(2) [the right to have or 
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adopt a religion or belief] and article 18(3) [the right to manifest religion or belief] usually 
overlap.’108 Elsewhere, they argue specifically ‘against dichotomized views of the forum 
internum and forum externum’ contending instead that, in relation to ICCPR Article 18, these 
elements should be understood in terms of continuum,109 emphasising that the ‘dimensions 
belong together and jointly constitute the human right to freedom of thought, conscience, religion 
or belief.’110 Indeed, they argue that understanding the forum internum and forum externum as 
‘closely interrelated dimensions within the freedom of religion or belief…makes a lot of 
sense.’111 
Importantly, Bielefeldt, Ghanea and Wiener stress that in ICCPR Article 18 the forum 
internum is ‘unconditional’112 whereas the forum externum can be limited, however, they contend 
that this difference in terms of the level of protection to be offered to the fora should not be 
interpreted as privileging the internal over external manifestation which is ‘supposedly devalued 
as mere worldly affairs and pushed back into second order concerns.’113 They argue that ICCPR 
Article 18 does not ‘establish an abstract priority of the internal sphere to the detriment of 
external manifestation of convictions in the larger life-world, nor does it do so to a particular 
religious rationale.’114 In fact, they stress that it ‘cannot be emphasized enough that the forum 
externum aspects of freedom of religion or belief are not in any sense less important than the 
forum internum’ even though the forum internum is protected unconditionally.115  
However, Bielefeldt, Ghanea and Wiener highlight practical problems of recognising the 
interrelationship between the forum internum and forum externum for the protection of the right 
to freedom of thought, conscience and religion. They argue that the assumption that the forum 
internum and forum externum overlap in ICCPR Article 18.2 could lead to the extreme 
consequence of ‘extending the unconditional guarantee of article 18(2) to most (or even all) 
religious activities or, alternatively, of denying the practical applicability of article 18(2) 
altogether.’116 They point out that, if the forum internum and forum externum are seen on a 
continuum, i.e. if manifestation in the forum externum is understood to flow from beliefs held in 
the forum internum, it may be argued that manifestations should also be protected unconditionally 
under Article 18.2 because a restriction on manifestation infringes the forum internum. This 
‘maximalist approach’, they rightly suggest, would lead to ‘an extremely broad application of the 
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non-coercion provision’ and lead to the irrelevance of Article 18.3 which specifically sets out 
permissible limitations on manifestation.117 On the other hand, they point out that, seeing the 
forum internum and forum externum on a continuum may lead to the argument that Article 18.2 
has little practical value because, without external manifestation, purely internal convictions will 
‘hardly ever become issues of legal contention.’118 Again, as they rightly suggest, this 
‘minimalist’ approach would eliminate any relevance for Article 18.2. They key to overcoming 
this impasse, they contend, is to ‘find a reasonable way between maximalist and minimalist 
interpretations.’119  
For Bielefeldt, Ghanea and Wiener the answer is found in the understanding of Article 
18.2. They advise sticking to the ‘precise wording’ of Article 18.2 as this paragraph does not 
simply prohibit ‘any kind of impact on the forum internum’ it prohibits, ‘more narrowly 
“coercion” of such a nature that it would actually “impair” the affected person’s “freedom to have 
or adopt a religion or belief of his choice”.’120 This, they point out is a ‘high threshold’.121 The 
absolute protection in Article 18.2 cannot apply to manifestations of religion or belief in 
general.122 However, the right to manifest ‘can benefit from the unconditional status’ of this 
provision in an ‘indirect manner’ because, they explain, the absolute protection of the forum 
internum is likely to ‘spill over’ to the forum externum and ‘support individuals in their freedom 
to live in accordance with their faith and to manifest their convictions in their social 
environments.’123 In this way, they explain, the freedom to have or adopt a religion or belief of 
one’s choice without being subject to coercion, directly or indirectly, has a positive effect on ‘the 
freedom to live an authentic religious life within the forum externum, both as individuals and in 
community with others.’124  
That the high level of protection to be offered to the forum internum can ‘spill over’ into 
the forum externum to protect the right of individuals to manifest their religion or belief, in 
certain circumstances, further demonstrates the interrelationship between the forum internum and 
forum externum aspects of the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion. For 
Bielefeldt, Ghanea and Wiener, ICCPR Article 18.2 is an element of the ‘holistic guarantee of 
 
117 Ibid. 76, 84. 
118 Ibid., 82. 
119 Ibid., 76. 
120 Ibid., 83, 87. 
121 Ibid. 
122 Indeed, the drafters of ICCPR Article 18 specifically noted that the prohibition on coercion did not apply to 
legitimate limitations under Article 18.3, see UNGA, Draft International Covenants on Human Rights: 
Annotation (1 July 1955) UN Doc A/2929, para 110. 





freedom of religion or belief’ which in Article 18.1 ‘spans forum internum and forum externum 
alike’.125  
Elsewhere, however, Bielefeldt, Ghanea and Wiener explain that whilst the holistic 
guarantee spans the forum internum and forum externum alike, it does not blur ‘the distinction 
between different degrees of legal protection’;126 whilst related, the forum internum and forum 
externum are ‘nonetheless distinguishable dimensions’127 for the purposes of protection and it 
remains an ‘important’128 distinction in practice. Despite recognising the interrelationship 
between belief and action in respect of conscientious objection to military service, for instance, 
they argue that ‘for the sake of dogmatic clarity and in view of the possible practical implications 
it is advisable to strictly distinguish between the forum internum and forum externum 
components.’129 There seems to be a concern that the recognition of the interrelationship between 
these realms may lead to contradictory jurisprudence and threaten the protection of the right in 
practice.130  
While the claim made regarding the interrelationship between the forum internum and the 
forum externum by Bielefeldt, Ghanea and Wiener seems to be based more on a philosophical 
perspective than textual analysis it is, nonetheless, a deeply valuable contribution to the 
understanding of the forum internum and forum externum distinction in ICCPR Article 18. 
However, the suggestion that in theory, the forum internum and forum externum in ICCPR Article 
18 should be understood as interrelated elements but, in practice, the components should be 
strictly distinguished seems somewhat difficult to reconcile. It appears to maintain the importance 
of a clear distinction between the forum internum and forum externum to the protection of the 
right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion in practice. This is a point which will be 
returned to later in this thesis.  
 
Conclusion  
This chapter focused on the question of whether there is a clear binary and hierarchical distinction 
between the forum internum and forum externum in the architecture of Article 9 and related 
international provisions protecting the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion 
(namely Article 18 of the UDHR and ICCPR and Article 1 of the 1981 Declaration). The analysis 
of the structure of ECHR Article 9, the travaux préparatoires relating to this article, and the right 
 
125 Ibid., 84. 
126 Ibid. 
127 Ibid., 76. 
128 Ibid., 486. 
129 Ibid., 290.  




to freedom of thought, conscience and religion in other international instruments reveals that a 
binary and hierarchical distinction between the forum internum and forum externum is not evident 
from the architecture of these articles, nor was it the intention of the drafters of these instruments 
to create such a distinction in the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion.  
Rather, this chapter argued that the structure of these provisions suggest, and the travaux 
préparatoires reveal, that the drafters emphasised the importance of both the forum internum and 
forum externum aspects of the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion, and 
importantly, recognised the interrelatedness rather than the distinctiveness of these realms. It 
repeatedly demonstrates that the interconnected nature of the forum internum and the forum 
externum has been, and remains, an inescapable feature of freedom of thought, conscience and 
religion.  This interrelationship, it contends, is clearly illustrated in the debates relating to the 
right to change religion or belief and the prohibition on coercion in international instruments 
finalised after the ECHR. Rather than a forum internum and forum externum distinction, 
therefore, the primary materials analysed in this chapter point to a forum internum and forum 
externum relationship.  
 This begs the question whether this understanding of ECHR Article 9 also reflected in the 
jurisprudence? Is the binary and hierarchical distinction between the forum internum and the 
forum externum really a ‘doctrine’ of the ECtHR? In order to address these questions, the next 
chapter will focus on the presentation of Article 9 and the protection to be offered to the right to 
freedom of thought, conscience and religion, in ECtHR jurisprudence.  
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This chapter explores the question whether a bright line, binary and hierarchical distinction 
between the forum internum and forum externum is a ‘doctrine’ of the ECtHR. In other words, it 
examines whether Article 9 jurisprudence actually says what commentators say that it says about 
Article 9. To do this, this chapter focuses on the way in which Article 9 has been presented before 
being applied to the facts of the case in Article 9 jurisprudence from the 1960s to the present day, 
available in both English and French.  
  This chapter forms three sections. The first analyses the way in which the terms forum 
internum and forum externum are used and the notion of a distinction between the two realms is 
presented in the general principles relating to Article 9. It argues, contrary to claims made by 
commentators, that a binary or hierarchical distinction between the forum internum and the forum 
externum is not a doctrine of the ECtHR. Rather, the ECtHR consistently presents the forum 
internum and forum externum as interrelated elements of the right to freedom of thought, 
conscience and religion as a whole. As such it contends that it is more helpful to understand the 
forum internum and forum externum in terms of a conceptual continuum ranging from the forum 
internum to the forum externum because the forum internum is always relevant in Article 9 
claims, it is just that the extent of its relevance depends on the ECtHR’s consideration of the 
facts. Even in cases concerning manifestations, the forum internum is relevant because 
manifestations flow from the forum internum; in other words, individuals usually act in a 
particular way because they believe they should or have a desire to do so.1  Thus, this section 
supports the conclusion in Chapter Two.  
The second section analyses the way in which the ECtHR has presented the protection to 
be offered to Article 9 rights in the general principles relating to Article 9. Whilst it is conceded 
that the ECtHR does state that certain rights can be limited whereas others cannot, this chapter 
argues that the ECtHR does not set up a rigid hierarchy between qualified and unqualified rights 
in which the forum externum is treated as a second order concern. Rather, it contends that the 
ECtHR’s comments about different levels of protection under Article 9 are part of a much more 
nuanced understanding of the protection to be offered to Article 9 rights. The ECtHR does not 
 
1 This thesis recognises that some actions have very little connection with the forum internum, for instance, an 
individual may simply wish to wear a religious item of clothing for cultural reasons. In such instances, forum 
internum relevance would be very weak indeed. And, it is likely that the ECtHR would not consider such an 




seem to be concerned with whether an issue falls into the forum internum or the forum externum, 
but rather with the extent to which the forum internum is relevant in any given case. This section 
argues that for the ECtHR, forum internum relevance seems to be the primary factor weighing in 
favour of the applicant. However, it is not the only factor which determines the outcome of a 
case; the ECtHR balances factors indicating a violation (primarily, but not only, forum internum 
relevance) with countervailing factors indicating no violation, to reach its decision.  
From this, section three sets out a hypothesis to be tested in Part II of this thesis, that if 
the protection of Article 9 rights in practice (i.e. when the general principles are applied to the 
facts of the case) is consistent with the way in which Article 9 has been presented by the ECtHR, 
one would expect to see the ECtHR conducting a balancing exercise in order to reach its decision, 
in all Article 9 cases.  
 
A. The Structure of ECtHR Jurisprudence: Fact and Law  
Before embarking on the analysis in this chapter, it is helpful to note the structure of ECtHR 
jurisprudence. Typically, cases are formed of three main sections: ‘the facts’, ‘the law’ and the 
outcome (sometimes followed by separate opinions). ‘The facts’ section includes the 
circumstances of the case, the relevant domestic law and practice, and also, relevant international 
materials (including the ICCPR, HRC’s General Comments, reports of the UN Special 
Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion or Belief) and comparative law.2  
 ‘The law’ section includes the ECtHR’s consideration of the admissibility of the 
complaint, the alleged violations of Convention rights, the parties’ submissions and the ECtHR’s 
assessment. It is in ‘the law’ section that the ECtHR sets out general legal principles, rules and 
doctrines relating to the article in question and relates the points of law to other ECtHR cases. 
Then it applies these principles to the facts of the case in its assessment, before reaching the 
outcome.  
Given that this thesis aims to analyse both what the ECtHR says and what the ECtHR 
does, and whether these are congruent, it is helpful to examine the presentation of Article 9 
(through the principles) and the application of the principles relating to Article 9, separately. This 
chapter focuses on the presentation of Article 9 (through the general principles). The following 
chapters in Part II will focus on the application of Article 9, that is, the decisions reached through 
the application of the principles of law to the facts.3  
 
2 A table of contents is helpfully set out in İzzettin Doğan and Others v Turkey App no 62649/10 (ECtHR, 26 
April 2016).   
3 It is recognised that this is a difficult distinction to make because there is considerable overlap but the ECtHR 
does make this distinction, see İzzettin Doğan and Others v Turkey App no 62649/10 (ECtHR, 26 April 2016)  





B. The Forum Internum and the Forum Externum in Article 9 Jurisprudence 
Despite the claim that the distinction between the forum internum and the forum externum is a 
‘doctrine’ of the ECtHR,4 and that the terms ‘forum internum’ and ‘forum externum’ constitute 
‘Strasbourg jargon’,5 commentators have not analysed the ECtHR’s use of the terms forum 
internum and forum externum or the notion of a distinction comprehensively in the jurisprudence. 
This section seeks to redress this.  
 
i. References to the Forum Internum and Forum Externum  
A detailed analysis of the case law reveals some striking points about the use of the terms, forum 
internum and forum externum, and the notion of a distinction between them. Firstly — and this is 
remarkable to note given the emphasis on this terminology in the literature — whilst the term 
forum internum appears in the case law, the ECtHR does not use the term forum externum. 
Instead, it prefers to speak of ‘acts’ or ‘manifestations’ of religion or belief. The claim that the 
forum internum and forum externum is ‘Strasbourg jargon’ is therefore seriously undermined by 
this simple textual examination, if anything, the evidence suggests that it is more accurate to say 
that these terms are commentators’ jargon.   
Secondly, whilst the ECtHR does use the term forum internum it has not always been part 
of Article 9 jurisprudence. A few commentators have noted (usually in a footnote) that the first 
use of the term forum internum in Article 9 jurisprudence is found in C v The United Kingdom on 
15 December 1983;6 this is close, but not entirely correct because the first time the term appeared 
was slightly earlier that year in the very similar case of X (Ross) v United Kingdom on 14 October 
1983.7 Commentators usually present the use of the ‘forum internum’ in C v The United Kingdom 
as evidence for the existence of a distinction between the forum internum and the forum 
externum. However, as pointed out in Chapter One, the problem with references to this case in the 
literature in support of such claims is just that, they are simply references. Commentators have 
not engaged with C v The United Kingdom in any detail in this respect, critically, they have not 
 
4 Javier Martínez-Torrón, ‘The (Un)protection of Individual Religious Identity in the Strasbourg Case Law’ 
(2012) 1:2 Oxford Journal of Law and Religion, 363, 366 footnote 18. 
5 Lourdes Peroni, ‘Deconstructing ‘Legal’ Religion in Strasbourg’ (2014) 3:2 Oxford Journal of Law and 
Religion 235, 236. 
6 C v The United Kingdom (1983) 37 DR 142. See for example: Carolyn Evans, Freedom of Religion under the 
European Convention on Human Rights (OUP 2001) 72; Rex Adhar and Ian Leigh, Religious Freedom in the 
Liberal State (2nd edn, OUP 2013) 100 footnote 9; B Labuschagne, ‘Religious Freedom and Newly-Established 
Religions in Dutch Law’ (1997) 44 Netherlands International Law Review 168, 173–5; Javier Martínez-Torrón, 
‘The European Court of Human Rights and Religion’ in Richard O’Dair and Andrew Lewis (eds) Law and 
Religion: Current Legal Issues 2001 Volume 4 (OUP 2001) 198 footnote 39.  




reflected on why it was introduced into the jurisprudence in 1983 or examined precisely how the 
term forum internum was used in that case or subsequent cases. It is, therefore, worth examining 
this in more detail.  
 
Both X (Ross) v The United Kingdom8 and C v The United Kingdom9 concerned Quakers who 
complained about being forced to contribute to military expenditure through the payment of tax. 
In C v The United Kingdom the applicant wanted to divert the percentage of his taxes used for 
defence expenditure to peaceful purposes because, he argued, directly or indirectly supporting 
defence expenditure was an ‘outrage to his conscience’ and ‘contrary to the requirements of the 
manifestation of his belief through practice.’10 In this case, the Commission opened its Article 9 
assessment with the statement that ‘Article 9 primarily protects the sphere of personal beliefs and 
religious creeds, i.e. the area which is sometimes called the forum internum.’11 It added that ‘in 
addition, it protects acts which are intimately linked to these attitudes, such as acts of worship or 
devotion which are aspects of the practice of a religion or belief in a generally recognised form.’12 
However, the Commission noted that whilst Article 9 protects this ‘personal sphere’, it 
‘does not always guarantee the right to behave in the public sphere in a way which is dictated by 
such a belief.’13 In respect of this case, the Commission explained that i) the obligation to pay 
taxes was a general and neutral obligation which had no specific conscientious implication in 
itself, ii) that the right of States to raise taxes is a right specifically authorised by the ECHR14 and 
iii) that Article 9 does not confer a right to refuse to abide by legislation, on the basis of a religion 
or belief, when laws apply generally and neutrally in the public realm. Consequently, it found no 
interference with Article 9.  
The principle that ‘Article 9 primarily protects the sphere of personal beliefs and religious 
creeds, i.e. the area which is sometimes called the forum internum’ has become known as the 
‘standard recital’15 and the sentence which follows this, which refers to ‘acts intimately linked to 
those attitudes,’ has been referred to as a ‘dictum’.16 Since 1983, the ECtHR has referred to the 
 
8 Ibid. 
9 C v The United Kingdom (1983) 37 DR 142 
10 Ibid. 
11 Ibid. 
12 Ibid.  
13 Ibid. 
14 For discussion see, Paul Taylor, Freedom of Religion: UN and European Human Rights Law and Practice 
(CUP 2005) 123. 
15 Malcolm D Evans, Religious Liberty and International Law in Europe (CUP 1997) 296. 




forum internum in twelve other cases reported in English.17 But why was the term ‘forum 
internum’ introduced by the Commission in 1983? What precisely did it add?  
Given that the Commission had not used the term before but referred to the fact that the 
sphere of personal beliefs and religious creeds is ‘sometimes called the forum internum’ it seems 
likely that it was drawing on external material. A probable explanation is that the term ‘forum 
internum’ was drawn from Catholic theology. As explained in the introduction the terms forum 
internum and forum externum are used in canon law. What is particularly interesting, and this is a 
point which has not been made in the literature to date, is that the promulgation and entry into 
force of the 1983 Code of Canon Law by Pope John Paul II, coincided with the first appearance 
of the term in ECtHR jurisprudence. This may simply be an interesting coincidence or may 
suggest that the term was introduced by someone acquainted with Catholic theology as shorthand 
way of referring to internal sphere of personal beliefs and religious creeds.   
Despite the emphasis on the forum internum in the literature on Article 9, it is striking to 
note that this term is not the most common way of referring to the ‘sphere of personal beliefs and 
religious creeds’ in the case law. In cases reported in English the term ‘individual conscience’ 
appears much more frequently than the term forum internum.18 Indeed ‘individual conscience’ 
appears more commonly than forum internum in a variation on the following version of the 
standard recital: ‘while religious freedom is primarily a matter of individual conscience, it also 
implies, inter alia, freedom to manifest one’s religion…’19 Since Kokkinakis v Greece in 1993 
this formulation has appeared in over forty cases available in English,20 thus, it is no 
overstatement to say that it permeates the case law. 
Furthermore, another point which has not been recognised in the literature to date (which 
is striking given the working language of the ECtHR is both English and French) is that both the 
term forum internum and the more commonly used synonym ‘individual conscience’ usually 
 
17 C v The United Kingdom (1983) 37 DR 142; Vereniging Rechtswinkels Utrecht v the Netherlands (1986) 46 
DR 200; H B v The United Kingdom App no 11991/86 (Commission Decision, 18 July 1986); K v The 
Netherlands App no 15928/89 (Commission Decision, 13 May 1992); Van Den Dungen v The Netherlands 
(1992) 80-A DR 147; CJ, JJ and EJ v Poland (1996) 84-B DR 46; Thlimmenos v Greece App no 34369/97 
(Commission Report, 4 December 1998) para 40; Saniewski v Poland App no 40319/98 (ECtHR, 26 June 2001); 
Porter v UK App no 15814/02 (ECtHR, 8 April 2003); Blumberg v Germany App no 14618/03 (ECtHR, 8 
March 2008); Skugar and Others v Russia App no 40010/04 (ECtHR, 3 December 2009); Schilder v The 
Netherlands App no 2158/12 (ECtHR, 16 October 2012) para 18.  
18 The term ‘individual conscience’ is used by very few commentators. For an example of its use, see Carolyn 
Evans, Freedom of Religion (OUP 2001) 101. 
19 Kokkinakis v Greece (1993) Series A no 260-A, para 31. In Pichon and Sajous v France the ECtHR explained 
that the ‘main sphere protected by Article 9 is that of personal convictions and religious beliefs, in other words 
what are sometimes referred to as matters of individual conscience’, see Pichon and Sajous v France ECHR 
2001-X 381. See also Begheluri And Others v Georgia App no 28490/02 (ECtHR, 7 May 2014) para 157. 




appears as ‘for intérieur’ in Article 9 case law in French.21 The first time in which for intérieur 
appears in the case law as part of the standard recital is in the French translation of C v The 
United Kingdom in 1983. The first time it appeared in a case reported only in French was in K 
and V v The Netherlands in 198722 and since then for intérieur has appeared in almost fifty cases 
available only in French.  
 The standard recital, whether expressed using the language of the forum internum, 
individual conscience or for intérieur is therefore deeply embedded in Article 9 jurisprudence. 
Indeed, it is much more embedded than commentators who have simply focused on appearances 
of the term forum internum have appreciated. In fact, it has become one of the ‘stock phrases’ in 
the ECtHR’s repertoire when dealing with Article 9.23 But what do all of these references mean? 
Is it evidence that a clear binary and hierarchical distinction between the forum internum and the 
forum externum is a doctrine of the ECtHR?  
To answer this question, it is necessary to further examine how the forum internum (and 
related notions) are presented in the general principles section in Article 9 jurisprudence.  If the 
purpose of the standard recital, and its variants, was to establish a clear binary and hierarchical 
distinction between the forum internum and acts or manifestations, then it can be argued that the 
Commission expressed this poorly, given that it continually referred to the forum internum 
alongside the right to manifest. The terms forum internum, individual conscience or for intérieur 
almost exclusively appear as part of the standard recital which is always followed by a reference 
to acts or manifestations in ECtHR jurisprudence. The relationship between the internal and 
external realm is therefore consistently emphasised in the case law through this textual feature. 
Looking more closely, the language used in the standard recital strengthens the relational element 
further. Whilst Article 9 ‘primarily’ protects the forum internum or is primarily a matter of 
individual conscience, it ‘also’ protects or protects ‘in addition’, acts in the forum externum 
which are intimately linked to the forum internum. Put another way, individual conscience 
implies, or in French, ‘it “implies” moreover’ the freedom to manifest.24 
It is worth reflecting on what is meant by ‘implies’ here. To ‘imply’ is ‘to indicate the 
existence of something by suggestion rather than explicit reference’ or to suggest that something 
 
21 See CJ, JJ and EJ v Poland (1996) 84-B DR 46 [French] and Kokkinakis v Greece (1993) Series A no 260-A 
para 31 [French]. 
22 K and V v The Netherlands App no 11086/84 (Commission Decision, 16 July 1987) [French].  
23 Other stock phrases include the statement that freedom of religion or belief is ‘one of the most vital elements 
that go to make up the identity of believers and their conception of life, but is also a precious asset for atheists, 
agnostics, sceptics and the unconcerned’ (see Kokkinakis v Greece (1993) Series A no 260-A, para 31), that 
Article 9 does not protect ‘every act motivated or inspired by a religion or belief’ (see Arrowsmith v United 
Kingdom (1978) 8 DR 123) and that Article 9 includes the ‘freedom to hold or not to hold religious beliefs and 
to practise or not to practise,’ (see Busacrini and Others v San Marino ECHR 1999-I, para 34). 




is a ‘logical consequence’.25 In the context of the right to freedom of thought, conscience and 
religion, it seems that for the ECtHR, whilst Article 9 primarily protects the forum internum or 
individual conscience, it also protects manifestation, because manifestation is a logical 
consequence of holding a religion or belief. In other words, the internal holding of a religion or 
belief presupposes external manifestation.  
Indeed, this has been emphasised by the ECtHR throughout its Article 9 jurisprudence.26 
In Kokkinakis v Greece, the most well-known ECtHR case concerning limitations on proselytism, 
the interconnection between belief and manifestation was explicitly emphasised by the ECtHR 
when it explained that ‘bearing witness in words and deeds’ was ‘bound up with the existence of 
religious convictions.’27 More recently, in Eweida and Others v United Kingdom28 which 
concerned limitations on actions taken in the employment context on the basis of religious 
beliefs, the ECtHR emphasised the connection between the forum internum and the forum 
externum even more strongly. The ECtHR reiterated the principle established in Arrowsmith v 
The United Kingdom that Article 9 does not protect every act motivated or influenced by a 
religion or belief,29 adding that in order to be considered a ‘manifestation’ for the purposes of 
Article 9, ‘the act in question must be intimately linked to the religion or belief’ in question.30 
The ECtHR stressed that ‘acts or omissions’ which are only ‘remotely connected to a precept of 
faith’ are not protected by Article 9, thus highlighting the important interconnection between 
belief and action. This was further emphasised in the statement that manifestations are not limited 
to acts of worship or devotion, but rather the ECtHR determines whether there is a ‘sufficiently 
close and direct nexus between the act and the underlying belief’ in each case.31 Thus, the 
important interrelationship between the forum internum and the forum externum is clear here. 
 Indeed, in the only definition of forum internum and forum externum in the case law the 
relationship between the two is emphasised. Judge Alberquerque explains, in his Concurring 
Opinion to Krupko and Others v Russia, that ‘the word religion derives from the Latin term 
religare which means, to bind, to bring together’; in the forum internum men and women are 
united with the deity and in the forum externum men and women are united with each other’.32 
 
25 ‘imply’ in Oxford English Dictionary (7th edn, OUP 2015). 
26 Indeed, when an applicant criticised the government’s ‘artificial and ineffective’ distinction between ‘activity’ 
arguing that Article 9 of the Convention protected both religious belief (forum internum) and its manifestation in 
practice (forum externum)’, the ECtHR, again emphasised the connection between the realms in setting out 
Article 9 principles, see Nolan and K v Russia App no 2512/04 (ECtHR, 12 February 2009), para 59, 61. 
27 Kokkinakis v Greece (1993) Series A no 260-A, para 31. 
28 Eweida and Others v United Kingdom ECHR 2013-I 215 (extracts). 
29 Ibid., para 82. See Arrowsmith v United Kingdom (1978) 8 DR 123.  
30 Eweida and Others v United Kingdom ECHR 2013-I 215 (extracts), para 82.  
31 Ibid. 
32Krupko and Others v Russia App no 26587/07 (ECtHR, 26 June 2014), Separate Opinion of Judge 




Whilst there are certainly problems with this definition of religion (and it is beyond the scope of 
this thesis to engage in that debate), this statement reveals that Judge Alberquerque understands 
the forum internum and the forum externum to be interrelated and corresponding elements.   
 The notion of a relationship between internal beliefs and external acts is similar to the 
nuanced approach taken in respect of private life in Article 8. The ECtHR has explained that it 
would be too restrictive to understand ‘private life’ as relating solely to an ‘inner circle’ in which 
an individual can live his own life as he wishes; it must be understood in relation to the ‘outside 
world’ which is ‘not encompassed with in that circle.’33  This was emphasised by Judge Martens 
who explained that Article 8 does not simply guarantee ‘immunity of an inner circle in which one 
may live one’s own, one’s private life as one chooses’34 because ‘the “inner circle” concept 
presupposes an “outside world” which, logically, is not encompassed within the concept of 
private life.’ 35  Referring to the Commission, Judge Martens explains that it has ‘repeatedly held’ 
that ‘private life’ comprises to a certain degree ‘the right to establish and develop relationships 
with other human beings…’ and the ‘development and fulfilment of one’s own personality.’ 36  
Furthermore, it is important to reflect on the fact that the ECtHR seems to prefer the language 
of ‘individual conscience’ rather than forum internum. It is certainly more difficult to map 
‘individual conscience’ onto a binary divide. If the forum externum is the opposite of the forum 
internum, what is the opposite of individual conscience? Is it group conscience, or external 
conscience? These are notions which do not appear in the case law. That the ECtHR prefers to 
describe religious freedom as ‘primarily a matter of individual conscience’ (which has no clear 
opposite) supports the theory that there is no binary divide between the forum internum and the 
forum externum in Article 9.  
 
ii. The Scope of the Forum Internum and Forum Externum 
Outside of the standard recital (the statement that ‘Article 9 primarily protects the sphere of 
personal beliefs and religious creeds, i.e. the area which is sometimes called the forum internum, 
and its variants) the terms forum internum, individual conscience and for intérieur are very rarely 
used by the ECtHR. Importantly, rights are not generally labelled as ‘forum internum’ rights, 
which means, as commentators have pointed out, it is very difficult to identify precisely which 
rights fall into this realm. 
 
33 Fernandez Martinez v Spain ECHR 2014-II 449 para 109. See also Niemietz v Germany (1992) Series A no 
251-B, para 29; Schüth v Germany ECHR 2010-V 397, para 53; Travaš v Croatia App no 75581/13 (ECtHR, 4 
October 2016) para 51.  
34 Beldjoudi v France (1992) Series A no 234-A, Concurring Opinion of Judge Martens, para 3. 





Indeed, there is only one instance in all of the case law of a right being explicitly 
described as a forum internum right. In Sinan Işik v Turkey the ECtHR explained that what was ‘at 
stake’ in the case was the ‘right not to disclose one’s religion or belief’ which ‘falls within the 
forum internum of each individual.’37 This is, however, an exception. Generally, the ECtHR 
speaks loosely of the rights encompassed by Article 9, preferring to speak of the ‘general right’ to 
freedom of thought, conscience and religion and the right to manifest.38 Occasionally it refers to 
specific protections offered under Article 9, for instance, that it protects against compulsion to 
participate in religious activities when one is not a member of the religious community in 
question39 but, in these instances, the ECtHR does not mention whether these are forum internum 
or forum externum rights.  
For commentators, this vagueness is a significant problem. They place a great deal of 
emphasis on the legal significance of the forum internum and forum externum distinction (namely 
that the forum internum is synonymous with absolute protection and the forum externum with 
qualified protection) and as such argue that the scope of these realms should be strictly delineated 
in order to ensure that the correct level of protection is offered. To address this perceived ‘failure’ 
on the part of the ECtHR to identify forum internum and forum externum rights, commentators 
frequently draw up lists of rights which fall (or should fall) into either the forum internum or the 
forum externum and be protected as absolute or qualified rights by the ECtHR, respectively. 
However, as Chapter One pointed out, this is a particularly contested area in the literature as 
commentators frequently reach very different conclusions as to which rights are forum internum 
and which are forum externum rights.  
 This chapter argues that the fact that the ECtHR does not categorise rights as either forum 
internum or forum externum rights is not a ‘failure’ but rather reflects the ECtHR’s understanding 
that there is an integral relationship between the forum internum and forum externum and, as 
such, rights cannot be categorised so simplistically. The notion that rights should, or even can, be 
categorised as either forum internum or forum externum rights in such a binary way, seems to be 
a misreading of the presentation of the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion in 
Article 9 jurisprudence. Rather than revealing a binary distinction between the forum internum 
and forum externum, a close examination of the presentation of Article 9 in the jurisprudence 
reveals a much more holistic understanding of Article 9; the forum internum (individual 
conscience and for intérieur) and forum externum are not ‘strictly separated’ but rather are 
 
37 Sinan Işik v Turkey ECHR 2010-I 341, para 42.  
38 See e.g., Darby v Sweden App no11581/85 (1989) Report 31, para 44, Darby v Sweden (1990) Series A no 
187; Kustannus Oy Vapaa Ajattelija AB and Others v Finland (1996) 85-A DR 29; Thlimmenos v Greece 
Report 1998 para 40. 
39 See e.g., Darby v Sweden App no11581/85 (1989) Report 31, para 51; Klein v Germany App no 10138/11 




presented as deeply interconnected realms across which the broad right to freedom of thought, 
conscience and religion is exercised.   
 That the ECtHR considers belief and manifestation to be inextricably linked is clear from 
statements made in the jurisprudence. In Ebrahimian v France, for instance, the ECtHR stressed 
that there was no reason to doubt that the applicant’s decision to wear the headscarf was a 
manifestation of a ‘sincere religious belief’ which was protected by Article 9.40 And, in Bayatyan 
v Armenia, for example, the Grand Chamber stressed the interrelationship between the forum 
internum and the forum externum in its recognition that conscientious objection to military 
service can be considered a manifestation of religion or belief, where there is a ‘serious and 
insurmountable conflict between the obligation to perform the military service and a person’s 
conscience or his deeply and genuinely held religious or other beliefs.’41 These cases will be 
looked at in detail in Part II of the thesis, but it is important to note them here because these 
statements illustrate that the ECtHR does not envisage a binary and hierarchical divide between 
the forum internum and forum externum. 
 
iii. A Conceptual Continuum from the Forum Internum to the Forum Externum 
Taking all this into account, it seems more faithful to the text of ECHR Article 9, the related 
travaux préparatoires and the way in which Article 9 is presented in the jurisprudence to see the 
forum internum and the forum externum aspects of Article 9 in terms of a relationship rather in 
terms of a strict dichotomy. Refining this further, it seems helpful to see the forum internum and 
the forum externum in terms of a conceptual continuum ranging from the forum internum to the 
forum externum; because actions flow from, or are ‘bound up’ with the forum internum, the forum 
internum is always relevant in Article 9 cases, to some degree.42  
On this continuum, at the one ‘end’ there is the holding of a religion or belief, entirely 
within the forum internum without any action, or manifestation, of any sort. At the other ‘end’ 
there are acts in forum externum which seem to have very little connection with religion or belief 
for the purposes of Article 9, in other words, they seem to have very little to do with the protected 
forum internum (despite claims to the contrary made by applicants). In terms of forum internum 
relevance, therefore, there is a spectrum of ‘weight’.  
In between these ‘ends’, there seems to be a considerable area in which the forum 
internum is engaged to a greater or lesser extent depending on the way in which the facts of the 
case are interpreted. The most obvious example of a right in this middle section of the continuum 
 
40 Ebrahimian v France ECHR 2015-VIII 99, para 47. 
41 Bayatyan v Armenia ECHR 2011-IV 1, para 110.   
42 A ‘continuum’ is defined as a ‘continuous sequence in which adjacent elements are not perceptively different 




is the right to manifest religion or belief. This is because the ECtHR has stressed that acts flow 
from beliefs (i.e. that there is an interrelationship between the forum internum and forum 
externum), however, it has also explained that manifestations can be limited in accordance with 
Article 9.2 in certain circumstances. Another right which seems to fall into this middle section is 
the right to change a religion or belief. The previous chapter demonstrated that this right has both 
forum internum and forum externum elements in that it is both to do with changing one’s mind (in 
the forum internum) and changing the way one behaves as a result of this change of mind (in the 
forum externum). Likewise, the right not to be forced to act in a way that is contrary to one’s 
religion or belief has both a forum internum and forum externum dimension; individuals refuse to 
act in a certain way because it is contrary to their conscience (in the forum internum) but in their 
refusal to act they can also be seen as acting in accordance with, or manifesting, their religion or 
belief (in the forum externum).  
This notion of a continuum ranging from the forum internum to the forum externum, in 
contrast to the notion of a bright line distinction between the forum internum and forum externum, 
seems to be a more helpful way of understanding Article 9. When the forum internum and forum 
externum are seen in terms of a rigid dichotomy, in which issues fall either into the forum 
internum or into the forum externum, issues which span both the forum internum and the forum 
externum cannot be accommodated. Significantly, in the forum internum and forum externum 
dichotomy model, when an issue is deemed a forum externum issue, the forum internum seems to 
become irrelevant. In contrast, the key point about the conceptual continuum is that it emphasises 
that the forum internum is always relevant; it is just that the extent of its relevance depends on the 
ECtHR’s consideration of the facts.   
This seems a sensible way of understanding Article 9 because, given the nature of the 
right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion, the forum internum dimension can never be 
completely irrelevant; the forum externum is inextricably linked with the forum internum because 
actions flow from the forum internum. As such, rather than asking whether a complaint is a forum 
internum or forum externum complaint, it seems much more likely that a key preliminary 
question for the ECtHR when addressing Article 9 complaints, concerning all Article 9 rights, is 
‘how relevant is the forum internum in the case in question?’. 
So far, however, no account has been taken of the role of countervailing factors in Article 
9 cases. At this point, therefore, it must be noted that whilst forum internum relevance appears to 
be the most important factor weighing in favour of the applicant in Article 9 cases it is not the 
only factor that the ECtHR takes into account. In considering complaints, it seems the ECtHR 




forum internum relevance) against countervailing factors indicating no violation of Article 9, in 
order to reach its decision. This will be explored further in the next section of this chapter.  
 
C. General Principles Relating to Article 9 Protection  
Commentators argue that evidence for a hierarchical relationship between the forum internum and 
manifestation is not only found in the language used to describe the realms in the standard recital 
(e.g. that the forum internum is the primary realm) but that this is hierarchy is clearly reflected in 
the different levels of protection to be offered within these realms. It is continually emphasised in 
the literature that the forum internum is the realm which is protected absolutely under Article 9 
whereas the forum externum is offered qualified protection in accordance with Article 9.2. This is 
so embedded in the literature that the term forum internum is often used synonymously with 
absolute protection and the term forum externum, with qualified protection. 
 This section demonstrates that the ECtHR does not set up a hierarchy between the 
absolute forum internum and the qualified forum externum in the jurisprudence. And, importantly, 
it does not, as commentators frequently do, conflate the forum internum with absolute protection 
and forum externum with qualified protection either. Rather, it takes a much more nuanced 
approach to the protection of limited and absolute rights.  
 
i. Limited Rights 
In the literature, commentators imply that because the right to manifest religion or belief can be 
limited by States, it receives little protection at the ECtHR. However, this simple statement 
misses a subtle but important point in Article 9 jurisprudence; the ECtHR actually states that 
manifestation cannot be limited unless it meets certain criteria set out in Article 9.2. There is, 
therefore, a presumption of enjoyment. In order for the interference to be deemed legitimate by 
the ECtHR, the restriction must be prescribed by law, necessary in a democratic society in the 
interests of public safety, for the protection of public order, health or morals or for the protection 
of the rights and freedoms of others. This reflects the importance placed on the right to manifest, 
and the recognition that the forum internum right to hold a religion or belief is always engaged, to 
some extent, in the manifestation of religion or belief so it will inevitably be affected by any 
restriction in the forum externum.    
 
a. The ECtHR’s Fluidity  
In cases concerning acts performed on the basis of religion or belief, it seems the ECtHR has to 
consider the procedural question whether, on the basis of the facts of the case, the right to 




Article 9), before considering the legal question of whether there has been interference on the 
basis of the facts, and if so, whether such interference is in accordance with Article 9.2.43  
 There is fluidity in terms of the ECtHR’s approach in cases concerning the right to 
manifest because of the ambiguity in the wording in ECHR Article 9.1 and 9.2. The term 
‘manifestation’, for instance, is vague; whilst the ECtHR has set out certain guiding principles in 
relation to what constitutes a manifestation for the purposes of Article 9,44 there are no objective 
tests which means a great deal depends on interpretation. It is not clear whether ‘worship, 
teaching, practice and observance’ is meant to be exhaustive of the scope of manifestation or 
simply examples of manifestation under Article 9. If it is an exhaustive list, then everything to be 
protected as a manifestation has to fit under one of the headings. This reading is supported by the 
fact that the ECtHR frequently rejects claims by emphasising that Article 9 ‘does not always 
guarantee the right to behave in the public sphere in a way which is dictated by such a belief,’45 
i.e. that it only protects certain forms of manifestation intimately connected with a religion or 
belief.   
 The ECtHR has been clear that elements of Article 9.2 must be interpreted narrowly, ‘for 
their enumeration is strictly exhaustive and their definition is necessarily restrictive.’46 For 
instance, the ECtHR has explained that Article 9.2 specifically excludes certain conditions, such 
as national security; this is not, as the ECtHR has explained, an ‘accidental omission’ but reflects 
 
43 See e.g., James Dingemans and Others, The Protections for Religious Rights: Law and Practice (OUP 2013) 
81.  
44 The ECtHR has explained that ‘‘practice’ in Article 9.1 ‘does not cover each act which is motivated or 
influenced by a religion or belief’ (known as a the ‘Arrowsmith test’ in the literature), see Arrowsmith v United 
Kingdom (1978) 8 DR 123. In the early jurisprudence the ECtHR held that an act must ‘directly express’ or be 
‘intimately linked’ to the belief in question to constitute manifestation, but this has softened so that ‘sufficiently 
close and direct nexus between the act and the underlying belief must be determined on the facts of each case’ 
(Eweida and Others v United Kingdom ECHR 2013-I 215 (extracts), para 82) and it is no longer necessary to 
show that the act fulfil a duty mandated by their religion or belief (SAS v France ECHR 2014-III 341 (extracts) 
para 55).  
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Netherlands (1992) 80-A DR 147; Yanasik v Turkey (1993) 74 DR 22; Karaduman v Turkey App no 16278/90 
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September 1997); Thlimmenos v Greece ECHR 2000-IV 263; Pichon and Sajous v France ECHR 2001-X 381; 
Porter v UK App no 15814/02 (ECtHR, 8 April 2003); Leyla Şahin v Turkey ECHR 2005-XI 173, para 121 ; 
Kurtulmuş v Turkey ECHR 2006-II 297; Köse and 93 Others v Turkey ECHR 2006-II 339; Blumberg v 
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2008) 61; Skugar and Others v Russia App no 40010/04 (ECtHR, 3 December 2009); Schilder v The 
Netherlands App no 2158/12 (ECtHR, 16 October 2012), para 18; SAS v France ECHR 2014-III 341 (extracts), 
para 125; Güler and Uğur App no 31706/10, 33088/10 (ECtHR, 2 December 2014) para 36. There is the 
slightly different formulation in Pichon and Sajous, ‘in safeguarding this personal domain…’, see Pichon and 
Sajous v France ECHR 2001-X 381.  
46 See Svyato-Mykhaylivska Parafiya v Ukraine App no 77703/01 (ECtHR, 14 June 2007), para 132; 
Sidiropoulos and Others v Greece ECHR 1998-I, 1594 para 38;SAS v France ECHR 2014-III 341 (extracts) 
para 113. In X v Latvia, Judge Albuquerque explained that it is ‘axiomatic that “restrictions” to human 




the importance of freedom of religion.47 The ECtHR has also defined what is meant the concept 
‘prescribed by law’. In order to meet the requirement of being ‘prescribed by law’ it is necessary 
for a measure not only to have a basis in domestic law but also to be sufficiently accessible and 
predictable, i.e. it must be clear enough to allow individuals to regulate their conduct. These 
limitations on the powers of States, the ECtHR has explained, are necessary so that public 
authorities do not arbitrarily interfere with the ECHR.48  
However, importantly the ECtHR has not clearly defined what is meant by the looser terms 
‘necessity’ and ‘proportionality’ in Article 9.2 which opens a considerable space for 
disagreement.49 And, added to this, under Article 9.2 the ECtHR can afford States a margin of 
appreciation50 which can be narrow or wide depending on the particular issue in question.51  
Taken together, the interpretation of the protection to be offered to the right to manifest 
religion or belief suggests that there are a number of possible approaches that the ECtHR may 
take in cases in which applicants have complained that their right to manifest has been unduly 
interfered with by the State. For instance, the ECtHR may find that the right to manifest religion 
or belief is not engaged on the facts of the case and i) choose to dismiss the Article 9 complaint as 
manifestly ill-founded or, ii) it may choose to characterise the complaint as one engaging a 
different Article 9 right (for example, the right to hold a religion or belief), or a different ECHR 
article altogether. Alternatively, the ECtHR may find that the right to manifest religion or belief is 
engaged and that State actions have affected this right, but that this does not constitute 
interference. If the ECtHR finds that the right to manifest religion or belief is engaged, and that 
State actions have interfered with this right, it may decide that the action is prescribed by law, 
necessary and proportionate and find no violation of Article 9 or that it is not prescribed by law, 
necessary or proportionate and find a violation of Article 9. In its Article 9 assessment, it seems 
the ECtHR balances factors indicating a violation (primarily, but not only, forum internum 
relevance) with factors indicating no violation in order to reach its decision. It can, on balance, 
 
47 See Nolan and K v Russia App no 2512/04 (ECtHR, 12 February 2009), para 73.  
48 See Boychev and Others v Bulgaria App no 77185/01 (ECtHR, 27 January 2011) [French] para 48; Hasan 
and Chaush v Bulgaria ECHR 2000-XI 117, para 84.  
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Convention on Human Rights under the Influence of Different European Traditions’ (2012) 17 Pontifical 
Academy of Social Sciences 329, 332.  
51 For a discussion of examples of broad and narrow margin of appreciation, see Kristin Henrard, ‘How the 
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give greater weight to countervailing factors or less weight to countervailing factors depending on 
the facts of the case.   
Considering the ECtHR’s emphasis on the importance of manifestation, and recognition of 
the inherent relationship between manifestation and the forum internum right to hold a religion or 
belief, one might expect the ECtHR to always interrogate State claims about the necessity and 
proportionality of any interference with an applicant’s right to manifest before reaching its 
decision. However, it would not be surprising to see the ECtHR choosing not to conduct such a 
rigorous assessment in some cases. If the ECtHR considers, from the outset of its Article 9 
assessment, that countervailing factors under Article 9.2 clearly outweigh forum internum 
relevance in a particular context, it may decide that a superficial or perfunctory examination is 
sufficient,52 choosing instead to accept the State’s analysis and permit the limitation on the right 
to manifest.    
 
ii. Absolute Rights   
The ECtHR has consistently stressed that the Article 9.2 does not apply to Article 9 as a whole 
but only to the right to manifest. However, despite this emphasis, it does not appear that other 
rights, including those understood to be ‘absolute’ rights, are exempt from balancing.  
In Kokkinakis v Greece, the ECtHR explained that the ‘fundamental nature’ of the rights 
in Article 9.1 is reflected in the wording of Article 9.2. Unlike the second paragraphs of Articles 
8, 10 and 11 which relate to all the rights listed in the first paragraphs of those articles, Article 9.2 
‘refers only to “freedom to manifest one’s religion or belief”.’53 This was also reiterated in Darby 
v Sweden in which the Commission explained that the first limb of Article 9.1 protects the right to 
freedom of thought, conscience and religion (the general right to freedom of religion) and the 
second limb protects the rights to change and manifest, and went on to explain that, whilst 
manifestation can be limited under Article 9.2, States are ‘obliged to respect everyone’s general 
right to freedom of religion and that right may not be restricted.’54  
In recent years, the ECtHR has been more emphatic that certain parts of Article 9 cannot 
be limited. In Tarhan v Turkey the Court stated that freedom of thought and conscience, and the 
right to have or adopt a religion or belief of one’s choice are rights according to which ‘Article 9 
 
52 In SAS v France the ECtHR noted that the ‘Court’s practice is to be quite succinct when it verifies the 
existence of a legitimate aim’ under the second paragraph of Articles 8-11, see SAS v France ECHR 2014-III 
341 (extracts), para114. 
53 Kokkinakis v Greece (1993) Series A no 260-A, para 33. See also Masaev v Moldova App no 6303/05 
(ECtHR, 12 May 2009) para 23; Ivanova v Bulgaria App no 52435/99 (ECtHR, 12 April 2007), para 79.  




does not allow any restriction whatsoever.’55 This is further evidenced in the ECtHR’s statement 
that ‘freedom of conscience is protected without reservation’ and along with the ‘right of 
everyone to have or adopt a religion or belief of his choice’ forms the ‘core’ of Article 9.56 This 
was reiterated in Eweida and Others v United Kingdom, and again in Suveges v Hungary, in 
which the ECtHR observed that  ‘religious freedom is primarily a matter of individual thought 
and conscience’ and then explained, for the first time in the jurisprudence, that this ‘aspect of the 
right set out in the first paragraph of Article 9 — to hold any religious belief and to change 
religion or belief — is absolute and unqualified.’57  
Ostensibly, the use of the language of ‘absolute and unqualified’ to describe the rights to 
hold and change a religion or belief in Eweida and Others v United Kingdom looks like a 
development in the jurisprudence. The phrase ‘absolute and unqualified’ has not been used by the 
ECtHR to describe any other ECHR right, not even Article 3 which is almost indisputably 
considered an absolute right which cannot be subject to limitations of any kind, not even under 
Article 15.58 However, in the context of the case as a whole, it seems that this language in Eweida 
and Others v United Kingdom is largely rhetorical given that the ECtHR found no violation of 
Article 9 as a result of the limitations placed on three out of four applicants in that case. The 
absolutist language was not used to protect absolutely against interference, but rather, it seems, to 
justify the ECtHR’s decision to permit limitations on Article 9. If the ECtHR had really 
considered the rights to hold and change religion or belief to be absolute and unqualified, it is 
unlikely that it would have reached the outcome it did in that case, particularly in respect to the 
third applicant.59  
 The key point is to consider what is meant by the terms ‘absolute’, ‘unqualified’, and 
‘unrestricted’ in terms of the ECHR as a whole. An ‘absolute’ right is usually understood to be a 
right which is subject to no exceptions in any circumstances whatsoever — no interference can 
ever be justified. Unlike qualified rights, interference with absolute rights cannot be justified on 
 
55 Tarhan v Turkey App no 9078/06 (ECtHR, 17 July 2012) [French], para 52. It is interesting that the ECtHR 
chooses to use language imported from ICCPR Article 18 here rather than using the language of ‘change’ in 
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56 Ibid. 
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the basis of countervailing factors, no matter how serious or weighty. Commentators have 
suggested, or implied, that this means that absolute rights are ‘largely sacrosanct’60 or 
‘untouchable’ rights. Given that they tend to equate the forum internum with the absolute realm, 
they argue that the forum internum is an entirely hands-off area for States, it is an area outside of 
a State’s control. For Danchin, for instance, the ‘inviolability’ of the internal realm is 
‘unchallenged and unchallengeable’.61 Even in texts in which commentators do not use the terms 
‘absolute’, ‘unconditional’, ‘unqualified’ or ‘unrestricted’ to describe the forum internum there is 
the clear assumption that the forum internum is never to be encroached upon. C Evans, in her 
monograph, does not ever precisely describe the level of protection offered to the forum internum 
but rather speaks vaguely of the ‘importance’ of this realm.62 It is this assumption which drives 
her to criticise the ECtHR for failing to recognise the importance of, and adequately protect, the 
forum internum.63  
However, it seems that what the ECtHR is concerned about here is not impact upon 
absolute rights per se but rather impact which crosses a particular threshold; the nature and 
degree of the impact appears to be key.64 The ECtHR has provided a clear example of the type of 
impact it considers to be prohibited under Article 9; the ECtHR has explained that ‘a State cannot 
dictate what a person believes or take coercive steps to make him change his beliefs’.65 In light of 
this, one would expect certain actions on the part of a State such as torture to recant or change a 
religion or belief, brainwashing (also known-as mind control or coercive persuasion), 
deprogramming, and indoctrination (the process of teaching an individual to uncritically accept 
beliefs) to always be prohibited under Article 9.66 This is because such actions are first and 
foremost concerned with an individual’s innermost thoughts and, in seeking to effect an internal 
change, they constitute a clear and direct assault on the right to hold or change a religion or 
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the European Convention on Human Rights (Council of Europe 2007) 60. 
61 Peter G Danchin, ‘Of Prophets and Proselytes: Freedom of Religion and the Conflict of Rights in 
International Law’ (2008) 49:2 Harvard International Law Journal 249, 263. 
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belief. Once such interference has been substantiated by the ECtHR one would not expect the 
ECtHR to conduct a lengthy analysis before finding a violation of Article 9. Indeed, it seems that 
any consideration of countervailing interests in the assessment would be inappropriate.  
However, it is important to note that the ECtHR does not say that this type of State action 
is always prohibited in all circumstances. It seems logical to infer that ‘cannot’ in the statement 
that ‘a State cannot dictate what a person believes or take coercive steps to make him change his 
beliefs’ means that, but, just because the ECtHR does not qualify what is meant by ‘cannot’, does 
not mean that no qualification is possible, i.e. does it mean that a State ‘cannot’ in any 
circumstances or does it mean that it ‘cannot’ except for very rare circumstances?67 It is difficult 
to tell for certain from the statement alone.   
 
a. The ECtHR’s Flexibility  
An analysis of the language used in Article 9 jurisprudence suggests that the ECtHR seems to 
have considerable flexibility in terms of protecting absolute rights too. Firstly, it can ask the 
procedural question whether a right to hold or change a religion or belief is engaged on the basis 
of the facts of the case. There is no objective test for reaching a decision as to whether a specific 
Article 9 right is engaged. Just because a complaint is framed in a particular way before the 
ECtHR (e.g. just because it is framed as a complaint concerning interference with the absolute 
right to hold or change a religion or belief) does not mean that the ECtHR has to deal with it in 
that way. Indeed, the ECtHR has been clear that it is ‘master of the characterisation to be given in 
law to the facts of the case’ and it is not ‘bound by the characterisation given by applicants’, nor a 
government or even the Commission.68 The ECtHR has explained that in accordance with the 
jura novit curia principle it can choose to consider a complaint under a different paragraph or 
article (even if not relied upon by the applicant) or an article previously deemed inadmissible by 
the Commission, because, for the ECtHR, ‘a complaint is characterised by the facts alleged in it 
and not merely by the legal grounds or arguments relied on.’69 This means that when presented 
with a complaint about interference with the right to hold or change a religion or belief, the 
ECtHR can characterise the complaint in a different way, for instance, as a complaint concerning 
limitations on manifestation if it deems that the most suitable way to approach the issue in the 
circumstances.  
 
67 For a similar discussion in relation to Article 3 see Steven Greer, ‘Is the Prohibition against Torture, Cruel, 
Inhuman and Degrading Treatment Really ‘Absolute’ in International Human Rights Law?’ (2015) 15:1 Human 
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Convention on Human Rights (Springer 1996) 697. 




Secondly, if it establishes that a complaint engages the absolute right to hold or to change 
a religion or belief, the ECtHR can then ask whether what happened in the case amounts to an 
interference with these absolute rights. Importantly, just because the ECtHR considers that the 
absolute right to hold or change a religion or belief is engaged, or even affected, in a particular 
case does not mean that it will find a violation of Article 9.  
The ECtHR does not suggest that the rights to hold or change a religion or belief are 
‘untouchable’ rights so that any State action which relates to, or affects, these rights must be 
considered a violation of Article 9. Rather, the ECtHR explains that any State action which 
constitutes an ‘interference’ or ‘limitation’ on these rights must be absolutely prohibited, and it 
has specifically set out the principle that States cannot dictate a person’s religion or belief or 
coerce a person to change it. This is similar to the protection offered in ICCPR Article 18.2. As 
explained by Bielefeldt, Ghanea and Wiener, ICCPR Article 18.2 does not simply prohibit any 
State conduct which affects the right to have or adopt a religion or belief, but more specifically, it 
prohibits any conduct attributable to the State which would ‘impair’ (i.e. weaken or damage) 
these rights.70 And, in deciding whether State action has affected or whether it has interfered with 
Article 9 it seems the ECtHR also has considerable flexibility. For instance, because the ECtHR 
has not defined what is meant by ‘coercion’ (or ‘compulsion’) which is often key in cases 
concerning claims of interference with the right to hold or change a religion or belief, it considers 
all the factors involved rather than reaching a decision based simply upon a strict definition.  
In light of the context of ECtHR jurisprudence as a whole, this recognition of flexibility 
in terms of protecting absolute rights under Article 9 seems sensible. The ECtHR does not 
automatically find a violation of Article 3 whenever applicants complain that they have been 
subjected to ill-treatment or torture or inhuman or degrading treatment, or even when it finds that 
these rights are engaged. There must be a ‘minimum level of severity’ in order to fall within the 
scope of Article 3, i.e. the facts of the case must cross the threshold required.71 However, there is 
no fixed criteria here.72 With respect to claims about ill-treatment, for instance, the ECtHR has 
explained that the assessment is relative; the ECtHR cannot list at the outset behaviour that 
constitutes ill-treatment because it depends on a variety of factors.73 If there is flexibility with 
 
70 Heiner Bielefeldt, Nazila Ghanea and Michael Wiener, Freedom of Religion or Belief (OUP 2016) 83. 
71 See Pretty v The United Kingdom ECHR 2002-III 155 para 52. The notion of a threshold is also evident in 
Article 8 jurisprudence, see Seven Individuals v Sweden (1982) 29 DR 104. The ECtHR has explained that 
Article 8 only comes into play where there is an invasion of ‘such gravity’ that ‘personal integrity is 
compromised’, see Polanco Torres and Movilla Polanco v Spain App no 34147/06 (ECtHR, 21 September 
2010) [French], para 40. 
72 In some cases, the threshold seems to be low, see e.g., Bouyid v Belgium ECHR 2015-V 457 paras 86-7, 101.  
73 See also Kudła v Poland ECHR 2000-XI 197 para 91; Peers v Greece ECHR 2001-III 275 para 67. For Rivers, 
Kudła v Poland is a ‘tolerably clear…example of balancing’ in relation to Article 3, see Julian Rivers, 




respect to absolute protection under Article 3 in different circumstances,74 this raises the question 
whether ‘absolute’ in Article 9 means that there can never ever, under any circumstances 
whatsoever be interference or restriction on the rights to hold or change a religion or belief, or 
whether this is also dependent on circumstances. It seems likely that it is the latter. If there are 
very weighty countervailing factors the ECtHR might not find a violation. Therefore, it seems 
that ECtHR also conducts a balancing exercise in respect of absolute rights too. This will be 
discussed in detail in the analysis of the cases in Chapter Four of this thesis.  
  
Overall, it seems that the ECtHR balances factors indicating a violation (primarily, but 
not only, forum internum relevance) with factors indicating no violation, in all Article 9 cases, in 
order to reach its decision. Whilst forum internum relevance is critical, therefore, it does not seem 
that every other consideration can simply be overridden when forum internum relevance is 
identified. In other words, forum internum relevance, even strong forum internum relevance, does 
not appear to be a trump card. 
 In terms of the margin of appreciation, there seems to be a ‘trade-off’ in that the 
‘loosening’ of the forum internum and the forum externum distinction seems to imply a narrower 
margin of appreciation. This is because, presently, there is a fairly broad margin of appreciation 
in relation to the area traditionally understood to be the forum externum. If the forum internum is 
not understood in absolute terms (i.e. if there can be intrusions into the forum internum in certain 
circumstances) decisions cannot simply be left up to the State. The margin of appreciation needs 
to be narrower in such cases because a higher degree of scrutiny on the part of the ECtHR is 
necessary in respect of the balance between forum internum relevance and countervailing factors. 
 
D.  Forum Internum Relevance and Countervailing Factors    
In addressing any complaint before it, the ECtHR considers both issues of fact and law. As 
Kritzer points out, it is important not to draw too sharp a distinction between the law and facts; 
the ‘framework established by the law determines which facts are relevant, and the particular 
facts influence the applicability of different legal principles’.75 The question, ‘what is a fact for 
the purpose of the case?’, is a legal question. The ECtHR is master of which facts are deemed 
legal facts and therefore relevant, and which are immaterial. Legal facts become ‘factors’ which 
the ECtHR takes into account in order to conduct the balancing exercise under Article 9.  
 
74 Greer points out, in relation to Article 3, that the ‘variability of relevant thresholds undermines this [absolute] 
status or at least raises a query about what it really means’, Steven Greer, ‘Is the Prohibition against Torture, 
Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment Really ‘Absolute’ in International Human Rights Law?’ (2015) 
15:1 Human Rights Law Review 101, 116. 




 The way in which the ECtHR approaches cases, and the decisions it reaches, depends 
heavily on the facts it deems relevant, and the way in which it characterises them for the purposes 
of the case. Take, for example, Darby v Sweden, mentioned above. This case concerned the 
obligation to pay church tax. The Commission found a violation of Article 9 because it decided 
that in refusing an exemption the State had failed to protect the applicant’s forum internum.76 In 
contrast, the Court decided not to examine the complaint under Article 9 at all because it 
characterised the complaint as an issue concerning the peaceful enjoyment of possessions and 
discrimination, and found a violation of Article 14 taken together with Article 1 of Protocol 1.77 
This example shows that the way in which the factual circumstances are framed is crucial.  
 If the ECtHR only took into account forum internum relevance in its consideration of 
Article 9 complaints, one would simply expect to see the highest level of protection in cases 
where forum internum relevance was strongest and the very lowest level of protection where 
forum internum relevance was weakest. However, as explained above, whilst significant, forum 
internum relevance is only one factor in the context of determination. The ECtHR balances 
factors weighing in favour of the applicant (primarily, but not only, forum internum relevance) 
with countervailing factors, to reach its decision.  
On the facts in some cases, one would naturally expect the ECtHR to consider forum 
internum relevance to be at its strongest and countervailing interests to be at their weakest, and 
thus, to offer the very highest degree of protection. For instance, in cases where applicants have 
complained that the State has directly interfered with the rights to hold or change a religion or 
belief (by coercing them to believe in or abandon a religion, for example), and the ECtHR has 
found such claims substantiated, one would expect the ECtHR to find a violation of Article 9. 
In contrast, on the facts in other cases, one would naturally expect the ECtHR to consider 
forum internum relevance to be at its weakest and countervailing factors to be at their strongest, 
and thus, to offer the very lowest degree of protection. For example, in cases in which restrictions 
have been placed on applicants who seek to inflict harm on themselves or others on the basis of 
their religion or belief, one would expect the ECtHR to find no violation of Article 9. Indeed, this 
is consistent with the understanding of limitations advanced by Krishnaswami; he explained that 
certain ‘obvious’ harmful manifestations — such ritual sacrifice, self-immolation and collective 
suicides — could (and should) always be limited.78 In more recent years, there is growing 
 
76 Darby v Sweden App no 11581/85 (1989) Report 31.  
77 Darby v Sweden (1990) Series A no 187. Darby v Sweden will be examined in detail in Chapter Seven. 
78 OHCHR, A Study of Discrimination in the Matter of Religious Rights and Practices by Arcot Krishnaswami, 
Special Rapporteur of the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and the Protection of Minorities 




consensus that other harmful manifestations of religion or belief, such as religiously motivated 
corporal punishment, can be clearly outweighed by countervailing factors.  
Most cases, however, are not as clear-cut because forum internum relevance and 
countervailing factors may both be strong or forum internum relevance and countervailing factors 
may both be weak. Whilst the facts are important in all Article 9 complaints, it is in these 
contested cases that one would expect the facts to play the greatest role, influencing the approach 
and outcome from the outset. In such cases, the balancing exercise is ‘harder’ (relatively 
speaking) and the outcome depends heavily on the way in which the ECtHR characterises the 
case.  
 
i. The Loose Concentric Circles Model  
Given the above, a helpful way of grouping the cases according to the ECtHR’s characterisation 
seems to be a loose concentric circles model, comprising three circles.79 In the innermost circle, 
one would expect to see cases in which forum internum relevance is strongest and countervailing 
factors are weakest, and thus for the ECtHR to offer a very high degree of protection. In the 
outermost circle, one would expect to see cases in which forum internum relevance is weakest 
and countervailing factors are strongest, and thus for the ECtHR to offer a very low degree of 
protection. In the middle circle one would expect to see the most contested cases (either because 
both forum internum relevance and countervailing factors are weak or both forum internum 
relevance and countervailing factors are strong) and thus, for the ECtHR to offer protection 
ranging from a high to a low degree depending on the way in which it balances the factors. 
It is important to note that this loose concentric circles model is, therefore, different from the 
continuum of forum internum relevance. The three circles (innermost, middle and outermost) do 
not represent different degrees of forum internum relevance; the loose concentric circles model is 
simply a way of grouping the cases according to the ECtHR’s characterisation and it is a useful 
way of ordering the cases for analysis in this thesis.   
An important point about this loose explanatory model is that there are no hard boundaries 
between the circles; the boundaries are porous. And, significantly, there are no ‘correct’ places 
for a right to fall. Where a right is seen to fall, using this model, depends on the way in which the 
ECtHR balances factors indicating a violation (primarily, but not only, forum internum relevance) 
with countervailing factors indicating no violation. Thus, it recognises and allows for the 
ECtHR’s flexibility and fluidity in addressing Article 9 cases.  
 
79 ‘concentric’ meaning ‘[o]f or denoting circles, arcs, or other shapes which share the same centre, the larger 




This thesis recognises that the doctrine of proportionality80 has been subject to a great deal of 
academic exploration.81 The balancing of rights and public interests is, as Rivers explains, 
‘endemic’ under the ECHR82 and some interesting normative accounts, which aim to discipline 
the ECtHR’s approach, have been advanced in the literature.83 Whilst the understanding of 
balancing in this chapter is drawn from the way in which Article 9 has been presented by the 
ECtHR and, as such, reflects what one would expect the ECtHR to do rather than setting out what 
it ought to do, there are clear similarities between theoretical accounts in the literature and the 
approach in this thesis.  
Take, for instance, Klatt and Meister’s account of proportionality and balancing.84 
Relying on Rivers’ discussion of the structure of proportionality analysis,85 they explain that in 
order to determine whether an act is proportionate (and therefore, justifiable) it is necessary for 
the ECtHR to consider whether it pursues a legitimate aim, whether it can achieve the aim it 
pursues, whether it impairs the right as little as possible and, whether there is a ‘net gain’ when 
the impact on the exercise of the right is weighed, or balanced, against the extent to which the 
aim is realised.86  
In respect of balancing, Klatt and Meister explain that it is necessary to establish the 
degree of infringement of a right, the importance of pursuing the legitimate aim, and, whether or 
not the importance of pursuing the legitimate aim justifies the infringement of the right.87 They 
contend that there can be three outcomes of balancing: if the infringement of the right outweighs 
the importance of pursuing the legitimate aim, the right prevails; if the importance of pursuing the 
legitimate aim outweighs the infringement of the right, the pursuit of the legitimate aim prevails; 
 
80 As Rivers explains, ‘the doctrine of proportionality in the wide sense is the name given to the set of tests used 
to establish whether a limitation of rights is justifiable’, Julian Rivers, ‘Proportionality and Variable Intensity of 
Review’ (2006) 65:1 Cambridge Law Journal 174, 174. The tests in the proportionality analysis are legitimate 
aims, suitability, necessity and proportionality in the narrow sense, ibid., 180-181. See also, Julian Rivers, ‘The 
Presumption of Proportionality’ (2014) 77:3 Modern Law Review 409, 412-415. 
81 See e.g., ibid.; Yutaka Arai-Takahashi, ‘Proportionality’ in Dinah Shelton (ed) The Oxford Handbook of 
International Human Rights Law (OUP 2013); Benedikt Pirker, Proportionality Analysis and Models of Judicial 
Review (Europa Law Publishing 2013); Julian Rivers, ‘The Presumption of Proportionality’ (2014) 77:3 Modern 
Law Review 409; Tor-Inge Harbo, The Function of Proportionality Analysis in European Law (Martinus 
Nijhoff 2015); Adam Ramshaw, ‘The case for replicable structure full proportionality analysis in all cases 
concerning fundamental rights’ (2019) 39:1 Legal Studies 120. 
82 Julian Rivers, ‘Proportionality and Variable Intensity of Review’ (2006) 65:1 Cambridge Law Journal 174, 
187.  
83 See e.g., Matthias Klatt and Moritz Meister, The Constitutional Structure of Proportionality (OUP 2012); 
Matthias Klatt and Moritz Meister, ‘Proportionality-a benefit to human rights? Remarks on the ICON 
controversy’ (2012) 10:3 International Journal of Constitutional Law 687. 
84 Ibid. 
85 Julian Rivers, ‘Proportionality and Variable Intensity of Review’ (2006) 65:1 Cambridge Law Journal 174, 
180-181.  
86 Matthias Klatt and Moritz Meister, The Constitutional Structure of Proportionality (OUP 2012) 8, 10.   




or, if both the infringement of the right and the importance of pursing the legitimate aim have the 
same weight, this causes a ‘stalemate’ and there will be ‘discretion in balancing’.88 In terms of 
attributing weight, Klatt and Meister suggest using Alexy’s ‘triadic scale’ of ‘light, moderate and 
serious’89 but they do not set out the precise weight to be given to rights or competing principles 
in the balance.   
Klatt and Meister’s account, therefore, resonates with the loose concentric circles model 
above and it helpfully illustrates that there is no dissonance between theory and the approach in 
this thesis. This thesis does not seek to challenge theoretical accounts of proportionality but, 
rather, to go beyond them because theoretical accounts tend not to describe what happens in 
ECtHR cases in practice. This thesis focuses on the way balancing works in Article 9 
jurisprudence to produce a descriptive ordering of cases relating to the right to freedom of 
thought, conscience and religion.  
 
ii. A Hypothesis 
At this juncture, a hypothesis can be proposed: if the protection of Article 9 rights in practice (i.e. 
when the ECtHR applies the principles to the facts of a case) is consistent with the way in which 
the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion and its protection by the ECtHR has been 
presented, then one would expect to see the ECtHR balancing factors indicating a violation 
(primarily, but not only, forum internum relevance) with countervailing factors to reach its 
decision in relation to all Article 9 rights. This chapter suggests that one would expect to see 
cases grouped roughly in terms of a loose concentric circles model in which the innermost circle 
represents forum internum relevance at its strongest and countervailing factors at their weakest, 
the outermost circle represents forum internum relevance at its weakest and countervailing factors 
at their strongest and, the middle circle represents forum internum relevance and countervailing 
factors at their most contested. This nuanced understanding of protection to be offered under 
Article 9 is very different to the idea advanced in the literature – that there is, or should be, a 
clear-cut distinction between the protection of absolute and qualified rights. 
The following chapters will test this hypothesis against the practice of the ECtHR when 
deciding cases. Does the ECtHR offer a very high degree of protection under Article 9 when it 
 
88 Ibid., 58, 79-80.  
89 Ibid., 12-13, 57, 59, 79. See also, Robert Alexy, A Theory of Constitutional Rights (OUP 2010) 402. The way 
Klatt and Meister envisage this working in practice is helpfully illustrated through their discussion of Otto-
Preminger Institut v Austria. They argue that the ECtHR did not balance properly in this case because it relied 
on the margin of appreciation doctrine. As there was a serious interference with the applicant association’s 
rights, the importance of pursuing the legitimate aim could only have outweighed the right if it was also serious. 
They argue that it was not serious and, therefore, contend that the interference could not be justified in this case, 





considers that forum internum relevance is strongest and countervailing factors weakest? Does it 
offer a very low degree of protection when it considers that forum internum relevance is weakest 
and countervailing factors strongest? Does protection vary from a very high to a very low degree 
in cases in which forum internum relevance and countervailing factors are both strong, or both 
weak, depending on the way in which the ECtHR balances the factors? 
 In considering these questions, Part II will demonstrate further that there is not a binary 
and hierarchical distinction between the forum internum and forum externum in Article 9. The 
detailed analysis of the protection of Article 9 in the case law will reveal that the ECtHR not only 
recognises that the forum internum and forum externum are interrelated aspects in theory, it also 
recognises this in practice. 
 
Conclusion  
This chapter demonstrates that presentation of the forum internum and the forum externum in 
Article 9 jurisprudence supports the reading of the forum internum and forum externum advanced 
in the previous chapter. By focusing on the precise wording, this chapter reveals that the way in 
which Article 9 and the protection to be offered under this right is presented in the jurisprudence 
suggests that there is not a binary and hierarchical relationship between the forum internum and 
the forum externum but, on the contrary, that these are both important aspects of the broad right to 
freedom of thought, conscience and religion and deeply interrelated realms.  
 The focused examination of the use of the terms forum internum and forum externum in 
Article 9 jurisprudence demonstrates that rather than emphasising a separation, the standard 
recital, in which the term forum internum most commonly appears, consistently stresses an 
interconnection between these two realms. The forum internum is ‘intimately related’ and ‘bound 
up’ with the forum externum. The forum internum and forum externum are presented as 
interconnected, overlapping spaces, encompassed by the broad right to freedom of thought, 
conscience and religion. As such, it argued that the notion of a conceptual continuum ranging 
from the forum internum to the forum externum, which recognises the forum internum is always 
relevant, is a helpful way of understanding the relationship between the forum internum and 
forum externum in Article 9. Indeed, the terms themselves remain useful in understanding Article 
9; what is problematic is the way in which they have been understood in the literature, 
particularly the elision of forum internum and forum externum and absolute and qualified 
respectively.  
 In respect to the presentation of protection under Article 9, this chapter argued that the 
terms forum internum and forum externum are not used as a device for distinguishing between 




takes a more nuanced approach to protection under this article. The ECtHR does not seem to be 
concerned with the question whether a right ‘fits’ either into the forum internum or the forum 
externum but rather with the subtler question of the extent to which the forum internum is 
relevant in a given case. However, it appears that whilst the forum internum is the most 
significant factor weighing in favour of the applicant it is not the only factor that determines 
Article 9 cases. The ECtHR seems to balance factors indicating a violation (primarily, but not 
only forum internum relevance) with countervailing factors indicating no violation in order to 
reach its decision.  
These findings led to a hypothesis. This chapter hypothesised that, if the presentation of 
Article 9 and the protection to be offered under Article 9 is consistent with the understanding of 
Article 9 and the protection of this right in practice (i.e. when applied to the facts of the case) one 
would expect the ECtHR to conduct a balancing exercise to reach its decision in all Article 9 
cases. It suggests that the ECtHR’s characterisation of cases can be helpfully understood using a 
model of three loose concentric circles. One would expect the highest degree of protection in the 
innermost circle where forum internum relevance is strongest and countervailing factors are 
weakest. One would expect the lowest degree of protection in the outermost circle where forum 
internum relevance is weakest and countervailing factors are strongest. In the middle circle, 
where forum internum relevance and countervailing factors are at their most contested, one would 
expect protection to range from the highest to lowest degree depending on the way in which the 
ECtHR characterises the case. Part II of this thesis will test this hypothesis by analysing the 























PART II: THE ECtHR’s APPLICATION OF THE RIGHT TO 




CHAPTER 4. STRONGEST FORUM INTERNUM RELEVANCE AND 
WEAKEST COUNTERVAILING FACTORS  
Introduction  
This chapter focuses on cases in which one would expect to see strongest forum internum 
relevance and weakest countervailing factors. In terms of the loose concentric circles model, 
advanced in the previous chapter, this chapter focuses on the innermost circle. Specifically, it 
examines cases in which applicants have complained about State interference with their right to 
hold, or pressure to change, a religion or belief. This is because these rights are understood to be 
absolute and unqualified rights so, where the ECtHR finds claims of interference or pressure 
substantiated, one would expect to see the ECtHR giving very little weight to countervailing 
factors on balance, and, offering a very high degree of protection. Is this is seen in Article 9 
jurisprudence in practice?1  
This chapter argues that in practice the protection of Article 9 rights is largely consistent 
with the way in which protection has been presented under Article 9. Notably, this chapter shows 
that the ECtHR does not treat the rights to hold or change religion or belief as ‘untouchable’ 
rights; it is not simply a given that if an applicant complains about interference with these rights 
the ECtHR will automatically find a violation of Article 9. The ECtHR can and does deploy a 
range of approaches. Firstly, when a complaint about interference with the right to hold or change 
a religion or belief is raised in conjunction with complaints under other ECHR articles, the 
ECtHR does not always conduct an examination of the Article 9 complaint if it finds a violation 
of another article. Secondly, when the ECtHR does examine such Article 9 complaints it does not 
necessarily find the rights to hold or change religion or belief are engaged. On some occasions it 
finds that the complaint is more appropriately characterised as engaging another Article 9 right, 
or on other occasions, finds no Article 9 right engaged at all. Thirdly, when the ECtHR considers 
that the right to hold or change a religion or belief is engaged, it only finds a violation of Article 9 
if it considers that the forum internum relevance is not outweighed by countervailing factors in 
the balance.  
 
1 There is a widespread assumption in the literature that the ‘nucleus’ of the right to freedom of thought, 
conscience and religion is ‘unproblematic’ because ‘States have not found it difficult to allow people to think’, 
see Martin Scheinin, ‘Article 18’ Guðmundur S Alfreðsson and Asbjørn Eide (eds) The Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights: A Common Standard of Achievement’ (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1999) 380; Owain 
Thomas, ‘Article 9: What is it, where does it come from, and do we need it (anymore)? (1 Crown Row, 2008) 
<http://www.preview2.1cor.enstar.net/1155/records/1150/OT%20Talk.pdf> accessed February 2018, 3; William 
A Schabas, The European Convention on Human Rights: A Commentary (OUP 2015) 420.  However, in an 
increasing number of ECtHR cases, applicants are arguing that States have interfered with their rights to have or 




So, whilst significant, forum internum relevance is not the determining factor in 
complaints concerning the rights to hold or change a religion or belief, rather, the ECtHR 
balances factors indicating a violation of Article 9 (primarily, but not only, forum internum 
relevance) with countervailing factors indicating no violation, in order to reach its decision. 
To illustrate this, this chapter examines cases in which complaints have been made about 
interference with the rights to hold and change religion or belief in three paradigmatic areas: 
Section A examines deprogramming measures, coercive psychiatric treatments and criticism of 
religion, Section B examines indoctrination and Section C examines employment sanctions on the 
grounds of religion or belief affiliation.  
 
A. Deprogramming, Coercive Psychiatric Treatment and Criticism of 
Religion  
This section examines cases in which applicants have complained about interference with the 
right to hold or change religion or belief as a result of deprogramming measures, coercive 
psychiatric treatment and criticism of religion. Through a close analysis of case law, this section 
will demonstrate that, in addressing complaints about such interference, the ECtHR exercises 
considerable flexibility. Contrary to what one might expect from the presentation of Article 9 in 
the literature, forum internum relevance, even very strong forum internum relevance, is not the 
determining factor in these cases. It is just one of the factors the ECtHR takes into consideration, 
in the balance.   
 
i. Deprogramming  
It is useful to begin the analysis in this chapter with a case concerning deprogramming because, 
given deprogramming is such an extreme form of interference with the right to hold a religion or 
belief, one might expect (from the way in which Article 9 is presented in the literature, at least) 
the ECtHR to always offer the very highest degree of protection against any such interference. 
This is not, however, what the jurisprudence reveals. Rather, the ECtHR’s approach in these 
cases offers support for the theoretical argument advanced in the previous chapter that the ECtHR 
exercises considerable flexibility in addressing complaints about interference with the absolute 
rights to hold or change religion or belief. Cases concerning deprogramming illustrate that the 
ECtHR can decide to conduct a superficial or perfunctory examination of the Article 9 complaint 
where it has already found a violation of a different ECHR Article (notably Article 5) even when 
it seems obvious that interference with the right to hold or change a religion or belief is 




This approach is illustrated in Reira Blume v Spain2 in which seven members of the 
Centro Esoterico de Investigaciones (CEIS), considered a ‘sect’ by the Spanish government, 
complained that they had been deprived of their liberty by their parents and State agents for ten 
days and subjected to deprogramming measures.3 Following the applicants’ arrest and release, 
they were taken by the Catalan police to a hotel and handed over to their families, where they 
were confined under constant supervision, in individual rooms with boarded up windows, for ten 
days and subjected to deprogramming measures by a psychologist and psychiatrist at the request 
of the government organisation, Pro Juventud. Upon leaving the hotel the applicants complained 
unsuccessfully to the domestic courts about inter alia false imprisonment and before the ECtHR 
the applicants asked the Court to hold that the State had failed to discharge its obligations under 
Articles 5 and 9.4  
For the ECtHR, the core of the applicants’ complaint was the detention itself,5 rather than 
the deprogramming. And, having found a violation of Article 5 on the basis that such a major 
deprivation of liberty, for which the authorities were ultimately responsible,6 was not justified 
even where there was a risk of suicide, it decided not to conduct a separate examination of Article 
9.7 It simply noted that the government had argued that ‘no Catalan police officer or other 
authority had taken part in the alleged deprogramming’ and the applicants accepted this.8 
Commentators have tended to gloss over the ECtHR’s decision not to address the Article 
9 complaint in detail. C Evans for instance thought that the case showed the ECtHR supporting 
the ‘right of an individual to make the controversial decision of changing from a mainstream 
religion to a so-called cult’, even if the protection was gained under a different article. 9 A similar 
reading was advanced by Taylor who argued that in this case the ‘element of personal choice 
seemed to prevail’.10 However, on closer inspection, the ECtHR’s decision not to address Article 
9 is revealing in terms of the ECtHR’s protection of the forum internum. The ECtHR has 
explicitly explained that States are prohibited from dictating an individual’s religion or belief or 
coercing an individual to change their religion or belief. Therefore, in choosing not to address 
Article 9 directly the ECtHR did not, as C Evans conceded, address ‘some complicated but 
 
2 Reira Blume and Others v Spain ECHR 1999-II 539; Reira Blume and Others v Spain 37680/97, ECHR 1999-
VII 1.  
3 Reira Blume and Others v Spain ECHR 1999-II 539, paras 12-15.  
4 Reira Blume and Others v Spain 37680/97, ECHR 1999-VII 1, para 23.  
5 Ibid., para 38.  
6 Ibid., para 35. 
7 Ibid., para 38.  
8 Ibid., para 36. 
9 Carolyn Evans, Freedom of Religion under the European Convention on Human Rights (OUP 2001) 97. See 
also Sylvie Langlaude, ‘Indoctrination, Secularism, Religious Liberty and the ECHR’ (2006) 55 International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly 929, 941. 




important issues that would have been raised by consideration of the applicants’ arguments based 
on freedom of religion.’11 
Whilst it is recognised that applicants often make claims under various ECHR articles, 
and as such it is generally sensible for the ECtHR to focus on what it considers to be the most 
important claims,12 this approach sometimes means the ECtHR overlooks important implications 
for other articles, especially Article 9. Harris and others have explained that given the heavy case 
load of the ECtHR, it may want to address cases as quickly as it can, and ‘this may be best 
achieved by avoiding having to examine an article that is as (frequently) as controversial as 
Article 9.’13 However, as they rightly point out this is a ‘regrettable’ approach because it means 
some important issues are left unresolved and it potentially limits ‘the opportunities for Article 9 
to be interpreted in such a way as to realise its full potential.’14 
In Reira Blume v Spain, the fact the ECtHR decided not to conduct a detailed examination 
of the Article 9 complaint implied that the claim concerning deprogramming (i.e. the claim of 
interference with the right to hold a religion or belief) was not considered important by the 
ECtHR or, at least, not as important as the claim concerning the deprivation of liberty in this 
case.15 It also suggests that the ECtHR’s analysis misses the point of the complaint as a whole as 
the applicants would not have been detained if they had not held the particular belief in question; 
it was the belief that motivated the detention. Moreover, in simply stating that no Catalan police 
officer or any other authority had taken part in the deprogramming the ECtHR did not address the 
request made by the applicants under Article 9. The applicants did not complain that State 
authorities had engaged in the deprogramming but rather asked the ECtHR to find that the State 
had failed to discharge its obligations under Article 9. Had the ECtHR considered whether the 
State had failed to discharge its positive obligations under Article 9, to protect the applicants’ 
right to hold a religion or belief, it is highly likely that it would also have found a violation of 
Article 9 on the facts.16 
 
11 Carolyn Evans, Freedom of Religion (OUP 2001) 7. 
12 Ibid. 
13 D Harris and others, Harris O’Boyle & Warbrick: Law of the European Convention on Human Rights (3rd edn, 
OUP 2014) 612.  
14 Ibid. Temperman argues this approach could leave an applicant with a ‘profound, “what if” feeling’, Jeroen 
Temperman, ‘Lautsi II: A Lesson in Burying Fundamental Children’s Rights’ (2011) 6 Religion and Human 
Rights 279, 282. Renucci discusses the ‘marginalisation of Article 9’, see Jean-François Renucci, ‘Article 9 of 
the European Convention on Human Rights’ Human Rights Files No 20 (Council of Europe 2005) 
<https://www.echr.coe.int/LibraryDocs/DG2/HRFILES/DG2-EN-HRFILES-20(2005).pdf> accessed July 2015, 
36.  
15 It would have been interesting to have seen the ECtHR’s approach to the complaint about forced hypnosis in 
order to adhere to an educational programme at a care home in GG v Italy, but this complaint was deemed 
inadmissible for failure to exhaust domestic remedies, see GG v Italy App no 42414/98 (ECtHR, 7 May 2002).  
16 For a discussion of positive obligations, see Eweida and Others v United Kingdom ECHR 2013-I 215 




The key point here is that, despite the striking facts in this case, the question of forum 
internum relevance was not the determining factor for the ECtHR in its analysis. On the contrary, 
it was just one factor the ECtHR (briefly) took into account. This case shows that in practice, in 
the context of deprogramming, the ECtHR does not consider the absolute right to hold a religion 
or belief to be an ‘untouchable’ right which acts as a ‘trump card’ in Article 9 claims. If that were 
the case, the ECtHR would surely have found a violation of Article 9 here; the fact that it did not 
provides evidence against such an interpretation of ‘absolute’ rights. Further evidence is seen in 
in cases concerning coercive psychiatric treatment motivated by an individual’s adherence to a 
religion or belief.  
 
ii. Coercive Psychiatric Treatment  
In some cases concerning coercive psychiatric treatment, the ECtHR has decided not to address 
the Article 9 complaint at all, after finding a violation of another ECHR article even when the 
forum internum is potentially at issue. This approach is illustrated well in the recent case of 
Atudorei v Romania17 which concerned coercive psychiatric treatment motivated by an 
individual’s adherence to a religion or belief. The applicant complained about being detained, 
twice, in a psychiatric hospital against her will and being kept under surveillance and heavily 
medicated by her parents for six months, as a result of her involvement with the Movement for 
Spiritual Integration into the Absolute (MISA).18 Whilst one might have expected the ECtHR to 
have given great weight to the forum internum in such circumstances, it did not even examine the 
applicants complaint under Article 9 that she had been prevented from practising her beliefs. It 
simply explained, after finding a violation of Articles 5 and 8, that it need not examine the 
complaints under Articles 9, 12 or 14.  
Again, it seems that the applicant in Atudorei v Romania was detained and kept under 
surveillance as a direct result of her involvement with MISA. Had the ECtHR examined the 
Article 9 complaint it may have not only found that the detention and surveillance interfered with 
her right to practice her religion or belief but also that there had been interference with her 
absolute right to hold a religion or belief too.19 Whilst it is recognised that the ECtHR may have 
decided not to address Article 9 for reasons of expediency, it is difficult to overlook the 
 
17 Atudorei v Romania App no 50131/08 (ECtHR, 16 Sept 2014).  
18 Ibid., para 36. 
19 In Tsavachidis v Greece, a number of dissenting Commissioners found that government surveillance of a 
Jehovah’s Witness community not only constituted an interference with the right to manifest religion or belief 
but also the right to hold a religion or belief, see Tsavachidis v Greece App no 28802/95 (Commission Report, 




implication that the Article 9 claim was considered to be unimportant by the ECtHR, or at least, 
not as important as the Article 5 and 8 claims in this case. 
And, in other cases concerning psychiatric treatment motivated by an individual’s religion 
or belief, in which the ECtHR has examined the Article 9 complaint in detail, the ECtHR has 
tended not to protect the forum internum absolutely either.  
This is clear from Mockute v Lithuania.20 The background to the complaint in this case is 
salient. The applicant, who had been taken by force to a psychiatric hospital following a 
deterioration in her mental health, was a member of the controversial Ojas Meditation Centre.21 
Whilst the applicant was in hospital, her mother and sister took part in a TV programme focusing 
on the activities of the Ojas Meditation Centre, in which they claimed meditation had had a 
negative impact on the applicant. These accounts, she claimed, were ‘blindly believed’ by the 
psychiatrists and after making the diagnosis that she was under the influence of a sect, the 
psychiatrists sought to stop her from meditating. She claimed inter alia that she had been forced 
to ‘promise not to meditate’ (because it was deemed harmful for her mental health and 
incompatible with her ‘social status’) and was told to adhere to Roman Catholicism, the 
traditional religion in Lithuania.22  
After her release the applicant complained before the domestic courts about interference 
with her right to liberty, privacy and her right to freedom of religion. In terms of the latter claim, 
the regional court initially found that the efforts made by hospital staff to alter the applicant’s 
views towards ‘non-traditional religion, meditation and their practice at the Ojas Meditation 
Centre’ infringed her right to freedom of religion.23 However, whilst the Court of Appeal agreed 
that the applicant had been deprived of her liberty, it disagreed with the finding in relation to 
freedom of religion, arguing that meditation was not a religious practice and the Ojas Meditation 
Centre did not have the status of a religion.24  
 Before the ECtHR, the applicant argued that the hospital had interfered with both her 
right to privacy and to freedom of religion. After finding a violation of Article 8, the ECtHR 
addressed the Article 9 claim, specifically the claim that the applicant was prevented from 
meditating at the hospital and had been subjected to ‘psycho-correction techniques aimed at 
bringing about a critical and negative attitude towards her religion.’25 In terms of understanding 
the ECtHR’s approach to protection of the forum internum the ECtHR’s assessment under Article 
9 in this case is extremely interesting so it is worth examining in detail.  
 
20  Mockutė v Lithuania App no 66490/09 (ECtHR, 27 February 2018).  
21  Ibid., paras 6-10.  
22  Ibid. 
23  Ibid., para 37. 
24  Ibid., paras 42-4. 




The ECtHR began by emphasising the primary importance of the right to freedom of 
thought, conscience and religion, reiterating the principles that ‘State authorities are not entitled 
to intervene in the sphere of an individual’s freedom of conscience and seek to discover his or her 
religious beliefs or oblige him to disclose such beliefs’ and that a ‘State cannot dictate what a 
person believes or take coercive steps to make him change his beliefs’.26 After considering the 
facts, the ECtHR found the applicant’s claims largely substantiated. During the applicant’s 52-
day stay at the hospital, it observed, she had to submit to the ‘unyielding authority of the 
psychiatrists who were trying to “correct” the applicant so that she abandoned her “fictitious” 
religion.’27 It found pressure had been exerted on the applicant both to change her religious belief 
and to prevent her manifesting it.28 Taking into account her history of mental illness, her 
vulnerable situation and the extent of the control exercised over her by the psychiatrists who 
encouraged her to become critical of her religion, the ECtHR found that there had been 
interference with the applicant’s right to respect for her religion.  
 However, strikingly, the ECtHR then went on to consider whether this interference was 
justified under Article 9.2. In its (confused) assessment of whether the interference was 
prescribed by law the ECtHR relied upon the Lithuanian Constitution and constitutional case law, 
explaining that according to domestic law having a religion ‘falls within the ‘inviolable’ sphere of 
private life and may not be limited in any way’ unless expressed through actions.29 The ECtHR 
observed that Lithuanian law did not allow psychiatrists to ‘pry’ into patients’ beliefs in order to 
‘correct’ them when there is no obvious and imminent risk that thought will turn into dangerous 
actions threatening the safety of the individual in question or others.30 In addition, it added that in 
terms of its own jurisprudence, States have a limited margin of appreciation ‘to justify 
interference with the freedom of individual conscience’31 and repeated again, the primary 
importance of freedom of thought, conscience and religion and the ‘fact that a State cannot 
dictate what a person believes or take coercive steps to make him change his beliefs’.32 It 
concluded that, having found the interference was not prescribed by law, there was a violation of 
Article 9 in this case.  
Having found that during the applicant’s involuntary hospitalisation she was subjected to 
pressure to change her religious beliefs and was prevented from manifesting them, and that there 
 
26  Ibid., para 119. 
27  Ibid., para 124. 
28  Ibid., para 123. 
29  Ibid., para 129. 
30  Ibid.  
31 This is curious because the margin of appreciation doctrine is relevant only to considerations of proportionality, 
not to the question of whether the measure is prescribed by law.  
32 In para 118, the Court refers to Bayatyan v Armenia ECHR 2011-IV 1, para 123 and to Moscow Branch of the 




had been interference with her right to respect for her religion, one might have expected the 
ECtHR to have decided that there had been a violation of Article 9 in this case, without 
considering permissible limitations under Article 9.2. Indeed, in considering the limitations under 
Article 9.2 it may look like the ECtHR was seriously undermining the principles that the rights to 
hold and change a religion or belief are ‘absolute’ and ‘unqualified’ rights and that a ‘State 
cannot dictate what a person believes or take coercive steps to make him change his beliefs’.33  
However, there is an alternative reading. Rather than viewing the consideration of Article 
9.2 limitations as an error on the part on the ECtHR it might reflect that, for the ECtHR absolute 
rights in theory are not always to be protected absolutely in practice, in all situations. Indeed, the 
ECtHR explicitly conceded that psychiatric treatment might necessitate discussing religion, and 
in its interpretation of Lithuanian law it even implied that ‘prying into’ and (importantly) ‘seeking 
to correct’ beliefs could be legitimate where there is a ‘clear and imminent risk that such beliefs 
will manifest [but have not yet manifested] into actions dangerous to the patient or others’.34 In 
other words, it might not find a violation of Article 9 where there are very strong countervailing 
factors. This is a far cry from the notion that the forum internum is an ‘untouchable’ realm which 
must be an entirely ‘hands-off’ area for States. Crucially, it seems to suggest that, for the ECtHR, 
State interference with the right to hold a religion or belief might be justifiable in specific 
circumstances.  
Indeed, the issue of psychiatric treatment poses a real challenge to the notion that 
interference with the right to hold a religion or belief should always be absolutely prohibited 
because it would preclude the ECtHR permitting the State to step in with such medical treatment 
where religion was at issue, even if the religion in question was deeply harmful.35 This does not 
seem sensible or workable in practice. Indeed, in taking a ‘hands-off’ approach in such situations 
it could be argued that the State would not simply be protecting the forum internum of the 
individual in question but rather ignoring its positive obligations under the ECHR. 
The fact that the issue in Mockute v Lithuania concerned the forum internum was not, for 
the ECtHR, therefore, a ‘trump-card’ meaning that all other countervailing considerations could 
be immediately set aside. Rather than being the determining factor, the forum internum — whilst 
important — was a factor taken into account by the ECtHR in the balance.36 Further examples of 
 
33  Mockutė v Lithuania App no 66490/09 (ECtHR, 27 February 2018), para 119. 
34 Ibid., para 129 (my emphasis). 
35 See Mari Stenlund and Pamela Slotte, ‘Is there a Right to Hold a Delusion? Delusions as a Challenge for 
Human Rights Discussion (2003) 16 (4) Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 829.  
36 It would have been interesting to have seen the ECtHR’s approach to a similar complaint in Schmutz v 
Switzerland, but the applicant died before he could pursue the application, see Schmutz v Switzerland App no 




this approach can be seen in cases concerning criticism of religion or government warnings 
relating to ‘sects’, to which this section will now turn.  
 
iii. Criticisms of Religion or Belief and Government Warnings against ‘Sects’ 
The ECtHR has considered a number of complaints concerning interference with the right to 
freedom of thought, conscience and religion as a result of criticism of religious groups or 
government warnings against ‘dangerous’ religious groups or ‘sects’. Again, in these cases, the 
ECtHR has not viewed the forum internum relevance as a ‘trump card’ but rather has taken it into 
account in the balance.37   
Take for instance, the Church of Scientology v Sweden which concerned an academic’s 
criticism of Scientology.38 The Commission pointed out that there is no right to be free from 
criticism under Article 9 and found the criticism in question  — which included referring to 
Scientology as the ‘cholera of spiritual life’ — did not, given the setting of an academic lecture, 
constitute an interference with Article 9.39 And in Keller v Germany in which Scientologists 
claimed that a State school publication had derided their beliefs, the Commission found that the 
criticism was ‘not aimed at any identifiable person’ and the effects were ‘too indirect and remote’ 
to constitute a violation of Article 9.40 In Dubowska and Skup v Poland in which the applicants 
complained that a newspaper’s depiction of the Madonna and Child in gas masks insulted 
religious feelings the Commission explained that ‘members of a religious community must 
tolerate and accept the denial by others of their religious beliefs and even the propagation by 
others of doctrines hostile to their faith.’41 As in Otto-Preminger Institut v Austria, the 
Commission did note that ‘respect for the religious feelings of believers’ protected by Article 9 
might be violated by ‘provocative portrayals of objects of religious veneration’, however, it did 
not consider that the applicants were ‘inhibited from exercising their freedom to hold and express 
their belief’ in the circumstances.42 The key point for the ECtHR seems not to be whether there is 
criticism or agitation which may affect the forum internum but rather whether the criticism or 
 
37 As M Evans has pointed out individuals do not have a right to be ‘untroubled by actions which challenge or 
offend’ their religion or belief, see Malcolm D Evans, Religious Liberty and International Law in Europe (CUP 
1997) 284.  
38 Church of Scientology v Sweden (1980) 21 DR 109. 
39 Ibid. 
40 See Keller v Germany App no 36283/97 (Commission Decision, 4 March 1998). 
41 Dubowska and Skup v Poland App nos 33490/96 34055/96 (Commission Decision 18 April 1997). 
42 Ibid. See also Otto-Preminger Institut v Austria, (1994) Series A no 295-A, 47. For a critique of the ECtHR’s 
approach in this case see, George Letsas, ‘Is there a Right not to be Offended in one’s Religious Beliefs? in 
Loreno Zucca and Camil Ungureanu (eds) Law, State and Religion in New Europe: Debates and Dilemmas 




agitation against a church or a religious group reaches a level where it ‘might endanger freedom 
of religion’.43  
 The notion of a threshold is also evident in the jurisprudence relating to government 
criticisms of, or warnings against, ‘sects’. In Universelles Leben v Germany,44 which concerned a 
complaint about a proposed governmental publication warning about the danger of ‘so-called 
youth sects and psycho groups’, the Commission explained that a State, in informing the general 
public on matters of concern, ‘is entitled to convey, in an objective but critical manner, 
information on religious communities and sects, if such information does not pursue aims of 
agitation or indoctrination endangering the freedom of religion’.45 In the circumstances of this 
case, the ECtHR found that if the government went ahead with the publication there would be no 
interference with Article 9 as the criticisms were lawfully raised against the group.  
The ECtHR’s approach is further illustrated in Leela Forderkreis EV and Others v 
Germany,46 in which the government not only criticised sects, but went to considerable lengths to 
prevent people joining them. In this case the applicants complained before the ECtHR that the 
government’s long standing ‘warning’ and ‘information campaign’ against sects, including the 
Osho movement, interfered with their right to manifest their religion.47 The ECtHR observed that 
since the 1970s the government had run an extensive campaign intended to increase public 
awareness about sects and sectarian groups and provoke discussion of their aims, and had given a 
number of official warning about sects.48 The ECtHR considered that the negative statements 
made about the Osho movement in this context interfered with the applicants’ right to manifest 
their religion or belief. However, in its assessment of the legitimacy of the interference the 
ECtHR found no violation of Article 9 because the interference was prescribed by law, pursued a 
legitimate aim (the protection of public safety, public order and the rights and freedoms of others) 
and was necessary and proportionate. Specifically, the ECtHR observed that the government 
campaign did not go beyond what may be viewed as public interest49 and in highlighting the 
dangers of a movement which the State considered to be ‘disturbing’, it was acting in accordance 
with ECHR Article 1 which places obligations upon Member States to ensure everyone in their 
jurisdiction can enjoy the rights and freedoms in the ECHR.50  
 
43 Church of Scientology v Sweden (1980) 21 DR 109. See also Choudhury v The United Kingdom App no 
17439/90 (Commission Decision, 5 March 1991). 
44 Universelles Leben e.V v Germany App no 29745/96 (Commission Decision, 27 November 1996).  
45 Ibid. See also Kjeldsen, Busk Madsen and Pedersen v Denmark (1976) Series A no 23, para 53.  
46 Leela Forderkreis EV and Others v Germany App no 58911/00 (ECtHR, 6 November 2008).   
47 Ibid., paras 8, 67. 
48 Ibid., para 8.  
49 Ibid., para 100.  
50 The ECtHR may have been influenced by the context in Germany regarding ‘sects’, see generally 




 Given the facts of this case, one might have expected the ECtHR to have made more of 
the forum internum relevance. As the information provided by the State in their campaign was 
likely to have already been known to members of the Osho movement it could have been 
interpreted as persuading ‘adherents to abandon their religion or belief.’51 Whilst it is recognised 
that the ECtHR is master of characterisation and can therefore characterise a complaint in the way 
it deems most suitable, the ECtHR’s decision not to address the question of whether the State’s 
actions interfered with their right to hold their religion or belief is revealing in terms of 
understanding forum internum protection. The forum internum was not a ‘trump-card’ in this case 
either but a factor taken into account in the balance. Rather than being an entirely ‘hands-off’ 
realm for States, it seems the ECtHR will, in certain circumstances, allow States to encroach upon 
the rights to hold or change a religion or belief to a considerable extent, without finding a 
violation if it considers there are weighty countervailing factors.52 
 
To sum up this section, cases concerning claims of deprogramming and coercive 
psychiatric treatment show that the argument in the literature that the rights to hold and change 
religion or belief are ‘untouchable’ rights is deeply flawed. The jurisprudence simply does not 
support such a claim. Rather, the ECtHR’s approach to the protection of the rights to hold a 
change religion or belief in these areas is, as hypothesised in Chapter Three, much more flexible. 
Frequently the ECtHR decides not to examine Article 9 in detail and when it does do so, the 
forum internum does not act as a ‘trump’ card. This sections shows that whilst significant, forum 
internum relevance is not the determining factor; the ECtHR balances factors indicating a 
violation (primarily, but not only, forum internum relevance) with countervailing factors to reach 
its decision. This approach is further evidenced in cases concerning indoctrination, to which this 
chapter will now turn.  
 
B. Indoctrination: Religious Education and the Educational Environment  
Complaints of indoctrination (or exposure to indoctrination) are commonly seen in relation to 
religious education in school, particularly as a result of State refusals to allow exemption from 
 
Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief: Visit to Germany (22 December 1997) UN Doc 
E/CN.4/1998/6/Add.2. 
51 Malcolm D Evans, ‘The Freedom of Religion or Belief in the ECHR since Kokkinakis or “Quoting 
Kokkinakis” in Jeroen Temperman J, T Jeremy Gunn and Malcolm D Evans, The European Court of Human 
Rights and Freedom of Religion or Belief: The 25 Years Since Kokkinakis (Brill 2019) PAGE 
52 It would have been interesting to have seen the ECtHR’s approach in MM v Bulgaria in which the applicant 
complained that the denial of parental rights due to her membership of a sect constituted ‘indirect coercion’ to 
change her religious beliefs and not to manifest them, but the parties reached a friendly settlement before it reached 
the ECtHR, see MM v Bulgaria App no 27496/95 (Commission Decision, 10 September 1996); MM v Bulgaria 




such education.53 The ECtHR has consistently reiterated the principles that Article 9 ‘affords 
protection against indoctrination of religion by the State, be it in education at school or in any 
other activity for which the State has assumed responsibility’54 and that Article 2 Protocol 1 
forbids the State to pursue an aim of indoctrination that might be considered as not respecting 
parents’ religious and philosophical convictions.55 In addressing complaints about such 
interference, this section argues that the ECtHR again exercises considerable flexibility. The 
ECtHR does not automatically find a violation of Article 9 when applicants complain that States 
have interfered with their rights to hold a religion or belief in this area, rather, the ECtHR 
balances forum internum relevance with countervailing factors to reach its decision.  
   
i. Religious Education  
In the early case of CJ, JJ and EJ v Poland56 which concerned inter alia compulsory religious 
education the Commission characterised the Article 9 complaint as a complaint about 
indoctrination, however, after a brief examination of the facts it concluded that there was no 
indoctrination, and found no interference with Article 9, because the second and third applicants 
had not been compelled to attend religious instruction which was ‘given on a voluntary basis’ and 
they were not ‘prevented from expressing their views concerning their beliefs.’57 It observed that 
the second applicant had made the decision to attend religious instruction for a year and the third 
applicant had opted to take an ethics course.  
 On a detailed reading of the facts, one might take issue with the Commission’s decision 
that there was no compulsion (or coercive manipulation)58 to attend religious instruction. The 
second applicant claimed that as a direct result of opting out of religious instruction she was made 
to ‘spend time alone in the corridor’, had to ‘repeatedly explain to passing teachers’ why she was 
not in class, and was told by one teacher that ‘it would be better if she did attend religious 
 
53 There is extensive literature on the topic, see e.g. Ingvill Thorson Plesner, ‘Legal Limitations to Freedom of 
Religion or Belief in School Education’ (2005) 19 Emory International Law Review 557; Sylvie Langlaude, 
‘Indoctrination, Secularism, Religious Liberty and the ECHR’ (2006) 55 International and Comparative Law 
Quarterly 929; Eugenia Relaño, ‘Educational Pluralism and Freedom of Religion: Recent Decisions of the 
European Court of Human Rights’ (2010) 32:1 British Journal of Religious Education 19; Jeroen Temperman, 
‘State Neutrality in Public School Education: An Analysis of the Interplay Between the Neutrality Principles, 
the Right to Adequate Education, Children’s Right to Freedom of Religion or Belief, Parental Liberties and the 
Position of Teachers’ (2010) 32 Human Rights Quarterly 865; Ian Leigh, ‘Objective, Critical and Pluralistic? 
Religious Education and Human Rights in the European Public Sphere’ in Loreno Zucca and Camil Ungureanu 
(eds) Law, State and Religion in New Europe: Debates and Dilemmas (CUP 2012).  
54 Angeleni v Sweden (1986) 51 DR 41; Efstratiou v Greece App no 24095/94 (Commission Decision, 16 
October 1995). 
55 Folgerø And Others v Norway ECHR 2007-III 51, para 84; Dojan and Others v Germany App nos 319/08 
2455/08 7908/10 and 2 others, (ECtHR, 13 September 2011).  
56 CJ, JJ and EJ v Poland (1996) 84-B DR 46. 
57 Ibid. 
58 For a discussion of coercive manipulation in the educational context, see Heiner Bielefeldt, Nazila Ghanea 




instruction.’59 She also claimed she was under pressure from her peer group as she was asked 
‘incessantly’ by other children why she did not attend the class. This psychological pressure, she 
argued, was such that she ‘felt rejected and grew increasingly silent and depressed,’ and ‘it broke 
her resolve’, so that she finally decided, against the wishes of her parents to attend religious 
instruction along with the other children.60 Indeed, in the context of the Article 3 claim, in which 
the applicant complained that this resulted in ‘depression, nervousness and a feeling of being 
rejected,’ the Commission conceded that the child ‘might have felt emotional distress,’ but did 
not consider that this met the minimum threshold for inhuman or degrading treatment under 
Article 3.61  
 However, even if the ECtHR had found compulsion to attend religious education classes 
it might not have found a violation of Article 9 because, in light of the jurisprudence as a whole, 
it seems the question of whether an applicant has been compelled to attend religious instruction 
forms only part of the ECtHR’s consideration of whether there has been indoctrination (or 
exposure to indoctrination). What seems to be more important is whether applicants have been 
forced to attend classes which are intended to indoctrinate, i.e. the content of the classes is key.  
The ECtHR has examined the content of religious education in a number of cases 
concerning indoctrination in education. In Angelini v Sweden, for instance, in which the 
applicants complained that their child had been ‘obliged to be brought into the Christian way of 
thinking’ (i.e. indoctrinated), the ECtHR found that the applicant had been exempted from 
religious instruction whenever it involved elements of worship, such as hymn singing, and agreed 
with the government that whilst there was an emphasis on Christianity, religious instruction 
concerned religions rather than the teaching of one specific religion.62 As such, the Commission 
concluded that the child had not been exposed to any religious indoctrination. 63  
The consideration of the facts in Folgerø v Norway,64 however, led the ECtHR to a 
different conclusion. In this case, in which parents claimed that the government’s refusal to grant 
full exemption to their children from compulsory KRL (teaching of Christianity with orientation 
about religion and philosophy) constituted an interference with Article 2 of Protocol 1 and Article 
9, the ECtHR considered that the heavy emphasis on Christianity in these classes meant that State 




61 Ibid. A similar complaint about ‘harassment’ was made but was not pursued in Nowak and Krynicki v Poland 
App no 32932/02 (ECtHR, 23 as 2009). 
62 Angeleni v Sweden (1986) 51 DR 41. 
63 Ibid. For a similar approach, see Bulski v Poland App nos 46254/99 31888/02 (ECtHR, 30 November 2004) 
[French].  




critical and pluralistic manner for the purposes of Article 2 of Protocol 1 and found a violation of 
that article.65 For similar reasons, the ECtHR also found a violation of Article 2 of Protocol 1 in 
Hasan and Eylem Zengin v Turkey66 and in Mansur Yalçin and Others v Turkey.67  
This emphasis on content seems logical because there is an important difference between 
forcing an individual to attend classes to learn about something that they simply do not want to 
know about (for instance, Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender (LGBT) issues) and forcing 
an individual to attend classes in which they will be indoctrinated (i.e. coerced into beliefs other 
than their own).68 It is not simply that the ECtHR ignores the forum internum in cases in which it 
finds that compulsion to attend religious education, or other classes, does not violate Article 9. 
The ECtHR considers forum internum relevance but balances this with countervailing factors in 
order to reach its decision.  
This is further illustrated in Konrad v Germany, for instance, in which the applicants 
sought permission to home school their children because school education — which included sex 
education — did not ‘suit their beliefs’.69 In this case the ECtHR did not ignore the relevance of 
the parents’ forum internum but considered that, on the facts, countervailing factors had more 
weight. The ECtHR explained that parents could not refuse ‘a child’s right to education on the 
basis of their [own] convictions’, emphasising the important benefits of school education for 
children.70 A similar approach was taken in Dojan and Others v Germany in which the ECtHR 
found that compulsory attendance of sex education classes did not violate the parents Article 2 
Protocol 1 or Article 9 right.71  
This balancing of forum internum relevance and countervailing factors is further 
illustrated in cases concerning the educational environment which will be examined next.  
 
 
65 The ECtHR did note, however, that the predominance of one religion in the curriculum does not necessarily 
constitute ‘a departure from the principles of pluralism and objectivity amounting to indoctrination’, see 
Folgerø And Others v Norway ECHR 2007-III 51, para 22, 89. See also Hasan and Chaush v Bulgaria ECHR 
2000-XI 117, para 63. For further discussion see, John Rees, ‘Religion, Politics and Law’ (2011) 11:1 
International Journal for the Study of the Christian Church 101; Ian Leigh I, ‘Objective, Critical and Pulralistic? 
Religious Education and Human Rights in the European Public Sphere’ in Loreno Zucca and Camil Ungureanu 
(eds) Law, State and Religion in New Europe: Debates and Dilemmas (CUP 2012), 202ff. 
66 Hasan and Eylem Zengin v Turkey App no 1448/04 (ECtHR, 9 October 2007). 
67 Mansur Yalçin and Others v Turkey App 21163/11 (ECtHR, 16 September 2014). 
68 In Bernard and Others v Luxembourg the Commission found that attendance of moral and social education 
classes did not amount interfere with Article 9, see Bernard and Others v Luxembourg (1993) 75 DR 57. And, 
elsewhere the ECtHR has explained that where the ‘rights of parents to respect for their religious convictions 
conflicts with the child’s right to education, the interests of the child prevail’, see Martins Casimiro and 
Cerveira Ferreira v Luxembourg App no 44888/98 (ECtHR, 27 April 1999) [French]. 
69 Konrad v Germany ECHR 2006-XIII 355. 
70 Ibid. See also Appel-Irrgang and Others v Germany ECHR 2009-IV 397. 




ii. The Educational Environment 
One of the most well-known and controversial cases concerning the educational environment is 
Lautsi v Italy.72 A comparison between the approach of the Chamber (Lautsi I)73 and later the 
Grand Chamber (Lautsi II)74 shows the ECtHR’s flexibility with respect to the claims of 
interference under Article 9; again, forum internum relevance is not the determining factor, but a 
factor taken into account by the ECtHR in the balance.  
In Lautsi I the applicant complained about the display of crucifixes in public-school 
classrooms in Italy, arguing that it was contrary to the principle of secularism, violated her Article 
2 Protocol 1 right to educate her children in conformity with her convictions and the Article 9 
rights of her children to believe or not believe, specifically their right not to profess Catholicism. 
Whilst it is recognised that this was largely a piece of strategic litigation, aimed at changing 
attitudes in Italy, for the purposes of the argument in this chapter it is useful to examine the way 
in which the ECtHR responded to the Article 9 complaint about forum internum interference.  
In its assessment, the ECtHR observed that it was ‘impossible not to notice crucifixes in 
the classrooms.’75 Relying on Dahlab v Switzerland76 it pointed out that as an integral part of the 
school environment, crucifixes ‘may be considered “powerful external symbols”,’77 and, referring 
to Karaduman v Turkey,78 it noted that in countries where most of the population adhere to one 
religion, such manifestations of religious signs, may place ‘pressure’ on students who do not hold 
the same religion or follow another religion.79 Whilst such manifestations ‘may be encouraging 
for some religious pupils’ it explained, they ‘may be emotionally disturbing for pupils of other 
religions or those who profess no religion.’80 In respect of the Article 9 claim, the ECtHR 
reiterated the principle that Article 9 protects both the ‘freedom to believe and the freedom not to 
believe’,81 describing the latter, for the first time in Article 9 jurisprudence, as a ‘negative 
freedom’.82  
 
72 There is extensive literature on this case, see e.g. Malcolm D Evans, ‘Lautsi v Italy: An Initial Appraisal’ 
(2011) 6 Religion and Human Rights 237; Gabriel Andreescu and Liviu Andreescu, ‘The European Court of 
Human Rights’ Lautsi Decision: Context, Contents, Consequences’ (2010) 26 Journal for the Study of Religions 
and Ideologies 47; Jeroen Temperman (ed) The Lautsi Papers: Multidisciplinary Reflections on Religious 
Symbols in the Public School Classroom (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2012); Lorenzo Zucca, ‘Lautsi: A 
Commentary on the Grand Chamber Decision’ (2013) 11:1 International Journal of Constitutional Law 218, 
221-222. 
73 Lautsi and Others v Italy App no 30814/06 (ECtHR, 3 November 2009).  
74 Lautsi and Others v Italy ECHR 2011-III 61.  
75 Ibid., para 54. 
76 Dahlab v Switzerland ECHR 2001-V 447.  
77 Lautsi and Others v Italy App no 30814/06 (ECtHR, 3 November 2009), para 54.  
78 Karaduman v Turkey App no 16278/90 (Commission Decision, 3 May 1993). 
79 Lautsi and Others v Italy App no 30814/06 (ECtHR, 3 November 2009), para 50.  
80 Ibid., para 55. 
81 Lautsi and Others v Italy App no 30814/06 (ECtHR, 3 November 2009), para 47 (e). 
82 Ibid. This is the first time ‘negative freedom’ was used by the ECtHR in relation to Article 9. For earlier use 




In applying this principle to the facts, the ECtHR observed that ‘negative freedom of 
religion is not restricted to the absence of religious services or religious education’, it also 
‘extends to practices and symbols expressing, in particular or in general, a belief, a religion or 
atheism.’83 Furthermore, it stated that this negative right deserves ‘special protection’ if it is the 
State which expresses a particular belief and places those who do not share the same belief in a 
situation from which they cannot remove themselves without considerable difficulty. The ECtHR 
decided that in displaying a symbol of a particular faith in school classrooms the State had failed 
in its duty to respect neutrality in the field of education,84 restricted the rights of parents to 
educate their children in conformity with their own convictions and the ‘right of schoolchildren to 
believe or not to believe.’85 In a unanimous decision it found a violation of Article 2 of Protocol 1 
taken together with Article 9.86 
In terms of the Article 9 claim, therefore, the ECtHR characterised this as a case in which 
forum internum relevance was strong and countervailing factors were weak. Indeed, in expanding 
the right not to hold a religion or belief to encompass protection against ‘practices’ or ‘symbols’ 
which express a religion or belief the ECtHR went far beyond what had previously been protected 
as part of this right. In effect, it created an ‘anti-right’87 because the right to manifest religion or 
belief includes the right to display religious symbols.88  And, in terms of the jurisprudence as a 
whole, this claim in Lautsi I is contradictory given that just a month earlier in Appel-Irrgang and 
Others v Germany (a case concerning exemption from classes on the basis that ethics teaching 
was ‘critical of or opposed to Christian beliefs’) the ECtHR had stated that it was ‘not possible to 
deduce from the Convention a right not to be exposed to convictions contrary to one's own’.89   
 
83 Lautsi and Others v Italy App no 30814/06 (ECtHR, 3 November 2009), para 55. 
84 For discussion of the State Church in Italy, see Silvio Ferrari ‘State and Church in Italy’ in Gerhard Robbers 
(ed) State and Church in the European Union (2nd edn, Nomos 2005). 
85 Lautsi and Others v Italy App no 30814/06 (ECtHR, 3 November 2009), para 57.  
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European Court of Human Rights’ Lautsi Decision: Context, Contents, Consequences’ (2010) 26 Journal for the 
Study of Religions and Ideologies 47, 63ff.   
87 Malcolm D Evans, ‘“And Should the First be Last?’” [2014] Brigham Young University Law Review 531, 
532. For further discussion see, Caroline K Roberts, ‘Is There a Right to be ‘Free From’ Religion or Belief at 
Strasbourg? 19:1 Ecclesiastical Law Journal 35; Caroline K Roberts, ‘Interpreting freedom from religion: a step 
too far?’ (University of Bristol Law School Blog) 13 June 2016 
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88 OHCHR, General Comment No 22: Article 18 (Freedom of Thought, Conscience or Religion)’ (20 July 1993) 
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In Italy, the Chamber’s decision caused an ‘uproar’90 and across Europe there was 
‘unprecedented interest’91 in and ‘widespread political condemnation of the decision’.92 Many 
critics appealed to the margin of appreciation doctrine,93 and this seems to have heavily 
influenced the Grand Chamber, which took a very different approach and reached the opposite 
outcome.94 Unlike the Chamber, the Grand Chamber explained that the crucifix was a ‘passive 
symbol’ which may have cultural, historical and religious symbolism and its influence could not 
be ‘deemed comparable to that of didactic speech or participation in religious activities’.95 It 
found that the display of crucifixes in public school classrooms did not denote a process of 
indoctrination, was within the margin of appreciation afforded to States under Article 2 Protocol 
1 and did not constitute a violation of that article. And, having found that there was no violation 
of Article 2 Protocol 1, the Grand Chamber decided that it was not necessary to conduct a 
separate examination of Article 9.96 It simply noted that Article 9 protects the ‘freedom not to 
belong to a religion’ and imposes an obligation upon States of neutrality and impartiality.97 
Indeed, it seems that the Grand Chamber rejected the Chamber’s broad interpretation of 
the right not to hold a religion or belief, given that it did not address this at all.98 Judge Bonello, in 
his Concurring Opinion, argued that ‘freedom of religion, and freedom from religion’ contains 
the rights to profess or embrace a religion, change one’s religion, and the right to manifest one’s 
religion by means of belief, worship, teaching and observance but does not include a right not to 
be exposed to religion or belief.99 On the facts, he contended, the ‘Lautsi’s enjoyed the most 
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absolute and untrammelled freedom of conscience and religion’ and whilst the presence of 
crucifixes in classrooms may be seen as a ‘betrayal of secularism’, it does not constitute a 
violation of Article 9.100 
To sum up, these cases concerning claims of indoctrination through requirements to attend 
religious education, or of interference with the right to hold (or not hold) a religion or belief as a 
result of the educational environment itself, show the ECtHR’s approach to the protection of the 
absolute right to hold a religion or belief is much more flexible than one would expect from the 
presentation in the literature. Again, the forum internum is not an entirely ‘hands-off’ area for 
States. Even when the ECtHR accepts that the right to hold a religion or belief (or the right not to 
be indoctrinated) might be at issue, it does not necessarily find a violation of Article 9. The cases 
examined above support the claim that, whilst significant, forum internum relevance does not 
determine Article 9 cases alone. The ECtHR balances factors indicating a violation (primarily, 
but not only, forum internum relevance) with countervailing factors to reach its decision. This is 
further illustrated in cases concerning employment sanctions and dismissals, to which this chapter 
will now turn.    
 
C. Employment Sanctions on the Grounds of Religion or Belief Affiliation   
In cases in which applicants have complained about sanctions in employment, taken on the basis 
of their religion or belief, the weight placed on the forum internum is again heavily influenced by 
the ECtHR’s consideration of the facts. 
 
i. Expulsion, Compulsory Retirement and the Cancellation of Contracts  
Complaints under Article 9 concerning expulsion or compulsory retirement from the military on 
the basis of religion or belief appear frequently in the case law, particularly against Turkey in the 
early 2000s.101 It is useful to examine the paradigmatic cases of Yanasik v Turkey102 and Kalaç v 
Turkey103 to illustrate the ECtHR’s approach here.   
 In Yanasik v Turkey a military cadet complained inter alia under Article 9 that he had 
been expelled from the army for indiscipline because the army claimed that he had participated in 
Muslim fundamentalist activities and propaganda. The applicant argued that the charges were 
‘unfounded’ and specifically ‘designed to punish him for his beliefs’ (i.e. that it interfered with 
 
100 Ibid., para 2.9.  
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Tahta v Turkey App no 39068/97 (ECtHR, 4 June 2002) [French]; Usta v Turkey App no 57084/00 (ECtHR, 21 
February 2008).  
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his forum internum).104 Despite this, however, the Commission characterised the complaint as a 
one concerning limitations on the manifestation of religion or belief, and in its assessment, it 
placed heavy emphasis on the facts, notably the applicant’s specific situation in the Turkish 
military and the countervailing factors of ensuring proper functioning of the armed forces. The 
Commission explained that by enrolling at a military academy a cadet voluntarily submits to 
military rules105 which may limit the right to practice religion or belief in order to allow the army 
to function properly and may require members of the armed forces to refrain from taking part in 
the Muslim fundamentalist movement, which seeks to ‘ensure the pre-eminence of religious 
rules.’106 In the circumstances, the Commission found that the cadets had not been prevented 
from worshipping at the academy, and as such did not find any interference with Article 9.   
A similar approach was taken by the ECtHR in Kalaç v Turkey which concerned a judge 
advocate and high command’s director of legal affairs in the Turkish Air Force who complained 
under Article 9 that his compulsory retirement was ordered on the basis of his religious beliefs 
and practices.107 The government contended that the applicant’s compulsory retirement was not 
motivated by his religious beliefs (his unlawful fundamentalist opinions) but rather that he was 
removed because he showed a lack of loyalty to the principle of secularism, which the armed 
forces were responsible for guaranteeing.108 
Again, the ECtHR characterised this as a complaint about limitations on manifestation, 
and placed a heavy emphasis on the facts, specifically the applicant’s specific situation in the 
Turkish armed forces. The Commission explained that the applicant chose to pursue a career in 
the military which may limit the right to manifest and forbid the adoption of conduct and attitudes 
hostile to ‘an established order’.109 Like the government, the ECtHR drew a distinction between 
the applicant’s religious opinions and beliefs on the one hand and his conduct and attitude on the 
other, finding that the compulsory dismissal was not motivated by the way in which the applicant 
manifested his religion (indeed it noted he was able to perform Salat and observe Ramadan) but 
rather his conduct and attitude which ‘breached military disciple and infringed the principle of 
secularism.’110 Therefore, again, it found no interference with Article 9.  
 
104 Yanasik v Turkey (1993) 74 DR 22.  
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This reasoning is typical of the ECtHR’s approach in numerous similar cases involving 
the dismissal of soldiers in Turkey.111 But it is not limited to Turkey. In Pitkevich v Russia, for 
instance, which concerned a judge who was dismissed for abusing her office to promote the 
Living Faith Church, the ECtHR distinguished between the applicant’s behaviour and views, 
noting she had not been dismissed for ‘belonging to a Church or holding religious views’ but for 
breaching her statutory duties and ‘jeopardising the image of impartiality’ of the judiciary.112  
The distinction between belief and attitude in Kalaç v Turkey has been criticised in the 
literature. C Evans, for instance, argued that Kalaç v Turkey was a case about the ‘right not to be 
discriminated against or penalised for holding a particular religion’, and in drawing such a 
distinction it was ‘difficult to see how any but the most totalitarian state could breach’ the right to 
freedom of religion.113 Taylor elaborated on this, arguing that the distinction was unconvincing 
and was ‘not sufficient to distinguish interference with manifestation from interference with the 
forum internum through punishment for merely holding particular beliefs’114 which may not be 
justified in any circumstances.115 For Taylor, the applicant had been punished ‘in order to 
persuade him to drop his religious interests’ (i.e. that it constituted coercion) but this, he argued, 
was ignored by the ECtHR.116 Indeed, this case caused Taylor to lose hope that forum internum 
protection would develop with the full-time ECtHR.117 More recently, Peroni, who has forcefully 
criticised the ECtHR for arbitrarily privileging the forum internum over the forum externum 
conceded that in Kalaç v Turkey the ECtHR did not follow the absolute form of protection of the 
forum internum that it ‘advocates in theory.’118 
The ECtHR’s approach to the complaints in Yanasik v Turkey and Kalaç v Turkey are, 
however, only really problematic if Article 9 is understood as establishing a clear binary and 
hierarchical distinction between the absolute forum internum and the qualified forum externum, in 
which the forum internum is ignored when the forum externum is deemed to be at issue. This 
thesis argues that this is a misreading of the jurisprudence; the ECtHR understands that the forum 
internum and forum externum are deeply interrelated realms and this means that the forum 
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internum is never irrelevant, it is just relevant to a greater or less extent depending on the facts.  
Rather than suggesting the ECtHR got the approach ‘wrong’, and ignored the forum internum, 
these cases can be read as examples of the ECtHR exercising its flexibility in the protection of the 
right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion. Based on the facts in these cases, the ECtHR 
decided to give more weight to countervailing factors.119  
 That the ECtHR does not ignore the relevance of the forum internum if it characterises a 
complaint as a complaint concerning limitations on the right to manifest is further illustrated in 
CR v Switzerland in which a security agent, with a licence to wear firearms, complained under 
Article 9 about the cancellation of a work contact on the grounds that he joined a religious 
movement which was considered to be dangerous.120 Whilst the ECtHR characterised the 
complaint about limitations on manifestation, it also considered whether the right to hold a 
religion or belief was engaged on the facts. In its assessment it agreed with the Federal Court that 
the interference did not compel the applicant to ‘abandon his convictions, to modify or abandon 
his practice within the sect.’121 It decided that the cancellation of the contract was not motivated 
by the applicant’s religion or belief, but rather by the concern for the protection of public order, 
security the rights and freedoms of others, and thus found no violation of Article 9.122   
 
These cases concerning expulsion, compulsory retirement and cancellation of contracts 
reveal that, for the ECtHR, paying a price for having a religion or belief does not necessarily 
constitute an interference with or violation of Article 9 in all circumstances.123 This is further 
evidenced in more recent cases such as Siebenhaar v Germany in which the ECtHR did not find 
the State had overstepped its margin of appreciation when it dismissed a childcare assistant from 
a kindergarten run by a Protestant Church, on the basis that her membership of the Universal 
Church was incompatible with the teachings of that Protestant Church.124 And in Fernandez 
Martinez v Spain, which concerned a teacher of Catholic ethics, the Grand Chamber upheld the 
State’s decision not to renew the teaching contract of a former Roman Catholic Priest who had 
subsequently married and fathered a family, because the applicant had ‘placed himself into a 
situation which was incompatible with the rules of the Catholic Church and that his right to resign 
was the ultimate guarantee of freedom of religion.’125  
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This ‘cost’ however does not seem to be limitless. This is evident from cases such as 
Knudsen v Norway and Konttinen v Finland, in which the ECtHR explained that ‘pressuring an 
individual to change his religious beliefs or preventing him from manifesting them’ would 
constitute an interference with Article 9’.126  Whilst the ECtHR deemed the complaints in these 
cases inadmissible due to a lack of evidence, the ECtHR reached a different outcome when it 
applied these principles to the facts of the case in Ivanova v Bulgaria.127   
 
ii. Dismissal from Employment  
In Ivanova v Bulgaria a swimming pool manager at a school in Bulgaria claimed she had been 
dismissed because of her religious beliefs and that this violated her right to freedom of religion.128 
The government contested this, arguing that her membership of a Protestant Evangelical 
community (the Word of Life) was not at issue, rather her employment had been terminated 
because the school changed the job requirements.129  
In the general principles section, the ECtHR reiterated that only the right to manifest 
religion or belief can be limited in accordance with Article 9.2, not the right to freedom of 
thought, conscience or religion itself.130 And, it explained that a State cannot dictate what a 
person believes or take coercive steps to make him change his beliefs,’131 recalling the principle 
that ‘pressuring an individual to change his religious beliefs or preventing him from manifesting 
them’ would constitute an interference with Article 9’.132 
In its examination of the facts, however, the ECtHR found that the termination of the 
applicant’s employment was driven by the applicant’s religious beliefs and her connection with 
the Word of Life.133 It found that government officials had placed pressure on the applicant to 
abandon her beliefs in order to keep her position at the school, and in applying the general 
principles to the facts, considered this constituted a ‘flagrant violation’ of her right to freedom of 
religion under Article 9,134 and in a unanimous decision, found a violation of that article.135 
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 For the ECtHR, therefore, this was a case in which forum internum relevance was at its 
strongest and countervailing factors at their very weakest. In the circumstances, this decision was 
unsurprising, and it is consistent with General Comment 22, which explains that measures 
(including restrictions access to employment on the basis of religion or belief) which have the 
‘same intention or effect’ as the use or threats of physical force or punishment to coerce 




Commentators have placed a great deal of emphasis on the immutable distinction between the 
absolute forum internum and the qualified forum externum in Article 9 in theory but have been 
forced to recognised that such a distinction is not readily apparent from the jurisprudence itself. 
Moreover, commentators have been forced to concede that when complaints have been made 
about interference with the ‘absolute’ rights to hold or change a religion or belief the ECtHR has 
not always accepted that these rights are engaged, and even when it does, it has not always 
considered that there has been interference with these rights. These observations have led 
commentators to argue that absolute rights have not been adequately protected by the ECtHR.137  
 However, this chapter reveals that the way in which the ECtHR protects the absolute 
rights to hold or change a religion is largely consistent with the way in which it presents 
protection in practice. Building upon the previous chapter, this chapter demonstrates that the 
ECtHR does not draw a binary and hierarchical distinction between the forum internum and 
forum externum in addressing complaints concerning interference with the rights to hold or 
change a religion or belief in practice. Rather, the ECtHR takes a much more nuanced approach, 
focusing not upon whether a forum internum or forum externum right is at issue but, instead, upon 
the extent to which the forum internum is relevant in the complaint in question. 
 Through the analysis of some paradigmatic cases relating to deprogramming, coercive 
psychiatric treatment and criticism of religion, indoctrination, employment sanctions and 
dismissal on the grounds of religion or belief affiliation, this chapter reveals that the ECtHR 
exercises considerable flexibility in its approach. In cases in which applicants have argued that 
the State has interfered with the rights to hold or change a religion or belief the ECtHR does not 
automatically find a violation of Article 9. In other words, the forum internum is not simply a 
‘trump-card’. If the ECtHR decides not to examine Article 9 in a particular case, decides that the 
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absolute rights to hold or change a religion or belief are not engaged, or decides that they are 
engaged but there has not been interference, the ECtHR is not necessarily (as commentators 
frequently suggest) getting the approach to the protection of these rights ‘wrong’. The ECtHR’s 
approach would only be ‘wrong’ if the ECtHR had set up a strict binary and hierarchical 
distinction between the forum internum and forum externum and had set out the principle that 
everything which touches upon the forum internum constitutes a violation of Article 9. As 
Chapter Three has demonstrated, this is not what the ECtHR has done.  
The ECtHR’s approach is, therefore, far more flexible than recognised in the literature. 
As ‘master of the characterisation to be given in law to the facts of the case’ the ECtHR is not 
bound by the way in which applicant characterise cases, nor is it bound by the way in which the 
respondent government, or even the Commission characterises the complaint.138 If the ECtHR 
does not consider the absolute rights to hold a religion or belief to be engaged, it can dispose of 
the case in another way using a range of techniques, for instance, by examining the complaint 
under a different article, or by characterising the complaint as a limitation on manifestation. 
Contrary to popular opinion in the literature, if the ECtHR characterises a complaint as a 
complaint about limitations on the right to manifest a religion or belief, rather than interference 
with the right to hold a religion or belief, this does not mean that the forum internum becomes 
irrelevant. On the contrary, the ECtHR recognises that the forum internum is always relevant, it is 
just that the extent of its relevance depends on the ECtHR’s consideration of the facts.  
Moreover, even when the ECtHR find that the rights to hold or change a religion or belief 
are engaged, and finds interference with these rights, it is not guaranteed that the ECtHR will 
always find a violation of Article 9, if it considers there are very weighty countervailing factors. 
Despite presenting these rights as absolute and unqualified rights in theory, the ECtHR does not 
always protect these rights absolutely in practice, in absolutely all circumstances. However, 
where it deems fit, the ECtHR does offer a very high degree of protection, thus revealing that 
such a level of protection is not just theoretical.   
The cases examined in this chapter present a real challenge to notions in the literature that 
the forum internum is, or should be, always protected absolutely by the ECtHR. Indeed, the 
notion that there is an ‘inner sanctum’ which is a ‘hands-off’ realm for the State in all 
circumstances, is just not evident from a close analysis of the case law. The jurisprudence 
examined in this chapter reveals that it is perhaps more appropriate to understand ‘absolute’ as 
meaning ‘“virtually”, rather than strictly, absolute.’139 Greer has argued in respect of Article 3 
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that it seems that absolute protection ‘applies in all but the rarest of circumstances’ but not ‘to the 
exclusion of every possible justification, exoneration, excuse or mitigation.’140 The absolute 
status is, a ‘matter of attribution rather than, as the orthodoxy holds, legal necessity.’141 This 
seems an apt way of describing Article 9 jurisprudence too.  
This is, of course, a very different way of interpreting Article 9 jurisprudence than in the 
literature. Whilst forum internum relevance is the principal factor weighing in favour of the 
applicant it is not the determining factor; the ECtHR balances factors indicating a violation 
(primarily, but not only, forum internum relevance) with countervailing factors in order to reach 
its decision. In terms of the loose concentric circles model, this chapter shows that the innermost 
circle, where forum internum relevance is strongest and countervailing factors weakest, and the 
highest degree of protection is seen, is very small indeed. It seems that the ECtHR reserves the 
very highest degree of protection under Article 9 for the most serious invasions into the right to 
hold or change a religion or belief.  
The next chapter will explore cases in the outermost circle, in the loose concentric circles 
model, where forum internum relevance is weakest and strongest countervailing factors are 
strongest and the lowest degree of protection is seen.  
 
Gewirth explains that ‘for a right to be absolute, it must be conclusively valid without any exceptions’, see ‘Are 
There Any Absolute Rights?’ (1981) 31:122 The Philosophical Quarterly 1. 
140 Steven Greer, ‘Is the Prohibition against Torture, Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment Really 




CHAPTER 5. WEAKEST FORUM INTERNUM RELEVANCE AND 
STRONGEST COUNTERVAILING FACTORS  
 
Introduction 
The previous chapter examined cases in which one would have expected to see strongest forum 
internum relevance and weakest countervailing factors, in other words, it focused on the 
innermost circle in terms of the loose concentric circles model. In contrast, this chapter focuses 
on cases in which one would expect weakest forum internum relevance and strongest 
countervailing factors, in other words, it focuses on the outermost circle in terms of the loose 
concentric circles model.  
Specifically, it examines cases in which applicants have claimed that their right to act in 
accordance with a religion or belief has been limited by the State on the grounds that the acts in 
question harm, or seek to harm, the applicant or others. It is recognised that ‘harm’ is a relative 
concept;1 precisely what is understood to be ‘harmful’ activity depends heavily on both place and 
time. Therefore, this chapter will focus upon cases concerning activities which are generally 
considered unacceptable in modern, democratic countries (even if the applicants do not agree). 
The key question for this chapter is whether the ECtHR has, as one would expect from the 
presentation of Article 9, considered forum internum relevance to be at its weakest and 
countervailing factors to be at their strongest, and thus offered a very low degree of protection 
where it finds such claims of harm to be substantiated, in practice.  
This chapter argues that in practice the protection of Article 9 is largely consistent with 
the way in which protection has been presented under Article 9. Again, the ECtHR’s approach is 
fluid here. If the ECtHR decides that the action in question cannot be construed as a manifestation 
and/or it considers that the act in question is widely understood to be harmful, it often conducts a 
succinct Article 9 assessment and permits the limitation in question. However, where the claim is 
understood as an ‘individual conscience’ issue (e.g. disciplining children) the ECtHR will take 
complaints seriously and conduct a lengthier assessment, even if it ultimately rejects them. This is 
because the ECtHR recognises that the forum internum is always relevant in Article 9 cases. 
Actions or manifestations in the forum externum flow from the forum internum, therefore, the 
ECtHR understands that limitations on manifestation inevitably impact upon the forum internum. 
So, whilst the ECtHR often finds no violation of Article 9 where there is evidence to support 
allegations of harm, the key point is that even at this ‘end’ of the spectrum of forum internum 
 
1 Here ‘harm’ is understood to mean physical and psychological injury. For a ‘harm analysis’ in relation to Article 
9 see, Robert Wintermute, ‘Accommodating Religious Beliefs: Harm, Clothing or Symbols, and Refusals to Serve 




relevance, the forum internum is not irrelevant for the ECtHR; it remains an important factor in 
the balance. To illustrate the ECtHR’s approach, Section A of this chapter will examine sanctions 
on individuals due to concerns about religiously motivated harm. It will analyse paradigmatic 
cases relating to religiously motivated sexual relations with minors, corporal punishment of 
children, compulsory vaccination refusal and use of illegal substances. 
The ECtHR does not, however, simply permit all limitations on manifestations which 
States claim to be harmful. In terms of the balance of factors, it is worth noting here that 
reliability of evidence is a factor which may weigh in favour of, or against, the applicant. For 
example, if the ECtHR considers that evidence to justify an intrusion is weak, then this will 
weigh in favour of the applicant.  
The question of reliability of evidence often arises in cases in which States have alleged 
that applicants are acting or seeking to act in harmful ways. Where the ECtHR considers that 
allegations of harm are suspect, or considers that the alleged harm is credible but the 
proportionality of State measures in response is questionable, it conducts a detailed Article 9 
assessment. Where it finds that allegations of harm are unfounded, or that State measures in 
response are disproportionate, it offers a high degree of protection. In other words, it gives less 
weight to countervailing factors in the balancing process.  
The balancing exercise in cases in which forum internum relevance and countervailing 
factors may both be weak, is harder (relatively speaking) than in cases in which forum internum 
relevance is clearly weak and countervailing factors are clearly strong. Such cases can be seen 
falling within the contested middle circle in which the degree of protection can be either high or 
low depending on the way in which the ECtHR balances the factors. 
To illustrate this, Section B of this chapter examines dissolution of, or refusals to register, 
religious communities due to concerns about religiously motivated harm, and analyses a number 
of typical cases relating claims about threats to national security, challenges to the rights and 
freedoms of members, and violations of health and safety regulations.  
 
A. Sanctions on Individuals Due to Concerns about Religiously Motivated 
Harm 
 
i. Sexual Relations with Minors and Corporal Punishment of Children 
As one would expect, the ECtHR has considered forum internum relevance to be at its very 
weakest and countervailing interests to be at their very strongest in cases in which applicants have 




Khan v The United Kingdom2 for instance, which concerned the punishment of a twenty-one-
year-old Muslim man for engaging in sexual relations and marrying a Muslim girl, aged fourteen, 
in accordance with Islamic law. Before the Commission the applicant complaint inter alia under 
Article 9 that domestic laws relating to sexual offences with minors had prevented him from 
manifesting his religion through his marriage under Islamic law.  
 In its assessment the Commission reiterated the Arrowsmith principle that Article 9 does 
not protect every act motivated by a religion or belief, 3 and observed that whilst the applicant’s 
religion may permit marriage of girls at twelve years old, marriage cannot be ‘considered simply 
as a form of expression of thought, conscience and religion’ under Article 9, but rather is covered 
by Article 12.4 In relation to Article 12, the Commission explained that the right to marry is 
subject to national laws, and under English law, a girl could marry with her parents’ consent at 
the age of sixteen, and without her parents’ consent at the age of eighteen. Given the age of the 
girl in question, the Commission agreed with the government that the marriage was invalid and 
that engaging in sexual intercourse with the girl constituted an offence under domestic law. It 
therefore deemed the complaint manifestly ill founded.  
 Given the facts, the Commission’s swift assessment under Article 9 was not surprising. 
Whilst it must be conceded that many countries would still permit marriage between an adult man 
and a young girl (and not view it as harmful), in Europe, and in the UK, in which this claim was 
raised, there is a general consensus that underage marriage is harmful. It is widely accepted that 
sexual abuse of a minor damages the physical and psychological health of the child in question 
and, as such, constitutes a clear violation of the child’s human rights. It seems obvious, therefore, 
that the ECtHR would give greater weight to countervailing factors, on balance.  
The ECtHR’s approach in such cases is further illustrated in KS v The United Kingdom.5 
In this case a convicted sexual offender complained that the ultimatum placed on him by the local 
authority — that he could only return to his family if he underwent psychiatric treatment to 
address his sexual offending — interfered with his Article 9 rights. The ECtHR, however, 
considered that, in so far as the complaint fell under Article 9, it could be restricted under Article 
9.2 to protect the health and rights of the applicant’s daughter. Thus, again, the forum internum 
was considered to have a weak bearing whereas the countervailing factors under Article 9 were 
considered to be very strong indeed.  
 
2 Khan v The United Kingdom App no 11579/85 (Commission Decision, 7 July 1986). 
3 Ibid. 
4 This is consistent with X v Federal Republic of Germany (1974) 1 DR 64. Recently, the ECtHR has asked 
whether a planned Islamic marriage ceremony constitutes a manifestation of religion or belief, see Dzikowski v 
Poland (communicated case) App no 38799/11 (27 May 2017); Dzikowski v Poland App no 38799/11 (ECtHR, 
15 May 2018). 




It also seems obvious that in cases in which applicants have claimed that the State has 
restricted their Article 9 right to manifest religion or belief through the corporal punishment of 
children that the ECtHR would also give little weight to the applicant’s forum internum and 
greater weight to countervailing factors. Indeed, again this is what the jurisprudence reveals. Take 
Seven Individuals v Sweden, for instance, in which the applicants — seven members of the 
Protestant Free Church Congregation in Stockholm — objected to changes in domestic law 
banning ‘corporal punishment or any other form of humiliating treatment’ because, they argued it 
restricted their rights and freedoms under the ECHR.6 The applicants claimed that ‘traditional’ 
methods of raising children including the ‘necessity of physical punishment’ was in accordance 
with their religious doctrine and the changes to the domestic law violated Articles 8, 9 and Article 
2 of Protocol 1. The ECtHR deemed all these complaints inadmissible.7 In respect of the Article 8 
claim, the Commission explained that there was no interference with this right because the 
changes in domestic law were intended to protect ‘protect potentially weak and vulnerable 
members of society’ from abuse and violence, adding that the same reasoning applied, mutatis 
mutandis, to the Article 9 complaint.  
 The ECtHR took the same approach in Abrahamsson v Sweden which concerned a parent 
who had punished his son by hitting him on the bottom with a birch rod and was convicted of 
assault and battery.8 The applicant complained that domestic law violated his rights under Article 
8, 9 and Article 2 of Protocol 1. Again, however, the ECtHR deemed all of these complaints 
inadmissible. In respect to the Article 8 claim, the ECtHR referred explicitly to its reasoning in 
Seven Individuals v Sweden, pointing out that in extending the Swedish law on assault and 
molestation to cover physical chastisement of children by their parents the State aimed to protect 
‘potentially weak and vulnerable members of society’ from abuse and violence.9 On this basis, 
there was no interference with Article 8 and the same reasoning applied mutatis mutandis to the 
Article 9 complaint.   
This is an approach which has remained consistent over time, and is illustrated even more 
clearly in the recent case of Tlapak and Others v Germany.10 In this case the ECtHR found no 
violation of Article 8 when parental authority was withdrawn from two members of the Twelve 
Tribes Church who believed corporal punishment (namely, caning) was a necessary part of 
parenting in accordance with their faith. Referring to Vojnity v Hungary11 the ECtHR explained 
 
6 Seven Individuals v Sweden (1982) 29 DR 104.  
7 Ibid. 
8 Abrahamsson v Sweden App no 12154/86 (Commission Decision, 5 October 1987). See also Phillip 
Williamson and others v UK App no 55211/00 (ECtHR, 2000).  
9 Abrahamsson v Sweden App no 12154/86 (Commission Decision, 5 October 1987). 
10 Tlapak and Othes v Germany App nos 11308/16 11344/16 (ECtHR, 22 March 2018).  




that the ‘parents right to communicate and promote their religious convictions in bringing up their 
children’ does not extend to exposing ‘children to dangerous practices or to physical or 
psychological harm’.12 Further, it explicitly took into account international law in its 
consideration of the facts, referring to Article 19 of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child 
which stipulates that State parties have a duty to take measures to protect children from inter alia 
physical or mental violence.13 
In these cases, the ECtHR did not simply ignore the applicants claim that their beliefs 
justified inflicting corporal punishment. The ECtHR recognised that the actions flowed from the 
forum internum but found the intrusion justifiable because of concerns about harm, and thus 
offered a low level of protection under Article 9. Thus, even in these cases, where countervailing 
factors were very weighty, forum internum relevance remained a factor which the ECtHR took 
into account in the balance. This same pattern is also seen in cases in which applicants have 
claimed that the State has unduly restricted their rights to manifest religion or belief by obliging 
them to allow their children to take part in compulsory vaccination schemes. 
 
ii. Compulsory Vaccination Refusal  
A typical case illustrating the ECtHR’s approach to compulsory vaccination refusal under Article 
9 is Boffa and 13 Others v San Marino14 in which the applicants refused to have their children 
vaccinated in accordance with a domestic decree. Before the ECtHR the applicants argued that 
domestic legislation violated ECHR Articles 2, 5, 8 and 9.  In its assessment the Commission 
reiterated the standard recital and the dictum — that Article 9 protects the forum internum and 
acts intimately linked with beliefs — but explained that the obligation to be vaccinated, set out in 
domestic legislation did not constitute an interference with Article 9 because it was generally 
applicable, relating to everyone regardless of religion or personal creed.   
 Again, therefore, the ECtHR did not simply ignore the forum internum in this case. The 
ECtHR explained that Article 9 protects the forum internum and actions which are intimately 
linked to it, but in considering the facts, decided to give more weight to countervailing factors, 
namely the fact that the obligation to be vaccinated was a general and neutral requirement. 
Indeed, the ECtHR has consistently held (rightly or wrongly) that general and neutral laws which 
do not have a link with an applicant’s personal beliefs, do not, in principle, interfere with Article 
 
12 Tlapak and Othes v Germany App nos 11308/16 11344/16 (ECtHR, 22 March 2018), para 79. 
13 Ibid, paras 58-60.  




9.15 Given this, it seems likely that in Vavřička v Czech Republic16 — in which the applicants 
have argued that the compulsory vaccination scheme violated their rights under Articles 8, 9 and 
Article 2 of Protocol 1 — the ECtHR will also decide that the obligation to vaccinate does not 
constitute an interference with Article 9 because it is a general and neutral obligation.17  
 
iii. Consumption of Illegal Substances  
As one would also expect, the ECtHR considers that forum internum relevance is weak and gives 
greater weight to countervailing factors in cases in which applicants have sought to justify the use 
of illegal substances under Article 9. A paradigmatic case in this respect is Franklin-Beentjes and 
CEFLU-Luz da Floresta v Netherlands18 in which an office holder in CEFLU-Lux da Floresta 
and the religious community itself complained that their right to manifest their religion or belief 
had been limited as a result of the confiscation of an illegal substance used and consumed in 
religious ceremonies.  
The applicants explained that the aim of the association was to study and practice the 
teaching of the Holy Daime and their central right was the ‘Holy Sacrament’, involving the 
consumption of a hallucinogenic decoction (referred to as ‘Santo Daime’ or ‘ayahuasca’) ritually 
produced using Amazonian plants.19 This brew contains N-Dimethyltryptamine (DMT), a banned 
substance listed in the Opium Act.20 Following a search of office holder’s home, the police 
confiscated ten jerrycans of ‘ayahuasca’ containing DMT, and unsuccessfully attempted to 
prosecute her for possession of an illegal substance. Before the ECtHR the applicants complained 
inter alia under Article 9 that the domestic authorities’ refusal to return the jerrycans filled with 
ayahuasca to the office holder prevented the applicants from ‘performing an essential sacrament’, 
and as such, unjustly interfered with their freedom of religion. Under Article 14, they complained 
that they had suffered discrimination because they were prevented from using ayahuasca when 
other religious denominations were allowed to use alcoholic wine in their ceremonies. 
 In considering this complaint, the ECtHR accepted that preventing applicants from using 
ayahuasca, which they claimed was an essential aspect of their religious rites, constituted an 
interference with their right to manifest religion in ‘worship’.21 Therefore, the ECtHR recognised 
 
15 See Skugar and Others v Russia App no 40010/04 (ECtHR, 3 December 2009). 
16 Vavřička v Czech Republic (communicated case) App no 47621/13 3867/14 73094/14 and 3 others (ECtHR, 7 
September 2015) [French]. 
17 See X v Netherlands App no 1068/61 (Commission Decision, 14 December 1962).  
18 Fränklin-Beentjes and CEFLU-Luz da Floresta v Netherlands (communicated case) App no 28167/07 (ECtHR, 
25 October 2012); Fränklin-Beentjes and CEFLU-Luz da Floresta v Netherlands App no 28167/07 (ECtHR, 6 
May 2014). 
19 Fränklin-Beentjes and CEFLU-Luz da Floresta v Netherlands App no 28167/07 (ECtHR, 6 May 2014), paras 
5-7. 
20 Ibid., para 8. 




the relationship between the forum internum and the forum externum, in other words, it 
recognised that their actions flowed from their beliefs.  
However, in its Article 9.2 assessment the ECtHR decided that the interference was 
prescribed by law because it was in accordance with the Opium Act which banned the possession 
of DMT and agreed with the government that the interference pursued the legitimate aim of 
protecting public order and public health, both clearly listed under Article 9.2. The ECtHR also 
found, after a detailed analysis of the facts, that the interference was necessary in a democratic 
society.  
 In this respect the ECtHR reiterated that Article 9 protects a number of forms of 
manifestation but does not protect every act motivated or inspired by a religion or belief.22 In 
particular, referring to C v The United Kingdom,23 the ECtHR emphasised that Article 9 does not 
protect a right to refuse to obey laws which apply generally and neutrally, even if the refusal is 
motivated by a religion or belief. It recalled that for many years, the Commission and the Court 
have recognised that religious practices could be legitimately limited under Article 9.2 in order to 
protect health. Referring to X v United Kingdom, the ECtHR explained that in the case of a Sikh 
who refused to wear a helmet when riding his motorcycle, the interest of road safety overrode the 
applicant’s religious duty to wear his turban.24 The ECtHR also referred to Eweida and Others v 
United Kingdom to illustrate that the ECtHR had recently held that a hospital nurse (Ms Chaplin) 
could be prohibited from wearing a cross on a necklace whilst working in order to protect her 
own health and safety, in addition to that of the patients.25 
 In Franklin-Beentjes and CEFLU-Luz da Floresta v Netherlands, the ECtHR agreed with 
the government that prohibiting the possession of DMT, given its potentially harmful nature, was 
essential for the protection of public health. The ECtHR observed that DMT was not only a 
prohibited substance in the Netherland’s Opium Act but also in rules of international law, 
namely, the Convention on Psychotropic Substances26 which is binding upon the Netherlands. 
Consequently, it deemed the Article 9 complaint manifestly ill-founded.  
 With respect to the complaint under Article 14 – that the applicants had been 
discriminated against because other churches, namely the Roman Catholic and Protestant Church, 
use alcoholic wine in their rituals – the ECtHR again found the complaint manifestly ill-founded. 
 
22 Referred to Kalaç v Turkey ECHR 1997-IV 1199; Kosteski v The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 
App no 55170/00 (ECtHR, 13 April 2006); Francesco Sessa v Italy ECHR 2012-III 165. 
23 C v The United Kingdom (1983) 37 DR 142. 
24 X v The United Kingdom (1978) 14 DR 234. 
25 Eweida and Others v United Kingdom ECHR 2013-I 215 (extracts), paras 98-99. This case will be discussed 
in the next chapter.  





The ECtHR explained that in order for an issue to arise there must be ‘difference in treatment of 
persons in comparable situations’, without any objective or reasonable justification, but the 
ECtHR did not find a comparable situation here.27 Firstly, it noted the consumption of wine is not 
regulated by the Opium Act and secondly, that the rites that the applicants refer to ‘differ 
significantly’ because, in the case of the Roman Catholic and Protestant Churches, the members 
do not ‘intend or expect to partake of psychoactive substances to the point of intoxication.’28   
  The ECtHR did not simply dismiss the applicant’s complaint under Article 9 in this case; 
it took into account forum internum relevance because it recognised that the consumption of 
‘ayahuasca’, as a central part of a religious rite, constituted a manifestation of religion or belief. 
And, in doing so it intuitively recognised that limitations on the manifestation in question 
inevitably impacted upon the forum internum. However, after a lengthy assessment of the facts, 
the ECtHR decided to give greater weight to countervailing factors.    
 
So far, this chapter has demonstrated that in cases in which applicants have complained about 
State limitations on their behaviour — which challenges generally applicable State laws intended 
to protect individuals from harm — the ECtHR has, where it agrees with the State that the action 
in question is clearly harmful, offered a very low degree of protection under Article 9. The cases 
examined above, which are typical of such cases, illustrate that the ECtHR either finds that the 
acts in question do not constitute manifestations of religion or belief or if they do, forum internum 
relevance is clearly outweighed by countervailing factors such as the protection of public safety 
or public order, health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.  
Given the specific facts of the cases examined this is unsurprising; the limitations on the 
acts in the cases above are consistent with the text of ECHR Article 9, the travaux préparatoires 
and the way in which Article 9 has been presented in the jurisprudence. Indeed, the limitations 
are also consistent with the ECHR more broadly in that Article 17 explains that there is ‘no right 
to engage in an activity or perform any act aimed at the destruction of rights and freedoms’ of 
others set out in the ECHR.29  
This chapter does not intend to imply that the ECtHR simply restricts all forms of 
behaviour that States regard as harmful. Just because the right to manifest can be limited in 
certain circumstances does not mean that the ECtHR always permits limitations, even when 
States argue forcefully that it should be limited in order to protect individuals from harm. In cases 
which are not so ‘clear-cut’, i.e. where the harm is question is not obvious or the applicants 
 
27 Ibid., para 54. 
28 Ibid. Perhaps it would have reached a different conclusion if alcohol was illegal.  
29 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (European Convention on Human 




contest the governments’ claims that they have acted or sought to act in a way which is 
considered harmful, the ECtHR begins with the question whether the actions in question are 
actually harmful (i.e. whether there is evidence to support State claims). And, even when it finds 
evidence to support claims that actions are harmful, it does not necessarily automatically defer to 
the State in limiting the manifestation, but rather conducts a detailed necessity and proportionality 
analysis before reaching its decision.  
This approach is frequently seen in cases in which religious communities, which are 
protected under Article 9,30 have argued that their right to manifest their religion or belief has 
been limited (particularly through the dissolution of religious communities and refusals to re-
register them) because States have made general claims that their practices are harmful, or that 
they have transgressed domestic laws intended to protect citizens from harm.31 This will be 
examined in detail in the next section.  
 
B. Dissolution of, or Refusals to Register, Religious Communities Due to 
Concerns about Religiously Motivated Harm  
This section demonstrates that in cases in which religious communities have complained about 
State interference with the right to manifest religion or belief, the ECtHR has again recognised 
that manifestations are inextricably linked with the forum internum, and as such, limitations 
inevitably have an impact on it. In light of this, the ECtHR not only offers a high degree of 
protection when it finds little or no evidence to support the claims of the State that there is a risk 
of harm, it also offers a high degree of protection when it considers that the measures taken by 
States in response to alleged harm are disproportionate. Put another way, in cases concerning 
religious communities the ECtHR offers a high degree of protection when it does not consider 
that forum internum relevance has been outweighed by countervailing factors.  
 
i. Threats to National Security 
The case of Moscow Branch of the Salvation Army v Russia32 illustrates the ECtHR’s approach to 
protection of Article 9 when evidence for State claims of ‘harm’ is lacking. In this case the 
government argued that it had refused to re-register the Salvation Army as a legal entity as an 
independent religious organisation because it was a ‘paramilitary organisation’ which posed a 
 
30 For discussion, see Julian Rivers, The Law of Organized Religions: Between Establishment and Secularism 
(OUP 2010), 52ff. 
31 See e.g., Altun and Others v Turkey App no 54903/10 (ECtHR, 10 July 2018); Güler and Uğur v Turkey App 
no 31706/10, 33088/10 (ECtHR, 2 December 2014); Metodiev and Others v Bulgaria App no 58088/08 
(ECtHR, 15 June 2017). 




threat to national security. The applicants argued that the State action interfered with Article 9 
and 11 and claimed that the notion that the Salvation Army was a ‘paramilitary organisation’ 
presented an impermissible assessment of the legitimacy of the religion practised by the 
applicants.  
 In its assessment the ECtHR emphasised the relationship between the forum internum and 
the forum externum by setting out the general principle that Article 9 protects both individual 
conscience and the right to manifest one’s religion or belief in practice. And the ECtHR 
explained that there is an expectation that believers can manifest their religion or belief in 
community with others without arbitrary State intervention. It emphasised that the list of 
exceptions both to freedom of religion and freedom of assembly ‘is exhaustive’, adding that the 
exceptions are ‘to be construed strictly and only convincing and compelling reasons can justify 
restrictions on that freedom.’33 Furthermore, the ECtHR reiterated that the general duty of 
neutrality and impartiality means that the State does not have any power to assess whether 
religious beliefs, or the ways in which they are expressed, are legitimate.34  
In its consideration of the facts, the ECtHR observed inter alia that whilst it was 
‘undisputable’ that the members of the Salvation Army used ranks similar to military ranks and 
wore uniforms, these were ways of organising the internal life of the community and manifesting 
religious beliefs and it ‘could not seriously be maintained that the applicant Branch advocated a 
violent change in the State’s constitutional foundations or thereby undermined the State’s 
integrity or security.’35 Given the State did not advance compelling reasons for the interference 
with the right to manifest in this case, the ECtHR unanimously found a violation of Article 11 in 
light of Article 9.36  
In this case, because the ECtHR considered that the ‘harm’ in question was not plausible 
and evidence for intrusion was weak, the ECtHR gave very little weight to countervailing factors 
in the balance.37 In other cases concerning alleged threats to national security, where the ECtHR 
has found allegations of harm unfounded, the ECtHR has also offered a high degree of protection. 
Take Nolan and K v Russia, for instance, in which the government denied re-entry to a member 
of the Unification Church on the grounds of national security because, it argued, the Unification 
Church was a cult which encouraged illicit or criminal activities, including ‘sexual 
 
33 Ibid., para 76. 
34 Ibid., paras 58, 92. Referring to Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia and Others v Moldova ECHR 2001-XII 
81; Hasan and Chaush v Bulgaria ECHR 2000-XI 117. 
35 Moscow Branch of the Salvation Army v Russia App no 72881/01 (ECtHR, 5 April 2007) para 92 
36 See also Perry v Latvia App no 30273/03 (ECtHR, 8 November 2007). 
37 This is consistent with variable intensity of review, see Julian Rivers, ‘Proportionality and Variable Intensity 




abuse…slavery, tax fraud…trafficking in arms or drugs’.38 After a lengthy analysis of the facts, 
the ECtHR found that the ban was intended to repress the applicant’s exercise of his right to 
freedom of religion and given the lack of evidence to support his exclusion from Russia on the 
basis of his religious activities, found a violation of Article 9.39  
 
ii. Challenges to the Rights and Freedoms of Members  
In cases in which States have claimed that religious groups challenge the rights and freedoms of 
their members, and the ECtHR has found little or no evidence to support such claims, the ECtHR 
has also offered a high degree of protection.  
A case which is typical of the ECtHR’s approach here is Jehovah’s Witnesses of Moscow 
v Russia40 in which the applicants complained that the Russian courts’ judgments dissolving the 
community and banning its activities interfered with Articles 9, 10 (right to freedom of 
expression) and 11 (right to freedom of association). The government argued that its measures 
were necessary because, it claimed, the community engaged in extreme acts which infringed 
rights of Russian citizens41 listing in its submission inter alia subjecting members to 
‘psychological pressure, ‘mind control’ techniques and ‘totalitarian’42 or ‘paramilitary 
discipline’,43 and encouraging members to commit suicide and refuse medical assistance, 
particularly blood transfusions. The government also claimed that the community encouraged 
members to refuse to perform military or civilian service,44 ‘lured’ children into the community 
(thus interfering with the parental rights of non-Witness parents) and spread literature which 
undermined respect for other religions.45 The State was emphatic that it was these concerns — 
rather than the beliefs of the Jehovah’s Witnesses — which motivated the restriction.46 Citing 
Manoussakis and Others v Greece, the government pointed out that the ECtHR has explicitly 
stated that States can ‘verify whether a movement or association carries on, ostensibly in pursuit 
of religious aims, activities which are harmful to the population’,47 and, referring to Otto-
Preminger-Institut v Austria, that States may take ‘measures aimed at repressing certain forms of 
 
38 Nolan and K v Russia App no 2512/04 (ECtHR, 12 February 2009) para 60. 
39 Ibid., paras 66, 75.  
40 Jehovah’s Witness of Moscow and Others v Russia App no 302/02 (ECtHR, 10 June 2010).  
41 Ibid., para 115. 
42 Ibid., para 128.  
43 Ibid., para 131.  
44 Ibid., para 95. 
45 Ibid. 
46 Ibid., para 97ff. 




conduct…judged incompatible with respect for the freedom of thought, conscience and religion 
of others’.48 
In its assessment under Article 9, the ECtHR set out a range of general principles. It 
reiterated the importance of freedom of thought, conscience and religion in a democratic society, 
noting the interrelationship between the forum internum and forum externum by repeating the 
standard recital that whilst Article 9 primarily protects the forum internum it also protects the 
right to manifest. The ECtHR stressed the importance of manifestation in community with 
others,49 and emphasised that the ‘autonomous existence of religious communities’ is necessary 
for pluralism in democratic societies and is at ‘the very heart’ of Article 9 protection, adding that 
the State’s duty of neutrality and impartiality prohibits it from assessing the legitimacy of 
religious beliefs.50 In terms of religious communities, which generally exist in the form of 
organised structures, the ECtHR explained that Article 9 must be interpreted in light of Article 11 
which protects the right of association. Whilst States have powers to protect citizens from 
associations which might endanger them, these powers must be used ‘sparingly’ as permissible 
limitations on Article 11 are to ‘be construed strictly and only convincing and compelling reasons 
can justify restriction on that freedom’.51 
In applying these principles to the facts, the ECtHR found that the refusal to grant legal 
entity status to the association constituted an interference with Article 11 and, given that this was 
a religious organisation, also constituted an interference with Article 9. In dissolving the 
community, the State had deprived the members of the right to manifest their religion in 
community with others, ‘indispensable elements of their religious practice.’52 In its consideration 
of the justification of the interference under Article 9.2, the ECtHR accepted that the interference 
was prescribed by law and considered that it pursued a legitimate aim, namely the protection of 
the health and rights of others.53  
The ECtHR’s consideration of the necessity of the measure, however, was very detailed; 
because the harm in question may have been plausible, it was necessary for the ECtHR to conduct 
a more detailed analysis.54 The ECtHR pointed out that in carrying out its scrutiny, it does not 
 
48 Jehovah’s Witness of Moscow and Others v Russia App no 302/02 (ECtHR, 10 June 2010), para 97; Otto-
Preminger Institut v Austria (1994) Series A no 295-A, para 47.  
49 Jehovah’s Witness of Moscow and Others v Russia App no 302/02 (ECtHR, 10 June 2010), para 99. 
50 Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia and Others v Moldova ECHR 2001-XII 81, para 188; Hasan and Chaush 
v Bulgaria ECHR 2000-XI 117, para 62. See also İzzettin Doğan and Others v Turkey App no 62649/10 
(ECtHR, 26 April 2016), 93.  
51 Jehovah’s Witness of Moscow and Others v Russia App no 302/02 (ECtHR, 10 June 2010), para 108. 
52 Ibid., para 103. 
53 Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia and Others v Moldova ECHR 2001-XII 81, para 113; Stankov and the 
United Macedonian Organisation Ilinden v Bulgaria ECHR 2001-IX 273, para 84.  
54 Again, this seems consistent with the variable intensity of review, see Julian Rivers, ‘Proportionality and 




aim to substitute its own view for the view of the State, but rather to ascertain whether the reasons 
given by the State for the interference are ‘relevant and sufficient’ and that action was taken 
based ‘on an acceptable assessment of the relevant facts.’55  
In its examination, the ECtHR found that what the Russian courts took to be an 
infringement of the rights of its members to respect for private life (for instance, encouraging 
unpaid work and mandatory missionary activities) constituted a manifestation of their religion or 
belief, protected by Article 9. Indeed, recalling Kokkinakis v Greece, the ECtHR explained that 
bearing witness is an ‘essential responsibility of every Christian’,56 thus again emphasising the 
interrelationship between belief and action. On the facts, the ECtHR found that there was no 
evidence of improper proselytism, or use of improper means to involve children of non-Witness 
parents in the organisation.57 With respect to allegations of proselytism, ‘mind control’, 
totalitarian discipline and coercion the ECtHR found it ‘remarkable’ that the domestic courts did 
not cite a single victim and concluded that these claims were not based on an ‘acceptable 
assessment the relevant facts’58 but rather ‘on conjecture uncorroborated by fact.’59  
In regard to the claim that the association encouraged suicide and the refusal of medical 
assistance, the ECtHR found that the domestic court’s decision that ‘No Blood’ cards justified a 
ban on the associations activities was tantamount to declaring the applicants’ beliefs illegitimate. 
It found that the domestic court had not provided relevant and sufficient reasons for the 
interference with individual autonomy with respect to religious beliefs and physical integrity and 
claims that the association’s activities damaged citizens health ‘lacked a factual basis.’60 The 
ECtHR also found that the government had ‘not persuasively shown’ the community, or 
individual members were incited to refuse to carry out civic duties,61 explaining that it is ‘a well-
known fact’ that Jehovah’s Witnesses are pacifists, and in carrying out civilian service instead of 
military service, they are simply exercising their right to do so under Russian law.62   
Before concluding, the ECtHR explicitly referred to the broader context. It observed that 
in Moscow following the 1997 Religions Act, Russian authorities had consistently refused the re-
registration of religious associations which are considered non-traditional, such as the Salvation 
Army and the Church of Scientology. It noted that prior to the act, the Jehovah’s Witnesses of 
 
55 Jehovah’s Witness of Moscow and Others v Russia App no 302/02 (ECtHR, 10 June 2010), para 108. See also 
United Communist Party of Turkey and Others v Turkey ECHR 1998-I 1, para 47; Partidul Comunistilor 
(Nepeceristi) and Ungureanu v Romania ECHR 2005-I 209 para 49.  
56 Jehovah’s Witness of Moscow and Others v Russia App no 302/02 (ECtHR, 10 June 2010), para 122. See 
Kokkinakis v Greece (1993) Series A no 260-A, para 31.  
57 Ibid., paras 147-148.  
58 Ibid., para 108.  
59 Ibid., para 130. 
60 Ibid., para 146.  
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Moscow had legally operated in Moscow. The dissolution of the community comprising 10,000 
members and the indefinite ban on its activities, was, according to the ECtHR ‘obviously the 
most severe form of interference, affecting, as it did, the rights of thousands of Moscow 
Jehovah’s Witnesses’.63 The ECtHR explained that even if it were to accept that the reasons for 
the interference were compelling, the dissolution of the community and ban on the activities was 
a ‘drastic measure’ which was disproportionate to the aim pursued.64 The ECtHR pointed out that 
the State could have adopted less restrictive means in this case, such as issuing a warning or fine 
before taking the measures that it did. As such, it unanimously found a violation of Article 9 read 
in light of Article 11, and Article 11.  
The critical question in this case was one of evidence. Given that the ECtHR found 
insufficient evidence to justify limiting the exercise of the right, it offered a high degree of 
protection.65 However, it is interesting to reflect on the fact that the ECtHR explained, in 
hypothetical terms, that even if it had found that there were ‘compelling’ reasons for the 
interference (i.e. if it had found claims of harm substantiated) it would still have found a violation 
on the basis that State action was disproportionate to the aims pursued.  
So, even when claims of harm are substantiated, the ECtHR may still find a violation of 
Article 9 if it considers that factors indicating a violation of Article 9 (primarily, but not only 
forum internum relevance) are not outweighed by countervailing factors. To see this approach in 
practice it is useful to examine Biblical Centre of the Chuvash Republic v Russia.66   
 
iii. Transgressions of Fire and Health and Safety Laws 
In Biblical Centre of the Chuvash Republic v Russia, the domestic authorities claimed the 
dissolution of a Pentecostal Biblical Centre which ran a Sunday School for children and a Biblical 
college for adults, was necessary because an inspection had revealed numerous violations of 
health and safety regulations.67 Before the ECtHR, the Biblical Centre complained that the 
government’s actions violated inter alia Articles 9 and 11.  
 In this case the ECtHR followed and directly cited Jehovah’s Witnesses of Moscow, 
explaining that it is expected that believers will be allowed to associate freely, without arbitrary 
State intervention, and that any decision to dissolve a religious community amounts to an 
interference with Article 9 in light of Article 11. Whilst the ECtHR noted that the State’s 
 
63 Ibid., para 159. 
64 Ibid. 
65 More recently the ECtHR has explained that there must be evidence of ‘real encroachment on the interests’ of 
others is required in order to justify a limitation’, see Eweida and Others v United Kingdom ECHR 2013-I 215 
(extracts), para 95. 
66 Biblical Centre of the Chuvash Republic v Russia App no 33203/08 (ECtHR, 12 June 2014). 




arguments may be taken to mean that the interference pursued the aims of the protection of health 
and rights of others under Article 9.2. and Article 11.2 it observed that the ‘drastic measure’ to 
dissolve the organisation with immediate effect ‘entailed significant consequences for the 
believers’ and as such required ‘very serious reasons by way of justification before it could be 
deemed proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued’, emphasising that it would only be 
warranted ‘in the most serious of cases.’68  
In its analysis the ECtHR did not find sufficient reasons for the serious interference. In 
addition to pointing to inconsistencies in the domestic courts’ approach with respect to reasons 
justifying dissolution of religious organisations,69 the ECtHR found that it had not been 
convincingly established that the organisation had received advance notice that its activities were 
in breach of the law and that it was not given time, or opportunity, to address the issues raised by 
the authorities with respect to the educational licence or the sanitary conditions. For the ECtHR 
this revealed the ‘determination’ of the authorities in ‘seeking to put an end to the applicant 
organisation’s existence.’70 The ECtHR criticised the domestic courts for the failure to take into 
consideration the impact of the dissolution of the organisation on the fundamental rights of the 
believers and observed that putting ‘an end to the existence of a long-standing religious 
organisation’ amounted to ‘the most severe form of interference’ which could not be deemed 
proportionate to the aims pursued.71 Therefore, it unanimously decided that there had been a 
violation of Article 9 in light of Article 11.  
 Even though this was framed as a complaint about limitations on manifestation, the 
ECtHR took into account forum internum relevance because, for the ECtHR, manifestations are 
understood to be inextricably linked to the forum internum, and as such, the ECtHR recognises 
that limitations on manifestation inevitably impact upon the forum internum. The ECtHR also 
emphasised that in respect of religious communities, manifestation in community is an essential 
part of practice. Even after finding that State claims of harm were substantiated, the ECtHR did 
not simply defer to the State. In its proportionality assessment, the ECtHR found the failure on 
the part of the State to consider less restrictive measures (for instance, a warning or a fine) and 
the drastic action it took to dissolve the community, indicated that the authorities were 
determined to prevent the organisation from operating.  
 
68 Ibid., para 54. 
69 Ibid., para 56. 
70 Ibid., para 57. 




On the facts of this case, therefore, the ECtHR gave less weight to countervailing factors 
in the balance. Where the facts are different, however, the ECtHR can decide that on balance, 
similar State measures have greater weight and find no violation of Article 9.72 
 
The explicit references to the facts, particularly the general clamp-down on religious 
groups in Russia in Jehovah’s Witnesses of Moscow v Russia, in the law section of the judgment 
clearly shows the importance of the broader context for the ECtHR in the consideration of Article 
9. Given the current climate, it would of course have been very difficult for the ECtHR not to 
have referred to the general context in Russia and other Eastern European countries in which the 
right to manifest religion or belief is being increasingly threatened by the numerous and varied 
limitations being placed on religious communities. Concerns about encroachments on the right to 
freedom of religion in these States (and others) are consistently raised in news reports and by 
human rights organisations.73 Indeed, the vast majority of cases concerning Article 9 
communicated to the ECtHR in recent years concern Russia, and nearby countries such as 
Azerbaijan, Ukraine and Bulgaria.74 A significant proportion of these cases concern Jehovah’s 
Witnesses75 but it is increasingly the case that other religious groups are complaining about 
limitations on the right to manifest in these States.76  
It will be interesting to see the outcome of Milshteyn v Russia in which the applicant, a 
follower of Elle-Ayat, a sun worshipping religious cult, complained about the government’s ban 
on the group’s activities for inter alia, publishing ‘extremist and dangerous texts’ and inducing 
members to ‘refuse medical assistance’ in favour of alternative therapies, including drinking 
‘active tea’.77 The key question put to the parties by the ECtHR was whether the ban was 
compatible with Articles 11 and 9, and whether the domestic courts carried out a ‘balancing 
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exercise which would have allowed them to weigh considerations of public health and safety 
against the countervailing principle of personal autonomy and religious freedom’.78 Similar 
questions were put to the parties in another recently communicated case of Evangelical Christian 
Church New Generation in Blagoveshchensk v Russia, which concerned restrictions on the 
organisation’s practice of neurolinguistic programming (NLP). The ECtHR enquired whether the 
domestic courts had carried out a balancing exercise between public safety and countervailing 
principles of religious freedom.79  
 
Conclusion 
The first section of this chapter demonstrated that in cases in which individuals have complained 
about restrictions on their behaviour resulting from generally applicable State laws intended to 
protect individuals from harm, the ECtHR has, where it concludes that the action in question is 
clearly harmful, offered a very low degree of protection under Article 9. However, even when the 
ECtHR considers that limitations on the freedom are, in principle, justifiable, forum internum 
relevance is not ignored. This is particularly evident in cases concerning manifestation of a 
deeply held inner belief, such as the corporal punishment of children. Because the ECtHR 
recognises that manifestations flow from the forum internum it intuitively recognises that 
limitations on manifestation inevitably impact upon the forum internum. However, when 
balancing forum internum relevance with countervailing factors in these cases, the ECtHR has, 
unsurprisingly, given greater weight to countervailing factors and found the restrictions to be 
justifiable.  
The second section of this chapter demonstrated that where the ECtHR does not find 
evidence to support claims of alleged harm, or finds allegations of harm credible but considers 
that State measures are disproportionate, the ECtHR offers a high degree of protection.  This was 
illustrated through an examination of cases in which States have dissolved religious communities 
or refused to re-register them, on the grounds that the groups threaten national security, challenge 
the rights and freedoms of members, or transgress fire and health and safety laws. In such cases, 
after finding interference with the right to manifest religion or belief, the ECtHR has balanced 
factors indicating a violation (primarily but not only forum internum relevance) with 
countervailing factors in order to reach its decision. Importantly, in cases concerning religious 
communities the ECtHR has consistently emphasised the interrelationship between belief and 
manifestation (i.e. the relationship between the forum internum and the forum externum) and has 
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intuitively recognised that limitations on manifestation will inevitably impact upon the forum 
internum. So, even when the ECtHR has found evidence to support State claims of harm, it has 
not necessarily found that forum internum relevance is outweighed by countervailing factors, on 
balance, especially when this concerns severe limitations such as the dissolution of communities.  
The balancing exercise in cases where forum internum relevance and countervailing 
factors may both be weak is harder (relatively speaking) than in cases where the forum internum 
is clearly strong and countervailing factors clearly weak. Such cases can be seen to fall into the 
middle circle in the loose concentric circles model, where the degree of protection ranges from a 
high to low degree depending on the way the ECtHR balances the factors. It is to a detailed 
examination of such contested cases that this thesis will now turn.   
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CHAPTER 6. FORUM INTERNUM RELEVANCE AND 
COUNTERVAILING FACTORS AT THEIR MOST CONTESTED (I) 
 
Introduction  
This chapter forms one of two chapters focusing on contested cases, that is, the kinds of cases in 
which it seems from the outset that the ECtHR might find a violation of Article 9 or might not. In 
terms of the loose concentric circles model of protection, these chapters concentrate on cases in 
the middle circle where forum internum relevance and countervailing factors are most contested 
and thus protection ranges from a very high to a very low degree depending on the balance of 
factors. The balancing exercise in cases the middle circle is ‘harder’ (relatively speaking) because 
in such cases forum internum relevance and countervailing factors may both be strong or forum 
internum relevance and countervailing factors may both be weak. As such, a ‘diligent empirical 
and normative analysis’ is required to ascertain whether limitations can be justified.1 
This chapter focuses specifically on the ECtHR’s approach to complaints concerning 
State limitations on the exercise of individual manifestation of religion or belief specifically 
through proselytism activities and the wearing of religious clothing or symbols. The next chapter 
will focus on the ECtHR’s approach in cases concerning complaints of State pressure on 
individuals to act in a way which is contrary to their religion or belief or to disclose their religion 
or belief against their will.  
Given the relationship between the forum internum and the forum externum one would 
expect the ECtHR to give considerable weight to forum internum relevance in cases concerning 
State limitations on the exercise of individual manifestation of religion or belief through 
proselytism activities and the wearing of religious clothing or symbols. However, again, one 
would not expect it to be the determining factor but rather a factor which the ECtHR takes into 
account in the balance. 
The key question for this chapter is whether this happens in practice: in such cases does 
the ECtHR draw a binary and hierarchical distinction between the forum internum and the forum 
externum and treat the forum externum as a second order concern, consistently permitting State 
interference with the right (as the literature generally suggests)? Or does the ECtHR balance 
factors indicating a violation (primarily, but only forum internum relevance) with and 
countervailing factors, and offer protection ranging from a very hight to a very low degree 
depending on the facts of the case?  
 
1 See Heiner Bielefeldt, Nazila Ghanea and Michael Wiener, Freedom of Religion or Belief: An International 




This chapter argues that the evidence supports the latter. To illustrate this, this chapter 
will examine the ECtHR’s approach in some paradigmatic cases; Section A will explore cases 
concerning limitations on proselytism activities in i) the community, ii) the armed forces and iii) 
the household. Section B will examine well-known cases concerning limitations on the wearing 
of religious clothing or symbols in i) schools and universities, ii) hospitals and iii) public spaces 
and Section C will examine lesser-known cases concerning limitations on the wearing of religious 
symbols in i) public spaces and ii) courtrooms.   
 
A. Proselytism Activities 
 
i. Proselytism Activities in the Community  
That the ECtHR takes into account the relevance of the forum internum in cases concerning 
restrictions on proselytism is evident in the most well-known case concerning proselytism, 
Kokkinakis v Greece.2 In this case, the applicant, a Jehovah’s Witnesses, gained entry into the 
home of a local Orthodox Cantor and his wife, and entered into a discussion with the wife, with 
the aim of converting her to their beliefs. Following this, the applicant was arrested, charged and 
convicted under the recently introduced Greek law against proselytism. Before the ECtHR the 
applicant complained inter alia under Article 9 that his right to manifest his religion or belief had 
been unduly limited by the State, specifically, he criticised the domestic legislation on 
proselytism, arguing there was a ‘logical and legal difficulty of drawing any even remotely clear 
dividing line between proselytism and the freedom to change one’s religion or belief…and to 
manifest it.’ 3 
In setting out the general principles, the ECtHR emphasised the interrelationship between 
the forum internum and the forum externum through the standard recital (that Article 9 primarily 
protects the forum internum but also protects manifestation of religion or belief) adding that 
‘bearing witness in words and deeds is bound up with the existence of religious convictions.’4 
The ECtHR explained that the right to manifest includes in principle the right to try to convince 
one’s neighbour, for example, through ‘teaching’, without which the freedom to change religion 
 
2 Kokkinakis v Greece (1993) Series A no 260-A. 
3  Ibid., para 29. For discussion see generally, Tad Stahnke, ‘Proselytism and the Freedom to Change Religion in 
International Human Rights Law’ [1999] Brigham Young University Law Review 251; Ted Stahnke, ‘The Right 
to Engage in Religious Persuasion’ in W Cole Durham Jr and others (eds) Facilitating Freedom of Religion or 
Belief: A Deskbook (Martinus Nijhoff 2004). 
4 Kokkinakis v Greece (1993) Series A no 260-A, para 31. Cumper explains that for many it is a ‘sacred duty’, see 
Peter Cumper, ‘The Public Manifestation of Religion or Belief: Challenges for a Multi-Faith Society in the 
Twenty-First Century’ in Richard O’Dair and Andrew Lewis (eds) Law and Religion: Current Legal Issues 2001 




or belief, protected by Article 9 ‘would likely remain a dead letter.’5 However, it observed that 
the right to manifest can be limited in certain circumstances, explaining that where multiple 
religions coexist, it may be necessary to restrict manifestation in order to ‘ensure that everyone’s 
beliefs are respected.’6 In terms of proselytism, the ECtHR noted that a distinction had to be 
made between ‘bearing Christian witness and improper proselytism’, explaining that the latter 
represented a ‘corruption or deformation’ of Christian witness,7 which could involve offering 
material or social advantage in order to gain new members, exerting ‘improper pressure on people 
in distress or need’, and ‘may even entail the use of violence or brainwashing’8 which was not 
compatible with the rights of others to freedom of thought, conscience and religion.9  
In applying the principles to the facts, the ECtHR agreed with the government that 
domestic legislation was ‘designed to punish improper proselytism’10 and, as such, found that the 
interference was ‘prescribed by law’11 and pursued the legitimate aim under Article 9.2 of 
protecting the rights and freedoms of others.12 However, after a brief consideration, it did not find 
that the restriction was justified by a pressing social need, so found a violation of Article 9. 
 The point about Kokkinakis v Greece is that it shows that just because the ECtHR 
characterises a complaint as a complaint concerning limitations on the right to manifest religion 
or belief, it does not simply ignore the forum internum relevance for the applicant. Indeed, it 
could be argued that the importance placed on manifestation as an expression of belief by the 
ECtHR meant that it did not adequately examine whether the applicant’s actions — in entering 
the home of the Cantor and his wife to share his beliefs — constituted ‘true evangelism’ or 
‘improper proselytism’.  
 Kokkinakis v Greece is also interesting because it shows that forum internum relevance 
can be a factor weighing in favour of the applicant and also a factor weighing against the 
applicant, when the forum internum of others (in this case, the proselytised) is considered as part 
of the rights and freedoms of others under Article 9.2. Whilst the ECtHR did not explicitly refer 
to the forum internum of others, it is, as Taylor points out, possible to interpret the consideration 
of the rights and freedoms of others as a consideration of ‘coercion impairing free religious 
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proselytism here, see Paul Taylor, Freedom of Religion: UN and European Human Rights Law and Practice (CUP 
2005) 68 footnote 212. 
8 Kokkinakis v Greece (1993) Series A no 260-A, para 48.  
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choice, amounting to interference with the forum internum.’13 Indeed, the protection of the forum 
internum of others features heavily in the separate opinions in this case.  
 The majority’s decision was supported by Judge Martens, in his partly dissenting opinion, 
who argued that the applicant’s visit to the Cantor’s wife was ‘perfectly harmless’ because there 
was ‘no trace of violence’ or ‘coercion’, ‘at worst, there was a trivial lie.’14 He contended that a 
violation of Article 9 should have been found on the basis that Greek law on proselytism did not 
pursue a legitimate aim, explaining that Article 9 does not allow States to criminalise attempts 
made by religious individuals to encourage others to change their religion. Judge Martens 
emphasised that it is not the role of the State to meddle in the conflict between proselytisers and 
the proselytised, arguing that it is no concern of the State if someone decides to change their 
religion and neither is it any concern of the State if someone ‘attempts to induce another to 
change his religion.’15 For Judge Martens the absolute nature of the right to hold or change a 
religion or belief meant that it was entirely beyond the purview of the State. This is an extreme 
position which is, as M Evans noted, ‘tantamount to abandoning the rights of the ‘proselytised’ 
who would be left to their own resources in the protection of their freedom and would seem to 
ignore the obligation placed on States by ECHR Article 1, to ensure that every citizen under its 
jurisdiction can enjoy the rights and freedoms in the ECHR.16 
 Judge Valticos, in his dissenting opinion, took a very different approach to the protection 
of the forum internum of others in this case. He argued that the State has a responsibility to 
protect the rights of the proselytised and was emphatic that proselytism through deceptive means 
should not in any way be protected under Article 9 because it constitutes a ‘rape of the beliefs of 
others’.17 He argued that Jehovah’s Witnesses engage in systematic and insistent efforts at 
conversion which constitute an attack on the religious beliefs of others, and characterised the 
applicant in Kokkinakis v Greece as a ‘hardened’, ‘militant’ Jehovah’s Witness, a ‘specialist in 
conversion’ and a ‘cunning purveyor of a faith he wants to spread’ who gained entry to the home 
of the Cantor’s wife and used the techniques of a salesman on the naïve woman to seduce her 
‘simple soul’.18 Whilst he conceded that ‘innocuous conversations’ should not be prosecuted, he 
argued that systematic and insistent proselytism activities, like the activity in Kokkinakis v 
Greece, should be prosecuted as ‘an intrusion on people’s beliefs’.19 
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15 Ibid. 
16 Malcolm D Evans, Religious Liberty and International Law (OUP 1997) 332. 






One way of understanding these diverging interpretations in this case is to appreciate the 
way in which the broader context may influence the weight given to countervailing factors. In 
Greece, the Eastern Orthodox Church is recognised as the State religion and the vast majority of 
citizens belong to that Church.20 It is difficult to overlook the fact that the strongest voice arguing 
that the State limitation was legitimate, because it was intended to protect the conscience of 
others, was the national judge, Judge Valticos. For him, in proselytising the wife of a Cantor of 
the Greek Orthodox Church the applicant threatened to the status-quo; in Judge Valticos’ words, 
‘sects are going to fish for followers in the best-stocked waters.’21 Therefore, he gave more 
weight to countervailing factors in the balance.  
In contrast, it seems highly likely that the majority were influenced by the ongoing 
clamp-down on Jehovah’s Witnesses’ activities in Greece at the time, and this background may 
have influenced their decision to give less weight to countervailing factors. The lack of 
methodological rigour with respect to determining whether the applicant’s actions constituted true 
evangelism or improper proselytism, may have been a reflection of the fact that the ECtHR knew 
from the outset the decision that it was going to reach.  
In the decade prior to Kokkinakis v Greece, over 2,000 Jehovah’s Witness were arrested 
for proselytism and many imprisoned.22 Kokkinakis himself was ‘exiled six times, arrested more 
than sixty times and served five years in various prisons for proselytism’.23 But it was not just 
Jehovah’s Witnesses who were targeted.24 Indeed, other individuals arrested and sentenced for 
proselytism included Pentecostalists, four of which also complained before the ECtHR about 
limitations on proselytism activity in Larissis v Greece.25 This is another case which 
demonstrates, more clearly, that forum internum relevance is not only a factor weighing in favour 
of the applicant, it may also be a countervailing factor when the forum internum of others is 
considered as part of the rights and freedoms of others under Article 9.2.  
 
ii. Proselytism Activities in the Armed Forces  
In Larissis v Greece, four officers of the Greek Air Force, who were members of the Pentecostal 
Church (in which evangelism is considered a duty),26 complained that the punishment for 
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manifesting their religion constituted a violation of inter alia Article 9. In its assessment under 
Article 9, the ECtHR set out the standard recital — that Article 9 primarily protects the forum 
internum but also protects manifestation of religion or belief — but also explained, that Article 9 
does not protect every act motivated or inspired by a religion or belief, specifically, that Article 9 
does not protect ‘improper proselytism, such as the offering of material or social advantage or the 
application of improper pressure with a view to gaining new members for a church’.27 
In applying these principles to the facts, the ECtHR paid close attention to the details and 
distinguished between the proselytism activities directed at the officers’ subordinates and the 
proselytism activities directed at civilians. The proselytism efforts of the officers with respect to 
their subordinates constituted, according to the ECtHR, improper proselytism, and as such it 
decided that the interference with the manifestation in this respect did not violate Article 9.28 The 
ECtHR explained that ‘what would in the civilian world be seen as an innocuous exchange of 
ideas which the recipient is free to accept or reject, may, within the confines of military life be 
view as a form of harassment or the application of undue pressure in abuse of power.’29 Given the 
subordinates were unable to remove themselves from the context in which the proselytism had 
occurred, the ECtHR found that this amounted to coercion. 
In this respect, the ECtHR considered the protection of the forum internum of others 
(namely, the individuals proselytised) as a countervailing factor. Whilst the protection of the 
applicants’ forum internum was the most significant factor weighing in their favour, the 
protection of the forum internum of others was a factor weighing against the applicants. In the 
balance, the ECtHR decided to give more weight to countervailing factors (namely the protection 
of the forum internum of the proselytised) and thus found no violation of Article 9.   
In contrast, the ECtHR found the proselytism efforts of the officers with respect to 
civilians did not constitute improper proselytism. It did not find sufficient evidence that the 
officers had taken advantage of the civilians’ family issues or ‘psychological distress’ or ‘applied 
unlawful pressure’.30 In the balance here, therefore, the ECtHR decided to give less weight to 
countervailing factors (namely the protection of the forum internum of the proselytised) and thus 
found a violation of Article 9.  
Again, therefore, despite characterising the complaint in this case as a complaint 
concerning limitations on manifestation, the ECtHR recognised the interrelationship between 
belief and manifestation, i.e. it took into account forum internum relevance. However, the ECtHR 
was not driven by general guidelines explaining when proselytism activities become unacceptable 
 
27 Ibid., para 45. 
28 Ibid., para 54.  
29 Ibid., para 5. 




intrusions into the forum internum of others, but rather focused on the facts, namely the specific 
relationships between the proselytisers and the proselytised, to decide whether the action in 
question constituted acceptable religious persuasion or unacceptable coercion. This emphasis on 
the facts left open considerable scope for disagreement as evidenced in the separate opinions.  
 Both Judge Repik and Judge van Dijk argued that a violation of Article 9 should have 
been found in relation to proselytism of the subordinates and the civilians, because, they argued it 
was not clear that the interference was prescribed by law.31 For Judge van Dijk, there was an 
issue with the ECtHR’s assumption of undue influence exercised by a more senior ranking figure 
over a lower ranking figure in the army. He argued that claims of ‘pressure’ on subordinates were 
not sufficiently substantiated and disagreed that there was a pressing social need to limit the 
manifestation.32 In particular, he argued that the alleged victim’s testimony revealed that he 
contacted one of the officers and sought his advice, and as such, the conversations on religion and 
the subsequent conversions were prompted by his own free will.   
 In contrast, Judge Valticos (who has also dissented in Kokkinakis v Greece) and Judge 
Morenilla argued that there was no violation of Article 9 in this case.33 These judges cast the 
action as ‘deliberate acts of proselytism are contrary to the respect for freedom of conscience and 
religion’ and contended pressure existed because subordinates would have been ‘influenced by 
the officers’ authority over them’ and civilians would have been influenced by the officers’ 
uniform.34 Thus, these judges reached diverging decisions in this case because they gave more, or 
less, weight to countervailing factors (namely the forum internum of others).  
 
iii. Proselytism Activities in the Household  
Given the ECtHR’s approach in Larissis v Greece, one might expect the ECtHR to also consider 
the forum internum of others (as part of the rights and freedoms of others under Article 9.2) as a 
countervailing factor in cases concerning proselytism activities in the family. Strikingly, 
however, in this context the ECtHR seems to give very little weight to the forum internum of 
others as a countervailing factor in the balance. The ECtHR’s approach in this respect is 
illustrated well in Vojnity v Hungary.35 
In this case, the applicant complained that the State had interfered with Articles 8, 9 and 
Article 2 of Protocol 1 in restricting his access rights to his son. The domestic authorities had 
 
31 Larissis and Others v Greece ECHR 1998-I 362, Partly Dissenting Opinion of Judge Repik; ibid., Partly 
Dissenting Opinion of Judge van Dijk. 
32 Larissis and Others v Greece ECHR 1998-I 362, Partly Dissenting Opinion of Judge van Dijk. 
33 Ibid., Partly Dissenting Opinion of Judge Valticos, Joined by Judge Morenilla. 
34 Ibid. This was supported by Judge De Meyer, see Larissis and Others v Greece ECHR 1998-I 362, Concurring 
Opinion of Judge De Meyer. 




raised concerns about the ‘heavy handed’ proselytism of the child by his father and had denied 
the applicant, a member of the religious denomination Hit Gyülekezete, access rights because it 
considered that he held ‘ideas hallmarked by religious fanaticism’ and had abused his right to 
influence his son by forcing his beliefs onto him in such a way as to trigger anxiety and fear in 
the boy, endanger his development, leading to his alienation from the applicant.36 
In considering the legitimacy of the denial of access rights, the ECtHR explained that 
Articles 8, 9 and Article 2 of Protocol 1 give the right to parents to ‘communicate and promote 
their religious convictions’ to their children, ‘even in an insistent and overbearing manner, unless 
this exposes the latter to dangerous practices or to physical or psychological harm’.37 Whilst the 
ECtHR noted the domestic authorities’ concerns that the applicant’s participation in the child’s 
life was ‘harmful’ due to his ‘insistence on proselytism’,38 and recognised that the child had been 
placed under ‘psychological strain’ which had caused emotional imbalance, the ECtHR did not 
find ‘convincing evidence’ of ‘actual harm’.39 The ECtHR concluded that the protection of the 
son’s psychological health from the stress placed upon it by his father’s intensive proselytism 
efforts did not qualify as a ‘weighty reason’ justifying the different and less favourable treatment 
with respect to the applicant’s access rights, and therefore, found a violation of Article 8 and 14, 
and did not find it necessary to examine the applicant’s Article 9 complaint.40  
In choosing not to examine the complaint under Article 9, the ECtHR did not explicitly 
weigh up the applicant’s Article 9 right to proselytise against the son’s forum internum right not 
to be coerced.41 The fact that it chose not to do this suggests that, for the ECtHR, parents can 
impact upon a child’s forum internum to a considerable extent without this necessarily 
constituting a violation of Article 9.42   
 
The first section of this chapter demonstrates that the ECtHR does not simply defer to States and 
permit limitations on the right to manifest in cases concerning the right to manifest through 
proselytism. Rather than drawing a binary and hierarchical distinction between the forum 
internum and the forum externum, as the literature suggests, the ECtHR recognises that the forum 
 
36 Ibid., para 17. 
37 Ibid., para 37. This was consistent with the earlier statement concerning parental rights to steer their children 
along the lines of their own beliefs, see Kjeldsen, Busk Madsen and Pedersen v Denmark (1976) Series A no 23.  
38 Vojnity v Hungary App no 29617/07 (ECtHR, 12 February 2013) para 38. 
39 Ibid. 
40 It will be interesting to see ECtHR’s approach in the recently communicated case of Fouquet v France in 
which the applicant (a Muslim) complained about being forced to convert to the faith or her foster family (who 
were Jehovah’s Witnesses), see Foquet v France (communicated case) App no 59227/12 (ECtHR, 2 October 
2017) [French]. 
41 For a discussion of coercion within the family see, Heiner Bielefeldt, Nazila Ghanea and Michael Wiener, 
Freedom of Religion or Belief (OUP 2016) 87. 




internum and forum externum are deeply interrelated, emphasising that bearing witness is bound 
up with beliefs. And, the ECtHR intuitively recognises that limitations on manifestation through 
proselytism may affect an individual’s right to hold a religion or belief. Even when the 
proselytisers right to manifest religion or belief comes into conflict with the right of the 
proselytised to hold a religion or belief, the ECtHR does not simply allow limitations on the right 
to manifest in order to protect the absolute right to hold a religion or belief at all costs but, 
instead, considers whether the right of the proselytised to hold a religion or belief has been 
interfered with by the proselytiser, on the particular facts of the case.  
 Again, these cases show that forum internum relevance is not the determining factor but 
rather a factor taken into account in the balance in Article 9 cases. This which means that the 
ECtHR (and individual judges) often reach different outcomes in ostensibly similar cases 
depending on the balance of factors. In some instances, State restrictions can be viewed as 
illegitimate interferences with the right to manifest religion or belief, whereas, in other instances, 
restrictions can be viewed as justified by a pressing social need, namely the protection of the 
rights and freedoms of others. This pattern of protection is also illustrated in cases concerning the 
wearing of religious clothing and symbols which the next section of this chapter will explore in 
detail.   
   
B. Wearing Religious Clothing or Symbols (I) 
As noted in Chapter One, the literature relating to Article 9 tends to focus heavily, sometimes 
exclusively, on cases concerning limitations on the wearing of religious clothing or symbols, 
especially those concerning the wearing of headscarves including the hijab, niqab and burkha.43 
Such cases are contentious because whilst the wearing of such religious clothing, and symbols 
such as a cross around one’s neck,44 is usually considered a legitimate form of manifestation by 
 
43 See e.g. Aernout Nieuwenhuis, ‘European Court of Human Rights: State and Religion, Schools and Scarves. 
An Analysis of the Margin of Appreciation as Used in the Case of Leyla Sahin’ (2005) 1:3 European 
Constitutional Law Review 495; Carolyn Evans, ‘The Islamic Scarf in the European Court of Human Rights’ 
(2006) 7 Melbourne Journal of International Law 52; T Jeremy Gunn, ‘Fearful Symbols: The Islamic Headscarf 
and the European Court of Human Rights in Sahin v Turkey’ (2008-2009) 3 Droit et Religions 339; Erica 
Howard, Law and the Wearing of Religious Symbols: European Bans of the Wearing of Religious Symbols in 
Education (Routledge 2011); T Jeremy Gunn, ‘Religious Symbols in Public Schools: The Islamic Headscarf and 
the European Court of Human Rights Decision in Sahin v Turkey’ in W Cole Durham Jr and others (eds) Islam, 
Europe and Emerging Legal Issues (Ashgate 2012); Daniel Hill and Daniel Whistler, ‘Religious Symbols and 
the European Convention on Human Rights’ (2013) 171 Law and Justice 52; Tereas Sanader, ‘Religious 
Symbols and Garments in Public Places – a Theory for the Understanding of SAS v France’ (2015) 9 Vienna 
Journal on International Constitutional Law 186; Sylvie Bacquet, ‘Religious Symbols and the Making of 
Contemporary Religious Identities’ in Russell Sandberg (ed) Religion and Legal Pluralism (Routledge 2016); 
Stephanie Berry, ‘A ‘Good Faith’ Interpretation of the Right to Manifest Religion? The Diverging Approaches 
of the European Court of Human Rights and the UN Human Rights Committee’ (2017) 37:4 Legal Studies 672. 




the ECtHR, States have often argued that it is necessary to restrict this manifestation in order to 
pursue legitimate aims under Article 9.2, particularly to protect public safety, public order and the 
rights and freedoms of others. Indeed, this section follows naturally from the examination of 
complaints about limitations on proselytism above because States often argue that religious 
clothing and symbols can have a proselytising effect on others.  
 Again, in cases concerning limitations on manifestation through the wearing of religious 
clothing or symbols the ECtHR intuitively recognises that limitations affect the right to hold a 
religion or belief because the forum internum and the forum externum aspects of Article 9 are 
interrelated. But, forum internum relevance is not the determining factor; the ECtHR balances 
forum internum relevance with countervailing factors to reach its decision. In this section, the 
ECtHR’s approach in well-known cases concerning complaints about restrictions on the right to 
manifest religion or belief through the wearing of religious clothing or symbols will be examined, 
in the following subsections: i) schools and universities, ii) hospitals and iii) public spaces.  
 
i. Schools and Universities 
A well-known case concerning restrictions on the wearing of headscarves is Dahlab v 
Switzerland in which a teacher in a State primary school complained that the measure which 
prohibited her from wearing her headscarf whilst teaching interfered with her right to manifest 
her religion.45 The government claimed that the restriction did not interfere with Article 9, but if 
it was deemed to do so by the ECtHR, it could be justified under Article 9.2 as the restriction, 
which was based on the principle of denominational neutrality in schools, pursued the legitimate 
aim of upholding religious harmony and preserving ‘individual freedom of conscience in a 
pluralistic democratic society.’46 Further, the government argued that as a State representative the 
applicant should not align herself with any belief, especially when this was expressed by the 
wearing of ‘a powerful external symbol’ such as the Islamic headscarf.47  
 Through its general principles, the ECtHR explained that Article 9 primarily protects the 
forum internum but also protects manifestation of religion or belief, adding that ‘in democratic 
societies’ where a number of religions coexist it ‘may be necessary to place restrictions on this 
freedom in order to reconcile the interests of the various groups and ensure that everyone’s 
 
45 Dahlab v Switzerland ECHR 2001-V 447. 
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47 Ibid. For discussion of ‘powerful external symbol’ see generally T Jeremy Gunn, ‘Religious Symbols in 
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beliefs are respected’.48 Whilst it found that the limitations on the wearing of the headscarf 
constituted interference with Article 9, it did not however find a violation of that article.  
 In its assessment, the ECtHR explained that the measure was prescribed by law, and 
pursued legitimate aims under Article 9.2, namely the protection of the rights and freedoms of 
others, public safety and public order. And with respect to the necessity of the restriction, the 
ECtHR explained that States have a certain margin of appreciation in determining the need for 
interference. In considering the facts, the ECtHR observed that whilst the applicant had worn the 
headscarf for years without any complaints and that there were no objections to her pedagogy, it 
was ‘very difficult to assess the impact’ of a ‘powerful external symbol’ such as the headscarf on 
young children, recognising that it could not ‘be denied outright’ that the headscarf may have 
‘some kind of proselytising effect’, especially given that it is stipulated in the Koran.49 The 
ECtHR concluded that it was difficult to reconcile the wearing of a headscarf in a classroom with 
the principles of tolerance, respect for others and non-discrimination which teachers in a 
democratic society have a responsibility to convey to pupils and decided that in restricting the 
applicant’s right the State had not exceeded its margin of appreciation.50 
 Whilst Bielfeldt, Ghanea and Wiener note that the wearing of a headscarf by a teacher is 
unlikely to constitute coercion, it is (like proselytism within the family) an issue which may fall 
into the ‘grey zone between the mere exercise of legitimate influence and the use of illegitimate 
coercion’ and, as such, needs careful consideration.51 It may be argued in Dahlab v Switzerland 
that the ECtHR did not conduct a sufficiently detailed analysis. Despite pointing out its important 
oversight role in terms of State claims of necessity, the ECtHR did not seek concrete evidence for 
the need to restrict the wearing of the headscarf nor did it explain precisely how the such a 
manifestation undermined the principles of tolerance, respect for others and non-discrimination. 
Indeed, one could argue that restrictions on the wearing of the headscarf had the very same effect. 
The ECtHR uncritically accepted the government’s argument that the headscarf is a ‘powerful 
external symbol’ and put the impact of the manifestation in very vague terms.  
Langlaude, for instance, has criticised the ECtHR’s broad and speculative reference to 
‘some kind of proselytising effect’ and the way it seems to have expanded the notion of 
indoctrination so that the wearing of the headscarf in front of children of a tender age is seen to 
affect their freedom of conscience.52 Taylor made a similar criticism arguing that Dahlab v 
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Switzerland ‘sadly illustrates the error of applying too low a threshold’ for interference with the 
forum internum of others.53  
There is, however, another way of reading this case; the lack of methodological rigour 
may have been a conscious choice rather than a failing on the part of the ECtHR. It seems that for 
the ECtHR the context in Dahlab v Switzerland was key; at the material time in Switzerland 
denominational neutrality in schools was a central constitutional principle, and in wearing the 
headscarf whilst teaching, the applicant directly challenged this. Whilst the ECtHR observed that 
in wearing a headscarf the applicant was manifesting her religion, and as such recognised the 
forum internum relevance (because of the interrelationship between the forum internum and the 
forum externum), in the balance, the ECtHR gave greater weight to countervailing factors 
(including upholding the principle of denominational neutrality in schools).  
This approach is further evidenced in Leyla Şahin  v Turkey in which a university student 
complained under Article 9 that the ban on wearing headscarves at university constituted an 
interference with her right to manifest her religion.54 She contended that it was a religious 
obligation and not, as the State argued, intended as a ‘means of protest,’ ‘did not constitute a form 
of pressure, provocation or proselytism’55 and was not incompatible with the principles of 
secularism and neutrality in education.56 In its Article 9 assessment, the ECtHR found that the 
ban constituted an interference with the right to manifest but considered that the principle of 
secularism was consistent with the values underpinning the ECHR57 and the ban, which was 
motivated by this principle, could be regarded as necessary in a democratic society in light of the 
margin of appreciation afforded to States.58 This was reiterated by the Grand Chamber which 
observed that in the educational context, where values such as pluralism, respect for the rights of 
others and gender equality are taught and applied, it is understandable that the State would want 
maintain the secular nature of the institution in question and deem the wearing of religious 
clothing to be contrary to the principle of secularism.59  
 
53 Paul Taylor, Freedom of Religion (CUP 2005) 172. This fits in with Taylor’s broader criticism of the ECtHR 
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54 Leyla Şahin v Turkey App no 44774/98 (ECtHR, 29 June 2004); Leyla Şahin v Turkey ECHR 2005-XI 173. 
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App no 27058/05 (ECtHR, 4 December 2008); Kervanci v France App no 31645/04 (ECtHR, 4 December 
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56 Ibid., para 86.  
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The ECtHR also considered what effect the headscarf ‘which is presented or perceived as 
a compulsory religious duty, may have on those who choose not to wear it’.60 Here the ECtHR 
referred to Karaduman v Turkey (which concerned the refusal to remove a headscarf for a degree 
certificate photograph) in which the Commission noted that States may enforce dress regulations 
to ensure that public order in higher education is not disturbed by fundamentalist religious 
movements and the beliefs of other students are not impinged upon.61 The ECtHR explained that 
in the context of Turkey, in which most of the population belong to a particular religion, steps 
taken by universities to avoid fundamentalist religious movements putting pressure on students 
who do not belong to the same religion, or belong to another religion, may be acceptable under 
Article 9.2.62 In light of this, the interference was considered to be justified and proportionate, so 
no violation of Article 9 was found.63   
 Again, in this case the ECtHR did not explain why the wearing of the headscarf was 
contrary to the principle of secularism, nor did it seek concrete evidence from the State as to 
precisely how the wearing of the headscarf could place pressure on students who did not wear 
one. Whilst it may be ‘understandable’ that the authorities may wish to maintain the secular 
nature of the university in question, it was the duty of the ECtHR to ascertain whether the way in 
which it sought to do this was compatible with the ECHR. Judge Tulkens, in her dissenting 
opinion, questioned the majority’s ‘general and abstract appeal to secularism’ and criticised it for 
failing to conduct a thorough necessity and a proportionality analysis.64 She pointed out that only 
‘indisputable facts and reasons whose legitimacy is beyond doubt – not mere worries or fears – 
are capable of satisfying the requirement and justifying interference with a right guaranteed by 
the Convention.’65 Relying on Smith and Grady v The United Kingdom66 she argued that concrete 
examples are required to justify interference with a fundamental right.  For Judge Tulkens, the 
majority simply assumed that the headscarf placed pressure on others,67 and ignored the fact that 
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bans by Member States on religious symbols in schools had not extended to universities because 
they were intended for adults ‘who are less amenable to pressure.’68  
Again, however, it is likely that the lack of methodological rigour in this case was a 
conscious choice rather than a failing on the part of the ECtHR.69 The ECtHR did not ignore the 
relevance of the forum internum for the applicant; the ECtHR balanced it against countervailing 
factors, and in doing so, decided to give greater weight to countervailing considerations.70 The 
ECtHR agreed with the government that in wearing the headscarf at university — where it was 
specifically banned — the applicant was provocatively challenging the constitutional principle of 
secularism, and given the background in Turkey at the material time, in which wearing a 
headscarf at university was one of the ways of making a political statement,71 this decision on the 
part of the ECtHR was unsurprising. Rather than taking a step by step approach to the complaint 
the ECtHR seems to have skimmed over key questions under Article 9.2 because it knew, from 
the outset, the outcome it was going to reach (i.e. that it would defer to the State) because of the 
facts.72    
Another case which illustrates this is Kurtulmuş v Turkey in which an Associate Professor 
at the University of Istanbul, who was suspended and eventually dismissed on the basis that she 
wore a headscarf, complained that the ban on wearing headscarves whilst teaching violated inter 
alia her right to manifest her religion.73 In its Article 9 assessment the ECtHR decided that the 
ban constituted an interference with the right to manifest. However, it considered that the 
measure was prescribed by law and pursued legitimate aims, namely the protection of rights and 
freedoms of others and protection of public order. With respect to the question of necessity, the 
ECtHR noted States can restrict the wearing of the Islamic headscarf where it deems it 
incompatible with aims above, and referring to Dahlab v Switzerland, emphasised the importance 
of preserving neutrality in State school education. It noted that it was not objections to a person’s 
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religious beliefs which motivated restrictions on religious dress but rather the ‘principle of 
secularism and neutrality in public service’ which was a fundamental principle of the Turkish 
State.74 The ECtHR decided that the State had not overstepped its margin of appreciation with 
respect to determining requirements on state school teachers and thus deemed the complaint 
manifestly ill founded. 
So, whilst the ECtHR took into account the applicant’s forum internum (because it 
recognised that the limitation on wearing a headscarf inevitably impacted on the applicant’s 
forum internum), the ECtHR decided, in the balance, to give greater weight to countervailing 
factors.  
Again, the ECtHR did not conduct a lengthy analysis of the necessity of the limitation or 
seek concrete evidence of how a teacher, wearing a headscarf at a university, undermined the 
rights and freedoms of others and threatened public order, particularly given the applicant was 
teaching adults who are not so easily influenced as children. And, the applicant was allowed to 
wear her headscarf during her PhD, and for the first two years of teaching so the proportionality 
of the ban was ‘debatable’ indeed.75 In pointing out that the applicant had taken on the role of a 
public servant voluntarily and would not have been unaware of the obligation upon her not to 
express her religious beliefs in an ‘ostentatious manner’, the ECtHR seems to reveal its own 
understanding of what was at stake here.76 Commentators have pointed out that the ECtHR seems 
able to appreciate different motivations in relation to the display of a crucifix in schools, but 
chooses not to do so in relation to the wearing the headscarf.77 This thesis argues that this choice 
to do, or not to do so, is not simply arbitrary. It reflects the fact that the ECtHR balances forum 
internum relevance and countervailing factors in order to reach its decision.  
In some cases, the ECtHR gives the impression that it is all about the weight of 
countervailing factors. This is particularly so when the case concerns a manifestation, such as the 
wearing of a headscarf. In such instances, because the focus is on an action in the forum externum 
the consideration of forum internum relevance is reduced to the background.  
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This is particularly evident in Melek Sima Yilmaz v Turkey in which a high school teacher 
complained that prohibition on wearing headscarf whilst teaching violated inter alia her right to 
manifest.78 Here the ECtHR did not explicitly consider forum internum relevance at all. It simply 
noted that it had already examined similar complaints in Dahlab v Switzerland and Kurtulmuş v 
Turkey and in those cases found no violation of Article 9 given the importance of respect of 
neutrality in education and the margin of appreciation available to States with respect to 
requirements on state school teachers, and saw no reason to depart from its conclusion in the case 
in question.79  
These cases concerning the wearing of headscarves in schools and universities 
demonstrate that the ECtHR tends to focus heavily on the countervailing factors in this context, 
and forum internum relevance often seems to have a minimal role in the assessment. This 
approach is further evidenced in cases concerning limitations on the wearing of clothing or 
symbols in hospitals.  
 
ii. Hospitals  
In Ebrahimian v France a social worker in a psychiatric department of a public hospital argued 
that the non-renewal of her contract, on the grounds that she refused to remove her headscarf, 
interfered with inter alia her right to manifest her religion and was not, as the government 
claimed prescribed by law80 and did not pursue a legitimate aim of protecting the rights and 
freedoms of others.81 The government argued that neutrality in hospitals was important because of 
the potential effect a ‘visible external sign’ might have on ‘the freedom of conscience of frail and 
easily influenced patients,’82 but the applicant contested this, claiming that the headscarf did not 
undermine the principle of neutrality of the public service, did not threaten public order, and was 
not an ‘act of proselytism’.83 For the applicant, the non-renewal of the contract was motivated by 
the new management’s objections to her religion.84 
In its Article 9 assessment the ECtHR stated that there was no reason to doubt that that 
the wearing of the headscarf ‘was a “manifestation” of sincere religious belief protected by 
Article 9’, and that the decision not to renew the applicant’s contract constituted an interference 
with the right to manifest religion or belief.85 Given that the ECtHR understands that 
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82 Ibid., para 44. 
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manifestations flow from the forum internum, and thus, any restrictions upon manifestations 
inevitably impact the forum internum, the ECtHR implicitly recognised that the forum internum 
was engaged in this case. In terms of the balance of factors, forum internum relevance was 
therefore a factor weighing in favour of the applicant. However, the ECtHR concentrated largely 
upon the strength of countervailing factors in its assessment.  
 In its consideration of whether the measure was prescribed by law the ECtHR explained 
that in order to meet the requirements under Article 9.2 the measure must not only have a basis in 
domestic law, it must accessible, individuals must be able to foresee the consequences of it, it 
must be compatible with the rule of law and sufficiently clear about the circumstances in which 
States can take measures affecting ECHR rights.86 In this case the ECtHR agreed with the 
applicant that there was no law prohibiting public employees from wearing religious symbols,87 
however, it observed that France is a secular republic, and neutrality of public services is part of 
State secularism and is a ‘fundamental principle of the public service’.88 Despite the fact that 
there was no explicit reference to the applicant’s profession in this general obligation of 
neutrality, and that when the applicant started the job she could not have foreseen that her 
manifestation would be restricted, the ECtHR nevertheless found the Conseil d’Etat’s opinion in 
2000 made it clear that the principle of secularity applied to ‘all public services’, so found the 
measure to be prescribed by law.89  
The ECtHR found that the ‘requirement of religious neutrality in a context of 
vulnerability of public service uses’ pursued the legitimate aim of protecting the rights and 
freedoms of others,90 specifically patients’ rights to respect for their religious or spiritual beliefs, 
and their ‘equal treatment without distinction of religion.’91 And it also found that the restriction 
was necessary in order to uphold neutrality in public service and to protect the rights and 
freedoms of others. Citing Leyla Şahin v Turkey, the ECtHR observed that the precise details of 
regulations on public servants must, to a degree, be left in the hands of the State given that it 
depends on the national context,92 noting that States can invoke the principle of secularism and 
neutrality to justify restrictions on the wearing of religious clothing and symbols by public 
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servants, particularly teachers working in public schools or universities.93 With respect to the 
question of proportionality, the ECtHR explained that in the hospital environment States have a 
wide margin of appreciation ‘because hospital officials are better placed to take decisions 
concerning their establishment than a judge, or international tribunal’94 and also better placed to 
assess the proportionality of the punishment for failing to adhere to the opinion of the Conseil 
d’Etat.95 Consequently it found no violation of Article 9. 
In this case, therefore, the ECtHR gave more weight to countervailing factors. Given 
ECtHR had already found that headscarf bans on students (e.g. Leyla Şahin v Turkey),96 pupils 
(e.g. Kose and 93 Others v Turkey,97 Dogru v France,98 Kervanci v France,99 Atkas v France100), 
and teachers and lecturers (e.g. Dahlab v Switzerland,101 Kurtulmuş v Turkey102), were in 
accordance with Article 9.2 it seemed, as Brems has pointed out, ‘a fortiori that it had to accept 
bans for agents of a public service.’103 However, again the ECtHR did not consider precisely how 
the wearing of the headscarf undermined the rights and freedoms of others, and in accepting that 
the ban was intended to ensure respect for the beliefs of patients and ensure equal treatment 
without distinction on the grounds of religion, the ECtHR implied that the wearing of the 
headscarf could be equated with disrespect for the beliefs of others and discriminatory treatment 
without seeking any evidence to support this. Indeed, Judge De Gaetano, in his dissenting 
opinion, criticised the majority for assuming that the ‘abstract principle of laicite or secularism of 
the State requires a blanket prohibition’ on the wearing of religious clothing or symbols.104 The 
majority’s reasoning was, he contended, ‘very weak and at times contradictory’ and based on the 
‘false’ and ‘dangerous’ idea that users of public services ‘cannot be guaranteed an impartial 
service if the public official manifests in the slightest way, his or her religious beliefs’.105 Whilst 
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he noted that States have a wide margin of appreciation in respect of regulations on public 
servants, he contended that this is not limitless, and argued that in this case, there had been a 
violation of Article 9.  
 The ECtHR also paid little attention to the proportionality of the limitation, instead, it 
simply considered whether the authorities had taken an acceptable approach. This, as Brems has 
pointed out is a ‘quasi-procedural’ approach, which limited the examination to the type of 
arguments made by the State rather than looking at their relevance to the issue in question. In his 
partly concurring and partly dissenting opinion, Judge O’Leary argued that the majority had 
‘mixed’ both concrete and abstract approaches to the assessment of proportionality under Article 
9.2 – it was both ‘targeted and functional and vague and broad.’106 On the one hand, it considered 
the applicant’s job role, and the vulnerability of the patients and service users,107 but on the other 
hand, it conducted a more abstract assessment of proportionality based on the ‘abstract nature of 
the principle of neutrality and secularism’.108 The latter, which formed the ‘heart’ of the analysis, 
was problematic because the majority did not find evidence that the applicant had infringed the 
principle of neutrality in public service, by for example pressuring or proselytising others.109 Like 
Judge Tulkens in Leyla Şahin v Turkey, Judge O’Leary emphasised the importance of conducting 
a concrete assessment of proportionality, especially in relation to blanket bans. Referring to SAS v 
France,110 he emphasised that where States rely on ‘flexible notions, principles and ideals to 
justify interferences with the freedom to manifest one’s religion’ (i.e. secularism and neutrality), 
the ECtHR must carefully examine the limitation. This, he argued, was lacking in the majority’s 
assessment.   
 However, again there seems to be an alternative explanation for the ECtHR’s approach. 
Rather than failing to take a methodologically rigorous approach it seems the ECtHR chose not to 
do so. It accepted the argument that upholding the constitutional principle of secularism and 
neutrality in public services was a legitimate basis for limiting manifestation and gave a wide 
margin of appreciation to the State in deciding how to safeguard it. Whilst the ECtHR did not 
ignore the forum internum relevance in this case, it seems to have decided from the outset of the 
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Article 9.2 assessment that it would give more weight to countervailing factors (i.e. that it would 
defer to the State) so the analysis under Article 9 was succinct.  
This approach is further evidenced in respect of the second applicant (Ms Chaplin) in 
Eweida and Others v United Kingdom, a nurse who was prohibited from wearing a cross around 
her neck whilst working on an NHS hospital ward.111 The ECtHR had decided — in respect of 
the first applicant (Ms Eweida) who complained about limitations on the wearing of a cross when 
working for British Airways — that wearing a cross to bear witness to Christian faith was a 
manifestation of religious belief, in accordance with Article 9.112 And, it had emphasised the 
importance of manifestation in its assessment of Ms Eweida’s complaint, explaining the right to 
manifest is a ‘fundamental right’ because it is essential for a democratic society to ‘tolerate and 
sustain pluralism and diversity’ and because of ‘the value to an individual who has made religion 
a central tenet of his or her life to be able to communicate that belief to others.’113 The ECtHR 
also considered that Ms Chaplin’s desire to manifest her religious belief through the wearing of a 
cross at work constituted a manifestation of religion for the purposes of Article 9 and considered 
that the health authorities’ refusal to allow the applicant to remain in her nursing role while 
wearing the cross constituted an interference with her right to manifest her religion.114 That the 
ECtHR took seriously the importance of this manifestation of a deeply held religious belief in 
respect of the second applicant is evident from the ECtHR’s statement that Ms Chaplin’s right to 
wear the cross should, as in the case of Ms Eweida, weigh ‘heavily in the balance’ in the Article 
9.2 assessment.115 However, whilst the ECtHR found a violation of Article 9 in respect of Ms 
Eweida, because the domestic authorities did not sufficiently protect her right to manifest her 
religion, and thus breached its positive obligations,116 the ECtHR did not find a violation of 
Article 9 in respect of Ms Chaplin.  
How can this decision be explained? This thesis stresses that forum internum relevance is 
the most significant factor weighing in favour of the applicant, but it is not the only factor which 
determines the outcome in Article 9 cases. The ECtHR balances forum internum relevance with 
countervailing factors to reach its decision. In considering the facts, in respect of Ms Eweida, the 
ECtHR gave little weight to countervailing factors because evidence regarding encroachment on 
the interests of others was lacking. However, with respect to Ms Chaplin, the ECtHR gave more 
weight to countervailing factors, namely the protection of health and safety on the hospital ward. 
This, it explained, was a factor which ‘was inherently of greater magnitude than that which 
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applied in respect of Ms Eweida’,117 and thus it found the intrusion to be justified in the 
circumstances in respect of Ms Chaplin.118 In terms of the loose concentric circles model, this is a 
good example of a ‘harder’ case (relatively speaking) in the middle circle, because both forum 
internum relevance and countervailing factors were strong.  
 
iii. Public Spaces 
In terms of limitations on manifestation through the wearing of religious clothing in public 
spaces, a controversial and much debated case is SAS v France, in which the applicant 
complained that the French ban on face coverings in public interfered with her right to manifest 
her religion.119 In setting out the general principles, the ECtHR explained that the list of 
exemptions in Article 9.2 is ‘exhaustive and their definition restrictive’ and explained that the 
restriction must pursue an aim therein in order to be deemed legitimate.120 In a detailed 
examination, the ECtHR accepted the government’s argument that the law pursued the aim of 
protecting public safety, however, it pointed out that respect for the minimum set of values of an 
open and democratic society was not an aim expressly included in Article 9.2. Whilst the ECtHR 
did not accept that the ban sought to ensure equality between men and women, nor did it accept 
the argument that it sought to uphold respect for human dignity (because it was not considered 
contemptuous or offensive behaviour) it did accept the argument that ‘living together’ could be 
linked to the legitimate aim of protecting the rights and freedoms of others.121 However, it 
observed that ‘living together’ was a vague concept which was at ‘risk of abuse’, so explained 
that a careful examination of the necessity of the limitation was required.122 
In its assessment of the necessity of the measure, the ECtHR again recognised the 
interrelationship between the forum internum and the forum externum, but explained where 
several religions co-exist, it may be necessary to restrict the right to manifest — in order to 
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reconcile the interests of different groups and ensure everyone’s rights are respected — 
emphasising the State’s role as the neutral and impartial organiser, and its duty to ensure mutual 
tolerance.123 The ECtHR noted that the ban was not motivated by religious clothing but rather the 
fact it concealed the face; the ECtHR gave considerable weight to the government’s argument 
that the face plays an important role in social interaction and that the veil challenges ‘open 
interpersonal relationships’.124 The ECtHR considered that the State was best placed to ensure 
conditions in which individuals can ‘live together in diversity’, and in giving the State a wide 
margin of appreciation, decided that the ban on face coverings was justified under Article 9.2.  
Again, the methodological approach in this case was suspect. Whilst the ECtHR found 
that ‘living together’ could be linked to a legitimate aim under Article 9.2, it did not explain 
precisely how the ban protected the rights and freedoms of others125 and did not seek concrete 
evidence to support the government’s claim that face coverings had a negative effect on 
interpersonal relationships.126 The proportionality analysis was also lacking in that the ECtHR did 
not enquire why a general ban on face coverings in all public spaces, rather than a less intrusive 
or restrictive measure was necessary. Given that forty-five out of forty-seven Member States did 
not ban face coverings in public there was a ‘very strong indicator for a European Consensus’ 
against such measures.127  
However, again the ECtHR’s decision may be explained by recognising that the ECtHR 
placed more weight on countervailing factors in the balance. Whilst the ECtHR did not ignore the 
forum internum – indeed, it stressed the importance of manifestation and the need for strong 
reasons to justify limitations – the ECtHR agreed with the government that in wearing the face 
covering in a public area, individuals challenged an important societal principle (le vivre 
ensemble) and therefore gave greater weight to countervailing interests. This is typical of the 
ECtHR’s approach in other similar cases. In Belcacemi and Oussar v Belgium128 and Dakir v 
Belgium129 which also concerned a ban on face coverings in public, the ECtHR again permitted 
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the State a wide margin of appreciation, holding that the decision whether or not to ban the full 
face veil in public was a ‘choice of society’.130  
 
So far, this section has examined cases in which the ECtHR has largely deferred to the 
analysis of the respondent government. As noted, many commentators have commented on the 
ECtHR’s lack of rigour in these cases. In particular, they argue that the ECtHR permits 
limitations on the forum externum, without considering the potential implications for the forum 
internum. The implication is that if the ECtHR had adopted a more methodologically rigorous 
approach it would have reached more satisfactory outcomes including, potentially, finding 
violations of Article 9 in situations where it currently tends not to do so.  
Whilst this general criticism about the ECtHR’s lack of methodological rigour may be correct 
the implication drawn from it may be overstated. Firstly, the ECtHR takes into account forum 
internum relevance in these cases because it recognises that the forum externum flows from the 
forum internum and is inevitably affected by limitations on the forum externum. In Article 9 
complaints the forum internum is always relevant; it is just that the extent of its relevance 
depends on the ECtHR’s consideration of the facts.  
Secondly, the lack of methodological rigour in these cases need not be understood as a 
‘failure’ on the part of the ECtHR but rather as a conscious choice. In some cases, the ECtHR 
chooses to conduct a detailed and methodologically rigorous examination. This is clearly 
evidenced in cases such as Franklin-Beentjes and CEFLU-Luz da Floresta v Netherlands,131 
Jehovah’s Witnesses of Moscow v Russia132 and Biblical Centre of the Chuvash Republic v Russia 
examined in the previous chapter.133 In other cases, such as those examined so far in this chapter, 
the ECtHR chooses not to conduct a detailed and methodologically rigorous examination in order 
to reach its outcome.  
How can this be explained? The answer lies in recognising the important role of the facts in 
Article 9 cases. The case law examined so far in Part II reveals that forum internum relevance, 
whilst the most significant factor weighing in favour of the applicant, is not the determining 
factor. The ECtHR balances forum internum relevance and countervailing factors to reach its 
decision. Importantly the ECtHR seems to conduct this balancing from the very outset of the 
Article 9 examination, so it heavily influences the approach the ECtHR takes and the outcome it 
reaches from the outset.  
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The analysis of the cases in the above section reveal that where the ECtHR agrees with the 
State that the manifestation in question threatens the essential interests of the State, such as the 
upholding of the principles of secularism and of denominational neutrality, the ECtHR is unlikely 
to dwell on the evidence requirement and/or proportionality analysis and is likely to defer to the 
State. The way in which the ECtHR characterises the facts has an important influence on the 
ECtHR’s approach.  In these cases, it seems the ECtHR knows the outcome it wishes to reach and 
the Article 9.2 assessment is often superficial or perfunctory because it is little more than a means 
of reaching that end. The idea that a more methodical step-by-step approach to the Article 9.2 
assessment in such cases would have led to a different outcome seems, therefore, unlikely.  
 
C. Religious Clothing and Symbols (II) 
There are a number of cases in the jurisprudence concerning limitations on the right to manifest 
religion or belief through the wearing of religious clothing and symbols in which the ECtHR has 
not deferred to the State but rather has offered very strong protection under Article 9. These 
cases, however, are not as well-known as the cases examined above because they tend to be 
conveniently overlooked by commentators seeking to justify their argument that the ECtHR treats 
manifestation as a ‘second order concern’ simply deferring to States whenever they wish to 
restrict the right. This section will examine these lesser known cases in i) public spaces and ii) 
courtrooms, and in doing so, will further highlight the importance of the facts in the consideration 
of Article 9 complaints. 
 
i. Public Spaces 
Take for instance Ahmet Arslan v Turkey which concerned members of the Aczimendi 
community who were convicted for manifesting their religion through the wearing of religious 
clothing outside of their mosque.134 The government argued that it was necessary to limit such 
manifestations in order to uphold secular and democratic principles and to ‘prevent acts of 
provocation, proselytism and propaganda.’135 Whilst the ECtHR, relying on Refah Partisi (The 
Welfare Party) and Others v Turkey136 and Leyla Şahin v Turkey,137 agreed that the restriction 
pursued legitimate aims under Article 9.2 (namely maintenance of public security, protection of 
order and the rights and freedoms of others) it did not find that the need for the restriction had 
been convincingly established by the government. 
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For the ECtHR there were two key differences between this complaint and other 
complaints concerning religious dress. Firstly, the applicants who considered that their religion 
required them to dress in a particular manner were ‘ordinary citizens’ rather than State 
representatives and, therefore, were not under an obligation to refrain from expressing religion or 
belief in public (cf. Dahlab v Switzerland138 and Ebrahimian v France139). Secondly, the 
applicants’ manifestation did not take place in a public establishment but rather in a place which 
was open to all, namely in front of the Kocatepe Mosque as part of a religious ceremony 
organised in this Muslim place of worship.140 As such, the ECtHR explained, case law 
emphasising the role of State in limiting religious clothing in public establishments was not 
applicable to this case. In assessing the necessity of the limitation, the ECtHR found no evidence 
that the applicants had provoked others and engaged in acts of proselytism.141 Consequently, it 
found a violation of Article 9.  
 Whilst the ECtHR sought to distinguish this case from other religious clothing cases in 
which applicants were public servants, or sought to manifest religion in public establishments, it 
could still be argued that the ECtHR’s approach here was inconsistent with cases such as SAS v 
France,142 Belcacemi and Oussar v Belgium143 and Dakir v Belgium,144 in which the applicants, 
who were also ‘ordinary citizens’ complained about bans on the wearing of religious clothing in 
public spaces. However, the ECtHR’s approach does not seem inconsistent if one recognises that 
the ECtHR gave less weight to countervailing interests in this case because it did not consider the 
manifestation to be a provocative challenge to the constitutional principle of secularism; it was 
considered a legitimate manifestation of belief through which the applicants neither threatened 
public order nor placed pressure on the rights of others. Indeed, the ECtHR placed particular 
emphasis on the right to manifest in its reasoning. Notably, it did not employ the standard recital 
with the caveat that ‘in protecting this personal sphere, Article 9 does not always guarantee the 
right to behave in the public sphere in a way which is dictated by such a belief’, suggesting from 
the outset, that it would not limit the right to manifest in this case.  
 Other examples of the ECtHR giving little weight to countervailing factors and offering a 
high degree of protection under Article 9 can be seen in relation to wearing religious clothing or 
symbols in the courtroom, to which this chapter will now turn.    
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Cases concerning the wearing of religious clothing in the courtroom provide further, clear 
challenges to the argument that the ECtHR consistently defers to the State in such manifestation 
cases, showing the ECtHR can, and does, give less weight to countervailing factors when it 
deems appropriate, on the facts.  
Take Hamidovic v Bosnia and Herzegovina,145 for instance, in which a member of the 
Wahhabi/Salafi version of Islam complained under Article 9 and 14 about interference with his 
right to manifest as he had been punished for refusing to remove his skullcap when giving 
evidence in court. According to the domestic courts, the rule relating to the removal of headgear 
on public premises was ‘one of the basic requirements of life in society,’ and in the secular State 
of Bosnia and Herzegovina, manifestations of religion in courtrooms was prohibited.146   
Whilst the ECtHR agreed that the measure was prescribed by law and referring to Leyla 
Şahin v Turkey and Ahmet Arslan and Others v Turkey, explained that it pursued the legitimate 
aim of upholding the principle of secularism,147 it did not consider that the measure was 
necessary. In its examination the ECtHR again distinguished the issue from earlier cases 
concerning religious clothing in the workplace,148 pointing out that as this case concerned a 
witness in a criminal trial, it was a ‘completely different issue.’149 As a private citizen, and not a 
public official, the applicant was not ‘under a duty of discretion, neutrality and impartiality’.150 
The ECtHR placed a heavy emphasis on the importance of individual manifestation, 
noting that in Eweida and Others v United Kingdom the ECtHR had stressed the fundamental 
nature of this right, not only because pluralism and diversity is part of a healthy, democratic 
society, but also because it is important that individuals for whom religion is a ‘central tenet’ of 
their life, can communicate their beliefs to others.151 Further, it observed that whilst, in some 
instances, individual interests must be subordinated to those of the group, ‘democracy does not 
always mean that the views of a majority must always prevail.’152 In this case, the ECtHR did not 
find that the applicant sought to mock the trial, encourage others to reject secular values or 
 
145 Hamidovic v Bosnia and Herzegovina App no 57792/15 (ECtHR, 5 December 2017) 
146 Ibid., paras 8, 9, 10.  
147 The ECtHR reiterated that the ‘aim to uphold secular and democratic values can be linked to the legitimate 
aim of the “protection of the rights and freedoms of others under Article 9.2”’, ibid, referring to Leyla Şahin v 
Turkey ECHR 2005-XI 173, para 99; Ahmet Arslan and Others v Turkey App no 41135/98 (ECtHR, 23 
February 2010), para 43. 
148 E.g. Dahlab v Switzerland ECHR 2001-V 447; Kurtulmuş v Turkey ECHR 2006-II 297; Eweida and Others v 
United Kingdom ECHR 2013-I 215 (extracts). 
149 Hamidovic v Bosnia and Herzegovina App no 57792/15 (ECtHR, 5 December 2017), para 26.  
150 Ibid., para 40. See also Pitkevich v Russia App no 47936/99 (ECtHR, 8 February 2001).   
151 Ibid., para 41. Refers to Eweida and Others v United Kingdom ECHR 2013-I 215 (extracts), para 81.  




disturb proceedings.153 In punishing the applicant for refusing to remove his skullcap the ECtHR 
considered the State had exceeded its wide margin of appreciation and found a violation of 
Article 9.  
 Again, the decision may appear inconsistent with earlier cases which also concerned 
limitations on ordinary citizens who wished to manifest their religion in public institutions, such 
as Leyla Şahin v Turkey.154 However, there seems to be a key difference in terms of the context 
for the ECtHR. The ECtHR considered the wearing of the headscarf in Leyla Şahin v Turkey to be 
a subversive or provocative action, whereas in Hamidovic v Boznia and Herzegovina it did not 
find that the skullcap was worn with intent to ‘make a mockery of the trial, incite others to reject 
secular democratic values or cause a disturbance’.155 In terms of the balance in this case, the 
ECtHR considered that countervailing factors were weak, and thus it offered a higher degree of 
protection under Article 9.  
This is further illustrated, albeit slightly differently, in Lachiri v Belgium in which a 
Muslim woman who was excluded from the courtroom during a criminal trial because she refused 
to remove her headscarf, complained under Article 9.156 The government argued that the measure 
was in accordance with domestic law which stipulates that individuals attending hearings must 
stand uncovered, in respect and silence.157 However, the applicant contended that domestic law 
was used inconsistently because magistrates asked individuals to remove hats, caps and helmets 
in the courtroom but did not ask Catholic nuns to remove veils, Jews to remove Kippahs or Sikhs 
to remove turbans.158 She claimed that in banning her from the courtroom for wearing a headscarf 
the magistrates had equated the wearing of the Islamic headscarf with disrespectful behaviour.159 
Further, she contended that, as an ordinary citizen she was not under an obligation of discretion 
with respect to the public expression of her religion, and courtrooms are public places, open to 
all.  
The Centre for Human Rights of the University of Ghent supported the applicant in their 
third party intervention, pointing out that the domestic law relating to headgear was outdated 
(because it related to a time in which removal of headgear in a house or church was deemed a 
sign of respect and recognition of authority) and there was significant confusion about the 
circumstances in which the provision should be applied. They argued that the purpose of the 
 
153 Ibid., para 41. 
154 Leyla Şahin v Turkey ECHR 2005-XI 173. 
155 Ibid., para 41. 
156 Lachiri v Belgium App no 3413/09 (ECtHR, 18 September 2018) [French]. 
157 Ibid., para 22. 
158 Ibid., para 25.  




provision was to ensure order in the courtroom and in excluding the applicant for simply refusing 
to remove her headscarf, the government violated the applicant’s Article 9 right.  
 In its assessment the ECtHR accepted that the action constituted a manifestation and that 
there had been interference with the right to manifest. Whilst it found that the measure had a basis 
in law and was accessible and predictable the ECtHR did not, given its conclusion about the 
necessity of the interference, consider it necessary to examine whether it was foreseeable.160 The 
ECtHR explained that maintaining the authority of the judiciary was an aim under Article 10.2, 
rather than Article 9.2, but considered that the prevention of disrespectful and disruptive 
behaviour in judicial institutions161 could be linked to the protection of order in Article 9.2. The 
ECtHR pointed out that the facts in this case were similar to Hamidovic v Boznia and 
Herzegovina and Ahmet Arslan v Turkey because the applicant, who wore religious dress in a 
public space, was a ‘mere citizen’, not a state representative exercising a public function. The 
ECtHR did note that the public nature of the Brussel’s Courthouse was different from a public 
square or a street and, as a public institution, it recognised that the principle of neutrality could 
override the right to manifest, however, it did not find that the government pursued an objective 
of neutrality in the public institutions. And, the ECtHR did not find that the applicant had acted in 
a disrespectful way or threatened the conduct of the hearing. Therefore, it considered the 
necessity of the restriction had not been established so it found a violation of Article 9.162  
This case provides a further example of the ECtHR balancing forum internum relevance 
and countervailing factors; in the circumstances it considered that countervailing factors did no 
outweigh forum internum relevance therefore offered a high degree of protection under Article 9. 
This case also provides further, clear evidence that the ECtHR often knows the outcome it is 
going to reach in a case, from the outset, and this affects its approach. In Lachiri v Belgium the 
ECtHR explained that it did not need to address the question of foreseeability because of the 
decision it had reached regarding the necessity of the interference. In a step-by-step approach 
under Article 9.2 the question of foreseeability of a law should be addressed before the question 
of necessity of interference. That the ECtHR skipped the former question because of its decision 
in respect of the latter, indicates that the ECtHR knew the outcome it wanted to reach before it 
conducted the Article 9.2 assessment. Thus, this case again shows that the ECtHR’s approach to 
Article 9 complaints is much more broad brush than previously recognised in the literature.  
 
 
160 Ibid., para 35.  
161 Ibid., para 38. 
162 Recently, the ECtHR found a violation of Article 3 of Protocol 1 (the right to free elections) when an MP 
was forced to leave parliament to take an oath following protests about the Islamic headscarf, see Kervanci v 





This chapter focused on the ECtHR’s approach to complaints concerning State limitations on the 
exercise of manifestation of religion or belief specifically through proselytism activities and the 
wearing of religious clothing or symbols by individuals. In terms of the loose concentric circles 
model, these are cases which one would expect to fall in the contested middle circle because both 
forum internum relevance and countervailing factors may be strong or both forum internum 
relevance and countervailing factors may be weak. 
This chapter argues that in addressing these complaints the ECtHR does not draw a clear 
binary and hierarchical distinction between the forum internum and the forum externum treating 
the latter as a second order concern. Rather, the ECtHR recognises that the forum internum and 
the forum externum are deeply interrelated and as such intuitively understands that limitations on 
the right to manifest religion or belief inevitably affect the forum internum.  
Contrary to claims made in the literature, the ECtHR does not always defer to the State 
and permit limitations on this type of manifestation. It is not the default position that the forum 
externum is overridden. Instead, as one would expect from the way in which Article 9 has been 
presented, the ECtHR offers a range of protection under Article 9 depending on the weight it 
gives to the forum internum and to countervailing factors in these cases.  
It seems that, in some cases concerning limitations on manifestation through the wearing 
of religious clothing, the ECtHR chooses not to take a methodologically rigorous approach and 
scrutinise States’ decisions. Instead, it opts to conduct a superficial or perfunctory examination 
under Article 9.2 because, having taken into consideration the facts, it knows the from the outset 
the decision it will reach (i.e. that it will not find a violation of Article 9). This chapter 
demonstrates that this is a clear trend where the ECtHR considers that the manifestation in 
question threatens the essential interests of the State, such as the upholding of the principles of 
secularism or denominational neutrality. In such cases the ECtHR is unlikely to dwell on the 
evidence requirement and/or proportionality analysis and more likely to defer to the State in 
restricting the manifestation.  
However, this chapter also demonstrates that in cases in which the ECtHR does not 
consider that the manifestation in question threatens essential interests of the State the ECtHR 
sometimes chooses to conduct an in-depth analysis under Article 9 before reaching its outcome, 
or sometimes decides to skip over aspects of the Article 9.2 assessment because it knows from the 
outset the decision it will reach (i.e. that it will find a violation of Article 9).  
 The key point here is that the ECtHR does not deploy a particular approach when 
addressing complaints about interference with the right to manifest through the wearing of 




Therefore, generalisations about the ECtHR’s approach — particularly simplistic claims that the 
ECtHR is biased towards Christians and against Muslims, or towards orthodoxy and against 
orthopraxy — which are extrapolated from a few cases in which the ECtHR has permitted 
limitations on manifestation, are deeply problematic. Such generalisations conveniently ignore 
cases which show the ECtHR offering a high degree of protection in manifestation cases. Indeed, 
it is very difficult to explain these cases away as ‘anomalies’ or as evidence that the ECtHR is 
unable to effectively pursue its agenda against orthopraxic religions, specifically Islam.163 And, 
the jurisprudence as a whole also seriously calls into question the idea that the ECtHR largely 
protects the right to manifest religion in ‘private lives of adherents and unstructured public 
spaces.’164 Recent cases show the ECtHR can, and does, offer a high degree of protection to 
manifestation in the public sphere and in public institutions in particular circumstances.    
A significant corollary of the analysis in this chapter is that it reveals that the ‘lens’ which 
the ECtHR brings to the case is more important in cases concerning manifestation, than the ‘type’ 
of issue in question. In cases concerning limitations on manifestation of religion or belief the 
ECtHR does not seem to work with a category mindset, deploying a predefined approach when 
faced with certain ‘types’ of cases, but rather seems to take a much more nuanced, case by case 
approach. This chapter has revealed that the approach and outcome in some ‘headscarf cases’ is 
actually more akin to that in ‘proselytism cases’ than it is to other ‘headscarf cases’. As such 
categorising cases as ‘proselytism cases’ or ‘headscarf cases’ and looking for consistency of 
approach within each of these types of cases is potentially mistaken.  Taking this further, in the 
context of claims concerning limitation on manifestation, some of the ‘headscarf cases’ are 
similar to cases concerning dissolution of religious communities or refusals to register religious 
communities which were examined in the previous chapter. Whilst commentators have argued, 
therefore, that the ECtHR requires more evidence of justification and less reliance on the margin 
of appreciation in registration cases than in headscarf cases,165 the jurisprudence as a whole does 
not seem to support such simplistic claims.  
The next chapter — which will explore the ECtHR’s approach in cases concerning State 
pressure to act in a way which is contrary to one’s religion or belief or to disclose religion or 
belief through an examination of conscientious objection, refusal to pay tax and objection to 
 
163 Recently, after conducting a highly detailed comparative analysis of cases concerning manifestation through 
the wearing of religious clothing in Turkey and France, Gunn concluded that the ECtHR is biased against Islam, 
see T Jeremy Gunn, “‘Principle of Secularism” and the European Court of Human Rights: A Shell Game’ in 
Jeroen Temperman J, T Jeremy Gunn and Malcolm D Evans, The European Court of Human Rights and 
Freedom of Religion or Belief: The 25 Years Since Kokkinakis (Brill 2019). However, Gunn has conveniently 
ignored cases concerning Muslims in which the ECtHR has found a violation of Article 9. 
164 Julian Rivers, The Law of Organized Religions: Between Establishment and Secularism (OUP 2010) 65.  
165 Carolyn Evans, ‘Individual and Group Religious Freedom in the European Court of Human Rights: Cracks in 




revealing one’s religion or belief in oath taking procedures or official documents — will provide 
further support for the findings in this chapter.  
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CHAPTER 7. FORUM INTERNUM RELEVANCE AND 
COUNTERVAILING FACTORS AT THEIR MOST CONTESTED (II)  
 
Introduction  
This chapter forms the second of two chapters focusing on contested cases, that is the kinds of 
cases in which it seems that the ECtHR might find a violation of Article 9 or might not. Again, in 
terms of the loose concentric circles model, these chapters focus cases in the contested middle 
circle. The balancing exercise in cases in the middle circle is ‘harder’ (relatively speaking) 
because in such cases forum internum relevance and countervailing factors may both be strong, or 
forum internum relevance and countervailing factors may both be weak. As such, a ‘diligent 
empirical and normative analysis’ is required to ascertain whether limitations can be justified.1 
This chapter explores the ECtHR’s approach in cases in which applicants have 
complained about State pressure to act contrary to their religion or belief and State pressure to 
disclose their religion or belief. Again, these issues seem to engage the forum internum to a 
considerable degree so one would expect the ECtHR to give considerable weight to forum 
internum relevance, in the balance, in these cases. However, in light of the presentation of Article 
9, one would not expect it to be the determining factor but rather a factor taken into account by 
the ECtHR in the context of determination.  
The key question for this chapter is whether this is what is seen in practice. Through the 
analysis of the case law this chapter argues that is largely the case. The ECtHR does not take a 
rigid, pre-defined approach to these complaints based on the type of right in question but rather 
offers a range of protection as a result of balancing forum internum relevance and countervailing 
factors. To illustrate this approach, this chapter forms two sections. Section A explores refusals to 
act contrary to one’s religion or belief in the context of conscientious objection to military service 
and payment of church tax and Section B examines objections to disclosing one’s religion or 
belief during oath taking procedures and on official documents.  
 
A. Refusals to Act Contrary to One’s Religion or Belief 
i. Conscientious Objection to Military Service  
One of the most prominent types of conscientious objection in the jurisprudence is conscientious 
objection to military service. Of all these cases, the most well-known is Bayatyan v Armenia in 
 
1 See Heiner Bielefeldt, Nazila Ghanea and Michael Wiener, Freedom of Religion or Belief: An International 




which the applicant argued that imprisonment for refusing to perform military service (when no 
alternative civilian service was available) interfered with Article 9.2 In this case, the Grand 
Chamber reversed the Chamber’s decision, overturning the ECtHR’s long-standing approach 
established in Grandrath v Germany,3 of deferring to Article 4.3.b (the provision relating to 
forced labour) when complaints concerning conscientious objection to military service have been 
brought under Article 9. Given the bulk of case law in which the ECtHR has consistently deferred 
to Article 4.3.b, regardless of the specific circumstances,4 the Grand Chamber’s decision to 
examine the complaint under Article 9 in Bayatyan v Armenia was a turning point and it has set 
the precedent for subsequent cases. In terms of this chapter, Bayatyan v Armenia illustrates the 
Grand Chamber balancing forum internum relevance with countervailing factors and deciding, on 
the basis of the facts, to give less weight to countervailing factors and thus to offer a high degree 
of protection.  
 Like the applicant,5 the Grand Chamber recognised that since Grandrath v Germany there 
had been considerable development in terms of recognising a right to conscientious objection, so 
much so, there was virtually a European consensus.6 It took a ‘living instrument’ approach to the 
 
2 Bayatyan v Armenia App no 23459/03 (ECtHR, 12 December 2006); Bayatyan v Armenia ECHR 2011-IV 1, 
para 108. 
3 Grandrath v Germany (1966) 10 Yearbook 626. 
4 For the Commission the decision whether to grant a right to conscientious objection (and alternative service) is 
the choice of the State and there is no right to exemption under Article 9, see e.g., X v Austria (1972) 40 DR 50-
52; Conscientious Objectors v Denmark (1977) 9 DR 117; Chardonneau v France App no 17559/90 
(Commission Decision, 29 June 1992) [French]; Dimitrov v Bulgaria App no 47829/99 (ECtHR, 23 September 
2004); Stefanov v Bulgaria App no 32438/96 (ECtHR, 3 May 2001). It maintained this position regardless of 
whether conscientious objection was motivated by religion or belief or by a position of thought or conscience, 
see e.g., GZ v Austria App no 5591/72 (Commission Decision, 2 April 1973); A v Switzerland (1984) 38 DR 
222; Heudens v Belgium App no 24630/94 (Commission Decision, 22 May 1995); Peters v Netherlands App no 
22793/9 (Commission Decision, 30 November 1994) Johansen v Norway ECHR 1996-III 979; Ulke v Turkey 
App no 39437/98 (ECtHR, 24 January 2006). It also held that it was the State’s choice when providing a right to 
conscientious objection whether to limit this to objectors motivated by religious beliefs, see N v Sweden App no 
23505/09 (ECtHR, 20 July 2010); Suter v Switzerland (1986) 51 DR 162 [French]; Peters v Netherlands App no 
22793/9 (Commission Decision, 30 November 1994). And when States offered alternative civilian service, the 
Commission explained that it was the State’s decision whether this had the same or a longer duration than the 
military service, see e.g., Julin v Finland App no 17087/90 (Commission Decision, 6 December 1991); Autio v 
Finland App no 17086/90 (Commission Decision, 6 December 1991). The Commission held Article 9 did not 
offer protection to ‘total objectors’ those objecting not only to military service but also to alternative civilian 
service (where offered), e.g. X v Federal Republic of Germany (1977) 9 DR 201; Fadini v Switzerland App no 
17003/90 1826/91 (Commission Decision, 8 January 1993); Hudens v Belgium. And, the Commission held that 
being penalised for refusing to perform military service did not violate Article 9, see e.g. A v Switzerland (1984) 
38 DR 222. For further discussion see, Howard Gilbert, ‘The Slow Development of the Right to Conscientious 
Objection to Military Service under the European Convention on Human Rights’ [2001] European Human 
Rights Law Review 554; Leonard Hammer, ‘Selective Conscientious Objection and International Human 
Rights’ (2002) 36 Israel Law Review 145; José de Sousa e Brito, ‘Conscientious Objection’ in W Cole Durham 
Jr and others (eds) Facilitating Freedom of Religion or Belief: A Deskbook (Martinus Nijhoff 2004).  
5 Bayatyan v Armenia App no 23459/03 (ECtHR, 27 October 2009), paras 51, 63. 
6 Bayatyan v Armenia ECHR 2011-IV 1, para 108. For discussion of the notion of European consensus see, 
Fiona De Londras and Kanstantsin Dzehtsiarou, Great Debates on the European Convention on Human Rights 




ECHR7 — explaining that ‘a failure…to maintain a dynamic and evolutive approach would risk 
rendering it a bar to reform or improvement’ —8 and decided that Article 9 should no longer be 
read in light of Article 4.3.9 It also supported the applicant’s reading of the travaux préparatoires 
concerning the purpose of Article 4.3.b, namely, that it did not recognise or exclude conscientious 
objection, and therefore, should not limit Article 9. 10       
Whilst the Grand Chamber noted that Article 9 does not explicitly mention a right to 
conscientious objection, it set out the principle that where opposition to military service is 
‘motivated by a serious and insurmountable conflict between the obligation to serve in the army 
and a person’s conscience or his deeply held religious or other beliefs,’ this constitutes a 
‘conviction of sufficient cogency, seriousness, cohesion and importance to attract the guarantees 
of Article 9.’11 On the facts, the Grand Chamber considered that the applicant’s objection to 
military service was motivated by his genuinely held religious beliefs, which were ‘in serious and 
insurmountable conflict with his obligation to perform military service’ and as such his ‘failure to 
report for military service’ constituted ‘a manifestation of his religious beliefs.’12  It decided that 
the conviction for draft evasion constituted ‘interference with his freedom to manifest his 
religion’13 and after finding that the interference was not necessary in a democratic society found 
a violation of Article 9.  
In this case the ECtHR clearly recognised the interrelationship between the forum 
internum and the forum externum, i.e. the connection between an individual’s beliefs and their 
refusal to perform military service. Indeed, the approach taken in this case was consistent with 
General Comment 22 in which the HRC observed that whilst ICCPR Article 18 ‘does not 
explicitly refer to a right of conscientious objection’, the HRC understands that this right can ‘be 
 
7 Judge Power criticised the Chamber for failing to take a ‘living instrument’ approach, see Bayatyan v Armenia 
App no 23459/03 (ECtHR, 27 October 2009), Dissenting opinion of Judge Power, para 2. See also Bayatyan v 
Armenia App no 23459/03 (ECtHR, 27 October 2009), Concurring opinion of Judge Fura, ibid., para 2.   
8 Bayatyan v Armenia ECHR 2011-IV 1, para 98. 
9 Ibid., para 109.  
10 Ibid., para 100. 
11 Ibid., para 110. This is similar to the ‘serious conflict’ test of the HRC. For discussion see, Paul Taylor, 
Freedom of Religion: UN and European Human Rights Law and Practice (CUP 2005) 152. 
12 Previously, the Commission noted in the obiter dicta in Thlimmenos v Greece that the applicant’s original 
conviction for refusing to enlist constituted an interference with the applicant’s right to manifest religion or 
belief, but did not consider this further because the issue in question concerned discrimination in respect of a job 
application, see Thlimmenos v Greece App no 34369/97 (Commission Report, 4 December 1998), para 45. 
Judge Power in her dissent to the Chamber’s judgment, and Judge Liddy in her dissent to Tsirlis and 
Kouloumpas v Greece, both argued that conscientious objection was a manifestation of religion or belief, see  
Bayatyan v Armenia App no 23459/03 (ECtHR, 27 October 2009), Dissenting opinion of Judge Power, para 2; 
Tsirlis and Kouloumpas v Greece ECHR 1997-III 909. For discussion see Howard Gilbert, ‘The Slow 
Development of the Right to Conscientious Objection to Military Service under the European Convention on 
Human Rights’ [2001] European Human Rights Law Review 554; Heiner Bielefeldt, Nazila Ghanea and 
Michael Wiener, Freedom of Religion or Belief: An International Law Commentary (OUP 2016) 291ff. 




derived from Article 18 in as much as the obligation to use lethal force may seriously conflict 
with the freedom of conscience and the right to manifest one’s religion or belief.’14 In light of the 
facts in Bayatyan v Armenia, the Grand Chamber characterised it as a case in which there was 
strong forum internum relevance, which was not outweighed by countervailing factors (namely, 
the obligation to perform military service), and therefore, it offered a high degree of protection.  
The ECtHR has followed the Grand Chamber’s approach in subsequent cases concerning 
conscientious objection to military service. Where the ECtHR considers that there is a ‘serious 
and insurmountable conflict’ between the obligation to perform military service and the 
individual’s ‘conscience or his deeply held religious or other beliefs’ and considers that Article 
9.2 limitations are not legitimate, it finds a violation of Article 9.15 However, where it does not 
consider such a conflict exists, or considers limitations legitimate, it does not find a violation of 
Article 9.16 
 The ‘clear and unequivocal reversal of the case law’ in Bayatyan v Armenia certainly 
marks a ‘breakthrough’17 in the jurisprudence with respect to conscientious objection.18 However, 
despite now offering protection under Article 9, the ECtHR’s approach is not, according to 
commentators, problem free. Taylor, for instance, argues that conscientious objection claims are 
prima face about interference with the forum internum and should not be ‘shoe-horned’ into the 
manifestation bracket.19 This, and similar arguments, are founded upon the notion that there is a 
clear binary and hierarchical distinction between the forum internum and the forum externum; in 
other words, the assumption that if the ECtHR characterises a complaint as a manifestation issue 
it ignores the forum internum. This thesis argues, however, that this a potentially mistaken 
assumption. So far, Part II has demonstrated that the ECtHR does not draw a clear binary and 
hierarchical distinction between the forum internum and the forum externum in Article 9 
jurisprudence but rather considers that these two aspects of Article 9 are deeply interrelated. In 
 
14 OHCHR, General Comment No 22: Article 18 (Freedom of Thought, Conscience or Religion) (20 July 1993) 
UN Doc CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.4, para 11. Notably, Judge Power referred to Reports of the COE Committee of 
Ministers and UN in her dissenting opinion, see Bayatyan v Armenia App no 23459/03 (ECtHR, 27 October 
2009), Dissenting Opinion of Judge Power, para 2. 
15 See e.g. Erçep v Turkey App no 43965/04 (ECtHR, 22 November 2011); Bukharatyan v Armenia App no 
37819/03 (ECtHR, 10 January 2012); Feti Demirtaş v Turkey App no 5260/07 (ECtHR, 17 January 2012) 
[French]; Buldu and others v Turkey App no 14017/08 (ECtHR, 3 June 2014) [French]; Papavasilakis v Greece 
App no 66899/14 (ECtHR, 15 September 2016). 
16 The ECtHR found no violation in Iorga and Moldovan v Romania App nos 15350/05 19452/05 (ECtHR, 9 
April 2013) or in Enver Aydemir v Turkey App no 26012/11 (ECtHR, 7 June 2016) [French]. For an analysis, 
see Caroline K Roberts, ‘Conscientious Objection to Military Service in Turkey’ 5 European Human Rights 
Law Review, 567. 
17 Ann Power-Forde, ‘Freedom of Religion and ‘Reasonable Accommodation’ in the Case Law of the European 
Court of Human Rights’ 5:3 Oxford Journal of Law and Religion 575, 602. 
18 Council of Europe/European Court of Human Rights, ‘Overview of the Court’s Case-Law on Freedom of 
Religion’ (30 April 2019) <https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Guide_Art_9_ENG.pdf> accessed April 2019, 
para 4.  




doing so, it intuitively recognises that limitations on the right to manifest religion or belief affect 
the forum internum.  
Even before the ECtHR decided to consider conscientious objection to military service 
under Article 9, it did not simply ignore related forum internum claims. This is clearly seen in the 
Chamber’s approach in the initial Bayatyan v Armenia judgment. Before the Chamber, the 
applicant had argued firstly that his conviction for refusing to serve in the army interfered with 
his right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion, and secondly, that the primary aim of the 
prosecution was ‘to coerce him into abandoning his conscientious objection to military service’ 
and ‘coerce him to join the Armenian Apostolic Church’.20 The ECtHR considered both 
arguments under Article 9. It deemed the first inadmissible (because it deferred to Article 4.3.b) 
and found the second complaint about interference with the absolute right to hold a religion or 
belief unsubstantiated because, it noted, there was nothing in the material submitted to indicate 
that the domestic courts were doing anything other than enforcing domestic legislation.21 Had it 
found the claim about coercion to abandon beliefs substantiated it is likely that it would have 
considered forum internum relevance to be very strong and any countervailing factors to be weak 
in this context and thus offered a very high degree of protection under Article 9.22 
And, in the Grand Chamber’s decision in Bayatyan v Armenia, and the subsequent similar 
cases, the ECtHR has emphasised the interrelationship between the forum internum and the forum 
externum. It is, therefore, highly unlikely that just because it has now characterised conscientious 
objection to military service as a manifestation (i.e. in the forum externum) it will now ignore the 
forum internum in Article 9 complaints. Given its flexibility, it seems the ECtHR could decide to 
characterise a complaint about punishment for refusing to perform military service as an 
interference with the right to manifest a religion or belief and/or the right to hold a religion or 
belief depending on its interpretation of the facts. The important point here is that, for the ECtHR, 
rights are not ‘fixed’ as either forum internum or forum externum rights. Rather, the extent to 
which the forum internum is relevant in any given case depends heavily upon the ECtHR’s 
consideration of the facts.  
Again, therefore, there is the corollary here that the ECtHR’s approach does not simply 
depend upon the ‘type’ of issue in question (i.e. conscientious objection to military service). If the 
ECtHR finds that there has been interference not only with the right to manifest religion or belief 
but also interference with the right to hold a religion or belief in a case concerning conscientious 
 
20 Bayatyan v Armenia App no 23459/03 (ECtHR, 12 December 2006)  
21 Ibid. 
22 It would have been interesting to have seen the ECtHR’s approach to the complaint that imprisonment for 
refusing to perform military service was intended to force the applicants to ‘alter the contents of their conscience 
and religion’ but this application was withdrawn, see Petrou and Konstantinou v Cyprus App nos 24120/94 




objection to military service, the approach and the outcome may be more similar to cases such as 
Ivanova v Bulgaria, which concerned dismissal from employment on the grounds of religion or 
belief,23 than to other conscientious objection cases. This flexibility is further illustrated in cases 
concerning refusals to pay church tax to which this section will now turn.  
 
ii. Refusals to Pay Church Tax 
The ECtHR has addressed numerous cases in which individuals and organisations have 
complained about obligations to pay general taxes.24 In these cases, the ECtHR has generally 
considered that in respect of individuals, the obligation to pay general taxes has ‘no specific 
conscientious implications in itself’25 and they cannot, as Rivers points out, ‘insist on a 
hypothecated tax regime to reflect their religious or ideological convictions’.26 In respect of 
organisations, the ECtHR has pointed out that Churches or other religious organisations are not 
exempt from all taxation,27 and profit making corporations cannot benefit from Article 9 in this 
respect.28  
The ECtHR has also examined numerous cases in which individuals have complained 
about payment of church taxes. This is a more complex area because the ECtHR has to balance 
both the right of religious organisations to ‘solicit and receive voluntary contributions’29 and the 
right of individuals not to be forced to contribute to religious activities of a religious organisation 
of which they are not a member. Again, this section reveals that, in deciding complaints 
concerning the obligation to pay church taxes, the ECtHR balances forum internum relevance and 
countervailing factors to reach its decision.  
 
a. Obligations to Pay Church Tax arising from Employment  
The most well-known case concerning payment of church tax is Darby v Sweden in which a 
Finnish citizen, who worked in Sweden, complained under inter alia Article 9 that he had been 
enrolled as a member of the Church of Sweden (Lutheran Church) against his will and had been 
 
23 Ivanova v Bulgaria App no 52435/99 (ECtHR, 12 April 2007). 
24 See e.g., C v The United Kingdom (1983) 37 DR 142; HB v The United Kingdom App no 11991/86 
(Commission Decision, 18 July 1986); Iglesia Bautista El Salvador and Ortega Moratilla v Spain App no 
17522/90 (Commission Decision, 11 January 1992); Bouessel du Bourg v France App no 20747/92 
(Commission Decision, 18 February 1993); Kustannus Oy Vapaa Ajattelija AB and Others V Finland (1996) 85-
A DR 29; L’Assocation ‘Sivananda de Yoga Vedanta’ v France App no 30260/96 (Commission Decision, 16 
April 1998) [French]. 
25 Skugar and Others v Russia App no 40010/04 (ECtHR, 3 December 2009).  
26 Julian Rivers, The Law of Organized Religions: Between Establishment and Secularism (OUP 2010) 62. 
27 Iglesia Bautista El Salvador and Ortega Moratilla v Spain App no 17522/90 (Commission Decision, 11 
January 1992); L’Assocation ‘Sivananda de Yoga Vedanta’ v France App no 30260/96 (Commission Decision, 
16 April 1998) [French]. 
28 Kustannus Oy Vapaa Ajattelija AB and Others V Finland (1996) 85-A DR 29.  




forced to pay church tax.30 The only way to avoid paying the tax, he claimed, would be to become 
a resident of Sweden and apply for exemption under the Dissenter Tax Act. The government 
disputed that the applicant had been registered as a member of the Church of Sweden. It also 
argued that Article 9 does not include a right to exemption from payment of taxes and, even if the 
Commission considered it did, it would be ‘too far-fetched’ to argue that it did in this case 
because the applicant voluntarily subjected himself to domestic law by working in Sweden.31 
Whilst the Commission agreed with the government that the applicant had not been 
registered as a member of the Church of Sweden (so deemed that complaint manifestly ill-
founded) it found the applicant had been refused a reduction in the tax under the Dissenter Tax 
Act, and as such, considered whether the obligation on the applicant to pay church tax, contrary 
to his wishes, was compatible with Article 9.   
In setting out the general principles, the ECtHR explained that Article 9 ‘can be divided 
into two parts:’32 the first ‘limb’ protects the ‘general right to freedom of religion’ whereas the 
second limb protects ‘a more specific right to change and manifest one’s religion,’33 but, these 
limbs are not exclusive. It explained that given Article 9.2 ‘only permits limitations on the 
freedom to manifest one’s religion’, States are ‘obliged to respect everyone’s general right to 
freedom of religion and that right may not be restricted’.34 It also reiterated that a State Church 
system does not, in itself, violate Article 9, however, it stressed that ‘no one may be forced to 
enter, or be prohibited from leaving, a State Church.’35 Providing domestic law permits 
individuals to leave a church (and thereby avoid paying church tax) freedom of religion is 
safeguarded.36  
 In its assessment, the Commission noted that as the applicant was not a member of the 
Swedish State church, he could not leave the church in order to avoid the obligation to pay tax.37 
And, in the circumstances, the legal obligation to pay the church tax could ‘not be characterised 
as a “manifestation of his religion”.’38 Instead, it considered that the complaint engaged the 
‘general right to freedom of religion,’ explaining that ‘this right protects everyone from being 
compelled to be involved directly in religious activities against his will without being a member 
 
30 Darby v Sweden (1988) 56-B DR 173; Darby v Sweden App no11581/85 (1989) Report 31; Darby v Sweden 
(1990) Series A no 187. 
31 Ibid. 
32 Darby v Sweden App no 11581/85 (1989) Report 31, para 44. 
33 Ibid., para 44. See also Thlimmeenos v Greece Report 1998 para 40.  
34 Darby v Sweden App no 11581/85 (1989) Report 31, para 44.  
35 Ibid., para 46.  
36 This is consistent with the earlier decisions in E and GR v Austria (1984) 37 DR 42 and Gottesmann v 
Switzerland (1984) 40 DR 287. 
37 Carolyn Evans, Freedom of Religion under the European Convention on Human Rights (OUP 2001) 296. 




of the religious community carrying out those activities.’39 For the Commission, the obligation to 
pay church tax was viewed as such involvement.40 It emphasised that States are required to 
respect religious convictions of individuals who do not belong to a Church, by, for example, 
allowing them to be exempted from contributing to its religious activities.41 It decided that the 
government’s claim that the Dissenter Tax Act did not apply to the applicant because he was not 
resident in Sweden, was not sufficient justification for departing from the positive obligation to 
protect the applicant’s freedom of religion, and as a result, the Commission found a violation of 
Article 9. 
In this case the Commission considered that forum internum relevance was strong and 
that countervailing factors were weak. However, it did not explain precisely why it considered 
that the applicant was ‘compelled’ to be ‘directly involved’ in religious activities, and thus, why 
forum internum relevance was so strong here. Indeed, on the facts, it is debatable whether the 
applicant was ‘directly involved’ in religious activities. The jurisprudence reveals that payment of 
church tax is not necessarily considered a religious act. Elsewhere the Commission has referred to 
it as an ‘obligation’ stemming from Church membership, in a similar way that financial 
obligations arise as a result of membership of private associations.42  
Secondly, it is debatable whether the applicant was ‘compelled’ to pay church tax. To be 
compelled is to be ‘forced to do something’ or to be ‘under constraint’.43 Whilst the applicant was 
under a legal obligation to pay church tax, he was only under the obligation because he chose to 
work in Sweden. Judge Martinez argued, in his dissenting opinion, that there was no violation of 
Article 9 because it was simply a financial matter. The applicant was obliged to pay taxes which 
corresponded with his income in accordance with the Swedish law, where he worked of his own 
volition.44   
Given the wider jurisprudence, it is striking that the majority specifically rejected this 
argument. There are numerous instances in Article 9 case law where the ECtHR has argued that 
because applicants have ‘voluntarily’ submitted themselves to a system of norms (a ‘specific 
situation’)45 in university, employment or the army, which limits their right to manifest, they 
cannot claim a violation of Article 9.46 This was illustrated in the discussion of Yanasik v Turkey 
and Kalaç v Turkey in Chapter Four of this thesis, in which the ECtHR took into account the 
 
39 Ibid., para 51.  
40 Ibid. See Bruno v Sweden App no 32196/96 (ECtHR, 28 August 2001); Lundberg v Sweden App no 36846/97 
(ECtHR, 28 August 2001).  
41 Darby v Sweden App no11581/85 (1989) Report 31, para 58 (my emphasis). 
42 E and GR v Austria (1984) 37 DR 42. 
43 ‘compel’ in Oxford English Dictionary (7th edn, OUP 2015).   
44 Darby v Sweden App no 11581/85 (1989) Report 31, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Martinez. 
45 For a discussion of this notion see Russell Sandberg, Law and Religion (CUP 2011) 84-86. 




applicants’ specific situation (their military career) into account when considering the legitimacy 
of limitations.47 The ECtHR has also frequently advanced the right to resign argument in cases in 
which applicants have complained that their duties as a result of their employment conflict with 
their religion or belief. The ECtHR has repeatedly explained that the right to freedom of thought, 
conscience and religion is protected by the right to resign.48  
It seems the Commission, could, therefore have taken a very different approach and 
reached a very different outcome in this case. Indeed, the fact that the complaint in Darby v 
Sweden need not necessarily have be construed as an interference with the right to freedom of 
thought, conscience or religion is evidenced by the ECtHR judgment, in which the complaint was 
characterised as an issue concerning the peaceful enjoyment of possessions under Article 1 of 
Protocol 1 and discrimination under Article 14.49 
 How can the Commission’s approach in Darby v Sweden be explained? It seems that this 
case again reveals the significance of the ‘lens’ adopted by the ECtHR. The Commission thought 
there was strong forum internum relevance in this case because it decided that what was at stake 
was ‘respect’ for the religious convictions of those who did not belong to the State church, in 
other words, their right to hold (or not hold) a religion or belief.50 The Commission stressed that 
States are required to respect the religious convictions of those who do not belong to the State 
church by permitting exemptions from obligations to contribute to religious activities (i.e. 
through a Dissenter Tax) and found that in refusing to offer the applicant exemption it had ‘failed 
to respect the applicants right to freedom of religion’.51 In considering countervailing factors, the 
Commission gave very little weight to the government’s claim that the Dissenter Tax Act did not 
apply to the applicant because he was not a resident in Sweden, and thus, decided that there had 
been a violation of Article 9. However, by looking at the case through a different ‘lens’ (as an 
issue about the peaceful enjoyment of possessions and of discrimination) the Court did not find it 
necessary to consider Article 9 at all.  
 
47 Yanasik v Turkey (1993) 74 DR 22; Kalaç v Turkey ECHR 1997-IV 1199. 
48 See X v The United Kingdom (1981) 22 DR 27; Konttinen v Finland App no 24949/94 (Commission Decision, 
3 December 1996); Stedman v The United Kingdom (1997) 89-A DR 104. It is only recently, in Eweida and 
Others v United Kingdom that the ECtHR observed that rather than holding that freedom of religion is protected 
by the right to resign, it would be better to ‘weigh that possibility in the overall balance when considering 
whether or not the restriction was proportionate’, see Eweida and Others v United Kingdom ECHR 2013-I 215 
(extracts), para 83. 
49 Darby v Sweden (1990) Series A no 187. A similar approach was taken to an applicant’s complaint about being 
forced to tolerate hunting on his land. The Chamber thought that Article 9 was engaged but the Grand Chamber 
characterised it as a property rights issue and having found a violation of Article 1 Protocol 1, did not examine 
Article 9, see Herrmann v Germany App no 9300/07 (ECtHR, 20 January 2011); Herrmann v Germany App no 
9300/07 (ECtHR, 26 June 2012). 
50 Malcolm D Evans, Religious Liberty and International Law in Europe (CUP 1997) 296 and Paul Taylor, 
Freedom of Religion (CUP 2005) 160. 




b. Obligations to Pay Church Tax arising from a Joint Tax Assessments   
The importance of the facts in cases concerning objections to pay church tax is further evidenced 
in Klein v Germany.52 In this case, the Court, like the Commission in Darby v Sweden did 
examine the complaint under Article 9, but in balancing forum internum relevance and 
countervailing factors, it reached a different decision.  
In Klein v Germany the applicant complained under inter alia Article 9 that he had been 
‘compelled to pay the special church fee levied on his wife without being a member of that 
church’53 because it had been offset against his tax reimbursement claim in their joint tax bill.54 In 
its assessment the ECtHR explained, citing the earlier case of Bruno v Sweden,55 that it would 
examine the complaint from the perspective of the ‘negative aspect’ of freedom of religion and 
conscience, namely the ‘right of an individual not to be compelled to be involved in religious 
activities against his will without being a member of the religious organisation in question’.56 
Whilst the Court shared the government’s view that it was the applicant’s wife on which the 
church fee was levied, and not the applicant himself, it reiterated that Article 9 is important ‘for 
non-believers or for those not belonging to any institutionalised religious group’ and explained 
that in cases where States oblige individuals to contribute to a religious organisation, whether 
directly or indirectly, when they are not a member of the organisation in question, there will be an 
interference with Article 9.57 The ECtHR found that due to the joint tax assessment the German 
legislation caused a situation in which the applicant was also under his wife’s financial 
obligations to her church when he was not a member.58  
This finding was almost identical to that in the Commission Report in Darby v Sweden.59 
However, rather than following the Commission’s approach in Darby v Sweden by finding a 
violation of Article 9 at this point, the ECtHR considered the legitimacy of the interference under 
Article 9.2. It decided that the interference was prescribed by law and pursued the legitimate aim 
of ensuring the rights of churches and religious communities to levy church taxes. And, after a 
lengthy consideration of the administrative process for joint tax assessments and offsetting, 
decided that in light of the wide margin of appreciation left to States in this area, the reasons 
provided for the interference with the applicant’s rights were sufficient so found no violation of 
Article 9. Notably, the ECtHR pointed out that the applicant and his wife had decided to make a 
 
52 Klein v Germany App no 10138/11 (ECtHR, 6 April 2017).  
53 Ibid., para 76. 
54 Ibid., para 69. 
55 Bruno v Sweden App no 32196/96 (ECtHR, 28 August 2001); Lundberg v Sweden App no 36846/97 (ECtHR, 
28 August 2001).  
56 Klein v Germany App no 10138/11 (ECtHR, 6 April 2017), para 76. 
57 Ibid., para 81. 
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joint tax declaration which meant that their claims were processed jointly. The applicant could 
have undone the offsetting, and received a refund, by applying for a settlement notice which 
would not have caused any financial burden or been time consuming.   
If one expects consistency of approach and outcome across the category of ‘church tax 
cases’ then, on the basis of the facts of the case, and the finding made by the ECtHR (that the 
applicant was subjected to financial obligations towards a church of which he was not a member), 
one might have expected the ECtHR to have reached the same decision as the Commission in 
Darby v Sweden, i.e. to have found a violation of Article 9. The fact that it did not may look 
inconsistent from this angle. Moreover, if one approaches these church tax cases from the 
perspective that there is binary and hierarchical distinction between the forum internum and 
forum externum in Article 9 then the approach and outcome in the Commission Report in Darby v 
Sweden and approach and outcome in Klein v Germany may not only appear inconsistent but also 
erroneous because it might look like the ECtHR subjected an absolute right to limitations suitable 
only for qualified rights. In Darby v Sweden, Bruno v Sweden and Lundberg v Sweden the 
Commission and Court observed that the obligation to pay church tax to a church of which one is 
not a member, could not be characterised as a manifestation of religion or belief.60 However, it 
may appear that the ECtHR treated the right as a manifestation in Klein v Germany because it 
considered the legitimacy of the interference with the right under Article 9.2. 
However, there are a number of serious problems with such criticisms. Firstly, as has 
already been argued, it is deeply unhelpful to view the case law in terms of categories, for 
instances, in terms of ‘headscarf cases’, ‘conscientious objection cases’ or in this instance, as 
‘church tax cases’. The previous chapter, and the previous section of this chapter, explained that a 
close analysis of the case reveals that it is not the type of complaint in question that is key to the 
ECtHR’s approach and outcome in a case. The ECtHR is concerned with the particular facts of 
the case in question. In its assessment, the ECtHR balances factors pointing towards a violation of 
Article 9 (primarily, but not only, forum internum relevance) with countervailing factors, in order 
to reach its decision. The different decisions in Darby v Sweden and Klein v Germany can be 
explained by looking at countervailing factors. In Darby v Sweden the Commission considered 
that countervailing factors (including the government’s argument that the Dissenter Tax Act did 
not apply to the applicant) were weak, so found a violation of Article 9. However, in Klein v 
Germany, it considered countervailing factors (including the fact that the applicant could simply 
have applied for a settlement notice) were very strong, so found no violation of Article 9. 
 
60 Ibid.; Bruno v Sweden App no 32196/96 (ECtHR, 28 August 2001); Lundberg v Sweden App no 36846/97 




Secondly, the notion that the ECtHR’s approach in Klein v Germany was erroneous 
because it subjected an absolute right to limitations under Article 9.2 is also hugely problematic. 
The overarching argument of this thesis is that there is no clear binary and hierarchical distinction 
between the forum internum and the forum externum in Article 9; rather, it has repeatedly stressed 
that the evidence from the ECHR, the travaux préparatoires and the case law supports the 
argument that these elements are deeply interrelated and should be understood in terms of a 
continuum. If the ECtHR had explicitly stated that the right not to be compelled to directly 
participate in religion or belief related activities of which one is not a member was an absolute 
right, which could not be limited in any circumstances, and then considered the legitimacy of any 
interference under Article 9.2, one could potentially have argued that there was an internal 
inconsistency in this case.  
However, the ECtHR did not do this. In Klein v Germany it simply presented the right not 
to be compelled to be directly involved in religious activities of an organisation of which one is 
not a member as a ‘negative right’ without indicating the level of protection to be offered. So, 
rather than arguing that the ECtHR in Klein v Germany made a mistake — that it confused the 
forum internum and forum externum aspects of Article 9 — it is more sensible to see the ECtHR’s 
approach as a reflection of its flexibility in the protection of Article 9. Rights are not ‘fixed’ at 
certain points but can move along the continuum of forum internum relevance depending on the 
facts of the case. And depending on the weight the ECtHR gives to countervailing factors in the 
balance, the ECtHR can and does reach different decisions on different facts. The point here is 
that just because a right has been protected in a particular way, in a particular case, does not mean 
it always has to be protected in the same way in later cases.61 This flexibility on the part of the 
ECtHR is illustrated further cases concerning the disclosure of religion or belief which will be 
explored in the next section.  
 
B. Objections to Disclosing One’s Religion or Belief  
i. Disclosure During Oath Taking  
a. Oaths of Office 
Before practising as a lawyer in Greece it is necessary to take an oath on the Christian Gospels or 
make a solemn declaration before a competent court.62 In Alexandridis v Greece, which 
concerned a newly qualified lawyer, the applicant complained to the ECtHR that whilst he chose 
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to affirm, in order to do so, he was forced to reveal that he was not an Orthodox Christian and this 
violated Articles 8, 9 and 14.63 The ECtHR decided to address this complaint under Article 9 
alone.64 In setting out the general principles the ECtHR reiterated the standard recital (that Article 
9 primarily protects the forum internum but also protects manifestation) and recalled that in 
previous case law, including Buscarini v San Marino,65 the ECtHR had invoked ‘negative rights’ 
under Article 9, including the ‘freedom not to join a religion and the right not to practice’.66 In 
Alexandridis v Greece, the ECtHR explained that it considered the right to manifest one’s religion 
or belief ‘has a negative aspect, namely the right of the individual not to be compelled to state his 
faith or his religious beliefs and not to be forced to engage in conduct in which it could be 
inferred that he has — or does not have — such beliefs.’67 
 In considering the facts, the ECtHR found that there was a ‘presumption’ that a lawyer 
who appears before the tribunal is an Orthodox Christian, and therefore wishes to take the 
religious oath of office. This presumption meant that the applicant was forced to partly reveal his 
religious beliefs (i.e. that he was not an Orthodox Christian) when he asked to make a solemn 
declaration.68 Further, the ECtHR observed that to ‘be allowed to make a solemn declaration 
individuals are forced to declare that they are atheists or that their religion forbids the taking of an 
oath.’69 The ECtHR explained the scope of the negative aspect of the right to manifest, stressing 
that it is not open to State authorities to interfere in the freedom of conscience of a person by 
enquiring into their religious beliefs or by obliging them to manifest them, especially in relation 
to the taking of an oath to exercise certain functions. The ECtHR concluded that the ‘obligation 
imposed on the applicant to disclose before the competent court that he was not an Orthodox 
Christian and that he wished to make a solemn declaration rather than take a religious oath 
infringed his right not to be compelled to express his religious beliefs’70 and, in a unanimous 
decision, found a violation of Article 9.  
In this case the ECtHR gave great weight to the applicant’s forum internum and very little 
weight to countervailing considerations. Interestingly, again, the ECtHR did not explain precisely 
why forcing individuals to reveal their religion or belief in part or in full constituted an 
 
63 Ibid., para 21. 
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interference with the forum internum. Perhaps this was simply considered unnecessary given the 
principle that States are prohibited from interfering in the freedom of conscience of a person by 
enquiring into their religious beliefs or by obliging them to manifest them, especially in relation 
to the taking of an oath to exercise certain functions. Having characterised the issue in such a 
way, and in taking the facts into account, the ECtHR offered a very high degree of protection 
under Article 9, from the outset, in this case.  
However, that the ECtHR can take a different approach when the facts are different is 
illustrated in cases concerning oath taking procedures for witnesses in court. 
 
b. Oaths Taken by Witnesses in Court   
In Dimitras and Others v Greece71 in which the applicants, who were legal representatives for the 
Helsinki International Federation (a human rights non-governmental organisation (NGO)), made 
complaints about the oath taking procedure for witnesses in Greek courts, the ECtHR gave 
greater weight to countervailing factors than it did in Alexandridis v Greece, but nonetheless, 
decided that countervailing factors did not outweigh forum internum relevance on balance. The 
applicants complained that the assumption in Greek courts that witnesses are Orthodox Christians 
meant they had to disclose that they were not Orthodox Christians, and often had to reveal that 
they were atheists or Jews, in order to make a solemn declaration when swearing in.72  Despite 
this, however, the applicants found that court minutes often described them as Orthodox 
Christians and recorded that they had taken an oath by placing their hands on the Gospel.73 In 
order to have the minutes corrected they had to again ‘exteriorise’ their beliefs.74 Before the 
ECtHR the applicants argued that this violated Article 9 (and also Articles 8 and 14),75 and 
claimed they had no recourse to an effective remedy under Article 13.   
 After examining the Article 13 complaint and finding a violation, the ECtHR examined 
the Article 9 complaint regarding the obligation upon the applicant to disclose his religion or 
belief during oath taking procedures in court.76 In setting out the principles the ECtHR explained 
that it had previously invoked ‘negative rights’ under Article 9, including the right not to join or 
practice a religion77 and relying on Alexandridis v Greece explained that the right to manifest 
one’s religion or belief has a ‘negative aspect, namely the right of the individual not to be 
compelled to state his faith or his religious beliefs and not to be forced to engage in conduct in 
 
71 Dimitras and Others v Greece App no 42837/06 and 4 others (ECtHR, 3 June 2010) [French].  
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which it could be inferred that he has – or does not have – such beliefs.’78 In addition, the ECtHR 
again emphasised that States are prohibited from interfering in the freedom of conscience of a 
person by enquiring into their religious beliefs or obliging them to manifest them and noted that 
this is all the more true when a person is obliged to do so in order to perform certain functions, in 
particular, in connection with oath taking.79  
 In its assessment of the facts the ECtHR found that there was a presumption that the 
applicants were Orthodox Christians and they not only had to reveal whether or not they were 
Orthodox Christians but also that they were atheists or Jews in order to be allowed to affirm and 
for the standard text to be corrected in the minutes.80 Consequently, the ECtHR found 
interference with the applicant’s ‘freedom of religion’ under Article 9.81 
In considering the legitimacy of the interference, the ECtHR found that the interference 
was prescribed by law and pursued a legitimate aim under Article 9.2, namely the protection of 
public order and guaranteeing the administration of justice. However, in its consideration of the 
proportionality of the measure, the ECtHR decided that State legislation and the way it was 
applied by the domestic courts was inconsistent with the right to freedom of religion under 
Article 9. It emphasised that domestic law created a presumption that witnesses were Orthodox 
Christians82 and did not allow individuals to avoid the obligation to take the religious oath by 
opting to make a solemn declaration.83 Instead, domestic law implied that detailed information 
about religious convictions should be provided (namely that individuals must explain that they 
adhere to another recognised religion, that their religion does not allow oath taking, or that they 
do not believe in a religion)84 and did not allow individuals who were Orthodox Christians to 
avoid taking the oath if it contradicted their convictions. Further, the ECtHR found that domestic 
law obliged witnesses to confirm their identity including inter alia, their religion before hearings. 
Consequently, the ECtHR concluded that the interference was not justified in principle or 
proportionate to the objective pursued and unanimously found a violation of Article 9.  
So, whilst the ECtHR gave greater weight to countervailing factors in Dimitras and 
Others v Greece than it did in Alexandridis v Greece, on balance, it did not consider that forum 
internum relevance was outweighed by countervailing factors. This is further evidenced in a raft 
of later cases dealing with very similar complaints brought by Dimitras and other individuals in 
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Dimitras and Others v Greece in 2011,85 Dimitras and Others v Greece in 2012,86 Dimitras and 
Gilbert v Greece in 2013,87 and Dimitras v Greece in 2018.88 
Again, it is likely that for those who work with a binary and hierarchical forum internum 
and forum externum framework the approach in Alexandridis v Greece and the approach in the 
Dimitras and Others v Greece may seem inconsistent because the ECtHR did not consider 
limitations under Article 9.2 in Alexandridis v Greece but did do so, in respect of the same right, 
in Dimitras and Others v Greece. Thus, it might appear that in the latter case the ECtHR 
inappropriately subjected a right, previously treated as an absolute right, to Article 9.2 limitations.  
However, it seems that this is a misunderstanding of the ECtHR’s approach. For the 
ECtHR rights are not ‘fixed’ at certain points on the continuum of forum internum relevance; 
rights can move along the continuum depending on the specific facts of the case in question. That 
the ECtHR took a different approach in Alexandridis v Greece and in Dimitras and Others v 
Greece is not evidence that the ECtHR is unable to consistently apply a bright line distinction 
between the forum internum and forum externum or between absolute and qualified rights, but 
rather evidence that such a clear distinction does not exist for the ECtHR. The ECtHR adopts a 
much more nuanced approach to the protection of Article 9, balancing forum internum relevance 
and countervailing factors in order to reach its decision. Whilst the complaints in Alexandridis v 
Greece and Dimitras and Others v Greece may look similar, they were quite different, and the 
different facts led the ECtHR to take a different approach. 
In Dimitras and Others v Greece,89 the complaint was brought by members of the Greek 
Helsinki Monitor an organisation in Greece which campaigns on human rights, minority rights 
and anti-discrimination issues (and which represented the applicant in Alexandridids v Greece). 
Mr Dimitras, the lead applicant in the Dimitras cases in 2010, 2011 and 2013, 2017 and 2018 was 
the founder and president of the Greek Helsinki Monitor,90 and the other applicants in these cases 
(Valliantos, Papanikolatou, Gilbert and Alexandridis) were employees of the organisation. The 
complaint about being forced to disclose religion or belief in order to make a solemn declaration 
in court was brought along with a complaint about impartiality in the judiciary. The applicants in 
Dimitras and Others v Greece complained under Article 6 that ‘the presence of religious symbols 
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in the courtroom and the fact that Greek judges are Orthodox Christians contribute to raising 
doubts as to their objective, even subjective, impartiality.’91 The ECtHR rejected this complaint 
as manifestly ill-founded92 because the applicants did not demonstrate that they were directly 
affected (i.e. that they were victims), explaining that the system of individual petition in Article 
34 ‘excludes applications lodged by way of actio popularis.’93  
This complaint may have affected the way in which the ECtHR approached the Article 9 
complaint. i.e. that it saw the complaint in a different light to that in Alexandridis v Greece, as a 
piece of strategic litigation which sought to expose and eliminate discriminatory structures, 
namely the oath taking system in Greece. As such, it gave greater weight to the countervailing 
factors (the interests of the State) in the assessment and framed the complaint as one concerning 
limitations on manifestation so that balancing could take place explicitly under Article 9.2. But as 
mentioned above, even though the ECtHR appeared to give more weight to countervailing factors 
in Dimitras and Others v Greece than it did in Alexandridis v Greece, the ECtHR also found a 
violation of Article 9 in Dimitras and Others v Greece.  
This pattern of balancing forum internum relevance and countervailing factors is further 
demonstrated in cases concerning the disclosure of religion or belief through official documents.  
 
ii. Disclosure Through Official Documents  
A number of applicants have complained that there has been interference with the right to 
freedom of thought, conscience and religion as a result of disclosure of religion or belief through 
official documents, including school reports, identity documents and wage tax cards. Whilst the 
complaints are ostensibly similar the ECtHR does not always give the same weight to 
countervailing factors and thus, does not reach the same outcome in each of these cases.  
 
a. School Reports 
A useful case to illustrate the ECtHR’s approach in this area is Grzelak v Poland in which the 
third applicant complained inter alia under Articles 9 and 14 that the lack of a mark for 
‘religion/ethics’ on his school reports throughout his time at school, because he opted out of 
religious education (and ethics classes were not provided) meant that he was compelled to reveal 
his convictions (or lack thereof) each time he presented his reports.94 
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92 Ibid., para 56.  
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 The ECtHR reiterated the general principles set out in Alexandridis v Greece — relating 
to disclosure of religion or belief — verbatim.95 In addition, the ECtHR recalled that Article 9 is a 
precious asset for non-believers, explaining that when a State creates a situation in which 
individuals are obliged to reveal that they are non-believers, whether directly or indirectly, it will 
find an interference with the negative aspect of Article 9.96 This, the ECtHR added, is especially 
so when an individual is obliged to reveal such information in the context of education.97 In 
considering the facts, the ECtHR observed that the missing mark for ‘religion/ethics’ on the 
applicant’s school reports (because he had opted out of religious education and no ethics classes 
were provided98) fell within the scope of the negative aspect of Article 9 because it would 
probably be understood from this that he did not hold religious beliefs.99 This case differed from 
Saniewski v Poland,100 the ECtHR explained, because in that case there were marks missing for 
other subjects too so one could not conclude whether the applicant had decided not to take 
religious education classes or whether classes were just not organised in that year.  
Furthermore, in Grzelak v Poland the ECtHR noted that marks for religion/ethics classes 
were taken into account in calculating the pupil’s average score for the year, so opting out of 
religious education classes when no ethics classes were available could have put the pupil at a 
disadvantage and thus, he may have felt pressured to take the religious education classes.  
In its consideration of the facts, the ECtHR explicitly referred to the immediate context 
(education) and the broader facts of the case (including the religious demographic in Poland). It 
explained that it was ‘mindful of the politically sensitive nature of the issues at hand,’101 noting 
that in countries like Poland where there is a dominant religion, the lack of a mark on school 
reports distinguished the applicant from the majority of the population.102 The ECtHR concluded 
that the margin of appreciation offered to the State (in respect of the provision of religious 
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education in school) had been exceeded and found a violation of Article 14 in conjunction with 
Article 9 because of the ‘unwarranted stigmatisation’ and the infringement of the right not to 
manifest religion or belief.103 
Again, in this case the ECtHR did not explain precisely how the State’s actions 
constituted an interference with, and violation of, Article 9. It did not seek concrete evidence that 
the lack of a mark on his school report for religious education ‘stigmatised’ the applicant but 
rather the ECtHR seems to have acted on pre-emptive concerns, suggesting that the report would 
be understood that he did not take part in religious education classes, and that he would be 
‘regarded as a person without religious beliefs’ (with the implication that he would be subject to 
discrimination). Indeed, the majority’s approach was criticised by Judge Björgvinsson who 
argued that they went too far in finding a violation of Article 9 because ‘the applicant had not 
been subjected to any kind of indoctrination or pressure by the authorities’ regarding religion or 
belief, neither did he show that he had, or would, suffer ‘detriment which would amount to an 
interference’.104  
Again, however, it is likely that the ECtHR did not consider it necessary to explain why 
the State action in this case interfered with Article 9 given that it had set out the principle that 
where States create situations in which individuals are forced to reveal they are non-believers 
(especially in the educational context) it will find an interference with Article 9. Having 
characterised the issue in such a way, the ECtHR offered a very high degree of protection under 
Article 9 from the outset, in this case. 
   
b. Identity documents  
The ECtHR also considered that forum internum relevance outweighed countervailing factors in 
Sinan Işik v Turkey in which the applicant complained firstly, that the Turkish government had 
refused his request to alter his religious affiliation from ‘Muslim’ to ‘Alevi’ on his identity card, 
and secondly, that it obliged him to disclose his religion, contrary to Article 9, because it was 
mandatory to include such information on identity cards.105 In its assessment, the ECtHR was not 
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para 8-9. Judge Björgvinsson’s approach was similar to that of the majority in Sanieweski v Poland which found 
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persuaded by the government’s claim that this did not constitute a measure compelling citizens of 
Turkey to disclose their religion or belief.106 On the contrary, the ECtHR explained that what was 
at stake in the case was ‘the right not to disclose one’s religion or beliefs, which falls within the 
forum internum of each individual.’107 As explained in Chapter Three of this thesis, this is the 
only case in which the ECtHR has explicitly stated that an issue falls into the forum internum, and 
it is curious that it does so here because this is clearly not a ‘classic’ forum internum situation. In 
this case, the ECtHR emphasised that the right is ‘inherent’ in the right to freedom of thought, 
conscience and religion, and to ‘construe Article 9 as permitting every kind of compulsion with a 
view to the disclosure of religion or belief would strike at the very substance of the freedom it is 
designed to guarantee’.108 In applying these principles to the facts, the ECtHR found a violation 
of Article 9.  
 Again, however, the ECtHR did not seek evidence of precisely how obliging an 
individual to reveal his religion or belief on an identity card (especially when it was, later, 
possible to leave the box blank) constituted compulsion. For Judge Baretto the majority went ‘too 
far’ in finding a violation of Article 9, because, since the change in the law which meant 
individuals could leave the religion box blank, there was no interference with Article 9.109 This 
did not oblige an individual to disclose religion and considering that asking for religious 
adherence to be deleted from official registers constituted disclosure of religion was excessive.110 
The majority’s decision can, however, again be explained by recognising that the ECtHR 
balanced forum internum relevance and countervailing factors, and in doing so, decided that the 
forum internum was not outweighed by countervailing factors in this case.  
For the ECtHR, leaving the box for religion blank was no solution to the problem of 
disclosure because individuals would still be distinguished from the majority who entered their 
religion in the box.111 The ECtHR noted that the cards were used frequently (for school 
registration, identity checks, military service and so on) and so opened up the potential for card 
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bearers to be discriminated against on the basis of their religion or belief by State authorities in 
Turkey. 112 Having characterised the issue in this complaint as one concerning compulsion to 
disclose religion or belief, and placed little very weight on countervailing factors (including the 
claim that disclosure of religion or belief on identify cards was necessary for demographic 
purposes113) the ECtHR offered a very high degree of protection under Article 9, from the outset. 
In other cases concerning disclosure of religion or belief through official documents, the ECtHR 
can, and does, take a different approach and reach a different outcome.  
 
c. Wage Tax Cards 
In balancing forum internum relevance and countervailing factors, the ECtHR can, and does 
sometimes, offer a low degree of protection under Article 9 in cases concerning the right not to 
disclose religion or belief. This is illustrated clearly in Wasmuth v Germany114 in which an 
independent lawyer complained that the dashes on his wage tax card in the space for ‘Church tax 
levy’ revealed to his employer that he did not belong to one of the six churches entitled to levy 
tax (or had chosen to opt out of the payment of church tax entirely)115and this  constituted an 
infringement of his right not to declare his religious convictions.116 The ECtHR found no 
violation of Article 9 here.   
In setting out the principles the ECtHR explained, by drawing explicitly on Alexandridis v 
Greece117 and Dimitras and Others v Greece,118 that the right to manifest religion or belief has a 
negative aspect, namely the right of an individual not to be obliged to act in such a way that it can 
be deduced that he or she has or does not have particular convictions.119 In its assessment the 
ECtHR noted that in light of recent case law (namely, Sinan Işik v Turkey and Grzelak v 
Poland)120 the situation did constitute an interference with the ‘applicant’s right not to declare his 
religious convictions.’121 In considering the legitimacy of the interference under Article 9.2, the 
ECtHR found that the obligation imposed on the applicant was prescribed by domestic law122 and 
served the legitimate purpose of ‘guaranteeing the rights of churches and religious societies to 
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levy tax’.123 In terms of the proportionality of the interference, it found that the information on 
the tax card was ‘of limited informative value’ as it just revealed that the applicant was not a 
member of one of the six churches or religious organisations permitted to levy taxes124 and 
explained that the applicant’s religion or belief could not be deduced from this. It observed that 
the wage tax card was not intended for ‘general use’ but only for relations between the taxpayer, 
tax authorities and the employer.’125 Drawing upon Lundberg v Sweden and Bruno v Sweden126 
the ECtHR added that a margin of appreciation was enjoyed by States in respect of the financing 
of churches and religions. Whilst the provision of the information constituted an interference with 
the applicant’s right not to manifest his religion, the interference was not disproportionate,127 so 
found no violation of Article 9.128 
 Again, as noted in respect of Alexandridis v Greece and Dimitras and Others v Greece, 
commentators who think that the ECtHR draws a binary and hierarchical distinction between the 
forum internum and the forum internum might argue that the ECtHR’s approach, to the same 
right, in Wasmuth v Germany, in which it considered permissible limitations under Article 9.2, 
was inconsistent with the approach in Grzelak v Poland and Sinan Işik v Turkey in which the 
ECtHR did not consider permissible limitations under Article 9.2. However, again, this thesis 
argues that this is a misunderstanding of the jurisprudence because rights are not ‘fixed’. The 
extent to which the forum internum is relevant in any given case depends heavily on the facts. 
And, whilst in Sinan Işik v Turkey the ECtHR stated that the right to disclose one’s religion or 
belief fell within the forum internum, it did not state that the forum internum was synonymous 
with absolute protection. This is an important point which must not be overlooked. The ECtHR 
explained in Sinan Işik v Turkey that ‘permitting every kind of compulsion with a view to the 
disclosure of religion or belief would strike at the very substance of the freedom it is designed to 
guarantee’,129 it did not, however, say that all types of compulsion should be prohibited. In 
Wasmuth v Germany, the ECtHR explained that an obligation to reveal religion or belief in order 
to substantiate a claim was a type of compulsion that it could permit.  
The ECtHR took a different approach and reached a different outcome in Wasmuth v 
Germany because of the facts were different; it seems this complaint was construed as a claim for 
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a special exemption. The ECtHR considered that the applicant was seeking a special measure 
(exemption from the payment of church tax) and as such the State’s request for substantiation did 
not constitute a disproportionate interference with Article 9. Notably, however, the ECtHR did 
express, in an obiter dictum, that in cases where the interference was ‘more significant’ the 
‘balancing of interests could lead to a different conclusion’ (i.e. a violation of Article 9).130  
To support its finding in Wasmuth v Germany, the ECtHR relied on the case of Kosteski v 
Former Yougoslav Republic of Macedonia in which the ECtHR had observed that ‘while the 
notion of the State sitting in judgment on the state of a citizen’s inner and personal beliefs is 
abhorrent and may smack unhappily of past infamous persecutions,’ in seeking substantiation for 
claims based on religion or belief it is acceptable in certain circumstances.131 In Kosteski v 
Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia the applicant ‘sought to enjoy a special right’ which 
allowed Muslims to take holidays on particular days; it was this attempt to enjoy a ‘special right’, 
which was later referred to as a ‘privilege or entitlement not commonly available,’ that justified 
the enquiry into the applicant’s religion or belief.132 In that case, the ECtHR explained that when 
employees seek to rely on a particular exemption to explain their absence, ‘it is not oppressive or 
in fundamental conflict with freedom of conscience to require some level of substantiation when 
that claim concerns a privilege or entitlement not commonly available’ and, if an individual is 
unable to provide such substantiation then the employer is entitled to reach a negative 
conclusion.133 And elsewhere in the jurisprudence, the ECtHR has found that States can seek 
information concerning ‘values and beliefs’ held by candidate for public employment to check 
that they do not hold views which are incompatible with the office.134 
That the forum internum is not synonymous with absolute protection is further evidenced 
in the dissenting opinion of Judge Berro-Lefèvre and Judge Kalaydjieva in Wasmuth v 
Germany.135 They reiterated that freedom not to manifest one’s religion or belief is a matter for 
the for intérieur of each individual but also considered permissible limitations under Article 9.2. 
For these judges there was a violation of Article 9 in this case because the structure of the wage-
tax card revealed that the applicant was not a member of the churches or religious organisations 
permitted to levy taxes and, given this was revealed to the employer, it could impact on the 
applicant’s career prospects. It would be more satisfactory, they argued, if this was revealed only 
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to the authorities so that a balance between the right of churches to raise taxes and the individual 
right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion could be maintained. 136  
 The key point about this analysis of cases relating to objections to revealing one’s religion 
or belief is that it shows that the forum internum in Article 9 jurisprudence is not synonymous 
with absolute protection. This idea, constantly reiterated in the literature, is just not supported in 
the practice of the ECtHR.  
 
Conclusion  
This chapter formed the second part of the examination of contentious cases, that is, the kinds of 
cases in which it seems that the ECtHR might find a violation of Article 9 or might not. In terms 
of the concentric circles model of protection, it focused on the middle circle. It examined cases 
concerning State pressure to act contrary to one’s religion or belief and compulsion to disclose 
religion or belief examining cases concerning conscientious objection to military service, refusals 
to pay church tax, and State pressure to disclose one’s religion or belief through oath taking 
procedures or official documents. This chapter explained that if one understands i) there to be a 
clear distinction between the forum internum and the forum externum in Article 9, ii) for the 
former to be synonymous with absolute rights and the latter to be synonymous with qualified 
rights and, iii) for rights to be ‘fixed’ as either forum internum or forum externum, or absolute or 
qualified rights, the approach of the ECtHR in a number of these cases also looks inconsistent or 
erroneous. However, building on the previous three chapters, this chapter argues that this is a 
potentially mistaken way of viewing Article 9 jurisprudence.  
Thorough a close analysis of the case law, this chapter argues that the ECtHR does not 
draw a binary and hierarchical distinction between the forum internum and forum externum but 
rather, the ECtHR considers the forum internum and forum externum to be interrelated realms. 
The ECtHR recognises that the forum internum is always relevant in Article 9 claims; the precise 
weight given to the forum internum in any given case, is determined heavily by the ECtHR’s 
consideration of the facts. Importantly, the ECtHR does not consider the forum internum to be 
synonymous with absolute rights, and it does not ‘fix’ rights at certain points on the continuum of 
forum internum relevance. The ECtHR’s approach is much more nuanced and context dependent.   
Moreover, the degree of protection offered is not predetermined at the outset by the ‘type’ 
of case it is, i.e. a conscientious objection claim, a complaint about obligations to pay church tax, 
or to disclose religion or belief. This chapter has further illustrated that the ECtHR does not work 
with a category mindset. Thus, in supporting the findings in the previous chapter, this chapter 
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shows that this is a pattern across the jurisprudence as a whole. It is not just unhelpful to look for 
consistency of approach and outcome in the same ‘type’ of cases concerning limitations on 
manifestation. Looking for consistency in ‘types’ of cases is an unhelpful approach in Article 9 
jurisprudence overall.   
 Again, this chapter shows that there is a different sort of dynamic at play in this middle 
circle in the loose concentric circles model. The ECtHR is heavily influenced by the ‘lens’ which 
it brings to the cases, or in other words, what the ECtHR considers to be at stake in a given case. 
The strength of forum internum relevance and countervailing factors is heavily dependent on the 
ECtHR’s interpretation of the facts in the case. When this is recognised, the different approaches 
and outcomes in these contested cases in the middle circle appear to be much more consistent and 
coherent.  
 
Overall, Chapters Four, Five, Six and Seven, which form Part II of this thesis, demonstrate that it 
is not the forum internum and forum externum distinction which is the driving force behind the 
ECtHR’s approach to Article 9 complaints. This distinction is not a useful tool for understanding 
the ECtHR’s approach. If anything, relying on the distinction to analyse the jurisprudence is not 
only unhelpful but also harmful because it leads to commentators criticising the ECtHR for taking 
an inconsistent approach and reaching contradictory outcomes in ostensibly similar cases. The 
close analysis of the cases in these preceding chapters demonstrates that the loose concentric 
circles model is a helpful way of grouping the cases according to the ECtHR’s characterisation. 
Cases in which forum internum relevance is deemed strongest and countervailing factors weakest, 
fall into the innermost circle and receive the highest degree of protection. Cases in which forum 
internum relevance is deemed weakest and countervailing factors strongest, fall into the 
outermost circle and receive the lowest degree of protection. Most cases, however, fall into the 
contested middle circle. In the middle circle, forum internum relevance and countervailing factors 
may both be strong or forum internum relevance and countervailing factors may both be weak, 
and as such, protection ranges from a high to a low degree depending on the way the ECtHR 
balances factors indicating a violation (primarily, but not only, forum internum relevance) with 
countervailing factors indicating no violation.  
 The loose concentric circles model is, therefore, helpful because it recognises the 
ECtHR’s considerable flexibility in protecting Article 9 rights; it better reflects the reality of the 
case law than the notion of a binary and hierarchical distinction between the absolute forum 
internum and qualified forum externum and is conducive to a more coherent interpretation of 

















PART III: RECONCEPTUALISING THE PLACE OF THE FORUM 





CHAPTER 8. AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH TO UNDERSTANDING 
ECHR ARTICLE 9 AND THE JURISPRUDENCE     
 
Introduction 
This chapter draws together the findings from the detailed analysis of Article 9 jurisprudence, 
available in English and in French from the 1960s to the present day, in Part II of this thesis and, 
in doing so, advances an alternative approach to the understanding of Article 9 jurisprudence. 
Section A examines the forum internum and forum externum relationship and the loose concentric 
circles model of Article 9 protection, emphasising the importance of the facts in Article 9 cases 
and more widely across ECHR jurisprudence. Following from this, Section B explores broader 
contextual factors which may legitimately be taken into account by the ECtHR in its 
consideration of Article 9 complaints.  
 
A. The Forum Internum and Forum Externum Relationship and the Loose 
Concentric Circles Model 
The findings in Part II of this thesis support the hypothesis set out in Part I, namely that if the 
presentation of Article 9 and the protection to be offered under Article 9 is consistent with the 
protection of this right in practice (i.e. when applied to the facts of the case) one would expect to 
see the ECtHR balancing factors indicating a violation of Article 9 (primarily, but not only forum 
internum influence) with factors indicating no violation, in order to reach its decision in all 
Article 9 cases.  
Part II demonstrates that the ECtHR does not, as the literature so frequently claims, draw 
a binary and hierarchical distinction between the forum internum and the forum externum offering 
absolute protection to the former and qualified protection to the latter. Indeed, it has shown that it 
is artificial to claim that the ECtHR approaches Article 9 complaints on the basis of whether an 
issue is a forum internum or forum externum issue and offer protection on the basis of such a 
categorisation. The ECtHR’s approach is considerably more nuanced than this. Notably, the 
ECtHR recognises that the forum internum and forum externum aspects of Article 9 are deeply 
interrelated and this has a significant impact on the way in which it approaches Article 9 
complaints. Contrary to what C Evans has argued in relation to other Article 9 principles, the 
standard recital — that Article 9 primarily protects the forum internum but also protects acts 




‘incantation’ which is ‘strangely disconnected’ from the reasoning and the outcome.1 This thesis 
argues that statements made about the relationship between the forum internum and forum 
externum reflect the fact that this understanding of Article 9 is deeply embedded in the 
jurisprudence as a whole.  
The forum internum is not considered to be either relevant or irrelevant by the ECtHR, 
rather, the forum internum is always deemed to be relevant because the ECtHR intuitively 
recognises that limitations on the forum externum will inevitably affect the forum internum. The 
key question for the ECtHR, therefore, concerns the extent to which the forum internum is 
relevant in any given case because forum internum relevance is the most significant factor 
weighing in favour of the applicant.  
However, forum internum relevance is not the only factor the ECtHR takes into 
consideration in Article 9 complaints; the ECtHR balances factors indicating a violation 
(primarily, but not only, forum internum relevance) against countervailing factors indicating no 
violation, in order to reach its decision. Where the ECtHR considers forum internum relevance to 
be strongest and countervailing factors to be weakest, it offers a high degree of protection. Where 
it considers forum internum influence to be weakest and countervailing factors to be strongest it 
offers a low degree of protection. Where the strength of the forum internum and countervailing 
factors are contested (because they are both weak or both strong), the degree of protection 
depends heavily on the way the ECtHR balances the factors.  
Taken together, these findings support the suggestion that the explanatory model of three 
loose concentric circles denoting forum internum relevance at its strongest and countervailing 
factors at their weakest, forum internum relevance and countervailing factors at their most 
contested, and forum internum relevance at its weakest and countervailing factors at their 
strongest, is a useful way of ordering the cases according to the ECtHR’s characterisation. This 
model is helpful because it recognises the flexibility in terms of the ECtHR’s approach to Article 
9 protection.  
Secondly, and linked to this, the analysis in Part II has demonstrates that the ECtHR does 
not and should not necessarily take the same approach and reach the same outcome when 
addressing complaints concerning the same right. It was noted in Chapter Three that, given the 
presentation of Article 9, in which the ECtHR has explicitly identified the right to hold and to 
change religion or belief as absolute and unqualified rights, one might expect the ECtHR to 
always protect these rights absolutely whenever the ECtHR finds that the rights are engaged on 
the facts and that there has been interference with them. However, whilst this is, as Part II has 
 
1 Carolyn Evans, ‘Individual and Group Religious Freedom in the European Court of Human Rights: Cracks in 




demonstrated, generally the case it is not always the case with respect to these rights. The forum 
internum is not a trump card outweighing all possible countervailing factors; it is not an 
inviolable core. Indeed, the ECtHR not only allows States to affect the forum internum to a 
considerable degree without deeming such impact a violation in certain situations (e.g. 
government warnings against sects) it even suggests that in certain circumstances interference 
with absolute rights might be permissible (e.g. in psychiatric treatment). There is, therefore, 
considerable flexibility in terms of the ECtHR’s approach in protecting these absolute rights. 
Absolute in theory does not always mean absolutely absolute in practice.  
The ECtHR does not mechanically deploy a particular approach to the protection of the 
right to manifest either. It was explained in Chapter Three that given the presentation of the right 
to manifest one would expect the ECtHR to carefully consider the legitimacy of limitations under 
Article 9.2. However, whilst Part II has demonstrated that this is generally the case, there are 
numerous instances in which the ECtHR has chosen not to conduct a methodologically rigorous 
examination of permissible limitations under Article 9.2 because, having characterised the 
complaint in a particular way, the ECtHR has established from the outset the conclusion it will 
reach.  
This flexibility in terms of approach to Article 9 rights has been further illustrated in 
respect to other rights within the scope of Article 9 such as the right to conscientious objection, 
the right not to be compelled to participate in religion or belief related activities of an 
organisation of which one is not a member, and the right not to disclose one’s religion or belief. 
Notably, the ECtHR has not indicated the level of protection to be offered to these rights (e.g. 
absolute or qualified). This seems to be because, for the ECtHR, rights are not ‘fixed’ but rather 
the level of protection offered against interference with Article 9 differs depending on the facts.  
Thirdly, and again linked to this, Part II has demonstrated that it is not the ‘type’ or 
‘category’ of complaint that defines the ECtHR’s approach in an Article 9 case.2 Importantly, the 
ECtHR does not mechanically deploy a pre-defined approach when faced with certain ‘types’ of 
complaints, such as complaints concerning limitations on the wearing of headscarves, refusals to 
pay tax or disclose religion or belief.3 Rather, the ECtHR takes a much more holistic and nuanced 
approach to Article 9 complaints than has been previously recognised in the literature. Whilst 
commentators have divided up Article 9 into the forum internum and forum externum and drawn 
 
2 Cf. M Evans who argued that cases were considered in ‘categories rather Article 9 as a whole’ and that the 
ECtHR was ‘overly influenced by the general category’ into which the case fell, see Malcolm D Evans, 
Religious Liberty and International Law in Europe (CUP 1997) 282. 
3 Henrard also recognised that there is not always consistency in ‘themes’ but to address this, she identifies ‘sub-
themes’ instead, see Kristin Henrard, ‘How the European Court of Human Rights’ Concern Regarding European 
Consensus Tempers Effective Protection of Freedom of Religion’ (2012) 4:3 Oxford Journal of Law and 




up lists of various rights included therein, and sought to categorise complaints according to the 
particular right engaged, or ‘type’ of complaint at issue, the ECtHR seems to take a much looser 
approach. Again, it is not the ‘type’ of complaint in question that is key for the ECtHR but rather 
the extent to which the forum internum is relevant in a particular case. This means that ostensibly 
similar cases can, and do, receive different degrees of protection depending on the balance of 
factors.    
 At the end of Chapter One, this thesis suggested that if the jurisprudence revealed that 
there is not a distinction between the forum internum and the forum externum in the text of 
Article 9 or the practice of the ECtHR, then it would be essential to grapple with the implications 
of this. And indeed, this is what Part II sought to do. Part II embraces the reality of the forum 
internum and forum externum relationship in Article 9 jurisprudence; it does not simply retreat to 
the established orthodoxy that a bright line distinction must be maintained between the forum 
internum and the forum externum in practice to ensure the protection of the right to freedom of 
thought, conscience and religion. In taking the jurisprudence on its own terms, Part II shows that 
the ECtHR’s recognition of the interrelationship between the forum internum and the forum 
externum in Article 9 does not necessarily lead to problematic jurisprudence and threaten the 
protection of the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion in practice. Part II 
demonstrates that the ECtHR can, and does, protect Article 9 rights whilst recognising the 
interrelationship between the forum internum and the forum externum.    
Going a step further, Part II has not only brought a new analysis of Article 9 
jurisprudence but also a new understanding of the driving force behind Article 9 jurisprudence. In 
revealing that the forum internum is always relevant, just to a greater or lesser extent depending 
on the ECtHR’s consideration of the facts, this thesis shows that the forum internum and forum 
externum distinction does not operate in way in which it has traditionally been understood to 
operate according to the literature. That the forum internum and the forum externum aspects of 
Article 9 are important elements flows from the text of Article 9 and the doctrine. However, 
despite what commentators suggest, the question of whether an issue falls into the forum 
internum or forum externum (and thus should be protected absolutely or qualified, as a result) is 
not the driving force in Article 9 jurisprudence. A close analysis of the jurisprudence reveals that 
whilst forum internum relevance is the most significant factor weighing in favour of the applicant, 
it is not the determining factor. The ECtHR balances forum internum relevance with 
countervailing factors to reach its decision.   
In some cases, the facts means the ECtHR deems the question of forum internum 




hugely relevant because of the nature of the complaint in question.4 This is a novel understanding 
of the place of the forum internum and forum externum in Article 9 jurisprudence, and as such, 
will be unpacked in detail in the following sections of this chapter. 
   
i. The Driving Force in Article 9 Jurisprudence  
In characterising Article 9 complaints the ECtHR does not simply follow the way in which the 
Article 9 complaint has been framed by an applicant or respondent government but rather, taking 
into account the complaint as a whole, characterises the issue in the way it deems most suitable 
and, as a result of its characterisation, offers the level of protection it deems most fitting. Instead 
of dividing and subdividing Article 9, the ECtHR tends to take a more holistic approach. Whilst it 
often refers to the right to manifest religion or belief, it frequently prefers to speak loosely of the 
right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion when addressing other aspects of Article 9, 
only occasionally identifying particular rights or protections under Article 9 such as the right not 
to disclose one’s religion or belief or the right not to be forced to directly participate in a religion 
or belief of which one is not a member.  
In doing so, the ECtHR has often been criticised by commentators for ‘ignoring’ specific 
rights in Article 9 cases or for getting the approach to complaints ‘wrong’ by either not 
understanding or not correctly applying the binary and hierarchical forum internum and forum 
externum distinction.5 However, a close reading of the case law shows that the ECtHR’s more 
nuanced approach is consistent with its own principles. The ECtHR has stated that it is ‘master of 
the characterisation to be given in law to the facts of the case and does not consider itself bound 
by the characterisation given by the applicant or the government or the Commission’.6 And, 
following the jura novit curia principle, the ECtHR has explained that once it has received a 
complaint it is free to characterise it ‘by the facts alleged in it and not merely the legal grounds or 
arguments relied on’.7 The ECtHR, therefore, may ‘deal with any issue of fact or law that arises 
 
4 For a discussion the opposite problem (using language relating to State regulation of religion in cases 
concerning individual rights) see, Malcolm D Evans, ‘From Cartoons to Crucifixes: Current Controversies 
Concerning the Freedom of Religion and the Freedom of Expression before the European Court of Human 
Rights’ (2010) 26:1 Journal of Law and Religion 345, 370.   
5 Kiviorg argues that the case law is ‘inconsistent’ and that there is ‘inconsistent theoretical reasoning, in cases 
dealing with individual or collective freedom of religion’, see Merlin Kiviorg, ‘Religious Autonomy in the 
ECHR’ (2009) 4 Derecho y Religion 131, 131. See also Carolyn Evans, ‘Individual and Group Religious 
Freedom in the European Court of Human Rights: Cracks in the Intellectual Architecture’ (2010) 26:1 Journal 
of Law and Religion 321, 339.  
6 Guerra and Others v Italy ECHR 1998-I 210, para 44. 




during the proceedings before it,’8 suggesting that what is conceived of as relevant fact and law 
may be very broad indeed. 
As such, it is not surprising that the ECtHR’s characterisation of the complaint in 
question is not always the same as that of the applicant or respondent government. For the ECtHR 
the forum internum is not the determining factor in any given case, rather it is a factor which the 
ECtHR takes into account when considering the facts in Article 9 complaints. This important 
finding is worth unpacking in more detail here.  
Part II argues that Article 9 jurisprudence is not driven simply by the question of whether 
a complaint engages the forum internum or the forum externum. Instead, the ECtHR takes into 
account forum internum relevance when considering the facts in Article 9 complaints and 
balances this against countervailing factors, to reach its outcome. This approach is not simply 
limited to the most contested cases, but rather, is the approach the ECtHR takes in all Article 9  
cases, concerning all Article 9 rights. 
This thesis argues that the ECtHR’s consideration of the facts plays a significant role in 
Article 9 cases because the ECtHR’s interpretation of the facts imbues its approach from the very 
outset in Article 9 complaints and plays out through the assessment as a whole. In the literature it 
is widely recognised that the ECtHR takes into account broader contextual factors in its 
consideration of whether there is a European consensus on a particular issue (e.g. conscientious 
objection or headscarf bans) or the breadth of the margin of appreciation to be afforded to States 
under Article 9.2. However, this thesis has stressed that these considerations do not simply appear 
at the end of an assessment under Article 9.2. Rather these considerations are there from the very 
beginning of the Article 9 assessment; the ECtHR balances in complaints of all ‘types’, 
concerning all rights, at all stages of the Article 9 assessment. 
Indeed, the ECtHR has recently explicitly described its approach in Rasul Jafarov v 
Azerbaijan in which the applicant complained that he had been arrested and detained without 
‘reasonable’ suspicion that he had committed a crime.9 In its assessment under Article 5 and 3 the 
ECtHR explained, in order to be satisfied that the suspicion against the applicant was reasonable, 
it had ‘to have regard to all the relevant circumstances’, and ‘in that connection, at the outset, the 
Court considers it necessary to have regard to the general context of the facts of this particular 
case.’10 Further it explained that whilst the ECtHR was not asked to give a ‘judicial assessment of 
the general context outlined in the complaint’ it, ‘nevertheless, considers that this background 
 
8 Philis v Greece (1991) Series A no 209, para 56 (my emphasis). See also Peter Kempees, A Systematic Guide 
to the Case Law of the European Convention on Human Rights (Springer 1996) 697.  
9 Rasul Jafarov v Azerbaijan App no 69981/14 (ECtHR, 17 March 2016), para 85. 
10 Ibid., para 120 (my emphasis). This is consistent with the comment made by Judge Mastscher in Guzzardi v 
Italy, explaining that ‘measures complained of must always be put back into the general setting in which they 




information is extremely relevant to the present case and calls for a particularly close scrutiny of 
the facts giving rise to the charges brought against the applicant.’11  
It is worth examining this important statement here because this is precisely what this 
thesis argues that the ECtHR is doing, and should be understood to be doing, in relation to Article 
9 complaints. The ECtHR makes three key points in Rasul Jafarov v Azerbaijan. Firstly, it 
explains that, taking into account all of the relevant circumstances it gives weight to the general 
context. Secondly, it explains that it gives weight to the general context from the outset. Bearing 
in mind that in this case the ECtHR was assessing the complaint under Article 5 (a qualified 
right) and Article 3 (an absolute right) this is important because it demonstrates the general 
context is not simply taken into account in the consideration of margin of appreciation in ECHR 
limitation clauses. It is important in all stages of the assessment. Thirdly, the ECtHR explains that 
its assessment of the general context can significantly affect its approach. In some cases, it may 
consider the background to be more or less important. The fact that some contexts call ‘for a 
particularly close scrutiny of the facts’12 implies that in others, a more superficial examination 
may be sufficient. 
 The ECtHR has further emphasised the importance of taking the general context into 
account in the recent case of Khalaifia and Others v Italy.13 In this case the Grand Chamber 
emphasised that the absolute nature of Article 3 means that a State cannot be absolved of its 
obligations as a result of ‘an increasing influx of migrants’,14 however, the ECtHR observed that 
‘it would certainly be artificial to examine the facts of the case without considering the general 
context in which those facts arose.’15 Thus, it explained that in its assessment it would ‘bear in 
mind, together with other factors’ the ‘situation confronting the Italian authorities at the relevant 
time.’16  
It certainly seems that in recent years, in relation to Article 3 at least, the ECtHR is 
willing to explicitly acknowledge the importance it places on broader contextual factors in its 
assessment of Article 3 complaints.17 Whilst the ECtHR has not been so explicit in its Article 9 
jurisprudence, the analysis in Part II of this thesis leads one to acknowledge that the key question 
for the ECtHR when addressing Article 9 complaints seems to be: what is the issue for this 
particular applicant, in that particular context, at the relevant time? And, following from this, 
 
11 Rasul Jafarov v Azerbaijan App no 69981/14 (ECtHR, 17 March 2016), para 120. 
12 Rasul Jafarov v Azerbaijan App no 69981/14 (ECtHR, 17 March 2016), para 120. 
13 Khlaifia and Others v Italy App no 16483/12 (ECtHR, 15 December 2016). 
14 Ibid., para 184. See also, MSS v Belgium and Greece ECHR 2011-I 255, paras 223-224. 
15 Khlaifia and Others v Italy App no 16483/12 (ECtHR, 15 December 2016), para 185.  
16 Ibid. 
17 In Sakir and Greece, for instance, the ECtHR explicitly pointed out that the background of a rise in racist 
violence in the district in question was an important factor in this case concerning the physical assault of an Afghan 




what does it mean to protect the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion for this 
particular applicant, in that particular context, at the relevant time?  
This is of course a very different way of understanding the forum internum and forum 
externum distinction Article 9 jurisprudence than that advanced in the literature. The ECtHR 
takes into account forum internum relevance when considering the facts in Article 9 complaints. 
Recognising this means the way in which the ECtHR characterises a complaint, the approach it 
takes in the Article 9 assessment and the outcome it reaches appears much more understandable 
(or explicable) and apparent ‘contradictions’ or ‘inconsistencies’ in terms of characterisation, 
approach and/or outcome are often reconciled.  
It must be stressed at this point, however, that this thesis does not intend to imply that the 
characterisations, approaches and outcomes in Article 9 cases are necessarily correct. What this 
thesis seeks to show is that, by recognising that the ECtHR balances factors indicating a violation 
(primarily, but not only, forum internum relevance) with countervailing factors indicating no 
violation one can understand why the ECtHR has approached a case in a particular way and 
reached a particular decision. The facts help the ECtHR to identify what the issue is in a given 
case and thus to respond accordingly. Notably, it explains why the ECtHR may take different 
approaches and reach different outcomes in ostensibly similar cases. If the facts are different it is 
likely that the ECtHR’s approach and/or outcome might be different.  
When Article 9 jurisprudence is understood in terms of the loose concentric circles model 
of protection, the ECtHR’s approach and the outcomes it reaches does not appear arbitrary or 
inconsistent (as argued in the literature)18 but rather appears more consistent. In cases in which 
the ECtHR establishes that States have interfered with an individual’s absolute right to hold or 
change a religion or belief it usually gives greatest weight to the forum internum and very little 
weight to countervailing factors and thus offers a very high degree of protection. In terms of the 
concentric circles model, the innermost circle includes, for example, cases in which the ECtHR 
has established that an individual has been forced to abandon or adopt a religion or belief in order 
to keep a job.  
In contrast, in cases in which the ECtHR finds that States have limited the behaviour of 
an individual or a community on the basis that it is considered harmful, and there is widespread 
consensus that it is harmful, the ECtHR usually gives little weight to the forum internum and great 
weight to countervailing factors and thus offers a very low degree of protection. In terms of the 
 
18 C Evans, for instance, argues that the outcomes are ‘ad hoc’, see Carolyn Evans, ‘Individual and Group 
Religious Freedom in the European Court of Human Rights: Cracks in the Intellectual Architecture’ (2010) 26:1 




concentric circles model, the outermost circle includes, for example, cases concerning corporal 
punishment of children or the use of large quantities of illegal drugs in religious ceremonies.   
In the contested middle circle in the loose concentric circles model, protection ranges 
from the highest to lowest degree depending on the balance of factors. Whilst it is argued that the 
ECtHR balances forum internum relevance and countervailing factors in all Article 9 complaints, 
it is in cases in which forum internum relevance and countervailing factors are both strong or 
forum internum relevance and countervailing factors are both weak that the balancing exercise is 
most difficult. Relatively speaking, therefore, these are ‘harder’ cases. For example, the middle 
circle includes contested cases concerning limitations on the wearing of religious clothing or 
refusals to disclose religion or belief. If the ECtHR decides, on the basis of the facts, to give less 
weight to countervailing factors, it offers a higher degree of protection; if the ECtHR decides to 
give more weight to countervailing factors, it offers a lower degree of protection.  
 Given the stress on the importance of the facts in Article 9 jurisprudence in this thesis it 
is worth considering this in more detail.  
  
ii. The Importance of the Facts in Article 9 Complaints  
Part II revealed that the ECtHR often takes different approaches and reaches different outcomes 
in ostensibly similar Article 9 cases. In doing so, it is argued, the ECtHR is not necessarily being 
inconsistent. Rather this can be explained by recognising that the ECtHR considers that for the 
particular applicant, in that particular place at the relevant time the issue was different, and 
therefore, what it means to protect the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion is also 
different. In respect of this, the ECtHR’s consideration of differences between Member States is 
an important factor.  
 
a. Differences Between Member States  
For years, commentators have argued that the ECtHR gives too much deference to (certain) States 
through the doctrine of the margin of appreciation under Article 9.2 leading to it uncritically 
supporting State decisions to limit the manifestation of belief in question.19 This approach, it is 
contended, has led to poor protection of the right to manifest religion or belief.   
This thesis, however, has argued that this is an oversimplification which is the result of 
drawing generalisations from a small selection of Article 9 case law, especially early ‘headscarf 
cases’. This thesis has repeatedly demonstrated that a close analysis of all case law relating to 
 
19 Ungureanu argues that the ECtHR is ‘incapable’ of developing a ‘flexible but coherent understanding of the 
margin of appreciation’, see Camil Ungureanu, ‘Europe and Religion: An Ambivalent Nexus’ in Loreno Zucca 




Article 9 does not reveal a consistent pattern of deference to Member States in relation to any 
‘type’ of case. In fact, it reveals that in many cases the ECtHR disagrees with arguments 
advanced respondent governments, instead finding that State actions have violated Article 9. To 
take manifestation cases as an example, the ECtHR does not simply defer to States. The analysis 
of the case law in Part II has highlighted some typical counterexamples in which the ECtHR has 
found that the dissolution of religious communities, refusals to re-register and limitations on the 
wearing of religious clothing by individuals (including headscarves) constitutes not only an 
interference with, but a violation of, Article 9.   
A close reading of the case law shows that the ECtHR is attuned to the variations across 
Member States and this affects the ECtHR’s Article 9 analysis.20 In some cases, this influences 
the finding of no violation of Article 9, whereas in other cases it leads to the ECtHR disagreeing 
with arguments put forward by States, and a finding of an Article 9 violation. Recognising that 
the ECtHR pays close attention to the broader context in Member States is not to suggest that the 
ECtHR understands the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion differently in 
different cases, but rather, that the ECtHR appreciates that what it means to protect this right may 
be different depending on the particular applicant, place and time.21 In other words, by taking into 
account broader contextual considerations in addition to the specific facts of the case, the ECtHR 
is making rights relevant rather than relative.   
Take the issue of disclosing one’s religion or belief. Commentators tend to argue that if 
the ECtHR finds that forcing individuals to disclose their religion or belief during oath taking 
proceedings in Greece constitutes a violation of Article 9, the ECtHR should take the same 
approach and reach the same outcome if a similar issue of disclosure against one’s will is raised 
in Germany in the context of tax declarations because the complaints engage the same right. 
However, this thesis has argued, the ECtHR does not simply deploy a pre-defined approach just 
because the complaint engages the same Article 9 right. The approach is more nuanced and 
contextualised. 
In these cases the ECtHR not only considered that there was a significant difference in 
terms of the facts (i.e. a State forcing an individual to reveal religion or belief without being 
prompted by that individual and a State seeking to substantiate an individual’s claim for special 
measures), it also considered that there was something quite different at stake for the applicants in 
 
20 For a discussion of the importance of ‘geographical politics’ between Western and Eastern Europe see 
Carolyn Evans, ‘Individual and Group Religious Freedom in the European Court of Human Rights: Cracks in 
the Intellectual Architecture’ (2010) 26:1 Journal of Law and Religion 321, 335-336. 
21 In Ebrahimian v France, for instance, the ECtHR explained that regulations on the manifestation of religion 
or belief ‘vary from country to another depending on national traditions and the requirements imposed by the 
protection of the rights and freedoms of others and the maintenance of public order’, see Ebrahimian v France 




being forced to disclose one’s religion or belief in Greece, in the context of oath taking 
proceedings in a public setting in 2008 and being forced to disclose one’s religion or belief in 
Germany, on a confidential tax declaration in 2011. In these cases, the ECtHR seems to have 
given considerable weight to broader contextual factors, including the constitutional 
arrangements of the State in question, the religious make-up of the State and the potential for 
discrimination, particularly against minorities, as a result of being forced to reveal one’s religion 
or belief. It seems that these considerations, taken together, were influential in leading to the 
ECtHR’s different approach and outcome in these cases. The lesson here, therefore, seems to be 
that one should not expect the same outcome in different States, on similar facts.  
 
b. Differences Within Member States  
In addition to accounting for different outcomes in different Member States, this thesis argues 
that the ECtHR’s approach to broader contextual considerations within the balancing process 
helps explain its different approaches and outcomes in ostensibly similar cases brought against 
the same State. 
Take complaints about limitations on the wearing of religious clothing for instance. 
Commentators tend to argue that if the ECtHR finds that a limitation on the wearing of religious 
clothing outside of a Mosque constitutes a violation of Article 9, the ECtHR should take the same 
approach and reach the same outcome in a similar issue of limitations on the wearing of religious 
clothing on a university campus, because these cases are of the same ‘type’ (i.e. religious clothing 
cases).  Given that the ECtHR has not done this, commentators have criticised the ECtHR for 
taking an inconsistent, unpredictable or ambiguous approach to this ‘type’ of complaint, 
especially when complaints of the same type are brought against the same State.22  
This thesis has emphasised that for the ECtHR it is not the ‘type’ of complaint that is the 
driving force behind its approach; rather it is the ECtHR’s interpretation of what it at stake for the 
particular applicant, in the particular context at the relevant time. Take, for instance, cases 
concerning limitations on the wearing of religious clothing in Turkey. It is clear that the ECtHR 
has given considerable weight to the political context, in the balance of factors, in these cases. As 
such, the ECtHR characterised the wearing of a headscarf on a university campus as a 
provocative challenge to the constitutional principle of secularism but characterised the wearing 
of religious clothing on the street outside of a Mosque as an innocuous manifestation.  
 
22 For Iglesias and Ungureanu, for instance, Article 9 jurisprudence is ‘marked by ambiguity and inconsistency’, 
see Marisa Iglesias and Camil Ungureanu, ‘The Conundrum of Pluralism and the Doctrine of the Margin of 
Appreciation: the Crucifix “Affair” and the Ambivalence of the ECtHR’ in Ferron Requejo and Camil 




Thus, recognition of the changing context explains why the ECtHR reaches similar but 
not the same outcomes in similar cases. It is not a matter of incommensurability, but of the 
ECtHR taking into account the different and shifting facts when balancing factors indicating a 
violation (primarily, but not only, forum internum relevance) with countervailing factors 
indicating no violation. Indeed, the ECtHR has explicitly stated that it has ‘regard to the changing 
conditions’ in States.23 This is a more rights-based rather than mechanical approach. And, this 
reading suggests that the ECtHR does not necessarily need to ‘discipline’, as Kamal has argued, 
the ‘free-wheeling case by case balancing’ in Article 9 jurisprudence.24  
 
iii. The Importance of the Facts in Other ECHR Complaints  
a. Predicting ECtHR outcomes Using Artificial Intelligence  
The importance of the relevant facts is also being recognised in relation to complaints brought 
under other ECHR articles. A recent study which used natural language programming to predict 
the outcome in Article 3, 6 and 8 cases is illustrative in this respect.25 The study found that the 
facts of a case are the best predictor for accuracy in Article 3 cases, and in Article 6 and Article 8 
cases, the circumstances (which contain the factual background of the case) was the best predictor 
for accuracy. Indeed, they concluded that the factual background of a case is ‘the most important 
part of the case when it comes to predicting the decision’ whereas the law was the ‘lowest factor 
for predictability.’26 The authors argued that this supported a legal realism interpretation of the 
case law. Whilst this new study of this kind is not without its methodological limitations it is, 
however, interesting because it reveals that the facts is important in driving the outcome in 
complaints concerning articles other than Article 9.  
b. Pilot Judgments  
The importance of the specific facts to the ECtHR’s approach is further evidenced when pilot 
judgments are considered. The pilot judgment procedure was introduced in 2004 to enable the 
ECtHR to address repetitive cases concerning systemic or structural problems at the national level 
efficiently. 27 When the ECtHR receives numerous (sometimes thousands)28 of applications which 
 
23 Chapman v United Kingdom ECHR 2001-I 41, para 70. 
24 See Jilan Kamal, ‘Justified Interference with Religious Freedom: The European Court of Human Rights and 
the Need for Mediating Doctrine under Article 9(2)’ (2007-2008) 46 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law, 
667. 
25 Nikolas Aletras and others. ‘Predicting Judicial Decisions of the European Court of Human Rights: A Natural 
Language Processing Perspective’ 2 PeerJ Computer Science e93 <https://peerj.com/articles/cs-93/> accessed 
March 2019.  
26 Ibid.  
27 Council of Europe, ‘European Court of Human Rights Factsheet: Pilot Judgments’ (January 2019) 
<https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/FS_Pilot_judgments_ENG.pdf> accessed January 2019.  
28 In Greens and MT v The United Kingdom, there were 2,500 similar complaints, see Greens and MT v The 




‘share a root cause’ it can select one (or more) for ‘priority treatment’ in a pilot judgment29 in 
which, the ECtHR not only decides whether there has been a violation in the selected case/s, but 
also identifies ‘the systemic problem’ and indicates to the government the (legislative) changes it 
needs to make to resolve it.30  
In pilot judgments the ECtHR is concerned with the general, not the specific. Rather than 
considering what the issue is for the particular applicant, in the particular context at the relevant 
time, the ECtHR takes a much more general, broad brush approach so that the ‘solution extends 
beyond the particular cases or cases’, i.e. for the benefit of all.31 For instance, with respect to 
claims concerning the right to property the ECtHR has called for States to implement a property 
right,32 to ‘secure effective and rapid right to restitution,’33 and to ‘take general measures’ in 
order to effectively secure the right to compensation.34 And, with respect to complaints about 
excessive length of proceedings and lack of domestic remedy, the ECtHR has, for instance, 
repeatedly called for States to introduce ‘effective remedies’ in respect of length of criminal 
proceedings. So, whilst the cases relate to specific States, the general guidance offered by the 
ECtHR is not State specific – it is about ensuring a standard across Member States (and 
increasingly dialogue with them).  
  It is, therefore, the general rule, rather than the particularities of the case/s, that the 
ECtHR seems to focus on in pilot judgments. This contrasts with Article 9 jurisprudence which is 
very fact specific, and in which the ECtHR usually refrains from making generalisations in 
respect the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion. It must be noted that there have 
not yet been any pilot judgments in relation to Article 9, however, if there were to be, it is likely 
that they would concern complaints concerning endemic issues where the specific facts of 
individual cases would not be that important, such as complaints concerning refusals to register 
(or re-register) certain religious communities in Eastern European States. Indeed, a good example 
of a very ‘general’ complaint which might indicate what one would expect from an Article 9 pilot 
judgment is Cyprus v Turkey which concerned Greek Cypriots living in Northern Cyprus. 35 The 
 
29 Council of Europe, ‘European Court of Human Rights Factsheet: Pilot Judgments’ (January 2019) 
<https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/FS_Pilot_judgments_ENG.pdf> accessed January 2019. 
30 Ibid. See also, Costas Paraskeva, ‘Human Rights Protection Begins and Ends at Home: The “Pilot Judgment 
Procedure” Developed by the European Court of Human Rights’ (University of Nottingham, 2006) 
<https://www.nottingham.ac.uk/hrlc/documents/publications/hrlcommentary2007/pilotjudgmentprocedure.pdf> 
accessed January 2019. 
31 Council of Europe, ‘European Court of Human Rights Factsheet: Pilot Judgments’ (January 2019) 
<https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/FS_Pilot_judgments_ENG.pdf> accessed January 2019. 
32 Following one application, the ECtHR found that 80,000 people were in the same situation in Broniowski v 
Poland ECHR 2004-V 1. 
33 Maria Atanasiu and Others v Romania App no 30767/05 33800/06 (ECtHR, 12 October 2010).  
34 Manushaqe Puto and Others v Albania App nos 604/07 34770/09 43628/07 and 1 other (ECtHR, 31 July 
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ECtHR focused heavily on the ‘general context’ and in the Article 9 assessment, the ECtHR 
found that the restrictions on the freedom of movement placed on that population limited their 
right to manifest their religion and constituted a violation of Article 9.36  
 
B. Broader Contextual Factors: Legitimate Considerations  
This thesis argues that the ECtHR balances factors indicating a violation (primarily, but not only, 
forum internum relevance) with countervailing factors indicating no violation, in order to reach 
its decision in Article 9 cases. This, it is argued, shapes the Article 9 analysis from the outset, 
filtering through the assessment, whether explicitly or implicitly, to the outcome.  
The ECtHR has emphasised that it can take into account any point or law or fact which 
arises out of the proceedings.37 Indeed, in respect of the consideration of law, Judge Rozakis, has 
recently emphasised that ‘the judges of Strasbourg do not operate in the splendid isolation of an 
ivory tower built with material originating solely from the ECHR’s interpretative inventions or 
those of the States party to the Convention.’38 Indeed, it is a ‘cardinal principle’ that the ECHR is 
a ‘living instrument’ which must be interpreted in light of ‘present day conditions’ in accordance 
with developments in international law.39 
 A detailed examination of the myriad of factors which the ECtHR takes into account, or 
which could legitimately be taken into account by the ECtHR, in the balance, is beyond the scope 
of this thesis. Specifically, such an examination would address a very different question to the 
questions that this thesis addresses. However, at this stage it is useful to briefly consider three 
broad cultural, social and political factors that one would expect to see the ECtHR consistently 
giving weight to when carrying out the balancing exercise in Article 9 cases, namely, i) the 
religious landscape of Europe, ii) constitutional arrangements of Member States and iii) 
contemporary concerns and values of Member States. 
 
i. The Religious Landscape in Europe  
It seems straightforward that in addressing complaints about State interference with the right to 
freedom of thought, conscience and religion that the ECtHR should take into account the 
religious landscape of Europe in order to place a particular complaint, in a particular Member 
State, against a broader background. As noted in the introduction, contrary to the secularisation 
 
36 Ibid., paras 241-247. 
37 Philis v Greece (1991) Series A no 209, para 56. 
38 Christos L Rozakis, ‘The European Jude as a Comparatist’ (2005) 80 Tulane Law Review 257, 278.  
39 Paulo Pinto de Alberquerque, ‘Is the ECtHR Facing an Existential Crisis?’ (Mansfield College, University of 
Oxford 28 April 2017) <https://www.law.ox.ac.uk/sites/files/oxlaw/pinto_opening_presentation_2017.pdf> 
accessed January 2019. See also Tyrer v The United Kingdom (1978) Series A no 26, para. 31; Bayatyan v 




thesis, there has not been a decline in religious observance. In Europe, religion has not been 
rejected, rather there has been a solidifying of religious observance and in many States, a marked 
increase in it.40 Paradoxically, at the same time, there has been a significant growth in numbers of 
atheists and agnostics. Whilst, on the one hand, many religious adherents support and call for 
religion in the political sphere,41 there are increasing calls for the public sphere, including 
politics, to be ‘purged’ of religion.42 As such the relationship between religion and the State has 
become a really contested area. 
 This social and cultural trend is reflected in the Article 9 jurisprudence. There has been a 
significant shift, particularly over the last decade, in respect of the type of applicant bringing 
complaints under Article 9 before the ECtHR. For many years the ECtHR addressed complaints 
under Article 9 made by individuals who sought to justify behaviour which challenged the status 
quo or to access special treatment by appealing to their religion or belief and the ECtHR rarely 
found a violation of Article 9 in such cases. For instance, it was common to see cases in which 
prisoners attempted to ameliorate their situation by appealing inter alia to Article 9 rights.43 Also, 
many of the earlier ECtHR cases featured applicants who were members of New Religious 
Movements (NRMs) including Druids,44 Wiccans45, Scientologists46 and Moonies47 and others48 
which were not often, at the material time, accepted as a religion or belief under domestic law (or 
even by the ECtHR) and they sought to access protection under Article 9. As the scope of 
‘religion or belief’ under Article 9 has expanded to cover a broad spectrum of world views and 
types of manifestation, in recent years, cases concerning atypical behaviour or ‘fringe’ 
movements have tended to fade into the background.  
 
40 Karl-Heinz Ladeur and Ino Augsberg, ‘The Myth of the Neutral State and the Individualization of Religion: 
The Relationship between State and Religion in the Face of Fundamentalism’ (2007) 8 German Law Journal 
143, 143.  
41 See e.g., Roger Trigg, ‘Religion in the Public Forum’ (2011) 13:3 Ecclesiastical Law Journal 274.  
42 See e.g., Denise Meyerson, ‘Why Religion Belongs in the Private Sphere, not the Public Square’ in Peter 
Cane, Carolyn Evans and Zoe Robinson (eds) Law and Religion in Theoretical and Historical Context (CUP 
2008). For discussion of the notion of ‘freedom from religion’ see, Heiner Bielefeldt, ‘Misperceptions of 
Freedom of Religion or Belief’ (2013) 35 Human Rights Quarterly 33, 49-50.  
43 X v Germany (1966) 22 Collection 1; X v Federal Republic of Germany (1970) 37 Collection 119; X v 
Federal Republic of Germany (1972) 40 Collection 25; McFeely and Others v The United Kingdom (1980) 20 
DR 44; X v The United Kingdom (1982) 28 DR 5; X v The United Kingdom (1974) 1 DR 41; X v The United 
Kingdom (1976) 5 DR 100; Natoli v Italy App no 26161/95 (Commission Decision, 15 May 1998); Kuznetsov v 
Ukraine App no 39042/97 (Commission Decision, 20 October 1998); Chester v The United Kingdom App no 
14747/89 (Commission Decision, 1 October 1990). 
44 Chappell v The United Kingdom (1987) 53 DR 241; Pendragon v The United Kingdom App no 31416/96 
(Commission Decision, 19 October 1998). 
45 X v The United Kingdom (1977) 11 DR 55.  
46 X and Church of Scientology v Sweden (1979) 16 DR 68; Church of Scientology v Sweden (1980) 21 DR 10. 
47 X v Autria [sic] (1981) 26 DR 89; L’Association Spirituale Per L’Unificazione Del Mondo Cristiano v Italy 
App no 11574/85 (Commission Decision, 5 October 1987). 
48 Omkarananda and the Divine Light Zentrum v Switzerland (1981) 25 DR 105; L’Assocation ‘Sivananda de 




In terms of the more recent jurisprudence, it is much more common to see individuals 
from ‘traditional’ religions (including Muslims49 and Christians50) bringing Article 9 claims, and 
perhaps, most significantly, traditional religious organisations bringing claims under Article 9 
(such as the Jehovah’s Witnesses,51 the Orthodox Church52 and Muslim53 and Jewish 
communities54). Reflecting the global picture, religious persecution is also on the rise in Europe;55 
there has been a dramatic rise in violence against religious groups,56 bans on and dissolution of 
religious groups, confiscation and destruction of religious properties,57 interference with structure 
and autonomy of religious communities,58 disruption of religious meetings,59 refusals to recognise 
religious communities,60 and other oppressive measures actively preventing individuals from 
manifesting their religion or belief in community with others. Following the 2017 ban on 
Jehovah’s Witnesses in Russia, for instance, which ‘effectively criminalises peaceful worship of 
175,000 citizens’61 many Jehovah’s Witnesses have sought asylum in Finland on the grounds of 
religious persecution.62 And there is a marked rise in Islamophobia63 and anti-Semitism across 
 
49 Leyla Şahin v Turkey ECHR 2005-XI 173; Ahmet Arslan and Others v Turkey App no 41135/98 (ECtHR, 23 
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55 See Melissa Steffan, ‘European Union Expands Asylum for Religious Persecution’ Christianity Today (13 
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2018) <https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/christians-persecution-jeremy-hunt-foreign-secretary-
a8698446.html> accessed December 2018; New Europe Newsroom, ‘Religious Persecution is increasingly 
becoming a global crisis’ (11 March 2019) New Europe <https://www.neweurope.eu/article/religious-
persecution-is-increasingly-becoming-a-global-crisis/> accessed January 2019. 
56 See, e.g., Jehovah’s Witness of Moscow and Others v Russia App no 302/02 (ECtHR, 10 June 2010), para 94.   
57 Ibid.  
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ban-supreme-court-vladimir-putin-british-government-alarmed-criticism-a7696621.html> accessed December 
2017.  
62 Oliver Carroll, ‘Hundreds of Russian Jehovah’s Witnesses apply for asylum in Finland’ Independent (22 
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Europe.64  Puppinick suggests that there is a battle ‘raging throughout Europe, a ‘battle of cultural 
identity’.65 Given the influx of immigrants to Europe questions of identity have become pre-
eminent.66  
And, notably, there are also more and more claims being brought before the ECtHR by 
atheists and agnostics, particularly in respect of forced disclosure of religion or belief. This issue 
is no longer confined to historic inquisitions or to dystopian fiction;67 States are increasingly 
seeking to find out what individuals believe and/or are putting them into situations in which this 
can be plausibly deduced. Moreover, given advances in computing and neuroscience, it is likely 
that such issues might become even more problematic and widespread in the future.68 
The point is that Article 9 jurisprudence is now largely concerned with individuals or 
religious communities that are bringing quintessential complaints about State interferences with 
or limitations upon their rights under Article 9, and the seriousness of these complaints is 
reflected in the fact that the ECtHR frequently finds violations of Article 9. On the whole, cases 
are not ‘trivial’,69 despite what politicians or the mass media may suggest.70 That the ECtHR 
should take into account the significant changes with respect to the protection of freedom or 
religion or belief in Europe in its analysis of such complaints seems obvious.  
Moreover, and related to this, it seems that the changes in terms of the types of applicant 
complaining about violations of Article 9 and the different questions that arise as a result, should 
also be a legitimate consideration for the ECtHR.  Take for example the increasing number of 
cases brought by religious organisations under Article 9.71 Approaching such claims in the same 
way as claims about interference with an individual’s freedom of religion may not be entirely 
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appropriate given the facts. Firstly, it is not clear that religious organisations have freedom of 
conscience in the same way as individuals, especially if they are commercial enterprises.72 And, 
religious communities tend to appeal to different combinations of ECHR rights in their claims 
before the ECtHR. 73 Whilst individuals often make claims under Article 9 in conjunction with 
Article 8 or Article 2 of Protocol 1, complaints under Article 9 by religious communities are often 
brought in conjunction with Article 11, Article 1 of Protocol 1 or Article 10.74 This brings 
additional considerations into the mix. In particular, in complaints concerning religious 
organisations it seems the ECtHR should consider much wider questions about the place of 
religion in society, not just the specific facts of the case in hand.75 This leads to the next point.  
 
ii. Constitutional Arrangements of Member States 
It also appears straightforward that the ECtHR should take into account the constitutional 
arrangement of the Members States in question in its analysis of Article 9 complaints. As Doe has 
pointed out, there are many different church-state arrangements or models across Member States 
in Europe.76 The relationship between the religion and the State has numerous different 
dimensions77 and the State’s attitude towards religion is often reflected in the constitutional 
settlement.78   
Even when the constitution of the State in question is not directly relevant to the 
complaint under Article 9, it remains relevant to some degree in any consideration of Article 9 
because it reveals something about the attitude of the State towards religion or belief in general. 
For instance, there are often significant differences between the attitude towards the exercise of 
the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion in ‘secular’ States and those with a clear 
State Church. That the ECtHR should take this into account seem obvious because it may 
significantly affect what it means to protect freedom of religion or belief for a particular 
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applicant, in a particular context. This is closely linked to the next point regarding contemporary 
concerns and values in Member States.  
  
iii. Contemporary Concerns and Values in Member States 
It also seems that the ECtHR should take into account contemporary concerns and values of 
Member States in its analysis of Article 9 claims. However, whilst one would expect the ECtHR 
to consider national norms, given the significant cultural and historical differences in Member 
States, it is important for the ECtHR to ascertain whether a measure in question reflects genuine 
concerns on the part of the State or reflects the pursuit of oppressive measures. 
This is particularly evident in the area of legal regulation of religion. In recent years, 
religious association laws have been increasingly passed in order to control and restrict the 
activities, and sometimes even the existence, of religious organisations rather than to enhance 
their freedom.79 Indeed, the legal recognition of a religious community by a State through 
registration laws can have a particularly negative effect of minority communities whose practices 
are not always well understood by the State in question. That the ECtHR should take into account 
this broader background to ascertain whether a limitation in a case in question is legitimate, 
seems natural and indeed appropriate.  
It is also necessary for the ECtHR to take a cautious approach to claims of national 
security, particularly in response to heightened concern about safety in relation to terrorism. The 
protection of national security is explicitly excluded from Article 9.2, but States often advance 
such arguments under the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. Whilst the ECtHR 
should take into account the national setting, it also seems important that the ECtHR should 
carefully scrutinise the evidence to support the interference so concerns about extremism are not 
used as a vehicle for oppression of, or discrimination against, minority religions, especially 
Muslims, 80 or Jehovah’s Witnesses,81 which are often perceived to be a ‘threat’.  
The same goes for the ECtHR’s consideration of values or policy arguments. Whilst it 
seems that the ECtHR should take this into account in any Article 9 assessment, the ECtHR 
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should be cautious about the weight it decides to give to such factors. Societal values, such as the 
notion of le vivre ensemble, can be vague and, as the ECtHR has pointed out, are at ‘risk of 
abuse’.82 Again, appeals to social values, or policy arguments, can again be part of an oppressive 
or discriminatory agenda on the part of the State. For instance, whilst States may claim that the 
disclosure of religion or belief of citizens is necessary for policy reasons, such as the organisation 
of religious education in schools, it could also function as a means of control of discrimination. 
So, what may seem like an appropriate way of safeguarding freedom of religion in one State may 
not be an appropriate way of safeguarding in another, where there are different concerns and 
values. By paying close attention to the facts in Article 9 complaints the ECtHR can tailor the 
protection to the circumstances. This, however, may become increasingly difficult for the ECtHR 
in practice, given the recent developments concerning the role and future of the ECtHR. 
 
iv. Future Trajectory of the ECtHR: A ‘Closer Union’ with Member States?  
A common criticism of the ECtHR in general is that it interferes too much with the sovereignty of 
States, in other words, that it intrudes excessively into the domain of domestic courts and 
parliaments. For instance, the UK’s ex-Prime Minister, David Cameron, argued that the ECtHR 
did not ‘respect’ reasonable decisions made by domestic courts, and that the margin of 
appreciation afforded to States was too ‘slim’.83 In recent years, particularly during the UK 
government’s presidency of the Council of Europe in 2012, attempts have been made to address 
this perceived problem. Recent reforms of the ECtHR envisage an even closer relationship 
between the ECtHR and Member States through a greater emphasis on the principle of 
subsidiarity84 and margin of appreciation.   
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Both the Brighton Declaration85 and the Copenhagen Declaration86 on the reform of the 
ECtHR emphasise the role of domestic legal and political institutions in ensuring respect for 
ECHR rights. The Brighton Declaration encouraged the ECtHR to give ‘greater prominence to 
and consistently apply’ the principles of subsidiarity and the margin of appreciation in its 
judgments.87 Building upon calls for ‘a closer union’, it was decided at the conference to add a 
recital to the preamble of the ECHR explaining that in accordance with the principle of 
subsidiarity, Member States have the ‘primary responsibility’ for ensuring that rights in the  
ECHR and the Protocols can be enjoyed by citizens, and in doing so, they have a margin of 
appreciation which is subject to the supervisory jurisdiction of the ECtHR.88 The Copenhagen 
Declaration further emphasised the principle of subsidiary, explaining that it is intended to 
enhance rather than weaken human rights protection in Europe by underlining the responsibility 
domestic authorities have for ensuing the rights and freedoms in the ECHR. The role of the 
ECtHR, it explains, is to act as a ‘safeguard for violations that have not been remedied at the 
national level.’89 The ECtHR is to act as a ‘fail-safe’90 or an ‘ultimum remedium’.91 The principle 
of subsidiarity has been further strengthened through the Advisory Opinion procedure in Protocol 
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16, effective from 1 August 2018.92 According to Protocol 16 the highest court in Member States 
that are party to the Protocol can request non-binding advisory opinions from the ECtHR on 
questions of interpretation and application of the ECHR and its protocols, which have arisen out 
of cases that are pending before the domestic court.93 According to the preamble to Protocol 16, 
this procedure is intended to further enhance the ‘enhance the interaction’ between the ECtHR 
and domestic authorities, and in doing so, enhance the implementation of the ECHR.94  
The key point is that in these reforms the importance of knowledge of the local context is 
a leitmotif. Both the Brighton and Copenhagen Declarations, for instance, explain that national 
authorities are ‘in principle’ better placed to understand the local context than an international 
court95 (and by implication, better positioned to protect ECHR rights). And the Copenhagen 
Declaration reiterates the importance of context in its observation that, in respect of Articles 8-11, 
‘there may be a range of different but legitimate solutions’ which may be compatible with the 
ECHR ‘depending on the context.’96 
 The draft Copenhagen Declaration affirmed the importance of ensuring that ECHR rights 
are protected by State authorities at a national level ‘in accordance with their constitutional 
traditions and in light of national circumstances.’97 However, it is interesting to note that the 
ECtHR reacted to this statement in the draft text, on the grounds that it was ‘confusing’. The 
ECtHR explained that while it would take into account ‘constitutional traditions’ and ‘national 
circumstances’ in establishing whether a State has complied with the ECHR in a given case, it is 
‘ultimately’ for the ECtHR to make the decision whether State actions are compatible with the 
ECHR, as stated in the case law.98 This reveals that whilst the ECtHR will continue to take into 
account the specific facts (and perhaps place even more emphasis upon them), it remains 
committed to its supervisory function.  
 
 
92 Council of Europe, Protocol No 16 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms (12 October 2013) CETS No.214, para 2, 
<https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Protocol_16_ENG.pdf> accessed December 2018. 
93 Ibid.  
94 Ibid. 
95 This is recognised by the ECtHR, see e.g. İzzettin Doğan and Others v Turkey App no 62649/10 (ECtHR, 26 
April 2016), para 112. 
96 Council of Europe, ‘Copenhagen Declaration’ (12-13 April 2018) <https://rm.coe.int/copenhagen-
declaration/16807b915c> accessed January 2019, para 28. 
97Council of Europe, ‘Draft Copenhagen Declaration’ (5 February 2018) 
<https://menneskeret.dk/sites/menneskeret.dk/files/media/dokumenter/nyheder/draft_copenhagen_declaration_0
5.02.18.pdf> accessed January 2019, para 14.  
98 Council of Europe, ‘Opinion on the Draft Copenhagen Declaration’, (19 February 2018) 






This chapter draws together the findings from Part II, emphasising that Article 9 jurisprudence 
does not operate on the basis of a binary and hierarchical distinction between the absolute forum 
internum and the qualified forum externum but shows rather that the ECtHR takes a much more 
nuanced approach to Article 9 protection. For the ECtHR, the forum internum is always relevant, 
it is just that the extent of its relevance depends on the ECtHR’s consideration of the facts. 
However, whilst forum internum relevance is the most significant factor weighing in favour of the 
applicant, it is not the only factor which determines the outcome in Article 9 cases; the ECtHR 
balances factors indicating a violation (primarily, but not only, forum internum relevance) with 
countervailing factors indicating no violation, from the outset of its assessment, in order to reach 
its decision.  
For the ECtHR the key question in Article 9 complaints seems to be: what is the issue for 
the particular applicant, at the material time, in the particular context? And, what does it mean to 
protect freedom of religion or belief as a result? This approach means that the ECtHR takes into 
account important factual differences between and within Member States, and in doing so, makes 
rights relevant.  
 An examination of the broad cultural, social and political factors that the ECtHR could 
take into account in its consideration of the facts is beyond the scope of this thesis, however, it 
one would expect to see the ECtHR consistently giving weight to the religious landscape of 
Europe, constitutional arrangements of Member States and contemporary concerns and values of 
Member States. And, given the emphasis on knowledge of the local context stressed in the 
ongoing ECtHR reforms, it is likely that the facts, will continue to be relevant — and perhaps 






The purpose of this thesis was to explore the understanding of the right to freedom of thought, 
conscience and religion in Article 9 of the ECHR and the protection of this right by the ECtHR. 
More specifically, it sought to examine whether the orthodoxy in the literature — that there is a 
binary and hierarchical distinction between the forum internum and the forum externum in Article 
9 and that the understanding and application of this distinction by the ECtHR is undermining 
rather than enhancing the protection of the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion 
— stands up to scrutiny, or whether there is a better way of understanding Article 9 and the 
jurisprudence. Through a comprehensive doctrinal analysis of the text of ECHR Article 9, the 
related international instruments, the relevant travaux préparatoires and a detailed examination 
of all of the case law relating to Article 9 available in English and also in French, from the 1960s 
to the present day, this thesis has argued that there is very little support for the traditional 
approach to Article 9 in the literature and has, instead, offered a radical reappraisal of the 
understanding of Article 9 and Article 9 jurisprudence.   
The detailed examination of the way in which the right to freedom of thought, conscience 
and religion and the protection of this right by the ECtHR has been presented in the literature 
revealed that it is difficult to overemphasise the centrality of the forum internum and forum 
externum distinction in this material. For many years, commentators have claimed that there is a 
binary and hierarchical distinction between the absolute forum internum and the qualified forum 
externum in the architecture of freedom of religion or belief articles and that this is also a doctrine 
of the ECtHR. Crucially, there is widespread consensus that the correct application of the 
distinction is paramount for the protection of Article 9 rights in practice. Despite this, however, 
commentators have increasingly criticised the ECtHR’s understanding and application of the 
distinction, and the very existence of such a distinction in Article 9. In offering suggestions to 
address the problems they have identified commentators have been constrained by the perceived 
centrality of the forum internum and forum externum distinction and have sought to ‘tweak’ this 
rigid framework.  
The comprehensive and chronological analysis of the literature in this thesis revealed the 
interesting fact that, rather than being a feature of the literature on Article 9 from the outset, the 
distinction between the forum internum and forum externum has become increasingly central over 
time, notably, growing exponentially after the publication of C Evans’ seminal text.1 And, the 
increased use of the terms, and the emphasis on their distinctiveness, is largely the result of 
intertextual reliance rather than engagement with the case law; it is an idea that has become 
 




entrenched in the literature through superficial references, and repeated, unsupported assertions. 
And the same goes for early criticisms of the ECtHR; these criticisms have largely been built 
upon unquestioningly by later commentators, who have added a further conceptual critique of the 
binary and hierarchical forum internum and forum externum distinction. On the basis of this 
literature review alone, therefore, the accuracy of the presentation of the forum internum and 
forum externum distinction can be seriously called into question.  
The credibility of the claim that there is a clear binary and hierarchical distinction 
between the forum internum and the forum externum is further undermined through the 
examination of the way in which the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion is 
presented in the text of ECHR Article 9, related international instruments (including the UDHR, 
ICCPR and 1981 Declaration) and relevant travaux préparatoires. This primary material reveals 
that the forum internum and the forum externum aspects of the right to freedom of thought, 
conscience and religion are both important and deeply interrelated elements of this broad right 
and suggests it is more faithful to the text of Article 9 and the original intent of the drafters to 
speak of a forum internum and forum externum relationship. Indeed, any claims that there is a 
bright line distinction are textually unfounded.  
This understanding of the forum internum and forum externum in terms of a relationship 
is supported in the close textual analysis of the presentation of Article 9 in all of the case law, 
available in both English and in French from the 1960s to the present day. The presentation of 
Article 9 (in the general principles section of the case law) reveals that the forum internum and 
the forum externum are integral and deeply interrelated aspects of the right to freedom of thought, 
conscience and religion. The notion that a binary and hierarchical distinction between these rights 
is a ‘doctrine’ of the ECtHR is, therefore, jurisprudentially unfounded.  
 These findings called for a radical reappraisal of the understanding of Article 9. Building 
upon a recent, deeply valuable, interpretation of the forum internum and forum externum 
relationship in ICCPR Article 18 in the literature,2 this thesis argued ECHR Article 9, the relevant 
travaux préparatoires and the general principles in the case law, suggest that the forum internum 
and forum externum in Article 9 is also best understood in terms of a conceptual continuum, 
ranging from the forum internum to the forum externum. The notion of the conceptual continuum 
is more apt to encompass the complexities of the broad right to freedom of thought, conscience 
and religion, than the idea of a clear-cut forum internum and forum externum distinction because 
it recognises that the forum internum is always relevant in Article 9 complaints. The forum 
 
2 See Heiner Bielefeldt, Nazila Ghanea and Michael Wiener, Freedom of Religion or Belief: An International 




internum is always in play, even in cases concerning limitations on the right to manifest, because 
manifestations are intimately linked to, or flow from, the forum internum.  
Sanderson criticised C Evans for continuing to use the term forum internum despite 
pointing out ‘conceptual uncertainty and inconsistencies in its application,’ noting that she failed 
to offer ‘a stronger or more coherent conception’ in its place, or a ‘more accurate or unifying 
description of the concept itself’.3 The thesis argues that the terms forum internum and forum 
externum remain useful to the understanding of Article 9; the terms themselves are not 
problematic, what is problematic is the way in which they have been understood in the literature. 
 As a corollary of recognising the relationship between the forum internum and forum 
externum, and as a result of closely examining the language used to describe protection under 
Article 9, this thesis hypothesised that if the protection of Article 9 corresponds to the 
presentation of Article 9 by the ECtHR, one would expect protection to be more nuanced than the 
literature suggests. Rather than a bright line between ‘absolute’ and ‘qualified’ protection, one 
would expect protection under Article 9 to range from a very high degree of protection to a very 
low degree of protection. Where forum internum relevance is strongest and countervailing factors 
weakest, one would expect the highest degree of protection. Where forum internum relevance is 
weakest and countervailing factors strongest, one would expect the lowest degree of protection. 
Where forum internum relevance and countervailing factors are contested, one would expect to 
see protection ranging from the highest to lowest degree depending on the balance of factors.   
As such, a loose concentric circles model was proposed as a useful way of grouping the 
cases according to the ECtHR’s characterisation. Cases in which forum internum relevance is 
strongest and countervailing factors weakest fall into the innermost circle. Cases in which forum 
internum relevance is weakest and countervailing factors strongest fall into the outermost circle. 
Cases in which forum internum relevance and countervailing factors are both strong or cases in 
which forum internum relevance and countervailing factors are both weak fall into the contested 
middle circle. Whilst the ECtHR balances in cases concerning all Article 9 rights, cases in the 
middle circle are ‘harder’ cases (relatively speaking) than those which fall into the innermost and 
outermost circles because the balancing exercise is more difficult in those cases.   
 To test this hypothesis, this thesis conducted a detailed analysis of the application of the 
principles to the facts of the case in Article 9 complaints concerning a very wide variety of 
Article 9 rights (including the right to hold or change a religion or belief, the right to manifest a 
religion or belief, the right to conscientious objection, the right not to be forced to directly 
participate in a religion of which one is not a member and the right not to disclose a religion or 
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belief) and a wide variety of ‘types’ of cases (including cases relating to psychiatric treatment, 
religious education, dissolution of religious organisations, proselytism, religious clothing, 
conscientious objection to military service, church tax, oath taking and so on). This analysis, of 
the vast corpus of case law relating to Article 9 available in English and French from the 1960s to 
the present day, revealed the loose concentric circles model of protection is a better model for 
understanding Article 9 case law than the notion of a strict binary and hierarchical forum 
internum and forum externum distinction because it reflects the ECtHR’s nuanced approach to 
Article 9 protection. Importantly, the loose concentric circles model shows that there are some 
clear patterns in the jurisprudence. Where the ECtHR considers forum internum relevance to be 
strongest and countervailing factors weakest, it offers a very high degree of protection under 
Article 9. Where the ECtHR considers forum internum relevance to be weakest and 
countervailing factors strongest, it offers a low degree of protection under Article 9. Where the 
ECtHR considers the relevance of countervailing factors to be contested, if offers protection 
ranging from a high to low degree depending on the balance of factors. 
This is a significant conclusion. Article 9 jurisprudence is driven by the ECtHR balancing 
factors indicating a violation of Article 9 (primarily, but not only, forum internum relevance) with 
countervailing factors indicating no violation, from the outset of the assessment. This is a very 
different way of understanding Article 9 jurisprudence. Rather than asking whether the complaint 
at issue is a forum internum or forum externum complaint, and deploying an approaching 
accordingly, the ECtHR seems to take a much more nuanced approach. The key question for the 
ECtHR seems to be: what was the issue for this particular applicant, in that particular context, at 
the relevant time? And, given this, what does it mean to protect the right to freedom of thought, 
conscience and religion for that particular applicant, in that particular context at the relevant 
time? This is a much more rights-focused rather than a mechanical approach to Article 9. 
Importantly, it explains why the ECtHR reaches different decisions in cases of a similar ‘type’. If 
the ECtHR considers that there are significant differences in the facts, the ECtHR’s approach to 
the complaint and the outcome it reaches may also be different.  
A key point about the analysis in this thesis is that it grapples with the implications of the 
forum internum and forum externum relationship not only being a feature of the text of Article 9 
and the related travaux préparatoires but a feature of Article 9 jurisprudence too. It does not, 
after recognising the textual relationship between the forum internum and forum externum, retreat 
to the traditional position that a strict dichotomy between the ‘absolute’ forum internum and the 
‘qualified’ forum externum must be maintained in order to protect Article 9 rights in practice. It 
recognises that the ECtHR appreciates the relationship between the forum internum and forum 




 This reconceptualisation of the place of the forum internum and forum externum in ECHR 
Article 9 and Article 9 jurisprudence has significant corollaries. Notably, it reveals that many of 
the criticisms of Article 9 and the protection of this right in the literature which are based 
specifically on the notion of a binary and hierarchical distinction between the forum internum and 
forum externum are potentially mistaken because they are the result of viewing Article 9 and the 
case law through an inappropriate framework. Just because the jurisprudence does not fit the 
rigid, binary and hierarchical forum internum and forum externum framework, largely set up in 
the literature, does not mean the ECtHR is getting the approach to, and decisions in, Article 9 
cases, ‘wrong’. Article 9 jurisprudence is considerably more fluid than recognised in the 
literature. Importantly, the ECtHR appreciates the interrelationship between the forum internum 
and the forum externum, and this is reflected in the protection of Article 9 rights. It is misleading 
to continue to criticise the ECtHR for ‘ignoring’ the forum internum implications in complaints 
concerning the forum externum. It is also misleading to continue to criticise the ECtHR for failing 
to precisely delineate which rights fall into the forum internum and the forum externum and/or for 
‘confusing’ the distinction between the absolute forum internum and the qualified forum 
externum.  There is not a bright line between the forum internum and the forum externum in 
Article 9 jurisprudence; for the ECtHR, the forum internum is always relevant in Article 9 cases, 
it is just that the extent of its relevance depends on the ECtHR’s consideration of the facts.  
 Added to this, it is also harmful to criticise the ECHR Article 9 and the jurisprudence on 
the grounds that it reflects a Western Christian model of religion or belief, and as a result is 
biased towards orthodoxy and against orthopraxy. This is because this kind of criticism feeds into 
general criticism of the ECtHR that it is a Western instrument, biased against non-Western 
values, and thus, contributes to the undermining of the universality of human rights.4 Article 9 
protects various rights including the rights to hold, change and manifest a religion or belief. This 
thesis has argued that the holding of a religion or belief is not considered to be superior to the 
manifestation of it; the ECtHR recognises that holding a belief and acting in accordance with it 
are both integral aspects of the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion and are 
interrelated because the forum externum flows from, or is ‘bound up’ with the forum internum.5 
 The findings in this thesis, therefore, have significant implications for the way in which 
Article 9 and the jurisprudence is understood by commentators. The current model in the 
literature is frustrating and constraining analysis of Article 9 jurisprudence. Criticisms about the 
inconsistency and incoherence of the jurisprudence, on the basis of a rigid forum internum and 
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Universality Debate’ in O’Dair R and Lewis A (eds) Law and Religion (OUP 2001) 205-226. 




forum externum distinction, detracts from the considerable contribution that the ECtHR has made 
to the protection of the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion since the 1960s. 
Given the ECtHR is already facing a ‘crisis of legitimacy’ as judgments are frequently criticised 
and their legitimacy often questioned by Members States, media and society in general,6 it would 
be wise to avoid such potentially misplaced criticisms.  
The corollary of demonstrating that the forum internum and the forum externum are 
understood as integral and interrelated aspects of Article 9 and that this is reflected in the nuanced 
approach in the jurisprudence, is that commentary should move away from a narrow focus on the 
jurisprudential purity of the application of the forum internum and forum externum distinction 
(largely in isolation from the facts) and towards the more important question; is the ECtHR 
effectively implementing the ECHR right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion? In 
other words, it could potentially lead to an increased focus on the cogency of Article 9 cases. It 
must be emphasised that where decisions are not clear, logical and convincing, they should 
rightly be criticised.7 But, the jurisprudence should be criticised on its own terms, not on the basis 
of its adherence to a binary and hierarchical framework largely perpetuated in the literature. 
 Additionally, these findings — particularly those concerning the driving force in Article 9 
jurisprudence — also have implications for the way in which legal practitioners acting for 
applicants, frame Article 9 complaints (and for the way in which governments respond to such 
complaints). The notion of a strict distinction between the forum internum and the forum 
externum is increasingly becoming a feature of practitioner material.8 However, this thesis argues 
that such a distinction is not founded textually or jurisprudentially. The forum internum is always 
relevant in Article 9 complaints, it is just relevant to a greater or lesser extent depending on the 
ECtHR’s consideration of the facts. This means that practitioners do not need to frame Article 9 
complaints either as complaints engaging the forum internum or the forum externum but can take 
a more nuanced approach. What seems to be really key is to show the extent to which the forum 
internum is engaged on the facts because where the ECtHR considers forum internum relevance 
to be strongest and countervailing factors to be weakest, it offers the very highest degree of 
protection. So, if the State actions in question have affected an applicant’s forum internum, then it 
is essential that practitioners make this clear. 
 
6 Given the ECtHR is already facing a ‘crisis of legitimacy’ as judgments are fiercely criticised and their 
legitimacy is repeatedly questioned by Members States, media and society in general, it would be wise to avoid 
such potentially misplaced criticisms, see Kanstantsin Dzehtsiarou and Alan Greene, ‘Legitimacy and the future 
of the European Court of Human Rights: Critical Perspectives from Academia and Practitioners’ (2011) 12:10 
German Law Journal 1707, 1707. 
7 Indeed, the ECtHR has itself emphasised the importance of consistency in terms of the interpretation and 
application of the ECHR, see Chapman v United Kingdom ECHR 2001-I 41, para 70. 




Furthermore, these findings also have implications for judges, both at the domestic level 
and at the ECtHR in terms of the interpretation and application of Article 9. Future judges are not 
only being shaped by the ECtHR’s jurisprudence but also by academic commentary on Article 9. 
Given that the literature is not, as this thesis argues, an accurate reflection of what the ECtHR has 
done and what it continues to do in relation to Article 9, this is potentially damaging to the 
protection of this right at the ECtHR. Indeed, judges often disagree over the interpretation of 
Article 9, particularly in dissenting opinions.9 If there were a general understanding that the 
forum internum and the forum externum are deeply interrelated elements, and that as such, the 
forum internum is always relevant in Article 9 complaints, to a greater or lesser extent depending 
on the facts, perhaps there would be less disagreement on this architectural point.   
Overall, therefore, this thesis contends that this radical reconceptualisation of the place of 
the forum internum and the forum externum in ECHR Article 9 and the ECtHR jurisprudence 
advances the understanding of the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion and the 
protection of this right in practice.  
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